

Is Europe on the threshold of another transition?

MEPs of the Greens from a social networks perspective

National interests and the Common European Asylum System

German self-governance. Changes in reunified Germany

Climate protection in the German energy transition

The human right to a clean environment in Poland

Central and Eastern Europe in the global international order

Multiculturalism in borderlands in the covid-19 pandemic

A critical view of the uncritical Stalin Museum

Wilsonianism and its legacy in the US international strategy

The work of Kazimierz Papée in the Free City of Danzig

The struggle to incorporate Greater Poland into Poland in history textbooks

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Special Issue



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Is Europe on the threshold of another transition?

Dear *Przegląd Zachodni* Reader,

Europe's history and present day, the turbulent and dynamic relations of the neighboring Poland and Germany, and the anticipated global international order have for years been the subject of scientific articles, reviews, and analyses published in this journal of the Institute for Western Affairs. Our latest special English-language edition perfectly reflects the cross-sectional nature of the periodical.

The reader's attention will likely be drawn to the theme of European Union policies. It shows how national interests expressed by voters escalate to influence the decisions taken in plenary halls and staff offices in Brussels and Strasbourg. The EU's responses to current challenges are therefore more of a sum total of national egoisms than they are a policy line posing a threat of a European "superstate" alienating itself from its constituent countries.

Other issues shift the journal's focus to the Polish-German neighborhood and the domestic affairs of the countries on both sides of the Odra River. With the benefit of hindsight, the authors recapitulate the experience of political and social transformation and outline new contexts that significantly affect current decisions. The energy transition and natural resource protection have for years been identified as requiring attention and adequate action. The aftermaths of today's events will undoubtedly make them a high priority. The assertion that crises drive constructive transformations and enable people to appreciate the advances that have already been made is best illustrated by inspecting cities on the Polish-German border during the recent pandemic.

The current issue of *Przegląd Zachodni* closes with articles dealing with the history of the last century seen through the lens of the present day. *Magistra vitae* may take the form of an uncritical commemoration of a bloody dictator or convey a positive message taken out of history textbooks, which are synthetic by their very nature. It can also guide the global strategies of big-time politics that affect the lives of us all.

The articles selected for this special issue of *Przegląd Zachodni* were originally published in Polish in the various editions of the quarterly in 2020.

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MEPs OF THE GREENS AND GREENS/EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE IN 1989–2019 FROM A SOCIAL NETWORKS PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is twofold. Firstly, it is to present the origin and evolution of the organisational structures of the green movement, especially the results in elections to the European Parliament (EP) of those parties whose representatives were members of the Greens and Greens/European Free Alliance groups between 1989 and 2020, and to discuss their party platform.

The second objective is to analyse the structure of the Greens and the Greens/EFA during this period. The study was based on the methodological principles of social network analysis (SNA), which is one of the quantitative methods of social research (Batorski, Zdziarski 2009: 157). Network analysis is based on the mathematical foundations of graph theory, statistics, probability theory and matrix algebra (Faust, Wasserman 2007: 15). A characteristic feature of SNA is that it does not focus so much on the individual attributes of actors as on the relations (“ties”) between them, viewed in terms of the capabilities and limitations resulting from those relations (Wellman 1988: 20). The use of social network analysis enables the creation of an “information map” (in the form of graphs) of the groups discussed, an identification of potential leaders and central figures in a given group, and a statistical presentation of the entire structure or its parts (Kadushin 2012: 6–12). The analysis focuses on the entire structure based on the affiliation of individual MEPs to the Greens in 1989–2020,¹ where persons sitting in the same group in a given parliamentary term are considered to form a tie. These ties will build a network consisting of selected people who have served as MEPs over a period of

¹ Therefore, the EP terms 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are included in the study. For the first six, we use data for the end of the term – this ensures that we take into account those members sufficiently committed that they remained to the end of the term. For term 9, we consider its beginning (July 2019); this is because this term had not ended when the study began, and thus no other assumption seemed plausible.

almost thirty years, which will provide new insight into the group in question. The year 1989 was adopted as the starting point for the study, because this was the time that the first Green faction in the European Parliament was formed. The part of the analysis that focuses on the most central figures in the network will also consider the state of affairs following the UK's exit from the European Union.

The use of selected SNA algorithms made it possible to identify characteristic features of the entire network relating to its coherence across the parliamentary terms studied, and to isolate subgroups consisting of individuals who were more strongly connected. Centrality measures will enable the identification of MEPs having a special position in the structure, which provides evidence of their prestige and ability to take on a leading role. The following hypotheses were tested using the SNA algorithms:

- H1 – German MEPs hold the most important positions in the structure, as a result of the fact that they are the largest national subgroup in the successive groups co-founded by the Greens (Greens/EFA);
- H2 – the position of British MEPs in the network is not significant, because there were only a few of them throughout the period considered.

THE GREENS AND THE GREENS/EFA GROUP: ELECTORAL RESULTS AND POLITICAL AGENDA

The genesis of environmental groups can be traced back to the 1970s, when social activists representing Germany, France and Switzerland launched an anti-nuclear movement called ECOROPA. Before the first general elections to the European Parliament in June 1979, the organisation prepared a policy manifesto constituting a policy platform. In July 1979, following organisational transformations, PEACE – Platform for Ecological and Political Actions for Peaceful Change in Europe – was founded. It should be noted, however, that environmental activists failed to win seats in their first elections in 1979 for a variety of reasons, the key one being an internal dispute over the adopted strategy for political actions: whether to follow a parliamentary path or a more traditional one characteristic of social movements contesting the existing socio-political reality (Tosiek, Wicha 2006: 54). Environmental groups are a key element of so-called post-industrial social change, associated with the improvement of living conditions in highly developed countries and the increased importance of post-material values, including environmental concerns, clean air, clean water, etc. The institutionalisation of these groups began in the 1970s and proceeded in quite different ways in Western European countries (Richardson 1995: 3–16). In Germany, the environmental movement was a response to the inept actions of the state administration in protecting the natural environment. Among the most significant were social actions against the construction of nuclear power plants and plants for the disposal of radioactive waste. The attempts of local communities to influence urban development projects relating to the construction of expressways, airports and burdensome factories were also of great importance (Mirska 2004: 133).

The origins of factions in the EP can be traced back to 1952 and the functioning of the then Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This was the first such body to enable MEPs to form political groups (Kosowska-Gąstoł 2014: 76). The next stage was the formation of political groups in the European Parliament (Wojtaszczyk 1998: 172; Brack, Kelbel 2016: 217). The very beginning of the environmental group can be linked to the Rainbow Group, formed in 1984 as a coalition of the Greens, regionalists and other left-wing parties, which collapsed in 1989 (and disappeared from the EP in 1994) (Müller-Rommel 2002: 17–18). The Greens in the European Parliament constituted one of the political groups in the third and fourth parliamentary terms, which was active between 1989 and 1999 and represented environmental groups. The chairs of the group were in turn: Maria Amélia Santos (1989–1990; did not remain in the group to the end of the EP term), Maria Adelaide Aglietta (1990–1994), Alexander Langer (1990, 1994–1995), Paul Lannoye (1990–1994), Claudia Roth (1994–1998), and Magda Aelvoet (1997–1999) (European Parliament, A).

The group was formed on 25 July 1989 after the inauguration of the third term of the European Parliament. Thirty MEPs joined the group at the beginning of the term. It was also formed in the Parliament's fourth term, when it consisted of 22 MEPs. The faction was active until the end of the term in spring 1999 (Bomberg 1998: 113). In the next term, the environmental groups returned to the idea of forming a coalition with regionalists, which resulted in the establishment of a group known as the Greens/European Free Alliance.

The European Green movement operates on four basic levels. First, the European Green Party (EGP), composed of both political parties and individual MEPs, operates at the supranational level. Second, the members of the Green Group in the European Parliament (GGEP) constitute a group co-founding an alliance with the European Free Alliance (EFA) in the EP within the joint political faction known as the Greens/European Free Alliance (GEFA). This group is independent of the EGP; however, due to the participation of the GGEP members in the EGP structure, their networks overlap. Third, the institutional structure of the movement provides for the operation of the Federation of Young European Greens (FYEG), which brings together youth organisations from European countries. Finally, there is the Green European Foundation (GEF) at European level, which is an example of a think tank associated with a political party. The organisation of the European Greens is part of the Greens' structure at a global level (Ziętara 2017: 122).

In the EP term inaugurated in 1999, there were 46 MEPs of the Greens/European Free Alliance. This was the fourth largest parliamentary group after the European People's Party (EPP-ED), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The largest number of the group's MEPs was elected in France (9), followed by Belgium and Germany (7 each), the UK (6), Spain and the Netherlands (4 each), Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Italy (2 each), and Luxembourg (1) (European Parliament, B; Fontaine 2010: 620; Hix, Noury, Roland 2006: 496).

In the 2004 parliamentary term, the group had 41 MEPs, five fewer than previously. The largest number of the group's MEPs was from Germany (13), followed by France (6), the UK (5), Spain (5), Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy (2 each), and Latvia, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland (1 each). As the May elections took place after the EU's enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries, the weakness of environmental groups in that part of the continent cannot be overlooked. Of the eight post-communist countries, only Latvia returned a single Green MEP in 2004. Following the 2007 EP elections in Bulgaria and Romania, the group was enlarged by a representative from Romania (European Parliament, C; Fontaine 2010: 621).

In the 2009 parliamentary term, the Greens/European Free Alliance had 57 MEPs (data as of July 2009). It was thus the fifth largest parliamentary group, after the European People's Party, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Among the group's MEPs, the largest numbers were elected in France (15) and Germany (14 MEPs), followed by the UK (5), Belgium and Sweden (4 each), the Netherlands (3), Austria, Finland and Spain (2 each), and Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg and Portugal (1 each) (European Parliament, D).

In the next term, which began in 2014, the group saw a certain decline in its numbers, as its number of seats dropped from 57 to 50, placing it sixth following the European People's Party, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). The largest number of MEPs came from Germany (13), followed by France and the United Kingdom (6 each), Spain and Sweden (4 each), Austria (3), Belgium, Hungary and the Netherlands (2 each), and Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Finland and Slovenia (1 each) (European Parliament, E).

It is also worthwhile to analyse the EP election campaign that took place in May 2014 in the largest EU country, Germany, with the important proviso that the campaign was primarily dominated by German matters. It should be noted, however, that European issues occupied a prominent place on the agendas of political parties. Most of the major German political parties (including Alliance 90/The Greens) were in favour of increased democratisation of the European Union, based, among other things, on the granting to the European Parliament of the right of legislative initiative. The above premises considered, Alliance 90/The Greens and other parties – the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) – demanded that the role of the European Commission be reduced, and additionally, the CDU called for the direct election of the President of the European Commission by citizens, while the CSU, Die Linke and the FDP advocated the introduction of national referenda in the European Union. As to the banking union, the Greens as well as the CDU, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the FDP rated it positively. Both Alliance 90/The Greens and the SPD, Die Linke and the FDP supported the further enlargement of the European Union, advocating extensive

negotiations with Turkey with the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union with full membership rights. Virtually all major German parties adopted a pro-European stance in their programmes, with some major or minor reservations (Die Linke, CSU). The environmentalists were part of the mainstream of pro-European groups favouring further continuous intensification of integration processes (Kubiak 2014: 310).

Before the EP elections in 2014, Alliance 90/The Greens prepared a comprehensive 145-page electoral programme. In line with the origins and main objectives of the group, the major emphasis was placed on issues of ecology, development, and the protection of minorities. The programme also included an extensive chapter on the recovery of EU countries from the economic crisis that had begun in 2008 and affected the euro area in particular. One of the key demands of the Greens was to reduce the deficit of democracy in the Union by, among other things, strengthening the mechanisms of co-decision by EU citizens on European issues. Controversial points of this programme certainly included the proposal to turn the Union into a coherent space protecting refugees from outside the EU, by creating uniform and fair asylum rules. Another controversial proposal was to extend the electoral rights of EU citizens to all types of elections (and not just local and European Parliament elections, as is the case today) (Kosman 2014: 291).

The Greens called for greater transparency in lobbying of the EU institutions and agencies. An important institutional demand was to reduce the size of the European Commission and to increase the powers of the European Parliament by, among other things, granting it full legislative initiative. The Greens also proposed a European convention to discuss the future architecture of the EU. Issues relating to the Union's external relations were emphasised by progressive slogans concerning global justice, fighting poverty, disease, hunger and pollution, strengthening international law, human rights, taking up the global fight against environmental pollution, etc. Environmental activists believed that the European Union should play the role of a civil power (*Zivilmacht*), whose impact would be expressed through soft means rather than hard power. Among the flagship demands of the Greens were the self-taxation of EU countries for development aid to an amount of 0.7% of GDP, reduction of the poorest countries' debts, and the abolition of export subsidies in the EU agricultural policy. The Greens supported the continuation of the EU enlargement policy, which clearly distinguished them from the CDU/CSU and brought them closer to the SPD. This applied particularly to the Balkan states and Turkey; it was proposed that accession negotiations with Turkey should be continued despite its not currently meeting democratic standards. In their party document, the Greens emphasised the argument that had been made for earlier enlargements: that the prospect of joining the EU would provide the candidates with an important incentive for political, economic and social changes. Moreover, the Union should promote stability in its immediate – that is, Mediterranean and Eastern European – neighbourhood (Kosman 2014: 291).

In their policy documents, the Greens advocated sustainable development in Europe and social justice as their top political priorities. They supported democratic

changes in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. They emphasised the importance of such values as democracy, gender equality, and the right of all people to participate in public life and express their views. A central place in the documents is given to such issues as world security, which is understood as conflict prevention, elimination of the causes of wars, and the development of peaceful methods of resolving conflicts between both societies and states. Emphasis was also given to the importance of tolerance, equal rights for minorities and human rights for immigrants in both European and national politics (Sobolewska-Myślik 2004: 223).

In the 2019 parliamentary term, the Greens/European Free Alliance had 67 MEPs (data as of July 2020), which made it the fifth-largest group following the European People's Party, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Renew Europe, and Identity and Democracy (ID). The largest number of the group's MEPs was elected in Germany (25), followed by France (13), Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden (3 each), Denmark, Ireland, Spain and Lithuania (2 each), and Latvia, Luxembourg and Portugal (1 each) (European Parliament, F).

The most recent policy paper, entitled *Protéger notre avenir*, was announced in April 2020. Prepared after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it states that greater ambition, solidarity and cooperation are the key to building a new European model of social, economic and environmental resilience (Greens, A). The ideological stance of the Greens/European Free Alliance can also be determined by analysing how their MEPs voted in the European Parliament. Research carried out during the 6th, 7th and 8th parliamentary terms indicates that according to the traditional "left–right" division, the Greens/EFA alongside the GUE/NGL and S&D can be classified as left-wing groups. In the face of the growing importance of the division into pro-EU and anti-EU groups, it is important to note the evolution of the views of the group's MEPs regarding European integration. The voting patterns of the Greens/EFA in the 6th EP term indicated that the group should be classified among the Eurosceptics; in the next EP term, it was closer to the centre; while in 2014–2019 they could be considered a pro-EU group (alongside the Socialists, the Liberals and the EPL) (Hix, Noury, Roland 2019: 27).

Another factor that seems noteworthy is the cohesion of the group's voting, analysed using methods already widely used in the literature (Hix's cohesion index) and the newly introduced Index of Voting Cohesion (IVC). Based on analysis of voting patterns in the 6th EP term, Hix and Noury claim that the winning of seats by representatives of the states that joined the EU in 2004 did not alter the voting cohesion of the members of the Greens/EFA. In the sixth parliamentary term, they emerged as the second most cohesive group (following the S&D) (Hix, Noury 2009: 162). In the seventh term (2009–2014), mainstream political groups maintained a high level of cohesion (ranging from 0.903 to 0.774). The most cohesive political group was the Greens/EFA (0.903), followed by the EPP (0.850), S&D (0.840), and ALDE and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (0.781 and 0.774 respectively, but the difference is not statistically significant). Of these groups, only the Greens/EFA and the EPP attained increased cohesion compared with the sixth term (as well as the ECR, provided it is considered a successor to the Union for a Europe of the Nations,

although this is not clear). The level of cohesion of the radical parties was much lower (Stolicki 2015: 162).

Another characteristic of the Greens/EFA is a high participation rate in parliamentary votes. Figures for the last completed parliamentary term show that the group was second in terms of participation in votes (after the ALDE), although they also indicate that its representatives were least active in debates (VoteWatch, A; Laloux, Pennetreau 2019: 101).

The group is headed by two co-chairs: Ska Keller, a German MEP since 2009 who became co-chair in 2016, and Philippe Lamberts, a Belgian MEP since 2009 who was elected co-chair in 2014. The group also has seven vice-chairs. The Greens/EFA focus on both the environment and social justice – they want to fight climate change with green energy and to ensure human rights and equality for all. Two of the 14 vice-presidents of the European Parliament and two of the 20 chairs of parliamentary committees are members of the Greens/EFA (European Parliament, G).

CONDUCT OF THE ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF SNA

For the purpose of the analysis, UCInet and NetDraw software were used. Their use enabled calculation of the values of measures and preparation of a graphical representation of the network. The data on the co-sitting of MEPs from the analysed groups were taken from the official European Parliament website (European Parliament, H). This served as the basis for a table showing which of the 218 MEPs included in the survey sat in which EP term. The table was then converted into a square matrix of MxM type where the extreme columns and rows were proportionally filled with the names of the subjects forming the study population, and the resulting 47,524 cells showed MEPs who sat together in the analysed EP terms (or the absence of such a relation). The data format is supported by the UCInet software and enables analyses to be performed. Popular software used in research based on the SNA methodological principles also supports the use of other data formats (for example, the Siena, Pajek, Pnet and R software mentioned by Polish researchers; see Żukiewicz, Zielińska, Domagała 2018: 44).

Taking into account both network theories and the specific features of the studied population, attention should be paid to measures indicating those who, due to their strategic position in the network, can be expected to act as informal leaders across the entire dynamic, multi-term structure. The main measures determining the importance of individuals in the network, on the basis of which their potential for exercising power can be defined, are *degree*, *betweenness centrality*, *closeness centrality* and *eigenvector centrality*. The first measure is based on the assumption that an actor with the greatest number of ties to other actors is the most central node in the network (Faust, Wasserman 2007: 178). The degree can also be interpreted as an index showing one's activity in the network. However, in the case of a structure consisting of groups with a differing number of members and changing over a period of more than a decade, it gives only the most general picture of the number of ties. Due to the differences in the

size of the groups examined in successive terms, someone's position within the entire structure may be determined more by the ties that he or she had with MEPs serving at different times. Individuals with such characteristics can be considered a kind of link between groups formed in successive years. In this context, betweenness centrality, which indicates to what extent a given network actor "borrows" the mutual relations between different nodes in their closest possible tie – in other words, whether a given node provides an indirect connection, through two ties, between two other actors having no direct link – may provide the most information (Batorski, Zdziarski 2009: 165). The measure can be expressed by the following formula:

$$BC_k = \frac{\left(\sum_{i < j} \frac{g_{ikj}}{g_{ij}} \right)}{(N-1)(N-2)/2} \quad (i \neq j \neq k)$$

where BC_k is the betweenness centrality of node k , g_{ikj} is the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j passing through node k , g_{ij} is the number of shortest paths between nodes i and j , and N is the number of nodes in the network (Siudak 2015:124).

In this case, the values of betweenness for actors who are also in contact with people from other groups (in different parliamentary terms) will be much higher than for those who do not have such relations.

The closeness centrality measure enables us to find the node that is the closest to all others in the network. It indicates the possibility of influencing others, and determines independence and resistance to influence (Batorski, Zdziarski 2009: 165). The measure can be expressed by the following formula:

$$CC_i = \frac{N-1}{\sum_{j=1}^N l_{ij}} \quad j \neq i;$$

where CC_i is the closeness centrality, l_{ij} is the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j (geodesic distance), and N is the number of nodes in the network (Siudak 2015:124).

Considering the parameters of the analysed group, this measure can be well supplemented by the algorithm determining the eigenvector centrality. The value of the eigenvector for individual nodes increases when they have a direct relation with people who hold a key position in the network. In this way, they consolidate their position in the structure through fewer but better-quality relations. The measure can be expressed by the following formula:

$$e_i = \lambda \sum_{j=1}^N a_{ij} * e_j \quad (j \neq i);$$

where e_i is the eigenvector centrality of the analysed node i , λ is the constant of proportionality, and e_j is the eigenvector centrality of node j (Siudak 2015:125).

In scientific papers on SNA, published in both Polish and English, a variety of terms are used to define the basic components of the network. Terms such as, for ex-

ample, a node, an actor or an object are used for the entities that enter into relations. The elements that connect these entities are known as lines, relations, ties, or edges (see Batorski, Zdziarski 2009: 159; Żukiewicz, Zielińska, Domagała 2018: 42). In this paper, the members of the population being studied will be called nodes, and their connections will be referred to as ties or relations.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENTIRE NETWORK AND ITS SUB-NETWORKS

To present the structure of the network composed of MEPs belonging to the groups formed or co-formed by the Greens (the Greens/EFA), measures showing the characteristic features of the entire structure will be analysed. The network examined contains nondirectional relations that have values. This means that when a tie is taken to mean sitting in the same Greens (Greens/EFA) group in a given EP term, the initiator of the relation is not distinguished, which is possible in other types of network studies. The value of a tie, in the case under consideration, is its frequency – for instance, the same persons may have served as MEPs in several terms. The main characteristics of the structure, showing its continuity and cohesion, are given in Table 1.

Table 1

Measures of cohesion for the MEPs representing the Greens and Greens/EFA (1989–2019)

Measure	Result
Number of nodes	218
Number of ties	14996
Mean degree	66.789
Density	0.317
Components	1
Connection	1
Fragmentation	0
Closeness	0.749
Average distance	1.722
Network diameter	3

Source: author's analysis based on results returned by UCInet.

The network consists of 218 MEPs. The adoption of the above assumptions results in a dynamic picture of the structure of MEPs in 1989–2019,² which was formed

² The state of affairs after the May 2019 elections and before Brexit was taken into account; this is because the departure of several British MPs from the European Parliament had little impact on the structure created for a period of almost thirty years.


by 14,066 ties. The network has an average degree of ties amounting to 66.038. Assuming that having ties between all pairs of nodes would give 100%, the density of relations in the structure is 31.3%. The network consists of one component, which also ensures the completeness of at least indirect ties among nodes (index equal to 1), and related to this – no fragmentation. The average distance between nodes is small despite the fact that almost thirty years were taken into account; on average, people not connected to each other by co-sitting in the same term of the EP would need fewer than two intermediaries to come into contact. The greatest distance between people who could come into contact (without involving unnecessary intermediaries – the so-called network diameter) is three. These indices show the cohesion and significant degree of reproduction of the members of the analysed group, that is, the winning of seats in the EP in subsequent elections by a significant group of representatives of the studied population. A natural consequence of such a pattern is high network density. Based on the characteristics of the entire network, it can be assumed that the structure is not susceptible to decomposition or the formation of internal factions.

Out of the entire group of 218 MEPs, 155 sat in the EP only once, 31 twice, 23 three times, 6 four times and 3 five times. Taking the total number of MEPs in the previous term as 100%, 22.22% of MEPs from the analysed group sitting in the third EP term were re-elected for the fourth term, and the influx of new MEPs into the group was 77.78%. As many as 40% of the members of the Greens serving the fourth term won a seat in the elections held five years later. The group grew to 45 members,³ but due to high reproduction, the influx of new MEPs was slightly smaller and amounted to 75.6%. After the 2004 elections (the sixth EP term) the numerical strength of the group was comparable (43 members), but the reproduction rate from term to term again increased (44.4%). This resulted in a reduction in the level of co-optation to the parliamentary elite of the Greens/EFA, which amounted to 53.5%. Out of the MEPs in the analysed group sitting in the sixth EP term, 46.5% also represented the group in the seventh term. The number of MEPs in the group increased by 14 members, which resulted in a reproduction rate of 64.92%. In the eighth term, 42.1% had also sat in the EP at the end of the previous term, and the influx of new MEPs to the group amounted to 53.9%. In the ninth term, the reproduction rate was 36.5%, and 75.65% of the members were MEPs who had no experience from sitting in the EP between 2014 and 2019 (based on the profiles of MEPs representing all EP terms; European Parliament, A, 22 May 2020).

The density of the network means that it is difficult to form judgments about the structure of the MEPs in the study group based on the graphical image only, which is possible in the case of networks with lower density or a less regular number of ties. Therefore, in its graphical form, the network was reduced to those nodes that had three or more ties, eliminating persons with fewer relations and their ties. These steps can be regarded as an attempt to identify a sub-network of people especially related to each other. The structure based on the reduced number of ties discussed above is shown in Graph 1.

³ This part of the analysis considers the state of affairs at the end of the EP term, taking into account the possibility of leaving or joining the group during the term.

Graph 1

Sub-network created based on the strongest ties

Source: Author's analysis carried out using NetDraw.


The network built using three ties as the minimum number is made up of 31 MEPs. As can be seen, German MEPs (12 persons, marked with squares) and French MEPs (6 persons, marked with upward pointing triangles) make up the largest groups, but the position of the UK representatives (4 persons, marked with circles), who ceased to sit in the EP on 31 January 2020 due to the UK's leaving the EU, cannot be disregarded. In addition, the network included Belgian representatives (3 persons, marked with diamonds), Dutch MEPs (2 persons, marked with downward pointing triangles), and one representative each from Austria (Voggenhuber), Denmark (Auken), Luxembourg (Turmes) and Latvia (Ždanok), marked with an hourglass symbol. As to network cohesion, the main positions are held by Jill Evans representing the Welsh party Plaid Cymru, and Margrete Auken from the Socialist People's Party. The nodes corresponding to the MEPs mentioned above marked the cutpoints. According to graph theory, a cutpoint should be a person or persons whose removal from the network will cause the structure to be divided into two or more components (Faust, Wasserman 2007: 112). With respect to Jill Evans, this theoretical removal did indeed come about after the UK left the EU. This means that Margrete Auken is the only guarantor among the members of the study group that the network composed of strong contacts (sitting in the same group for at least three terms) will remain complete.

In Graph 1, thicker lines are used to indicate the ties created when individual MEPs served together in the same parliamentary group in four different parliamentary

terms. This assumption emphasises even further the position of the (now former) British MEPs. A separate network formed on this basis is shown in Graph 2.

Graph 2

The sub-network isolated based on the maximum value of ties (namely 4)




Source: Author's analysis carried out using NetDraw.

In the graph above, large square nodes indicate MEPs who are cutpoints in the strongest (in terms of the frequency of relations) sub-network. In this way, the roles of the German MEP Hiltrud Breyer and the Belgian politician Bart Staes are also highlighted. However, it is also noteworthy that the most closely connected part of the network is made up of a group of three MEPs from Great Britain (Jill Evans, Ian Hudghton, Jean Lambert) and Bart Staes. In the language of social network analysis, a group of people among whom all relations are mutual is called a clique. In the case under examination, taking into account the highest value of ties occurring in the network (4 EP terms), this was the strongest sub-network in the entire structure.

Graph 3

The sub-network isolated based on the maximum value of ties (namely 4) when the British MEPs had left the EP



Source: Author's analysis carried out using NetDraw.

The departure of the British MEPs from the EP led to changes in that part of the network in which the ties were the strongest. The role of Hiltrud Breyer, who is the

only link in the strong connection between Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf and Bart Staes, as well as between those MEPs and Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Elisabeth Schroedter, is now strengthened.

THE LEADERS' POSITION IN THE GROUP STRUCTURE WITH REFERENCE TO ALL TIES

The presentation of the tie structure for the MEPs from different EP terms using SNA enables the highlighting of their position within the entire structure. Such variables as degree, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector centrality, as defined earlier, were used. As to the degree measure, the value of the ties was not taken into account, but the presence or absence of ties was. This means that, for example, Jill Evans' ties indicate the number of ties to and from other actors, and any other tie with the same actor is ignored.⁴

The closeness centrality index, according to the measure adopted, "takes values from 0 to 1, where values close to 0 indicate a low position of the node in the network, whereas a value of 1 indicates a node with minimum distance to all other nodes in the network" (Siudak 2015: 124). Betweenness centrality is shown in its standardised form (n-betweenness), which "is calculated by dividing these measures by their maximum possible value, which enables the result to be expressed as a percentage (this is the percentage in which a given actor participates in particular relations)" (Swacha 2014: 19). After performing the calculations using UCInet software, the MEPs with the highest ten scores for each of the measures adopted were identified; they are compared in Tables 2, 3 and 4. As a result, a list of 21 names was compiled.

Table 2

Indices: degree and closeness of actors in the population examined (ten highest scores)

Name	Degree	Closeness
Evans Jill	185	0.871
Auken Margrete	160	0.792
Staes Bart	151	0.767
Ždanok Tatjana	144	0.748
Breyer Hiltrud	137	0.731
Eickhout Bas	137	0.731
Delli Karima	137	0.731
Häusling Martin	137	0.731
Rivasi Michèle	137	0.731

⁴ The value of the ties was the basis for isolating the sub-networks shown in Graphs 1 and 2.

Lamberts Philippe	137	0.731
Bütikofer Reinhard	137	0.731
Keller Ska	137	0.731
Giegold Sven	137	0.731
Jadot Yannick	137	0.731
Hautala Heidi	133	0.721
Lambert Jean	131	0.716
Hudghton Ian	131	0.716
Alfonsi François	121	0.693
Cohn-Bendit Daniel	120	0.691
Schroedter Elisabeth	120	0.691

Table 3

The n-betweenness index (ten highest scores)

Name	n-betweenness
Evans Jill	10.007
Staes Bart	7.789
Hautala Heidi	7.102
Breyer Hiltrud	4.990
Auken Margrete	3.493
Ždanok Tatjana	3.068
Lambert Jean	1.776
Hudghton Ian	1.776
Cohn-Bendit Daniel	1.775
Schroedter Elisabeth	1.775
Graefe zu Baringdorf Friedrich-Wilhelm	1.681
Jadot Yannick	1.111
Bütikofer Reinhard	1.111
Rivasi Michèle	1.111
Delli Karima	1.111
Eickhout Bas	1.111
Lamberts Philippe	1.111
Häusling Martin	1.111
Keller Ska	1.111
Giegold Sven	1.111

Source: Compiled by the author based on calculations performed in UCInet.

Table 4
The eigenvector index (ten highest scores)

Name	Eigenvector
Evans Jill	0.202
Auken Margrete	0.179
Staes Bart	0.155
Lambert Jean	0.149
Hudghton Ian	0.149
Eickhout Bas	0.149
Delli Karima	0.149
Häusling Martin	0.149
Rivasi Michèle	0.149
Lamberts Philippe	0.149
Bütikofer Reinhard	0.149
Keller Ska	0.149
Giegold Sven	0.149
Jadot Yannick	0.149
Ždanok Tatjana	0.133
Trüpel Helga	0.127
Smith Alyn	0.127
Cramer Michael	0.127
Harms Rebecca	0.127
Breyer Hiltrud	0.116
Cohn-Bendit Daniel	0.110
Schroedter Elisabeth	0.110
Hautala Heidi	0.108
Alfonsi François	0.103

Source: Compiled by the author based on calculations performed in UCInet.

The tables take into account the top ten scores yielded by the algorithms used, with the number of people varying due to identical results obtained by some of the respondents (the ranking of ten persons was also used in a section of a study relating to the structure of the Portuguese government; Moinz, Louçã, Oliveira, Soeiro 2016: 43). The measures of degree and closeness are given in one table (Table 2) because they led to the same ordering of the subjects, which further emphasises the need to use also the other two methods of identifying the central position of MEPs. In the case of the n-betweenness and eigenvector indices, the highest scores differ, and six MEPs (marked in bold in the table) appear in the groups with the highest ten

scores for particular measures only once. The results returned by the central measures enabled the creation of a ranking defining the most central people in the network. In this case, for obtaining a particular value of individual measures, a person was given a number of points equal to the place that their result took in the ranking (for example, Jill Evans heads all three tables – Tables 2, 3 and 4 – and therefore receives 3 points). On this basis, the following group leaders can be identified: J. Evans (3 points, UK), B. Staes (8 points, Belgium), M. Auken (9 points, Denmark), T. Ždanok (15 points, Latvia), H. Breyer (Germany), H. Hautala (Finland), J. Lambert (UK), I. Hudghton (UK) (18 points each), B. Eickhout (Netherlands), K. Delli (France), M. Häusling (Germany), M. Rivasi (France), P. Lamberts (Belgium), S. Keller (Germany), S. Giegold (Germany), Y. Jadot (France) (19 points each), D. Cohn-Bendit (sitting in the European Parliament in various terms, elected in both Germany and France) and E. Schroedter (Germany) (25 points each). As in the sub-network created by selecting members with the highest value of mutual ties, here we can see that the British MEPs held an important position, and their termination of service in the EP, parallel to the UK’s exit from the European Union, had a significant impact on the structure of the Greens/EFA group (J. Evans, J. Lambert, I. Hudghton). Six MEPs from the group selected by applying the network analysis measures were also members of the formal management of the group: B. Staes (1989–1999), H. Hautala (1999–2004), D. Cohn-Bendit (1999–2014), P. Lamberts (2014–2019, and since 2019), S. Keller (2014–2019, and since 2019), and B. Eickhout (since 2019) (European Parliament, H).

The three most central positions in the network identified by applying the algorithms mentioned earlier, with the potential to influence the major part of the Greens and the Greens/EFA in all EP terms, are held by (following the UK’s exit from the EU): a Belgian MEP (B. Staes), a Danish MEP (M. Auken) and a Latvian politician representing the Latvian Russian Union (T. Ždanok). The above results indicate that among the MEPs in the most central positions in the network structure there are no representatives of the Southern European countries (the group included members representing Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia and Croatia). However, there was no EP term in which there was no representative of one of the above-mentioned countries.

CONCLUSIONS

On comparing the research results to the hypotheses formulated at the outset, it should be concluded that the first and second hypotheses proved to be incorrect. Although German representatives of the Greens and Greens/EFA form the largest group in the sub-network of “strong ties”, and also based on the degree, closeness, eigenvector and n-betweenness indices, they do not hold the most central positions. The importance of German MEPs increases only when a sub-network is created based on the maximum value of relations (equal to 4). Bearing this in mind, it is worth emphasising the importance of Hiltrud Breyer, who is the central figure of such a group,

especially since the British MEPs have vacated their seats. If we also take into account other measures of centrality calculated for all members of the analysed group (degree, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector centrality), then only one German representative (H. Breyer) will be among the ten persons described as occupying the most central positions.

Both central measures not taking account of tie values (frequencies) and the analysis of the sub-network distinguished by focusing only on strong ties (with a number above 3) show how crucial was the position of British MEPs. British MEPs were at the very core of the network, with Jill Evans, Ian Hudghton and Jean Lambert occupying a strategically important place in the whole structure. These individuals were among the ten most central MEPs identified on the basis of the four SNA indices. In the sub-network based on the strongest ties, Evans, Hudghton and Lambert also act as links between German and Belgian MEPs and the Danish MEP. Their departure from the EP also meant that Margrete Auken was no longer a member of the group of MEPs with the strongest relations. From these data it is concluded that the second hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

It should be noted that the position occupied by the Greens/EFA in successive parliamentary terms was fairly stable in terms of their election results and agenda. It can be seen that the group's MEPs from the large EU countries such as Germany, France or Spain outnumber those representing new countries that joined the EU after May 2004. Taking that into consideration, it is important to stress the poor election results in the above-mentioned countries, mainly in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Their electoral platforms in successive elections, at both national and European level, should be regarded as fitting the model of concepts typical of Euro-enthusiast groups, namely those advocating progress in integration processes. Of course, environmental and healthy lifestyle issues occupy a significant place here, but there are also elements indicating a deficit of democracy within the EU institutions or the need for further enlargement of the EU to the Balkan states (mainly the post-Yugoslav countries and Turkey). The electoral programmes responded to the new challenges of European societies – the financial crisis of 2008 and the immigration crisis of 2015. The group's agenda in this regard should be considered closer to those found on the left of the political scene.

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ABSTRACT

The article presents an overview of the programmes and results in European Parliament elections of parties originating from the environmental movement, and analyses the structure of the Greens and Greens/EFA groups in the years 1989–2019. A study was conducted based on the methodological principles of social network analysis, which enabled a quantitative statistical analysis of the structure consisting of all representatives of the Greens and Greens/EFA groups. Two hypotheses were formulated: that the most prominent positions in the structure are held by German MEPs, due to their being the most numerous national subgroup of the successive groups created or co-created by the Greens; and that the position of British MEPs in the network is not significant because their number was low throughout the period examined. The results of the analysis indicated that neither hypothesis was confirmed.

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NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN REFORM OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM¹

The increased flow of migrants into the territories of EU member states in 2015 initiated discussions on the need to reform Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Despite oft repeated assurances by the European Commission, as well as declarations by member states expressing full support for necessary changes, the end of the reform process is not in sight. In the years 2016-18, the European Commission worked on and presented seven proposals for particular changes, which contrary to Commission expectations were not accepted by June 2018. The new commission headed by Ursula von der Leyen in March 2020 announced the presentation of new proposals for changes to the common asylum system.

The goal of this article is to demonstrate that while member states recognise the legitimacy of reforming the common asylum policy, the ever-lengthening work on getting new legal solutions accepted is caused – contrary to the declared necessity of creating a comprehensive model of protection for those forced to leave their place of residence and to search for protection in third countries – by the pursuit of securing particular interests. These are defined by member states primarily in terms of national interests. This article does not aim to present a detailed analysis of the proposed changes. References to projects of new legal solutions are general in nature and will be a point of departure for references to the argumentation of countries opposed to proposals put forth by the European Commission. Considerations will be made based on the assumptions of the neo-realistic approach which recognises states as the dominant participants in international relations, striving to secure their own interests. Despite the perception of interdependence and ongoing globalisation, neorealism underlines the necessity of pursuing national goals and undertaking actions directed at maximising power and influence as well as guaranteeing the survival and preservation of the state. Cooperation is valued by states as long as it guarantees the furtherance

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of their own interests and as long as costs do not exceed gains. To achieve the stated goal, methods characteristic to the social sciences, especially political science, will be applied.

THE REFORM PACKAGE PROPOSED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The first proposed reform of the common asylum policy was presented by the European Commission on 4 May 2016. The goal was to reform the Dublin Regulation, which outlines states responsible for examining asylum applications. It was precisely the ineffectiveness of this system that was fully revealed by the migration crisis in 2015. In accordance with the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation, the country responsible for examining an asylum application is first the EU member state in which family members of the applicant are residing. This category includes spouses, children and also parents or siblings of the person seeking protection. Only if this criteria cannot be applied is the state responsible for examining the application (*Regulation 2013*) the one:

- which has issued a visa or residence permit, and in the case of several such countries then a state which issued the document for the longest period of residency or that country which issued the document which expires on the latest date (art. 12.1, 12.3);
- where an irregular border crossing has taken place (art. 13.1), with the responsibility for examining the application expiring 12 months after the illegal entry;
- where a legal border crossing took place by an applicant covered by visa free movement (art. 14.1);
- in which the application was made in the transit area of an international airport (art. 15).

In a situation when it is not possible, according to the criteria listed above, to determine the responsible state, it is the state in which the application was made (art. 3.2).

Such solutions were an attempt to outline the principle of solidarity of member states in questions of asylum. The recognised goal was a just distribution of responsibilities, and at the same time the costs (not only financial) of accepting those applying for protection. The migration crisis of 2015 showed, however, that in a situation of a mass influx of irregular migrants, the first line countries, that is Greece and Italy, were obliged, in accordance with the solutions listed above, to examine almost all asylum applications, of which in 2015 alone, a total of 1,325,565 were submitted (*Annual Report 2018*: 223). The essence of the changes proposed by the European Commission in May of 2016 was then a “sustainable (and therefore just – A.P.) sharing of responsibility”, that is the distribution of persons applying for protection in migration crises between all member states and the “excessive strain” felt by some EU member states (cf. Proposal 2016: 3). The European Commission’s proposal foresaw the introduction of a correctional mechanism for the allocation of asylum applications (and consequently the transfer of people), which “would be activated automatically

in cases where Member States would have to deal with a disproportionate number of asylum seekers” (ibid. 4). An increased financial contribution was made an alternative for the acceptance of examining asylum applications.

The second packet of proposals, intended to lead toward the full harmonisation of asylum procedures and standards of protection, relating not only to those granted refugee status or some alternate form of protection foreseen in European law but also to those persons simply applying for protection, was announced by the European Commission on 13 July 2016. For this purpose, the Commission prepared drafts of new legal acts, which were intended to replace those in force at the time and to introduce a common procedure for the application for international protection, common norms for applicants to qualify for international protection and also unified norms for accepting persons applying for protection. This way, a complete communitarisation of asylum policy was to take place. The European Commission also applied for the creation of an EU Agency for Asylum with the task of ensuring the operation of and technical support for member states and strengthening cooperation in carrying out the solutions making up the new reformed system.

The proposed reform of the European Border and Coast Guard presented by the European Commission on 12 September 2018 was created to strengthen the protection of the EU’s external borders against an influx of people who do not fulfil the conditions for receiving protection from member states. Another goal was to remove such people from the EU when they did manage to reach the territory of member states during migration crises. The project foresaw making 10,000 officers permanently available to the agency by 2020. What is more, the officers would answer almost exclusively to Frontex. This would mean that they could be used by the agency in operations undertaken on the territory of member states or of a third state without the necessity of obtaining separate agreements from the states to which Frontex had delegated them. The Commission also proposed that the officers in permanent service were allowed to conduct ID checks of migrating persons and to issue permits or refusals to enter on the basis of general consent of the member state in which the operation would be conducted.

The process of negotiating the solutions proposed by the European Commission began in December 2016. The European Council accepted conclusions in the case of migration, stating: “The effective application of the principles of responsibility and solidarity remains a shared objective. Sustained efforts over the past months to review the Common European Asylum System have shown some areas of convergence, while other areas require further work.” (*European Council conclusions* 2016: concl. 6). The discussions undertaken in the following months led to a seeming breakthrough, which was expressed by the words: “there is a common understanding that the reformed CEAS needs to strike the right balance between responsibility and solidarity and that it needs to ensure resilience to future crises” (*European Council conclusions* 2017: concl. 23). The problem, however, lies in a different understanding of the essence of responsibility and solidarity. The European Commission emphasises the responsibility of ensuring the safety of migrants (some of whom are refugees)

and actions in solidarity in order to fulfil international legal requirements that result from the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951, which applies to all member states of the EU. Also regarded as crucial is the responsibility of all EU member states to extend aid to member states subjected to mass, irregular inflows of migrants. At the same time, for a given state this responsibility is elided in favour of protecting its own citizens from inflows of “foreigners” and the negative consequences that the inflow can bring about. Solidarity is thus treated rather as a possibility and not as an obligation to support member states struggling with mass irregular immigration. They stress the right to make their own decisions regarding the forms and degree of aid given. What is more, attempts to establish a common asylum policy within whose framework protective procedures and standards would be harmonised have been treated by some member states as attempts to conduct a kind of coup against their sovereignty. The idea of putting border officers under the almost exclusive command of Frontex has been treated similarly.

NATIONAL INTEREST AS A CATEGORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES²

Although at the end of the 20th century it was assumed that new non-state entities on the international scene would gain in importance so rapidly that they would become a threat to states, these prognoses did not materialise. Although transnational entities are significant players in the international arena, the international order is still, however, created primarily by sovereign states. Sovereignty then, despite attempts to redefine it, plays the primary role in determining the directions and instruments of international cooperation and the ways it is realised. This is also the case within the EU, where, despite the declared desire for cooperation, this is often upstaged by particular interests. It is obvious that in a world of interdependencies, which are typical of modern international relations, cooperation cannot be completely rejected. No state is able to pursue its interests entirely through unilateral actions. This does not change the fact, however, that sovereignty legitimises particularism which leads to the protection of state interests at the expense of common interests. In the unending tension between the pursuit of state interests and acting in solidarity, achieving the former is of key importance for countries. When considering undertaking cooperation, states are directed by a simple balance of costs and benefits. When the potential benefits from cooperation are outweighed by the costs that the country would have to bear, there is a refusal to cooperate and a denial of solidarity. The level of activity of states in the international area then is a result of the relationship between moral imperatives and the demands of effective political action (Morgenthau, Thompson 1985: 12) and is more often characterised by particularism than solidarity. Doubtless the paradigm of particularism in international relations is “the most ancient, the most embedded in common sense, the most vociferous” (Bogdandy, Dellavalle 2008: 28). It finds reflec-

² This section is a reworked version of the analysis contained in the introduction by Potyrała 2020.

tion in many theories in which cooperation is treated as being secondary in importance (Snyder 1997: 1). These range from the approach of realism, which assumes that politics is a struggle to defend different sides' own interests and to maximise power, through neo-realism, which recognises that the primary goal of states is survival and security, constructivism, in which anarchy in the international order is regarded as being created by states seeking to fulfil their own interests, to the neoconservative approach, which regards international law and solidarity as inhibitors of state interests. In all these theoretical approaches, a key role is played by particularism in relation to states pursuing their own interests.

In the international system, in which states still play leading roles, and the principle of their sovereignty is also a fundamental norm, the concept of interest is related to national interests. It is an instrument which mobilises, integrates and consolidates political elites and citizens of a country in the sphere of international actions and reactions, a kind of "stimulator of action based on a calculation of gains and costs in achieving goals" (Bieleń 2010: 73 ff; Bieleń 2005: 530). National interest is a factor determining the goals and strategies of states and forms the basis for international politics (*Współczesne* 2008: 80 ff).

Although reflections upon national interests remain in the centre of analyses in international relations, as a concept, it is one of the most controversial. Many authors completely reject it³ and draw attention to its multiple meanings and cast doubts upon its explanatory usefulness. It has so far been impossible to create a generally recognised and accepted definition of the term "national interest".

In the era of realism domination national interest was defined in terms of strength and identified with defence against the power of other states (Morgenthau, Thompson 1985: 5; Morgenthau 1950: 853). Areas that have been singled out are "military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people" (Kennan 1985-86: 205-206). For neo-realists, national interest is only the preservation of the state (Waltz 1979). Neoliberals point to three national interests, which are: the physical preservation of the state, the maintenance of autonomy and economic well-being (George, Keohane 1980) although they underline that in a democratic system – if public opinion recognises it as valid – national interest may also concern the promotion of human rights or democracy (Nye 1999: 23). Within constructivism, it is emphasised that states determine their interests in the process of defining situations (Wendt 1992: 398). National interests are influenced by situations arising both internally and externally. It is in relations with others that states determine their identity, a manifestation of which are national interests. They are perceived by constructivists as striving for physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and a feeling of worth, which are common to all countries (Wendt 1999: 235). An analysis of the literature makes it possible to indicate that national interest is defined as a collection of ideal goals, which a state should seek to achieve through international relations (Seabury 1963: 85). National interests are identified with governmental institutional interests and referred to

³ For example, Charles P. Schleicher or George Modelski.

as the public interest (Huntington 1968: 25). Those governing then define and pursue goals perceived as national interests. In a narrow understanding, these come to include vital interests, such as the maintenance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. As a result, the terms “national interest” and “national security” become interchangeable (Oppenheim 1987: 370). More broadly, national interest is any goal determined by government, with the proviso that it is carried out over time for the general good and not for a limited group (Krasner 1978: 35, 43).

In summary, the concept of “national interest includes the conscious preferences of countries, which arise as a result of internal needs” and external factors (Bieleń, 2015). Preferences (unlike goals or priorities) are conditioned by the need for survival, the maintenance of autonomy and independence, the guarantee of security and territorial integrity as well as the need for economic, civilizational, social and cultural development. External factors that determine preferences are obligations to allies, loyalty, dependence and also legal norms or ethical values. “The preferences of states are ultimately derived from fixed positions and roles as well as their status in the international community” (ibidem).

The work of Joseph Frankel, who pointed to aspirational and operational interests, is particularly valuable for understanding the concept of national interest. The first is a vision of a good life, that is a certain set of goals, which a state would like, if possible, to achieve (Frankel 1970: 31). Aspirational goals indicate a general direction for a state’s actions and are rooted in history and/or ideology, determined by political will and not the abilities of the state (ibidem: 32). Aspirational interests can be transformed into operational interests which are understood as the sum of all interests and policies pursued at a given moment. Usually these are short term, defined by the ruling party and often, although not always, result from goals or necessity (ibidem: 32–33). In Polish academia, the most widely known classification is that of Józef Kukułka, which indicated three categories of interests (Kukułka 1978: 265). The first includes existential interests connected with the survival of the state, its security, integrity and development. Co-existential interests result from the needs of the state in the area of sovereignty, participation, belonging, cooperation, reciprocity, competition and benefits. Functional interests concern state actions, its competence and its informational, technological and regulatory possibilities.

THE DEFENSE OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR OPPOSITION TO EUROPEAN COMMISSION PROPOSALS

In the face of the migration crisis, traditionally understood national interests underwent a rebirth in many EU countries. Protecting state territory against external threats has always been perceived in terms of national interest. It is a decisive factor in maintaining state sovereignty, it assures its independence as well as its political, economic and cultural autonomy. Guaranteeing the security of the state, territory and population is the overriding goal of every state. Threats related to mass irregular

migration involve both cross-border activity by organised crime, terrorists and the transfer of large groups of people and their subsequent presence in the destination country. Migration crises are treated as potentially destabilising internal situations. The presence of a large group of foreign nationals may lead to social unrest, economic instability and even pose a threat to the cultural identity of the society in hosting states. Such threats result directly from changes to the ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic make-up of the population (Buzan, 1991: 447). All these potential threats must be taken into account during the creation of immigration and border protection policies. It is precisely for this reason that member states recognised that reform of CEAS was necessary. By treating arrivals as “invaders”, “poison”, potential threats of terrorism or organised crime and social, cultural and religious threats,⁴ EU states were determined to stop the flow of migrants. Legal changes were treated as the first step in achieving this goal. At the same time, however, doubts were raised regarding the reform proposals for CAES put forth by the European Commission regarding the degree to which they did not guarantee the security of EU citizens, the territories of member states and the area of the EU as well as to what degree they threatened the sovereign right of states to determine the methods used to guarantee the security of borders and territories as well as to decide who can be granted the right of entry.

One of the first states whose representatives in official debates referred to the defence of national interests and at the same time expressed their disagreement with the proposed reform to CAES was Hungary. An analysis of the regulations of the Hungarian constitution made it possible to affirm that national interests are perceived to be the defence of independence, territorial and border integrity as well as the maintenance of the constitutional order (see *The Fundamental* 2010: art. 41.1, 48, 51 51A, 52, 53; also see *Hungary's* 2012: pt. 10). Threats to these interests include not only the use of force by a third country, but also by terrorist organisations or other armed groups. Critically, the security strategy adopted in 2012 indicates that a potential threat to national interests is also the fact that: “Distant security risks and challenges and sources of danger can cross our borders with dramatic speed” (*Hungary's* 2012: pt. 5). The migration crisis and the mass flows of foreign nationals onto the territory of Hungary were regarded as just such a threat. As early as 2015 it was clearly stressed – referring at the same time to the statements contained in the strategy outlined in 2012 – that migration could bring about a threat to national security and public order (ibidem: pt. 37). For this reason, Hungarian representatives from the very beginning raised the necessity of fighting irregular migration and crime related to migration including organised crime groups involved in human trafficking. They were also interested in strengthening cooperation with third countries, both transit countries and the source countries of irregular migrants. They did not express approval of the reform proposals, which – in their opinion – were an attack on the sovereign rights of the country. Gergely Gulyás, the head of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s office said: “no one should question our

⁴ See the comments by Victor Orbán (*Hungary's*, 2018; *Hungary*, 2018) and Andrej Babiš (*Migrants*, 2018).

freedom (...) to decide on migration” (from: *Hungarian*, 2018). Orbán himself said: “National sovereignty is simply fundamental (...) Our parents and grandparents would turn over in their graves if we contributed to someone else – and not Hungarians – deciding who is in our territory” (from: *Orban: nie mamy*, 2018).

Similarly, from the very beginning, the government of the Czech Republic has prioritised the defence of national interests in discussions on the necessity of introducing changes to better manage mass migration. The Czech Republic regards not only the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state political independence, but also the defence of “a democratic rule of law, including the guarantee and protection of the fundamental human rights and freedom of the population” (*Security* 2011: pt. 13). Interests described by the Czech government as vital could be threatened by, among other things, international migration. In particular, danger is posed by the participation of organised crime in illegal migration, while insufficient integration by immigrants can be a source of tension and lead to the radicalisation of immigrants (*ibidem*: 10). Consequently, the government of the Czech Republic assumed a clear position, according to which “Czech interests lie in the maintenance of the republic’s security. No one can dictate to us who we will accept in our territory” (from: *Prezydent Czech*, 2017).

The threat to national interests posed by irregular, especially mass, migration was also stressed by the Slovak government. Considering that the basis for distinguishing national interests is “the needs of its citizens and the state”, vital interests were determined to be protecting state and public security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders, political independence, domestic security and cultural identity (see *Security* 2005: pt. I.5). Consequently, it was precisely the necessity of ensuring these interests that justified opposition to the proposals of the European Commission. In the opinion of the Slovak government, illegal and uncontrolled inflows of foreign nationals comprise a security risk and although Slovakia is not a destination country, mass migration which cannot be managed by traditional methods of border control, is a destabilising factor and could negatively impact the interests of Slovakia. An address by PM Peter Pellegrini made it clear that “no migrants will come to Slovakia without the government’s consent”. The prime minister also stressed, that a situation characterised by “Brussels deciding this for us, or some other country dictating to us on this” would be unacceptable (from: *PM Pellegrini*, 2018; *Slovak*, 2018).

The Polish government also raised the question of protecting national interests as justification for opposing the European Commission proposals, underlining that “the ideas of the European Commission are harmful to Polish sovereignty” (from: *Szef MSWiA*, 2016). According to the National Security Strategy of 2020 the national interest includes the defence of independence, the inviolability of state territory, sovereignty and assurance of security of the State and its citizens (*Strategia* 2020: 11; cf. *Konstytucja* 1997: art. 5). Strengthening national identity and preservation of national heritage is also of key importance, as well as guaranteeing sustained and balanced social and economic development and protection of natural environment. Poland’s national interest is non-partisan in nature, an expression of which is the “common or convergent position of the main political forces in basic goals for the state and nation”

(*Exposé*, 2005). Among threats to the national interests, especially to public safety and order, uncontrolled migration “caused both by conflicts and having as its source social and economic problems” is mentioned (Strategia 2020: 32).

It was precisely these four states that dominated discussions on reform to the common policy regarding the inflow of migrants that is both asylum and immigration policy as well as changes to the foundations of the Schengen system. Cooperation within the Visegrád Group bore fruit with the acceptance of a common position regarding acceptable ways of reforming these policies. Its key component was the concept of flexible solidarity subsequently defined with the name effective solidarity. In the opinion of the V4 countries, cooperation between member states and the division of responsibilities for persons applying for protection cannot be determined in a top-down manner in European law. States should have the guaranteed freedom of choosing the manner in which they demonstrate solidarity and “decide on specific forms of contribution taking into account their experience and potential” (*Joint*, 2016). In the opinion of the proponents, the concept of flexible solidarity is a compromise in the matter of extending aid both to countries in order to deal with migration pressure and persons requiring protection and it is necessary to create a system that “takes into account the real needs and capacities of our societies and the commitment of our countries to national sovereignty” (*Joint*, 2018).

However, while opposition to the original proposals of the European Commission was justified in the case of front-line countries (exposed to mass, illegal inflows of foreign nationals), as well as destination countries (in which petitions for protection were filed *en masse*), it is more difficult to understand in the case of countries which did not experience negative effects of the migration crisis. Analysing data from the time when the crisis was reaching its peak, that is in 2015, when the EU received 1.3 million foreign nationals (a majority of whom applied for asylum), it can be clearly seen that the states bearing the burden of responsibility for those applying for asylum were Germany (476,510 applications), Hungary (177,135 applications) and Sweden (162,450 applications) (*A Welcoming*, 2020). In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia the totals were 1,515, 12,190 and 330 respectively (*ibidem*). The situation did not change in subsequent years when lively discussions were held on the possibility of accepting reforms. States opposing the obligatory system of relocation and resettlement, seeing threats to sovereignty in the proposed reforms also witnessed record low number of applications for protection in 2018. The number of applications in Poland reached 4,110, in Slovakia 175 while in Hungary only 670 applications were filed (*ibidem*).

Although opposition from the Visegrád Group was first subject to strong criticism by the remaining members of the EU, later, with the increasing severity of the crisis, the position of adherents of solidarity and a humanitarian approach began to evolve. It became obvious that, in the face of a mass illegal inflow of migrants, priority would be given in pursuing particular interests. Undoubtedly, one factor leading to the clear accentuation of national interest, among which the guarantee of the security of borders and territories and citizens was given prominence, were terrorist attacks in Paris in November of 2015, in Brussels in March of 2016, and Manchester in May of 2017.

It was the threat of terrorism that served as an argument justifying opposition both to implementing the September 2015 agreement concerning relocation and resettlement (by the end of 2017, only 32,366 persons⁵ had been relocated – *Komunikat 2017: 2*) as well as the proposal to establish permanent mechanisms for relocation and resettlement. What is of key importance is that the obstruction of the implementation of the 2015 decisions as well as the lack of acceptance for new proposals by the Commission came from states which were originally inclined to accept such ideas. The drive to defend national territories against potential threats carried by the influx of migrants resulted in barriers on borders and sending migrants to other states. Although the strongest criticism for undertaking such actions fell upon Hungary, the same solutions were applied by the government of Austria (closing its borders with Croatia and Italy, erecting fences on the border with Slovenia and announcing the construction of a fence on the border with Hungary), Slovenia (erecting a fence on the border with Croatia) and Italy (closing seaports to foreign vessels rescuing migrants at sea). In addition, in 2018 Spain, France and Italy undertook the creation of regional resettlement platforms in third countries, originally announced in 2016 by Hungary.

In the face of stiff opposition by an ever larger group of countries officially invoking arguments on the defence of national interests, the European Commission was forced to revise their original proposals put forth in May and July of 2016. In December 2017, a new proposal was presented that relocation should remain a key element of the reformed system; however, this was meant to be relocation of a dual nature. The European Commission proposed that in extraordinary situations (referred to in the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union) an obligatory relocation mechanism would be triggered, although in “less severe” situations relocation could be conducted on a good-will basis. The European Commission, however, reserved for itself the right to determine the nature of any given migration crisis and what remedial measures should be taken. The compromise proposal was intended to meet the expectations of member states. The European Commission considered both the voices of proponents of a division of responsibilities based on solidarity in circumstances of migration crises that might affect the EU in the future and opponents who declare solidarity but independently defined and in relation to national interests. In effect, however, in trying to satisfy everyone, the Commission did not satisfy anyone. This is because it had projected a system, which was a kind of patchwork of different and often mutually exclusive ideas. In addition, a project of solutions was elaborated which were in violation of obligations to refugees required by international law.⁶ The

⁵ Citing security concerns, the execution of calls for relocation was refused by the governments of Austria, France and even Germany.

⁶ A good case in point is the earlier mentioned regional disembarkation platforms located in third countries. On the one hand, this proposal satisfied opponents of accepting people into the EU during migration crises. The platforms are intended to process migrants rescued at sea (in international or territorial waters of EU countries). The goal is to fulfill the obligations of international law regarding the protections of migrants’ health and lives while at the same time not accepting them physically into the EU. The platforms could be created only in third countries regarded as safe and which observe the principle

results were extended discussions conducted over subsequent European summits. And although the diplomatic formulations appearing in documents made after meetings do not point to sharply different views, the comments by representatives of particular countries leave no doubt as to the atmosphere prevailing in these discussions.

The December 2017 proposal became the topic of discussions during the European Council summit of 28-29 June 2018. Debates showed tensions between two different visions of solidarity. The countries of the Visegrád Group, supported by Austria, were opposed to any possibility of establishing an obligatory relocation mechanism that would be automatically triggered. They pointed out that relocation was not a solution to the problem since it stimulates illegal migration. In turn, representatives of Italy, threatening to block the statement of the summit conclusions, demanded a guarantee that in the event of a subsequent migration crisis and mass inflow of foreign nationals onto Italian territory, the remaining countries would show solidarity and extend help. In the conclusions accepted after the meeting, it was emphasised that the reform of the CEAS, in particular the Dublin provisions must be carried out “based on a balance of responsibility and solidarity” (European Council conclusions 2018: concl. 12). In the opinion of participants, it had been possible to find a “common language regarding migration” (in the words of Angela Merkel) as well as to show “faithfulness to values” in the words of Emmanuel Macron (*Jest porozumienie*, 2018). It is difficult, however, to not notice that the conclusions of the summit reflected a drive to protect national interests and not common interests or common values, such as defending human rights. The solidarity invoked in the summit conclusions is particular in nature – a new asylum system is intended to defend national interests, not those of persons demanding international protection. This was emphatically demonstrated by comments from the leaders of countries opposing the European Commission’s proposals. Viktor Orbán, indicating that Hungary would remain a Hungarian country and would-not become an immigration country, announced victory and underlined that no migrant would be accepted onto the territory of Hungary without government approval (*Orban celebrates* 2018). Similarly, the representatives of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia commented enthusiastically on blocking the obligatory relocation mechanism. Mateusz Morawiecki indicated that the EU “accepted the position of Poland and the Visegrád group: ‘NO’ to forced relocation while ‘Dublin’ only through unanimity” (*Jest porozumienie* 2018).

The drive to protect national interests, in particular the sovereign right of states to control their own borders and to establish rules for cross-border movement, was also

of non-refoulement. They are intended to guarantee that after concluding investigations, entry into an EU country would be granted only to those persons that meet the criteria outlined in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, that is those with proof that fear of persecution in their countries of origin is well-founded and justified. On the other hand, the idea of regional disembarkation platforms could lead to violations of international law regarding human rights (independently of announcements of cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration), since the procedures would be accelerated, and doubts are raised regarding the conditions of confinement and also the detention of migrants.

apparent during discussions on the proposal by the European Commission to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). From the countries of the Visegrád Group there were overt accusations of an attack on sovereign states. The European Commission's proposal to transfer 10,000 state officials to agency control was treated as a violation of national interests that would deprive countries of the right to secure their own borders. Therefore, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary set a condition for the management of border officials to remain under national control. This was emphatically expressed by the Polish Minister of the Interior and Administration, Joachim Brudziński, who stressed: "I can't imagine that supra-national officials would decide (...) to admit citizens whom Poland might regard as threats" (quote: *Polska stawia*, 2018). As a compromise measure, the Czech Republic and Slovakia put forth the idea of financial solidarity, suggesting an increased transfer of EU funds directly to the countries managing the external borders. The Hungarian government underlined that border security is the responsibility of sovereign states, pointing to the lack of consent for the arrival of "mercenaries" that would "let in the migrants" and that "our homeland is not a transit building" (from: Hagenberg 2018, *Orban: znamy się* 2018). The Members of the Visegrád Group understood the need for a reform of CEAS, but their approval was conditional. Holding that sovereignty, understood as independent decision making in matters affecting state functioning, is the most important national interest, they wanted to maintain full control over the policies regarding migration flows. The Spanish government reacted to the European Commission proposals with a great deal of reserve, expressing concerns about officials from other countries conducting actions of a sovereign nature on Spanish territory. The Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, even described the proposal as "a little wild" and too expensive, stressing that member states should retain primary responsibility for protecting their borders (Hagenberg 2018).

As in the case of the failure of the permanent EU relocation mechanism, attempts to reform Frontex were met with the rigid positions of not just Central European countries but also frontline states (Greece, Spain, Italy). This led to changes in the plans of the European Commission. The agreements which managed to be accepted in April 2019, clearly state that member states maintain the right to control their borders, while Frontex may offer operational and technical help only when requested. When Frontex officers are sent to a member state (subject to approval by the country in question) the right to conduct border checks or carry out return programs including cases when force is used will in each case be subject to state authorities' approval. Agreed upon staffing increases of the agency also diverged from the European Commission's original proposal. The agency would have a permanent staff of 10,000 officers but their placement would end by 2027.

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The necessity of reforming CEAS remains uncontested. EU member states, however, disagree about the degree to which it should be communitarised. The arguments raised by some countries pointing to a drive to protect national interests, particularly to

protect sovereignty, which includes the right to control migration flows, to ensure state security, territorial integrity and citizen security, became the main reason for delays in work on the reforms proposed by the European Commission. The strenuous work of reconciling negotiating positions, threats of blocking the conclusions of European Council summits focusing on migration or official objection to the proposed permanent EU relocation mechanism for persons in need of international protection led to the reform project not coming into force. Ursula von der Leyen, taking over the presidency of the European Commission, announced the presentation of new proposed changes to CEAS. On 20 February 2020, an official announcement was made that reform of the Dublin system and the idea of communitarising asylum procedures were being abandoned. The process of creating asylum law started from the very beginning.

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ABSTRACT

Since 2016 proposals to reform the common European asylum system have been presented in the EU. The migration crisis of 2015 showed that previous provisions had not allowed for a quick and effective response that would meet both humanitarian and security challenges. Legal arrangements adopted as a reaction to the migration crisis were temporary in nature and were regarded as

unacceptable by some member states. Therefore, a total remodelling of the common asylum system has been recognised as necessary. The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that even though member states acknowledge the need for reform of the common asylum system, prolonged, indecisive proceedings are caused not by the need to comprehensively protect persons forced to flee and seek protection in third countries, but by the desire to protect national interests. Analyses are conducted based on neorealism, which recognises the dominant actors in international relations to be states aiming to protect their own interests and regarding cooperation as reasonable only when it is helpful in achieving these. The failure of the reform process indicates that cooperation within the EU is treated instrumentally and that the priorities of member states are based on particular and not common interests.

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GERMAN SELF-GOVERNANCE THIRTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN REUNIFIED GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

Local government is a key institution in a democracy based on the rule of law. As a component of public administration, it is part of the state's political system. Germany is no exception to this.

The present paper aims to discuss and evaluate the outcome of 30 years of reunified Germany's constitutional and structural transformations. Since the country's local government is undergoing constant changes, this contribution focuses solely on the analysis and evaluation of the foundations and directions of the constitutional and structural transformations spanning the period from Germany's reunification in 1990 until 2020.

The key research problem is the constitutional and structural transformations of German local government in the 30 years after the country's reunification, including an attempt to show the outcome and the direction of these changes. The following research questions are designed to corroborate the assumed research hypotheses: what internal and external factors had an impact on the reconstruction of East Germany's local government in 1990?; what model of local government was adopted in the GDR in 1990?; what models of German local government were developed as a result of the constitutional and structural changes in 1990-2019?; what is the status and level of complexity of German local government?

The underlying hypothesis of the present paper is that the constitutional and structural transformations of German local government in the past 30 years, instead of developing a uniform legal system and model of local government, are primarily designed to make it more efficient, strengthen and deepen democracy and increase its impact on the federal government.

The constitutional and structural changes in German local government that have occurred in the 30 years since the reunification can be analysed from the perspectives of political, historical and geographical sciences as this issue is multi-dimensional and diverse in nature. Hence, various research methodologies have been applied

in the present study, including methods used in historical sciences (cf. Chodubski 2004: 127-128; Łuszczynski 2005: 45-47), a statistical method (cf. Łuszczynski 2005: 49-50), a systems analysis method (cf. Chodubski 2004: 119-120; Łuszczynski 2005: 36-39), an institutional and legal analysis method (cf. Chodubski 2004: 126; Łuszczynski 2005: 48-49), a decision-making method (cf. Chodubski 2004: 130-131; Łuszczynski 2005: 39-42) and a deductive method. Moreover, other research procedures have been applied, such as the analysis and criticism of the existing literature and the secondary analysis of other authors' research findings.

The status of local government in contemporary Germany was developed just after World War II. As soon as the war came to an end, the German state ceased to exist as a single entity, having been divided into four zones of occupation. The capital city of Berlin met the same fate. Under the provisions of the Potsdam Treaty, it was assumed that following the processes of denazification, democratisation and decartelisation, a single German state would be established. Each of the occupation powers had a different approach to that issue. The institution which became a key pillar of the unification and democratisation of socio-political life in the West German zones of occupation was local government. Finally, two German states were established with Berlin being divided into western and eastern parts. West Berlin became an enclave that was formally administered by western allies whereas the eastern part became the capital city of East Germany, a country governed by the principle of democratic centralism with regional state institutions.

The status and role of local government were underlined in the constitutions of the states that were established in the zones of occupation and in the Basic Law of the FRG in 1949. Of key importance to the position of local government is Article 28, which to date provides for the protection of local government and the right for various forms of self-governance to function. The power to review the compliance of the states' legislation with the Basic Law, notably with Article 28, rests with the Federal Constitutional Court. The remaining issues can be reviewed by the State Constitutional Courts. Local government legislation falls within the exclusive competence of the federal states (for more see Honka 2018: 163-206; Geis 2018: 313-330; Kegel 2018: 493-495).

It might appear that defining the concept of local government is an easy and undemanding task. However,

Defining the concept of local government in the German context is culture-specific and slightly different from the Polish context. From the theoretical standpoint, this notion should refer to municipalities, municipal associations (*Gemeindeverbände*) and districts in the entire country as well as to governmental districts (*Regierungsbezirke*) in Bavaria. In practice, the concept also applies to other forms of self-governance, including various types of goal-oriented unions such as: *Landeswohlfahrtsverbände*, *Landschaftsverbände*, *Stadt-Umland-Verbände* and *Bezirksverband*. Special provisions for this are included in Article 28 of the Basic Law.

From the perspective of German political science, local government is a corporation of a community (entities) designated to perform public tasks on its own behalf and responsibility. It is pro-

vided by citizens with a full democratic mandate to exercise power on their behalf at the level of municipalities, municipal associations, districts, governmental districts in Bavaria and entities that are not equipped with this mandate but have been established to perform public tasks as long as their residents have the right to self-determination. This group of entities includes special forms of self-governance, (...) that is goal-oriented unions. Not every goal-oriented union is entitled to full local government rights. Thus, German local government is marked by flexibility, which complements and deepens democratic principles.

Both sets of entities of German self-governance have:

1. their own internal organisation; however, in the second group of entities of self-governance, authorities are not chosen by an election process;
2. legal personality;
3. their own sources of income; for municipalities, municipal associations and districts they are guaranteed by the Basic Law; the country's obligation is to provide resources for performing tasks and to reimburse expenses if additional costs are incurred;
4. their own assets, which they hold, use and manage.

Local government is part of the general structure of a democratic country based on the rule of law, representing the vertical division of powers. It is thus a political form of decentralised administration and is protected by law by courts, the State Constitutional Courts and the Federal Constitutional Court (as cited in: Honka 2018: 464-465).

The functioning of the zones of occupation and the origins of the FRG were of paramount importance to the development of political models of local government at municipal and district levels. From the establishment of the FRG until the reunification, there existed four local government constitutional systems at the municipal level and four local government constitutional systems at the district level.

The first one was the Northern German constitutional system or the directorial model. It was introduced after World War II by the British occupation administration in the states of Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia as well as in rural communes of Schleswig-Holstein. The second type, called the mayoral constitution or the Rhine constitution and grounded in the French tradition of the Napoleonic era, was used in small municipalities of Hesse, Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, and in rural communes of Schleswig-Holstein. The third type, the Magistrate's constitution (the municipal council constitution), was based on the 1808 Prussian municipal law instigated by Karl Friedrich vom Stein. This model was employed in the cities of Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein and in Bremerhaven. The fourth model, the Southern German constitution, dated from the 19th century and was introduced in the then independent states of Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg (cf. Freiberg 1970: 44-49; Berg 1982: 222-229; Dreibus 1982: 252-63; Heise 1982: 232-327; Schmidt-Jortzig 1982: 56-58; Schneider 1982: 209-221; Wehling 1982: 230-240; Wolff, Bachof, Stober 1987: 110-118; Stober 1996: 28-31; Vogelgesang, Lübking, Ulbrich 2005: 85-87; for more see Honka 2018: 219-257).

With regard to the constitutional systems at district level, the first one was the district committee constitution, which, with some modifications, still exists. Until the post-reunification reforms, it was used only in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein. The second model emphasised the role of the district administrator (*Landrat* or

Landrätin) and existed until Germany's reunification in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. The third type, that is the southern German constitution, was based on the special role of the district assembly (*Kreistag*),¹ and existed until the post-reunification reforms in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. The fourth was comprised of a constitution which emphasised the role of the district 'general director' and existed in Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia (cf. Seele 1982: 64; Seele 1990: 350-351; Schmidt-Jortzig 1982: 108-110; Leoński 1991: 20-21; for more see Honka 2018: 257-283).

What comes as an interesting solution are associations of towns comprising adjacent areas. They were established as part of reforms that took place in West Germany in the 1970s. In terms of hierarchical positioning, as local government corporations they should be placed between districts and municipal associations at higher levels. They comprise urban districts (*Kreisfreie Städte*) and the surrounding districts and municipalities. They are empowered to carry out public tasks of members at a supra-local level (cf. Seele 1982: 64; Seele 1990: 350-351; Schmidt-Jortzig 1982: 108-110; Leoński 1991: 20-21; for more see Honka 2018: 257-283).

The description of local government in the states of the former West Germany would not be complete without mentioning the cities of Hamburg and Bremen, which also became federal states, and higher-level local government units, each of which is unique in nature. The city-state of Hamburg consists of one municipality while the city-state of Bremen includes two municipalities: Bremen and Bremerhaven (for more see Honka 2018: 321-324). Higher-level local government units, in turn, are a very interesting solution, adding to the complexity of German local government. Formally, this third level of self-government exists in Bavaria and is called a governmental district (*Regierungsbezirk*). In the remaining federal states, governmental districts are not a local government level although a number of them have full rights of self-government and a tradition rooted in the past.

In the final years of the two German states, the FRG boasted a wide range of forms of self-governance that were protected by law. By that time, local government had already become an important link in the federal structure of West Germany.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES OF GERMAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 1990-2019

Protests of East German citizens against the SED regime began on 4 September 1989 and escalated with the forthcoming 40th anniversary of the GDR. The key demonstration, attended by approximately 70 thousand people, took place in Leipzig on 9 October 1989. This was followed by the growing protests of East Germans, who

¹ This word, which designates the district legislature, should be correctly translated as the district assembly. However, this entity is not a parliament which acts like a legal or state authority. The term *Kreistag* is used in German academic literature and media publications. For more see Honka 2018: 41-43.

demanded reforms and a reunification of the two German states. On 4 November 1989, a total of one million protesters gathered on Alexanderplatz in East Berlin. The wave of protests resulted in socio-political transformations in the GDR. However, if the two German states were to become one, the GDR had to embark on administrative and political reforms.

The administrative and political transformations aimed at changing the administrative structure of the GDR to make it compatible with that of the FRG were based on the principle of federalism grounded in local government. Since it was assumed that the GDR would quickly unite with the FRG, it was decided that the new law would be based on Article 28 of the Basic Law of the FRG (cf. Hesse, Ellwein, 1997: 76-77). However, that process needed to be preceded by changes in the structure of property ownership, the introduction of guarantees of non-party political and social participation into legal and political relations, and approval for citizen initiatives. Those regulations were adopted by the Council of Ministers of the GDR on 1 March 1990. Issues related to local government ownership were resolved after the local government law was passed (cf. Petzold 1990: 27-32) by the East German Parliament on 17 May 1990. The law introduced a uniform model of municipal and district local government in all of East Germany (for more see Honka 2018: 376-390).

Municipal authorities were represented by municipal councils while in towns belonging to a district or in urban districts, town representatives and the mayor were elected for a four-year term. The council made decisions on all municipal issues, except for matters that fell within the mayor's competence, and exercised control functions. In the first session, it elected its chair and at least one vice-chair. The sessions could be attended by the mayor and officials with the right to speak. In urban districts and in large towns belonging to a district, the council appointed the board or presidium. For support in implementing tasks, the council set up standing and ad hoc committees, which performed advisory functions or made decisions based on party parity. It could also appoint municipal residents with adequate qualifications to work in committees. The mayor (voluntary in small municipalities and professional in others) was responsible, among other things, for preparing draft resolutions of the council, executing resolutions, handling all affairs that were not under the exclusive authority of the council, delegating tasks to officials, and developing internal administrative divisions. The mayor could also make decisions in emergency situations on issues that were routinely delegated to the council as long as they were put on the agenda of the following meeting of the council or the head committee. The meetings of all the committees could be attended in an advisory capacity by the mayor and assistant officials with relevant expertise. The council could recall the mayor and officials by a two-thirds majority (cf. Schmid-Eichstaedt, Petzold, Melzer et al. 1990: 7-13, 79-123; Honka 377-382).

A very important solution, modelled on West German regulations, was to grant residents of municipalities the right to submit citizens' requests and demands as well as vote in referendums (for more see Schmid-Eichstaedt, Petzold, Melzer et al. 1990: 5-6, 71-78; Honka 2018: 382-383).

Besides carrying out supra-municipal tasks, the district was obliged to support its municipalities and towns in the execution of tasks and to ensure a fair distribution of burdens. District authorities, elected for a four-year term, included the district assembly (*Kreistag*) and the district administrator (*Landrat/Landrätin*). The district assembly made decisions on all district-related issues apart from those that were delegated to the district administrator. In its first session, the assembly elected the board and the professional district administrator. Assembly sessions, which by definition were held in public, could be attended by the district administrator and officials with the right to speak. In specific circumstances, secret sessions were allowed. The voting was also open; however, in specific cases the procedure was anonymised or a roll-call vote was conducted. For support in implementing tasks, the district assembly set up standing and ad hoc committees, which performed advisory functions or made decisions based on party parity. The mandatory committees included the district committee, the finance committee and the accounts audit committee. The district committee coordinated the work of the remaining committees and resolved all issues for which the district assembly was responsible. The district committee was headed by the district administrator in an advisory capacity. Its sessions could also be attended by officials with relevant expertise.

The district assembly could also invite residents with adequate qualifications to take part in the work of committees. The district administrator was head of administration, the external representative of the district and the immediate superior of district staff. They were also responsible for preparing and implementing resolutions of the assembly, handling all issues that were not the exclusive power of the assembly, developing internal administrative divisions and delegating tasks to professional or voluntary officials. The district administrator could also make decisions in emergency situations on issues that were routinely delegated to the assembly as long as they were put on the agenda of the following meeting of the assembly. If the assembly's decision was unlawful or harmful to the district, the district administrator could withdraw it for reassessment. The assembly could recall the administrator and officials by a two-thirds majority (cf. Schmidt-Eichstaedt, Petzold, Melzer et al. 1990; 24-25, 27-30, 190-195, 206-227).

The district administrator also carried out the tasks of the lower administrative authority of a federal state based on the provisions and instructions of the state government, bearing responsibility for their implementation. In this capacity, they were also responsible for the legal oversight of the district's towns and municipalities. To carry out these tasks, they received adequate funding from the federal state's budget and officials. The district administrator could delegate the tasks of the lower administrative authority to local government officials and the local government tasks to state officials. The district administrator provided feedback to the district committee on the implementation of the tasks and legal oversight (Schmid-Eichstaedt, Petzold, Melzer et al. 1990; 31, 227-229).

The democratisation of socio-political life and the ability to take advantage of the options provided by local government accelerated the reunification of the two

German states. Local government was key to the establishment of a single German state. For the reunified Germany, the state of East German municipalities, towns and districts posed a very serious problem. It was not their residents, an important component of civic society, that were an issue; the major setback was the weakness of those units of local government faced with the challenges set by a modern and democratic state.

Prior to the reunification, in East Germany there were 7,565 municipalities and towns, half of which had a population of less than 500. A similar situation occurred at district level as out of 189 rural counties, approximately 45% had a population of less than 50 thousand. A further complication was that there were 38 urban districts, 11 of which were boroughs of Berlin (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 1990). As a result, these units were extremely small in terms of area and their economic-demographic potential. The only solution to this problem was the decision to carry out a territorial and functional reform in the East German federal states in the early 1990s, a reform that was similar to the constitutional and structural changes that occurred in West Germany in the 1970s (cf. Knemeyer 1993: 271-289; Stüer, Landgraf 1998: 209-216); Knemeyer 2000: 496-501).

Prior to the implementation of the local government reforms, it was necessary to introduce into the constitutions of the new federal states the guarantees for local governments and to grant them an adequate position in the administrative structure of the federal states. Those provisions were based on Article 28 of the Basic Law. In the following years, the constitutions of the new federal states were passed by the state parliaments (*Landtage*): the Brandenburg constitution on 14 April 1992, the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania constitution on 23 May 1993, the Free State of Saxony constitution on 27 May 1992, the Saxony-Anhalt constitution on 16 July 1992 and the Free State of Thuringia on 25 November 1993. These constitutions addressed issues related to the right to self-governance, financing arrangements for usual and delegated (by the federal state) tasks and oversight of the units of local government (for more see Honka 2018: 391-398).

Following the adoption of the constitutions in 1992-1994, the state parliaments passed local government legislation, which was based on the regulations of the West German states cooperating in the creation of the new regulations. Their enactment marked the end of the first stage of the post-reunification legislative process.

A fundamental link of the constitutional and structural transformations from the early 1990s was the judgement of the Federal Administrative Court which ruled that the jurisdiction of municipal institutions was not identical to the *Bundestag*. Elected members of municipal institutions have the same rights and responsibilities as deputies to the *Bundestag* only with respect to their own municipalities. Their mandate is free in nature and unrestricted, and for its fulfilment councils receive no financial compensation. Their competencies are not guaranteed by the federal constitution but are only determined by the relevant local government institutions or the federal state's legislation (cf. Vogelgesang, Lübking, Ulbrich, 2005: 95, 97-98).

Constitutional models of municipalities after the reforms

The local government reforms launched in the mid-1990s abolished a separate constitutional order for local government in the East German states. Another outcome was the reduction of constitutional models of local government both at the municipal and district levels over the entirety of Germany along with their modification, which was geared towards the changing conditions of the social environment. Despite being classified into a specific model of municipal government based on specific shared features, the federal states developed separate models of rural municipalities: one with a voluntary mayor, the other one with a professional mayor. Such differences can be found in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein. However, at the core of this issue is the division of management competencies between two bodies: the collegial council and the monocratic mayor. At present, there are three groups of constitutional models created out of 16 municipal models (cf. Miller 1998: 216-220; Honka 2018: 399).

The first group is the dual model “council-mayor” (a modified group of the southern German model) under a single authority. This is found in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Thuringia, and North Rhine-Westphalia. Under this model, responsibilities are shared between the mayor or the lord mayor (*Oberbürgermeister*) and the municipal council. The basic assumption here is the balance of responsibilities with emphasis on the council. The time that has passed since the start of the reforms has shown that the mayor has supreme authority in the municipality. Their position is strengthened by the mandate they have received in direct elections and by the post of the president of the municipal council. As head of the council and administration, the mayor combines both legislative and executive powers. In addition to that, the mayor or lord mayor can be provided with the responsibilities that are delegated to the council. The latter, in turn, is the main collegial body of the municipality and is responsible for all matters that have not been assigned to the mayor (cf. Dolnicki 2003: 308-310; Honka 2018: 399-401; Reis 2018a: 397-398).

The transformation of the northern German constitutional system into the “council-mayor” system under a single authority in North Rhine-Westphalia was initiated by the act of 17 May 1994. That law stated that the changes would be introduced gradually within five years and that the post of professional mayor would be filled in two ways: 1) by the appointment of the town manager (*Stadtdirektor*) or municipal manager (*Gemeindedirektor*), 2) by electing a new professional mayor after reaching agreement with the municipal or town manager as the chief administrative official. Not since 2004 have the residents of North Rhine-Westphalia municipalities been able to directly elect their mayors for a five-year term (cf. Honka 2018: 401).

Municipal elections in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Thuringia are held under the system of proportional representation. By contrast, North Rhine-Westphalia has adopted a mixed system of proportional representation with a majority system. Saarland and Thuringia use an electoral threshold of 3% while the remaining states require 5%. Moreover, the electoral systems

in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony and Thuringia allow the transfer of additional votes to a candidate through accumulation and the election of candidates from more than one electoral list through vote reshuffling. In Bavaria, councils are elected for a six-year term while in the other states for a five-year term.

There are differences across the states with regard to the heads of local government institutions. In Baden-Württemberg, municipalities are headed by the mayor with the right to vote, who is elected by popular vote, urban districts and large towns belonging to the district by the lord mayor with the right to vote, also elected by popular vote; in Bavaria – by the first mayor elected by popular vote; in Saarland – in municipalities by the professional mayor without the right to vote, who is elected by popular vote, in urban districts and larger towns belonging to the district by the professional lord mayor without the right to vote; in Rhineland-Palatinate – by the professional mayor with the right to vote, elected by popular vote; in North Rhine-Westphalia and Thuringia – in municipalities by the professional mayor with the right to vote, elected by popular vote, in urban districts and larger towns belonging to the district by the professional lord mayor with the right to vote (in Thuringia, members of local government institutions can also elect a president); in Saxony – in municipalities by the professional mayor with the right to vote, elected by popular vote, in urban districts and larger towns belonging to the district by the professional lord mayor with the right to vote (cf. Honka 2018: 401-403).

The authorities of municipalities, urban districts and towns belonging to districts are responsible for setting up mandatory and voluntary committees with both an advisory and decision-making capacity. The committees supporting local government institutions in carrying out tasks include members of these bodies. Municipal legislation defines which of the committees are mandatory. By contrast, with regard to voluntary committees each state defines their number. In Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony, representatives of residents, who are experts in specific fields, can be appointed by the local government institutions or the committees to work as full committee members. Municipal administration, implementing the decisions of local government institutions, is managed by the municipal board composed of the mayor or lord mayor and full-time officials and staff. The second tier of administration comprises departments (*Dezernate*) managed by professional officials elected by local government institutions from among their members. The third and lowest level is offices within departments.

Mayors or lord mayors are elected for five-year terms in North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony and Thuringia, six-year terms in Bavaria, and eight-year terms in Baden-Württemberg. The mayor or lord mayor is responsible for representing the municipality or the urban district externally, implementing the tasks they have been assigned to execute pursuant to the laws or by the municipal council, suspending the execution of local government decisions if they are found to be unlawful and preventing the execution of such decisions if they are passed into law again. In the municipal council, the mayor or lord mayor, with the exception of Saarland, has the deciding vote. The mayor's deputy is the first official except for Bavaria, where

the municipal council elects another two voluntary mayors. In Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria there is no legislative provision for recalling the mayor or lord mayor. In the other states with the same municipal constitution, the mayor or lord mayor can be recalled by a two-thirds majority by the local government institution or by a simple majority by the residents (cf. Honka 2018: 403-404). Besides that, the residents of municipalities in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony can submit a citizens' request to the municipal council (for more see Honka 404-405).

In Rhineland-Palatinate, local government has a two-level structure of municipalities, a system which dates back to the pre-unification period. The second tier comprises associations of the neighbouring municipalities in the same district, which are established solely with the consent of their inhabitants. Association authorities are represented by a professional mayor and association council, elected in a direct vote for a five-year-term. A similar situation occurs in Saxony, where neighbouring municipalities can set up an executive association as a statutory corporation which has legal capacity. These associations are represented by an association assembly and association president (cf. Honka 2018: 405-406; Seefried 2018: 625-626).

The second group is the dual model "council-mayor" under two authorities. This is used in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein (since 1 April 1998) and Lower Saxony. Under this model, the mayor and the president of the council are formally equal superiors. The mayor has a strong mandate which comes from direct elections. By contrast, the president of the council or a similar institution is elected from among the members of these institutions (cf. Dolnicki 2003: 310-311; Honka 2018: 406-407; Reis 2018a: 398-399).

Under this model, various electoral systems have been adopted for a five-year term. In Lower Saxony, elections to municipal and city councils are held under a mixed system combining a majoritarian system with proportional representation. The remaining states, within this constitutional model, use proportional representation with electoral thresholds of 3% in Schleswig-Holstein and 5% in the others. Moreover, the electoral systems in Lower Saxony, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt allow the transfer of additional votes to a single candidate through accumulation and the election of candidates from more than one electoral list through vote reshuffling.

These states also vary with respect to the heads of local government institutions. In Brandenburg, municipalities are headed by the voluntary mayor elected by popular vote, municipalities that do not belong to *Ämter* (literally, offices – administrative units between municipalities and districts) and municipalities handling administrative issues by the council president and their deputy with the right to vote, elected from among the members of the assembly; in Lower Saxony – by the president with the right to vote, elected from among the council members; in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania – in professionally managed municipalities by the president with the right to vote, elected by the council while in voluntarily managed municipalities, the mayor can take over the council president's responsibilities and name their predecessor to be their deputy, which means that the mayor has the right to vote in the council; in Sax-

ony-Anhalt – in voluntarily managed municipalities by the mayor while in the others by the president of the council, who is elected from among its members; if a professional mayor or lord mayor, who is elected by popular vote, is also elected a council member, then the council can name them to preside over its sessions with the right to vote; in Schleswig-Holstein – by the president of the council with the right to vote, elected from among its members (cf. Honka 2018: 408-409).

In this constitutional model, just like in the single authority model, local government institutions have the same powers with regard to setting up committees with identical competencies. In Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein, representatives of residents with expertise in specific areas can be appointed by councils or committees to work as full committee members (cf. Honka 2018: 409).

Municipal administration, implementing the decisions of local government institutions, is managed by the municipal board composed of the professional mayor or lord mayor and full-time officials and staff. In Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein, the municipal board is headed by the voluntary mayor. The second tier of municipal administration comprises departments managed by professional officials elected by municipal bodies from among their members for the term of office which is equal to that of the mayor and lord mayor. The third and lowest level is offices within departments.

The mayor's or lord mayor's term of office varies from state to state and lasts from 6 to 12 years in Lower Saxony; 5 years in Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein; 8 years in Brandenburg; from 7 to 9 years in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The mayor or lord mayor is responsible for representing the municipality or the urban district externally and implementing the tasks they have been assigned to execute pursuant to the laws or by the local government institutions. They do not have the deciding vote in their local government institution. In Brandenburg, the mayor or lord mayor can suspend the execution of local government decisions if they are found to be unlawful and can prevent the execution of such decisions if they are passed into law again. The mayor's deputy is the first official. The mayor or lord mayor can be recalled by both the local government institution and the residents of the municipality. The mayor's or lord mayor's dismissal requires a two-thirds majority in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein, and a three-fourths majority in Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt. In all of these states, residents can recall their mayor or lord mayor in a simple majority referendum (cf. Honka 2018: 409-410).

The residents of municipalities in Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania can submit a citizens' request to their local government institution. Following a review by such an institution, this request must be put to a referendum. A different modus operandi is employed in Lower Saxony. In this state, a citizens' request is reviewed solely by a local government institution. Besides that, the residents of municipalities in Brandenburg, Lower Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania can submit enquiries to their municipal council to be reviewed during its session.

A distinctive feature of municipal government in Lower Saxony is the presence of municipal associations called *Samtgemeinden*, which date back to the pre-unification period. *Samtgemeinden*, which consist of towns belonging to the district and municipalities, are public-private corporations executing local government duties. They are composed of three institutions: the council, committee and mayor. Both the council and the mayor are elected in a direct vote by residents of member municipalities. In addition, local government in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein has yet another distinctive feature, a type of administrative division called *Ämter* (singular – *Amt*). In the case of Schleswig-Holstein, this mode of implementing tasks is a follow-up to the pre-unification solutions. *Ämter* are corporations of public law which comprise municipalities from the same district implementing municipal decisions in the field of local government tasks. These are solely administrative communities that are neither territorial corporations nor associations of municipalities. Their institutions are the *Amtsausschuss* (*Amt* committee) and *Amtsdi- rektor* (*Amt* director) or *Amtsvorsteher* (*Amt* head). Committees consist of seconded representatives of member municipalities, including mayors. The committee is responsible for settling important issues and overseeing the implementation of these decisions. The voluntary director or head is elected from among the members of the committee for the term of office of the municipal authority. In Brandenburg, however, the *Amt* head is a professional official. Moreover, the law allows municipalities that form an *Amt* to establish other administrative communities with other municipalities or *Ämter* (cf. Honka 2018: 411-412; Seefried 2018: 625-627).

The third group is the Magistrat's constitution (municipal administration constitution), based on the Prussian model. In terms of territorial scope, it is the smallest model as it occurs only in the state of Hesse and in the municipality of Bremerhaven, which is part of the federal state of Bremen. Until 31 March 1998, this system had also been employed in the towns of Schleswig-Holstein. Local government tasks are split equally between the municipal assembly and municipal administration (the executive). The municipal bodies in Hesse and Bremerhaven are headed by the honorary president of the council with the right to vote, who is elected from among its members. Elections are held under proportional representation with a 5% electoral threshold. The term of office of the local government institutions in Hesse lasts 5 years while in Bremerhaven it lasts 4 years. The municipal and urban district councils have the power to set up mandatory and voluntary committees with both an advisory and decision-making capacity. In Hesse, representatives of residents with expertise in specific areas can be appointed by councils or committees to work as full committee members (cf. Honka 2018: 413; Reis 2018a: 399-400).

The decisions of municipal assemblies are implemented by its administration, which also carries out its own tasks. This is a collegial administrative body headed by the mayor and in urban districts by the lord mayor. In the referendum of 20 January 1993, the residents of Hesse voted for the professional mayor to be elected in a direct vote. The mayor or lord mayor serves a six-year term and is responsible, among other things, for representing the municipality externally, issuing order regulations at

municipal level, and preparing executive decisions. In urban districts, the lord mayor is supposed to carry out tasks assigned by the federal state administration. The mayor or lord mayor also have the deciding vote in case of a tied vote, represents the administration in the council and provides information to the council on key administrative decisions. The mayor is the superior of the administrative staff. The remaining members of the administration, both professional and voluntary, are elected by the council. The term of office for professional members of the administration is six years in Hesse, while for voluntary members in Hesse it is five years and in Bremerhaven – four years. The second tier of administration comprises departments managed by assistant officials elected by the municipal bodies from among their members. The third and lowest tier is offices within departments. The mayor or lord mayor in Hesse and Bremerhaven can be recalled by the municipal council by a two-thirds vote or by the residents in a simple majority referendum (cf. Honka 2018: 414-415).

The reforms pursued applied not only to the constitution of municipalities but also to their territories and functions. As of 1 January 1991, there were 16,128 municipalities in Germany: 8,506 in the western federal states and 7,622 in the eastern federal states (Statistisches Bundesamt 1991). The basic aim of the territorial and functional reform in the eastern states was to ensure that all municipalities had a population of at least five thousand residents. Contrary to the 1970s reform in the western states, this reform was to be carried out on a voluntary basis. It was decided that the municipalities themselves should become aware of the need to merge into larger territorial units, increasing their population and economic potential. In the following year, there were 16,095 municipalities: 8,505 in the western states and 7,590 in the eastern states (Statistisches Bundesamt 1992). The year 1992 saw minor changes in the number of municipalities: there were a total of 16,043 municipalities in the entire Germany, of which 8,505 were situated in the western states while 7,538 in the eastern states. It was not until the following years that significant developments occurred in the area of territorial reform, as was shown annually by data from the German Statistical Yearbook. There were constant fluctuations in the number of municipalities, which triggered changes in their territorial, economic and population potential. At present, in the entire country of Germany, there are a total of 11,014 municipalities: 8,387 are situated in the western federal states while 2,627 in the eastern states (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). This means that the territorial municipal reform has been an ongoing process. Changes in this respect are also expected in the coming years.

Constitutional models of districts after the reforms

According to the 1991 Statistical Yearbook of the FRG, on 1 January 1991, in Germany there were a total of 543 districts: 237 rural districts in the western states and 189 rural districts in the eastern states; 91 urban districts in the western states and 26 urban districts in the eastern states (Statistisches Bundesamt 1991). Their overall number remained unchanged until the end of 1992 (Statistisches Bundesamt 1991). The number of districts was steadily changing, starting in 1993. Since 2016,

in the entire Germany, there have been a total of 401 districts, with 89 urban and 237 rural districts in the western states and 18 urban and 58 rural districts in the eastern states (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017, Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). Despite the changes that were made, the size and number of districts in the federal states still varies, which is primarily related to the area of the federal states (for more see Honka 2018: 418-419).

The district government reform from the early 1990s fundamentally changed the position of district administrator. Before the reform, the district administrator was a state official while after the reform the position became that of a local government official. The reform also strengthened the position of the district administrator in relation to the district assembly and consolidated the territorial, demographic and economic potential of rural districts, which led to the elimination of weak districts. The reduction of urban districts, in turn, resulted from demographic changes in the eastern federal states. Along with the altered status of the district administrator, changes were also made to the constitution of districts. By 1996 there were three and since 1996 there have been two groups of constitutional models at district level (cf. von Mutius 1996: 346-348; Henneke 1999: 133-149; Dolnicki 2003: 317-318), created out of 13 district models.

The first one is the southern German constitutional system, which is employed in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (since 1997), and Schleswig-Holstein (since 1999). This model is marked by a dualism of power with a strongly emphasised role of the district administrator, who is elected in a direct vote in Bavaria, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and by 2009 in Schleswig-Holstein. In Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein (since 2009), the district administrator is elected by the district assembly. They serve a six-year-term in Bavaria and Thuringia, a seven-year term in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, and an eight-year-term in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein, the term of office varies across districts; in the former case from seven to nine years while in the latter – from six to eight years. Also varied are the district administrator's powers and prerogatives: in Bavaria, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, they are a full member of the district assembly and district committee and serve as their president; in Baden-Württemberg, the district administrator presides over the district assembly and internal committees;² in Rhineland-Palatinate, they head the district police office; in Saarland, they are a legal representative of the district, who carries out tasks assigned by the federal state administration and presides over the district assembly without the right to vote (for more see Honka 2018: 422-432; Kegel 2018: 497-499).

The second group is the directorial system model, which occurred in the states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. The name was derived from the office

² There is no district committee in Baden-Württemberg.

that played a key role, that is, the district director or district general director in charge of administration. Under this model, the district administrator was only the honorary president of the district assembly. Following the 1994 reform in North Rhine-Westphalia and the 1996 reform in Lower Saxony, the position of the district administrator took precedence with district directors performing their functions until the end of their terms (cf. Honka 2018: 432-433).

The third group is the district committee constitution, which is used in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (until 1996), Schleswig-Holstein (until 1998), Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia (until 1999) and Lower Saxony (since 1 November 2001). Here the most important body is the district committee. Changes in the district administrator election process were introduced gradually as the terms of district directors and district general directors were coming to an end. In Lower Saxony, the district administrator has been elected by the district assembly since 1996, while in Brandenburg – since 2010. By contrast, in North Rhine-Westphalia by 30 August 2008 and since the start of the new term they have been elected in a direct vote. In this constitutional model, the district administrator's position is much weaker than in the southern German model; they implement resolutions and deal with current business. In Hesse, the district administrator cannot take active part in the work of the district assembly whereas in Schleswig-Holstein they participate in the work of the assembly in an advisory capacity. Their term of office is eight years in Brandenburg, six years in Hesse, and five years in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony (for more see Honka 2018: 433-437; Kegel 2018: 497-499).

A candidate for the district administrator needs to meet statutory criteria. In Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, they need to be over 21 years of age while in Baden-Württemberg – over 30. In Brandenburg, a candidate cannot be over 57 years of age whereas in Bavaria, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Lower Saxony, they cannot be older than 65. In addition, a candidate needs to be a state official with judicial or higher civil service education (cf. Henneke 1996: 35-36; von der Heide 1993: 115-116; Henneke 1999: 142-143; Dolnicki 2003: 316-320; Vogelgesang, Lübking, Ulbrich 2005: 115-116; Honka 2018: 439).

Based on the analysis of district laws, it can be concluded that the district assembly is the most important institution in all federal states. It has a robust social mandate to exercise power since it is elected by popular vote and reflects the political face of the district as a unit of local government and a self-government community (cf. Seele 1991: 169; Waechter 1997: 269-273; Stober 1996: 53-54; Honka 2018: 439-440). The district assembly is elected for a four-year term in Schleswig-Holstein, a six-year term in Bavaria, and a five-year term in the remaining states. Differences across states can also be seen with regard to the head of this institution. In Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony and Thuringia, the district assembly is headed by the district administrator with the right to vote, who is elected by direct popular vote; in Saarland – by the district administrator without the right to vote, who is elected by direct popular vote; in Lower Saxony – by the voluntary district administrator with the right to vote, who is elected by the district assembly

from among its members; in Brandenburg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein – by the voluntary president with the right to vote, who is elected by the district assembly from among its members. After Germany's reunification, the district assembly is not a parliament in its literal sense because deputies have no legal immunity. Only their public statements, except for insults, are protected by law. Formally, deputies to the district assembly are not bound by any instructions; however, they are subject to faction discipline (cf. von der Heide 1993: 114-115; Henneke 1999: 141; Dolnicki 2003: 315-316; Vogegelsang, Lübking, Ulbrich 2005: 114-115; Honka 2018: 440-441; Kegel 2018: 496-497).

In some federal states, the second most important institution is the district committee. It has been established in Bavaria, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (additionally, it coordinates the work of the remaining committees and has the power to settle issues in emergency cases), Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia as a district assembly committee; in Schleswig-Holstein – as the major committee that coordinates the work of the remaining committees in the district assembly; in Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland (in the latter two states, it has the power to settle issues in emergency cases) – as an intermediate body of the district, the powers of which are defined by the district assembly; in Hesse – as district administration (cf. von der Heide 1993: 115; Henneke 1999: 142; Dolnicki 2003: 316; Vogelgesang, Lübking, Ulbrich 2005: 115; Honka 2018: 441-442; Kegel 2018: 499-500).

Changes in the local government associations

Local government reforms in the post-unification period have also impacted municipal associations of towns with adjacent areas. Their status in the hierarchical structure has been maintained. They have their own bodies which are either collegial, with delegated or elected members, and those that are chosen by a single person. Their term of office varies from five to eight years. These associations are responsible for implementing supra-local public tasks and some of the those assigned to their members to enhance their effectiveness in planning, transportation, economy, infrastructure and administration. Some of these associations, such as the Saarbrücken Regional Association (*Regionalverband Saarbrücken*) or the Stuttgart Regional Association (*Regionalverband Saarbrücken*) are regional associations. By contrast, the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main Metropolitan Region (*Metropolregion Frankfurt/Rhein-Main*), established in place of the Frankfurt Urban Association, is a mandatory regional and urban association. These associations have a positive impact on socio-economic growth and on the living standards of their inhabitants. The reason why they support the municipal associations of towns with adjacent areas is a sense of shared interests and goals. As a result, this kind of inter-municipal cooperation is still being developed and modified (cf. Hesse 2005: 38-49; for more see Honka 2018: 442-447; Seefried 2018: 616-628).

Changes have also affected superior municipal associations and consisted in the dissolution of this kind of self-government corporations or their transforming into

goal-oriented associations. In the latter case, changes were made to the legal form which had no impact on the nature of tasks. In the Bavarian governmental districts, the only change was the extension of the assembly's term from four to five years. Moreover, federal states with superior municipal associations came to include Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony. These associations are public law corporations with the right to self-governance through their collegial and monocratic bodies. They carry out social security tasks, bear the costs of inpatient and partially inpatient care for people who need spiritual, physical and mental support, and undertake integration efforts in the labour market among employers and employees (for more see Honka 2018: 447-451; Reis 2018b: 529-540).

Changes in the city-states

Germany's reunification in 1990 also brought substantial changes to the city-states of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. Berlin was reinstated as a single entity and is now a municipality, a municipal association, a federal state and the capital of the FRG.

From 1990 to 1995, Berlin was subdivided into 23 districts (or boroughs – *Bezirke*). In the 22 October 1995 referendum, its inhabitants approved a new constitution. Since then, the city has been subdivided into 14 districts, all of them having a greater territorial potential. Changes had an impact not only on the city's administrative subdivision but also on the working of the administration. Beginning on 3 April 1998, the number of deputies to the state parliament of Berlin (*Abgeordnetenhaus*) was reduced to 130. The executive body, that is the Senate (the government) was also reduced. The Senate consists of the governing mayor and eight senators (at the time of the reunification there were 16). The reason for those reductions was an attempt to make the administration more effective and cost-efficient. Quantitative changes were also made to the district assemblies, by increasing the number of deputies from 45 to 55. The rationale behind those reforms was to change the population potential and the size of the city's administrative units (cf. Honka 2018: 451-452).

Along with Berlin's reunification, the most important change was the introduction of solutions that granted its inhabitants more powers to participate in the decision-making process both at the district and state levels. At the state level, they included a citizens' initiative and a citizens' request while at the district level – a citizens' request and a referendum. At the state level, the right to submit a citizens' initiative is given to all inhabitants of Berlin. By contrast, a citizens' request can concern the adoption of laws, amendments to laws and removal of laws, yet only with regard to acquired competences and shortening of the term of the state parliament. The citizens' request procedure excludes issues of budget, salaries, supplies, taxes, tariffs of public companies as well as HR decisions (for more see Honka 2018: 452-453).

At the district level, the right to submit a citizens' request is given to its inhabitants. The request can apply to all issues that are decided by the district assembly. The citizens' request and referendum cannot concern financial issues. Decisions require a simple majority in the referendum (Honka 2018: 453-454).

Equally important changes were introduced in the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, where the act of 29 May 1996 abolished the Senate's (government's) right to raise objections to the decisions made by the Hamburg Parliament (*Hamburgische Bürgerschaft*). Instead, the city's inhabitants and the Senate of Hamburg were granted the right to propose citizen legislative initiatives. The legislative initiative procedure excludes budget, taxes and fees of public companies. It is not possible to launch citizen legislative initiatives three months before the end of the term. Any amendments to laws adopted by the referendum can take effect two years after the referendum has been held (for more see Honka 2018: 454-455).

The changes that were introduced in Hamburg have also had an impact on mutual relations between government institutions. The Hamburg Parliament has the right to elect and dismiss only the first mayor and to administer the senators' oath. By contrast, the appointment and dismissal of the second mayor and the senators are the sole prerogatives of the first mayor. To become a senator, a candidate does not have to reside in Hamburg; however, upon taking office they are obliged to reside there. If a deputy to the Hamburg Parliament is appointed senator, they lose their seat unless, pursuant to a separate law, they are allowed to keep it. The Hamburg Parliament can dismiss the first mayor with an absolute majority. This does not result in the dismissal of the entire Senate, which continues to work until the election of a new mayor (Honka 2018: 455).

The 1994 reform in the federal state of Bremen brought about important changes. The number of deputies to the Parliament of Bremen (*Bremische Bürgerschaft*) has been reduced to 83 (67 from Bremen and 16 from Bremerhaven). A new solution is to shorten the term of the legislature by a two-thirds majority vote or through a citizens' social initiative. Other solutions that were introduced concerned a referendum, a citizens' social initiative and a citizens' request at the level of the municipalities of Bremen and Bremerhaven. A referendum in Bremen can be held following the Parliament's decision or at the request of 10 percent of Bremen's eligible voters. The referendum procedure excludes the city's budget, taxes, public and legal fees and the collection of charges. The inhabitants of Bremen can also submit expert requests for changes in resolutions if they are endorsed by at least 2% of the city's inhabitants over 16 years of age. This procedure excludes issues of the city's budget, public and legal fees and HR policy. In Bremerhaven, a referendum can be called in two ways: by the city's assembly or at the request of an initiative group. The inhabitants of Bremerhaven can also submit citizens' requests for changes in resolutions under the same terms as in Bremen (for more see Göbel 2007: 777-795; Honka 2018: 455-457).

Trends in changes to German local government after 2017

Very important changes in the working of local government came into force on 1 January 2020. Pursuant to the act of 1 June 2017 on the reform of financial relations between the federal government and the states, the solidarity surcharge, paid by richer states to poorer ones, was abolished. It was replaced by VAT receipts for the federal states, with rates dependent on the level of the states' economic devel-

opment. This amount will be supplemented by subsidies from the federal budget, totalling nearly 10 billion per year. In return, the states transferred in full to the federal government the management of motorways and national roads, and in part, the administration of schools, the financial control of the federal states and the control of treasury services. Moreover, the federal government was granted the right to provide direct assistance to municipalities threatened with bankruptcy without the federal state's prior consent, which by then was forbidden by the Basic Law (for more see Niespor 2017: 1-2; *Die Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen*, Monatsbericht des BMF August 2017: 1-11).

The reforms passed on 1 June 2017 and approved by the *Bundesrat* the following day are solutions that are bound to have an impact not only on the relations between the federal government, with its increased role, and the federal states, but also on the way local government works. However, it will take a few years before the outcomes of these changes can be fully assessed. These reforms also entail some threats, such as excessive centralisation caused by the restricted autonomy of the federal states and local government. So far, guarantees in that respect were provided by the Basic Law and principled case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. In view of the above, of key importance will be the results of subsequent elections to the Bundestag as they will have an impact on the potential emergence of a political force that may abuse the current position of the federal government in relation to the federal states and local government.

Equally important will also be whether subsequent changes will be made regarding local government institutions at the urban and municipal levels. For several years, there has been an ongoing discussion among inhabitants of municipalities and local government politicians on the introduction of restrictions in the number and duration of the mayor's or lord mayor's terms of office. At present there are no such restrictions in this respect. The mayor or lord mayor can be re-elected for an unlimited number of terms unless they reach the retirement age of 65 while in office (Breining 2012; Wallbaum 2013; Lemke 2018; Seng 2019; *Braucht Bayern ...* 2019).

CONCLUSION

Local government in Germany is doubtless one of the most important institutions in the country's political system, and as a permanent component thereof, it complements the principle of German federalism. Germany's local government has a special position: after World War II, it was instrumental in the restoration of democracy and unity in West Germany as well as in Germany's reunification. At present, as one of the cornerstones of the German state, it is the third echelon in the development of the state and administration. The present contribution, which addresses constitutional and structural changes of Germany's local government over the span of 30 years since the country's reunification, seeks to show this process and provide a critical reflection, which aims to balance this problem in all forms of German self-governance.

It has been shown in the present paper that the constitutional and structural changes in re-unified Germany have not resulted in uniform legislative solutions at the level of local government for the entire country. The changes in German local government have led to the more effective management of various forms of self-government, the growth of democracy and citizens having a greater impact on the government. Doubtless in formal solutions there are a number of similarities between the groups of constitutional models; however, the differences which have shaped German local government not only over the past 30 years and not only in the West German federal states in 1945-1990 have left their mark on the development of constitutional models of local government. Many of these differences date back to as early as the 19th century. Hence, despite a decreased number of constitutional models and multiple similarities in formal solutions, federal states continue to vary with regard to the adopted models of local government. These differences are rooted in the rise of local government in the 19th century, when the German empire was composed of a wide range of states.

The constitutional and structural changes in the post-reunification period were based on lessons learned from the 1970s reforms pursued in the West German federal states, which were instrumental in the better, more effective and rapid implementation of changes. At present, it is difficult to explicitly determine the effects of the most recent ongoing reform, which was passed in 2017 and pursued since the early 2020. However, a number of questions still need to be resolved and these cannot be as yet answered decisively. For example, how real are the threats resulting from the delegation of some powers of the federal states and local government units to the federal government? Perhaps the next elections to the *Bundestag* will provide an answer to this question. Thus, it will be necessary to follow closely the German political stage, pending the election results. This might not be the last local government reform as for the past few years a public debate has been taking place on whether to introduce the limit of terms that a mayor or a lord mayor can serve. This is a complex issue, as on the one hand this solution leads to rotation of those holding this post and increased democratisation of life; on the other hand, however, it forces changes even if a municipality is managed by a capable administrator, who enjoys the trust of its inhabitants.

Under Germany's federal system, specific local government legislation is passed and implemented by the federal states. Each direct interference of the federal government in local government tasks (e.g. financial support for local government units) was unconstitutional and required the consent of a federal state. Hence, the 2017 reform required the consent of the federal states to amend the Basic Law.

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ABSTRACT

Local government is one of the most important institutions of a democracy based on the rule of law in Germany. Its position and role were shaped immediately after the end of World War II. This paper aims to present and evaluate the constitutional and structural changes that have taken place in German local government within the 30 years of the post-unification period.

The present study is based on the hypothesis that the constitutional and structural changes of German local government in the past 30 years have aimed to make its bodies and institutions work more effectively as well as to strengthen and deepen democracy, thus increasing its impact on the federal government. These changes have not resulted in the development of a uniform legal system and model of local government in the entire country of Germany.

The constitutional and structural transformations of German local government can be analysed from the point of view of political, legal, historical and geographical science as this issue is multidimensional and diverse in nature. Therefore, various research methodologies have been used in the present study; these include methods employed in historical sciences, a statistical method, a systems analysis method, an institutional and legal analysis method, a decision-making method and a deductive method, as well as research procedures such as the review of documents, analysis and criticism of the existing literature and secondary analysis of other authors' research findings.

It has been found that the constitutional and structural transformations of German local government which took place as a result of non-unified reforms did not lead to the development of a uniform body of legislation concerning local government for the entire country, despite the similarity of many legal solutions. These changes have resulted in the more effective management of various forms of self-government, the development of democracy and citizens' greater impact on the federal government.

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CLIMATE PROTECTION AT THE HEART OF THE ENERGY TRANSITION PROCESS IN GERMANY¹

INTRODUCTION

A triangle of energy policy goals, encompassing security of supplies, competitiveness, and sustainable development (in accordance with environmental and climate protection requirements), has been embedded in Germany's process of energy transition (*Energiewende*). For the purpose of this article, energy policy is defined as "the entirety of the decisions taken by the government or by appointed offices and institutions with the aim of creating conditions for the proper development and functioning of the energy sector. They relate to the processes of production, distribution and consumption of fuels and energy, and include the phases of planning and shaping of the energy system, as well as the creation and implementation of regulations" (Molo 2013: 25). Energy transition, in turn, is a process of moving from forms of economic development that generate high emissions to a system based on the use of renewable energy sources. The goals formulated and the measures proposed to facilitate the German energy transition are necessary to ensure supplies of energy that will be friendly to the environment and the climate. From the federal government's perspective, energy transition is a central element of effective climate policy, and its implementation means ensuring both the delivery of climate-neutral consumable energy, and the effective use of that energy. Climate policy is understood as "a type of political activity at internal and international level oriented towards reducing or halting the progression and impact of global warming" (Molo 2019a: 193). The principal way in which that goal is to be attained is the limitation of emissions of greenhouse gases; the means of achieving this objective include the development of renewable energy sources, increased energy effectiveness, and energy saving. Germany is faced with problems of energy transition that are not without impact on the effectiveness of climate policy, which is largely shaped by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (*Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz*, EEG). Key factors here enabling Germany to meet its climate protection

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goals, apart from an increased pace of development of renewable energy sources, include the phasing out of coal and the setting of targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction in particular sectors of the economy.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the energy transition measures, focused on climate protection, that were developed in the years 2019–2020 by the German federal government, sometimes in conjunction with the federal states, and the CDU/CSU and SPD groups in the Bundestag. In this context, the following research questions are posed:

- What progress has been made towards the goals set for the development of renewable energy sources and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in particular sectors of the economy?
- What instruments have been adopted under the Climate Package?
- What is the plan for phasing out coal-based energy production?
- What measures are proposed to increase the pace of development of renewable energy sources?

To achieve the research objective and to provide an answer to the above questions, the author has applied the methods of factor and content analysis, as well as the elements of the decision-based method. Analysis has been made of documents, statistical data, studies, and publicity materials.

ATTAINMENT OF CLIMATE PROTECTION GOALS IN ENERGY TRANSITION

Energy transition in Germany is based on three pillars: the shut-down of nuclear power stations by 2022, the development of renewable energy sources, and increased energy efficiency; the latter two being key to progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. An additional component, significant for the achievement of Germany's long-term goal of climate neutrality, is the phasing out of coal in energy production by 2038. Data will be presented below concerning the development of renewable energy sources and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in particular sectors of the economy, reflecting progress towards meeting the objectives and targets in these areas, and serving as a point of reference for decisions on the introduction of additional measures to enable Germany to meet its medium- and long-term climate obligations.

Renewable energy sources

According to the 2010 Energy Concept, renewable sources would account for 18% of gross final energy consumption by 2020, and this would rise to 30% by 2030, 45% by 2040, and 60% by 2050. Moreover, renewable-source electricity would account for 35% of gross electricity consumption by 2020, rising to 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80% by 2050 (BMW 2010). The amended Renewable Energy Sources Act, which came into force on 1 August 2014, set additional intermediate targets: the aforementioned figure was to increase to 40–45% by 2025 and to 55–60% by 2035. In

the coalition agreement signed by the CDU/CSU and SPD on 12 March 2018, it was stated that efforts would be made to achieve a 65% share of renewable-source energy in gross electricity consumption by 2030. It was agreed necessary to strengthen the expansion of renewable energy sources, also in order to cover increased demand for electricity in such a way as to achieve the climate target in transport, construction and industry (Bundesregierung 2018: 71).

With the achievement of a 53.2% share in German national energy production, renewables reinforced their position as the most important native energy source (cf. Schill, Diekmann, Püttner 2019); for the sake of comparison brown coal (lignite) accounted for a 33.2% share. Since 1990, there has been constant growth in the percentage of primary energy consumption accounted for by renewable sources (in 2019 it was 14.8%, compared with 35.3% for mineral oils and 24.9% for natural gas). Likewise, there has been an increase in the contribution of renewables to gross final energy consumption, and – especially since 2010 – to gross electricity consumption (AGEB 2020: 2, 9). In 2019, the share of renewables in gross final energy consumption in Germany was 17.1%, compared with 16.5% in 2018. The total percentage share of renewables in gross electricity consumption in 2019 was 42.1%, broken down into 20.9% for wind power, around 7.8% for solar power, 7.4% for biomass, 8.2% for biogenic waste, and around 3.3% for hydropower (BMU 2020: 30, 33). By 2030 it is projected that total installed capacity in the case of solar power will increase from the current 45 GW to 98 GW, while onshore wind power capacity will grow to 67–71 GW, and offshore wind power capacity will increase from 15 GW to 20 GW (with a further rise to 40 GW by 2040).

The production of renewable-source electricity has risen, while the output of coal-fired power stations has fallen. Compared with 2018, electricity production from black (bituminous) coal fell by 31% to reach approximately 114 bn kWh, while production from brown coal decreased by 22% to 53 bn kWh, and production by gas-fired power stations increased by 10% to 91 bn kWh (AGEB 2020: 26). Natural gas has increased in importance as a transitional fuel in the process of conversion of the energy system. Gas-fired power stations are better suited than their coal-fired and nuclear equivalents to compensate for the natural fluctuations in renewable energy production. Renewable-source electricity production in 2019 totalled 244.3 bn kWh (up from 224.8 bn kWh in 2018), of which output from solar power increased by approximately 4% in 2019 (to 47.5 bn kWh from 45.8 bn in 2018). Following the highest annual increase in solar power capacity in 2012 (8161 MW), there was initially a significant decrease in new capacity, but since 2015 there has again been annual growth. In 2019, the increase in net capacity was 3835 MW, 32% more than the previous year's increase (2888 MW). Total installed solar power capacity at the end of 2019 was 49,016 MW, against 45,181 MW a year earlier (UBA 2020: 7, 8).

Onshore and offshore wind power produced 126 bn kWh of electricity in 2019, a rise of almost 15% over the 2018 figure (110 bn kWh). Following the record growth attained in 2017 (4891 MW), newly built net onshore wind power capacity fell from 2273 MW in 2018 to 886 MW in 2019. At the end of 2019, the total net-

power of onshore wind turbines was 53,333 MW. The number of turbines added to the network in 2017 was 2489, while in 2019 it was just 287. The negative trend was further reinforced by the Covid pandemic: in the first half of 2020, the total capacity of new wind turbines (both on- and offshore) was 811 MW. New offshore wind power capacity installed in 2019 totalled 1111 MW (compared with 990 MW in 2018), representing a rise in total capacity by over 17%, from 6396 MW at the end of 2018 to 7507 MW at the end of 2019. Electricity output from offshore wind farms in 2019 amounted to 24.7 bn kWh, up by almost 27% on the 2018 figure of 19.5 bn kWh (UBA 2020: 9).

The decline in the pace of construction of onshore wind farms is affecting the implementation of energy transition, and particularly progress towards the 2030 targets for the share of renewables in gross electricity consumption and for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. One of the reasons for the slowdown is a lack of permits for the construction of new wind turbines. Compared with 2014–2016, the average number of permits in the last three years is down by about 75%. Moreover, in recent years there has been a significant increase in the time needed for the approval and completion of projects, largely as a result of the growing number of legal proceedings, which occur in the case of almost two-fifths of approved projects. Almost one-third of legal challenges concern facilities that are already in operation (total power capacity 302 MW), which cannot be used until the legal dispute is settled. However, seven in ten challenges concern projects that have won approval, but have not yet been built (total power capacity 709 MW). Another relevant factor is the restriction of areas available for onshore wind power expansion due to regional planning decisions and air traffic control regulations, in addition to court action by environmental organisations and local communities (Quentin 2019).

Biomass was used to produce approximately 50.4 bn kWh of electricity in 2019 (compared with 50.9 bn kWh in 2018). Electricity produced from biomass made up around 8.7% of total gross electricity consumption. Output from hydroelectric plants rose by around 12% to reach 20.2 bn kWh (from 18 bn kWh in 2018), which is approximately 3.5% of total gross electricity consumption. Electricity from geothermal energy amounted to 0.2 bn kWh, a rise of around 10% over 2018, although this source still accounted for less than 0.1% of Germany's total gross electricity consumption (UBA 2020: 10). The overall share of renewables in gross electricity production increased to approximately 39.9% in 2019, from 34.9% in 2018 (AGEB 2020: 27). It should also be noted that the share of renewable sources in the consumption of energy for heating and cooling rose insignificantly from 14.3% in 2018 to 14.5% in 2019, while in the transport sector the share of renewables in final energy consumption remained at a level of 5.6% (UBA 2020: 6).

Greenhouse gas emissions

The 2010 Energy Concept included the target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40%, in comparison with 1990 levels, by 2020 (a reduction by approxi-

mately 500m tonnes CO₂ equivalent, to reach 750m tonnes), with the reduction to reach 55% by 2030 (a total fall of 688m tonnes to reach 562m tonnes CO₂ equivalent), 70% by 2040, and 80–95% by 2050 (BMW_i 2010). Achievement of the target of a 40% reduction in emissions by 2020 was to be supported by the “Climate Action Programme 2020” (*Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020*) adopted by the federal government on 3 December 2014. It contained a list of actions which were expected to trigger a reduction of between 62m and 78m tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2020 (BMUB 2014). The “Climate Action Plan 2050” (*Klimaschutzplan 2050*), adopted by the federal government in November 2016, sets the following greenhouse gas reduction targets to be achieved by 2030 by particular sectors: 62–61% in the energy sector, 67–66% in construction, 42–40% in transport, 51–49% in industry, and 34–31% in agriculture – these reductions being relative to 1990 figures (1248m tonnes CO₂ equivalent) (BMUB 2016). Experts noted that the target of a 40% reduction in emissions by 2020 would not be achieved without additional highly ambitious measures (Graichen, Peter, Litz 2017: 4, 5). This issue could not be ignored by the parties making up the prospective governing coalition following the elections to the Bundestag in the autumn of 2017. Hence, the aforementioned 2018 coalition agreement reached between the CDU/CSU and SPD contained a declaration that the target set for 2020 would be achieved “as quickly as possible”. There was also confirmation of the will to achieve the greenhouse emissions target for 2030, and an undertaking to pass a law embodying that target (Bundesregierung 2018: 142–143). As a supplement to the “Climate Action Plan 2050”, in 2019 there was prepared and adopted a “Climate Action Programme 2030” (*Klimaschutzprogramm 2030*), which includes multiple actions in the energy, industrial, construction, transport, agricultural and waste management sectors to enable all of the sectors to achieve their reduction targets for 2030. The Federal Climate Change Act (*Klimaschutzgesetz*, KSG), which came into effect on 18 December 2019, defines annual greenhouse gas emission budgets for particular sectors of the economy in the years 2020–2030 (cf. Table 1). By 2030, emissions are to be reduced by at least 55% relative to 1990 (section 3(1)). In Schedule 2 (to section 4 of the act) the permissible annual level of emissions in 2020 from all sectors is set at 813m tonnes CO₂ equivalent, which represents a 35% reduction relative to 1990 (KSG 2019).

Greenhouse gas emissions in 2019 totalled 805m tonnes (approximately 54m tonnes less than in 2018), which represents a reduction of 35.7% compared with 1990 levels. These emissions were broken down by sector as follows: energy 32%, industry 23%, transport 20%, construction 15%, agriculture 8%, and waste management 1%. The greatest contribution to the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 has come from the energy sector, which has achieved a reduction of 212m tonnes CO₂ equivalent, compared with reductions of 96m tonnes from industry, 88m tonnes from construction, 22m tonnes from agriculture, and 29m tonnes from waste management, while emissions from the transport sector have remained stable since the early 1990s (BMU 2020: 26, 28).

Table 1
Annual permissible emissions in 2020–2030

Annual permissible emissions (MtCO ₂ -eq)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
Energy sector	280		257								175
Industry	186	182	177	172	168	163	158	154	149	145	140
Construction	118	113	108	103	99	94	89	84	80	75	70
Transport	150	145	139	134	128	123	117	112	106	101	95
Agriculture	70	68	67	66	65	64	63	61	60	59	58
Waste management and others	9	9	8	8	7	7	7	6	6	5	5

Source: Federal Climate Change Act (*Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz*, KSG).

In 2019, emissions in the energy sector amounted to 254m tonnes CO₂ equivalent (17% down on the 2018 figure of 305m tonnes). The reduction in emissions was achieved thanks to the use of renewable energy sources and the replacement of coal with natural gas. Apart from the low gas prices on international markets, a significant factor was the reform of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which led to higher prices for CO₂ emissions allowances. The average price per tonne of CO₂ in 2019 was €24.65, almost twice as high as in 2018. As a result, coal-fired power stations were often more expensive to operate than gas-fired plants. In the years 1990–2019, greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector fell by 45%. Experts note the large potential for emission reductions in the sector; the annual figure is expected to fall to 175m tonnes CO₂ equivalent by 2030. The Federal Climate Change Act defines permissible annual emissions for the energy sector only for the years 2020, 2022 and 2030 (cf. Table 1). The main areas of actions taken to protect the climate are the phasing out of coal in electricity production, the development of renewable energy sources for electricity production and for transportation and heating, and improvements in energy efficiency (BMU 2020: 29, 31).

Greenhouse gas emissions in industry fell by 4% in 2019 compared with 2018, reaching a total of 188m tonnes CO₂ equivalent. From 1990 to 2019, the figure fell by 34%, especially in recent years due to process optimisation and improved energy efficiency. By 2030 the sector's emissions are to be reduced stepwise to 140m tonnes CO₂ equivalent, a reduction of 25% compared with 2019 levels (*ibidem*: 33). The transport sector is the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases in Germany (after the energy and industrial sectors). In 2019 its emissions amounted to 163m tonnes CO₂ equivalent. Between 1990 and 2018 these emissions fell by just 1%, from 164m to 162m tonnes CO₂ equivalent. The main reasons for the continuing high emissions in the transport sector include the dominance of fossil fuels and the growing number of

passenger and freight travels by road and air. It is expected that by 2030, emissions from the transport sector will have fallen by 42% compared with 1990. To achieve the permissible annual emissions level of 95m tonnes CO₂ equivalent by 2030, the sector will have to undergo a fundamental transformation (ibidem: 36). In the construction sector, emissions in 2019 were 4% higher than in 2018, at 122m tonnes CO₂ equivalent, although from 1990 to 2019 they decreased by 42%. However, a reduction of 52m tonnes is required in order to achieve the target set for 2030 (70m tonnes CO₂ equivalent, a reduction of 62% relative to 1990). Emissions in the construction sector are mainly caused by the burning of fossil fuels to heat rooms and to provide hot water. Since 2010, these emissions have been falling by about 3% annually. About 60% of energy consumption in the sector goes on indoor heating. In spite of efforts, the annual thermal modernisation index remains at just 1%, below the target of 1.5% (ibidem: 40–41). In agriculture, emissions fell by 2% in 2019 (compared with 2018) to reach 68m tonnes CO₂ equivalent. In the period 1990–2019, emissions decreased by 24%, although since 2000 the scale of the reduction has been smaller. The largest contributors to agricultural emissions are land use and animal farming, which account respectively for 35.9% and 35.3% of the total (ibidem: 42). Here emissions of CO₂ play a secondary role, but methane and nitrous oxide emissions are particularly significant. By 2030, emissions in this sector are projected to have fallen by 36% compared with the 1990 level, that is, they should reach 58m tonnes CO₂ equivalent. Emissions of greenhouse gases from wastes totalled 9.1m tonnes CO₂ equivalent in 2019, down by 5% compared with 2018 and by almost 76% compared with 1990 (ibidem: 44). The main reasons for this include the mandatory technical specifications for waste removal and recycling, and the ban on disposing of unprocessed organic municipal wastes.

According to initial estimates from McKinsey, at the peak of the lockdown introduced due to the Covid epidemic, in early April 2020, Germany's daily emissions fell by approximately 26%. This reduction was made possible by the significant curtailment of economic and social activity. If such a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions could be maintained for a longer period, the target set for 2030 would probably be achieved (McKinsey 2020).

NEW CLIMATE PROTECTION MEASURES IN ENERGY TRANSITION

In the process of energy transition related to climate policy, the focus on instruments serving to reduce greenhouse gas emissions gives rise to certain challenges, relating to the move away from coal in energy production, the adoption of a roadmap for emission reductions in the transport and construction sectors, and faster development of renewable energy sources (cf. Pritzl 2020: 702). Faced with the growth of the Fridays for Future social movement and the ambitious proposals formulated for measures to protect the climate, combined with criticism of the measures so far introduced – coming both from opposition parties, chiefly Alliance 90/The Greens, and from environmental organisations – the federal government has been compelled

to act. On 20 March 2019, a climate cabinet (*Klimakabinett*) was formed, consisting of the federal chancellor together with the ministers of finance, environment, economy and energy, transport, agriculture, and the interior and building. It has the task of ensuring the implementation of the “Climate Action Plan 2050”, including, in particular, attainment of the targets set for 2030. The means and goals of climate protection are included in the Climate Package (*Klimapaket: Klimaschutzprogramm 2030, Bundes-Klimaschutzgesetz, nationaler Brennstoffemissionshandel*). Below we shall consider the measures of importance for energy transition and climate policy included in that package, serving to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the move away from coal and the accelerated development of renewable energy sources.

The Climate Package

On 20 September 2019, the climate cabinet presented the main points of the Climate Action Programme 2030 (*Eckpunkte des Klimaschutzprogramms 2030*), which include instruments in the energy, transport, construction, industrial and agricultural sectors, expected to ensure achievement of the target of a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. A key measure for climate protection was to be the introduction of a national system of trading in CO₂ emission allowances not covered by the European Union’s system (EU ETS), with a price per tonne of CO₂ set at €10 in 2021, €20 in 2022, €25 in 2023, €30 in 2024, and €35 in 2025. From 2026 the price would be determined by auction, with a minimum price of €35 and a maximum of €60 per tonne of CO₂. All of the revenue obtained would be returned to the public through promotions of climate protection measures, or direct tax relief. The scheme is expected to lead to a fall in the price of electricity, for example due to the decrease in the renewable energy sources charge: in 2021 by 0.25 cents per kWh (from the current 6.405 cents), in 2022 by a further 0.25 cents, and in 2023 by 0.125 cents. The proposed measures included, for example, an increase in tax relief for energy renovation of buildings, the introduction of financial assistance for people wishing to replace old oil boilers, and expansion of programmes to support the optimisation of production processes in industry. The document provided for the ending of the use of coal in energy production by 2038, together with measures to increase the share of renewable sources in electricity production to 65% by 2030. To increase the acceptability of on-shore wind farm construction, a regulation was proposed setting a minimum distance of 1000 metres between wind turbines and residential areas. It was also planned to increase the capacity of offshore wind farms to 20 GW by 2030, and to remove the upper limit on financial support for solar panel installations. Measures for the transport sector included the development of charging infrastructure for electric cars (by 2030 it is projected that there will be 7 to 10 million such vehicles on German roads), increased support for the purchase of new electric cars, higher tax on high-emission vehicles, investment in rail infrastructure (network expansion and modernisation) and in local public transport, an increase in the price of air tickets, and a reduction in the VAT rate on rail tickets from 19% to 7% from 1 January 2020. All legal measures for

the implementation of this programme were to be approved by the federal government in 2019 (Bundesregierung 2019).

Ultimately, the “Climate Action Programme 2030” was prepared on the basis of the main points and proposals for action by the responsible ministries, and was approved by the federal government on 9 October 2019. It consists of four elements that serve to reduce CO₂ emissions:

- 1) programmes to finance and encourage reductions in emissions. Measures include public investment, improvement of comprehensive support programmes, and the introduction of new tax instruments ensuring significant savings in the energy, transport, construction, industrial and agricultural sectors. The package has a total value of approximately €55 billion in the years 2020–2023;
- 2) introduction of a national system of trading in CO₂ emission allowances from 2021, intended to stimulate economically effective innovations and to enable reductions in CO₂ emissions. The price of emissions from the burning of fuel oil, natural gas, LPG, coal, petrol and diesel will be gradually increased, to make alternative, climate-friendly energy sources more attractive to those making investment decisions in the areas of transport and heating;
- 3) revenue from CO₂ allowances to be invested in climate protection measures or returned to the public in the form of tax relief. With the introduction of prices for CO₂ emissions, the public will see a fall in electricity prices due to a decrease in the renewable energy sources charge by a billion euro annually. The launch of a national system of trading in CO₂ emissions is expected to lead to a reduction in emissions from transport and heating and to encourage increased investment in low-emission technologies;
- 4) regulatory measures in particular sectors. In the energy sector: ending the use of coal for energy production by 2038; an increase in the share of renewable sources in gross electricity production to 65% by 2030; increased capacity of on- and offshore wind farms, solar power, and cogeneration installations. In construction: the introduction of tax incentives for heat insulation of buildings; premiums for the replacement of old oil boilers. In transport: (for example) the development of passenger and goods transportation by rail; increased attractiveness of public transport; expansion of cycle paths and cycle parking; support for advanced biofuels and low-emission cars and trucks; expansion of the charging infrastructure for electric cars; tax incentives for electric mobility (BMWi 2019a).

Environmental organisations and opposition parties judged the measures contained in the “Climate Action Programme 2030” to be insufficient in terms of meeting Germany’s climate undertakings. A particular subject of criticism was the setting of the price of CO₂ emissions at an initial level of €10 per tonne in 2021. The federal government responded that the emission prices took account of the budgets of the less wealthy and the need to maintain the competitiveness of German firms in a situation where they were being burdened with additional costs (Kreutzfeldt 2019). The CO₂ emission prices were included in a bill on national trading in fuel emission allowances,

which was passed by the Bundestag on 15 November 2019, and then by the Bundesrat on 29 November. The new law (*Gesetz über einen nationalen Zertifikatehandel für Brennstoffemissionen*, BEHG) entered into force on 20 December 2019.

Some elements of the Climate Package were also criticised by the federated states, which appealed for, among other things, a change to the allocation of financial obligations arising from the package. For example, Daniel Günther (CDU), Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, proposed an initial price of €40 instead of €10 per tonne of CO₂ emissions, as well as a comprehensive review of the system of taxes and charges in the energy sector, emphasising the need for cheaper electricity produced from renewable sources, enabling it to be used in other areas (Schleswig-Holstein stellt... 2019; Bundesrat stoppt wichtige... 2019). On 29 November 2019, the Bundesrat unanimously approved the appointment of a Mediation Commission, made up of Bundestag and Bundesrat members, to consider the provisions of an act implementing the “Climate Action Programme 2030” in tax law (*Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Klimaschutzprogramms 2030 im Steuerrecht*), i.e. increasing relief for commuters, reducing VAT on rail tickets, and providing tax relief for building renovations (Bundesrat stoppt Teile... 2019).

A compromise finalised by the Mediation Commission on 18 December 2019 provided for an increase in the price of CO₂ emissions in the transport and construction sectors (see Edenhofer, Kalkuhl, Ockenfels 2020). On 20 May 2020, the federal government approved an amending bill (*Gesetz zur Änderung des Brennstoffemissions-handelsgesetzes*) that set a price of €25 per tonne of CO₂ in 2021. According to calculations of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, this is equivalent to 7 cents per litre of petrol, 8 cents per litre of diesel, 8 cents per litre of fuel oil, and 0.5 cents per kWh for natural gas. In subsequent years, the price per tonne of CO₂ emissions will rise accordingly: to €30 in 2022, €35 in 2023, €45 in 2024, and €55 in 2025. After that, emission allowances will be sold by auction, with a minimum price of €55 and a maximum of €65 per tonne of CO₂ (CO₂-Preise steigen... 2020). The amending act came into effect on 10 November 2020.

A part of the Climate Package was the aforementioned Federal Climate Change Act. A draft law was published on 18 February 2019 by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Section 1 set out the goal of achieving “emissions neutrality” by 2050, while section 3(1) laid down that greenhouse gas emissions would be gradually reduced relative to 1990 levels: by at least 40% by 2020, by at least 55% by 2030, by at least 70% by 2040, and by at least 95% by 2050. To achieve the goals set out in section 3(1), emission reductions were laid down in section 4(1) for the following sectors: energy, industry, transport, construction, agriculture, and waste management and others. The draft law set out not only emission reduction targets for each sector for the period to 2030, but also actions to be taken each year to counteract “deficits in attaining targets” at an early stage. If annual emission limits were exceeded, the responsible ministry would have to purchase emission allowances out of its own budget (BMU 2019). The proposal was controversial from the perspective of the federal ministries responsible for the transport and con-

struction sectors, which are far from achieving their set goals for emission reduction. The CDU did not agree to the setting of “rigid” reduction targets for sectors, emphasising the need to utilise innovations and new technologies for climate protection (Molo 2019b). Finally, on 9 October 2019, the federal government approved a climate law. As mentioned above, the resulting act came into force on 18 December 2019 and sets the aim of achieving emissions neutrality by 2050 (section 1), thus referring to Germany’s undertakings made at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in September 2019. Section 4(1) laid down that, in order to achieve the national climate protection targets pursuant to section 3(1), annual reduction targets were to be established by defining annual quantities of emissions for the following sectors: energy, industry, transport, construction, agriculture, and waste management and others. If the planned reduction in emissions is not achieved in a given sector, the responsible ministry must present actions to be taken under a remedial programme. The act provides for the possibility of amending the annual sector targets and transferring permissible quantities of emissions between the transport, construction and agriculture sectors. This may be done by decision of the federal government, subject to the condition that the final reduction target for 2030 is maintained. The federal government is to present to the Bundestag, among other things, annual reports on implementation of the act and plans for subsequent years. At the same time, the Expert Council on Climate Issues (*Expertenrat für Klimafragen*) is to support the federal government in implementing the Federal Climate Change Act, including by making annual evaluations of progress in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (KSG 2019).

The move away from coal

On 26 January 2019, the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment (*Kommission für Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Beschäftigung*) published a final report in which it recommended that the last coal-fired power station be closed by 2038 at the latest. Also, in 2032 an assessment was to be made of the possibility of accelerating the closure of all brown coal mines and power stations, to take place by 2035. The commission also considered an earlier start to the phase-out of coal: it proposed that operating coal-fired power station capacity be reduced by 12.5 GW (out of a total of approximately 45 GW) by 2022, recommending that by 2030 the remaining capacity should be just 17 GW (black coal 8 GW, brown coal 9 GW). Implementation of these recommendations would make a significant contribution to achieving the greenhouse gas reduction targets set for 2030 (BMWi 2019b). The report was intended to be used by the federal government as a basis for adopting appropriate legislation.

On 22 May 2019, the federal government approved the key points of a law on structural support for mining regions (BMWi 2019c), and on 28 August it approved a bill drawn up on that basis (*Entwurf eines Strukturstärkungsgesetzes Kohleregionen*). By 2038, brown coal mining regions would receive financial aid totalling €14 billion (€5.5 bn in 2020–2026, €4.5 bn in 2027–2032, and €4 bn in 2033–2038). The aid was to be distributed among regions as follows: 43% for the Lusatian re-

gion (divided 60:40 between Brandenburg and Saxony), 37% to the Rhine region, and 20% to the Central German region (divided 60:40 between Saxony-Anhalt and Saxony). A further €26 billion was to be invested by the federal government in such areas as the development of transport infrastructure in coal-mining regions (BMW 2019d).

Extended negotiations between the federal government and the states where brown coal mines and power stations are situated, also involving the operators of those facilities, caused delays in the presentation of a bill on the cessation of energy production from coal. The matter of dispute concerned compensation for businesses in case of earlier closure of coal-fired power stations (cf. Oei, Kendzioriski, Herpich et al. 2020). On 11 November 2019, the aforementioned bill was published; apart from the phasing out of energy production from coal by 2038, it also contained provisions on renewable energy sources, including the setting of a minimum 1000-metre distance between newly built wind turbines and residential neighbourhoods. The distance regulation was to apply in the case of neighbourhoods containing as few as five households. This regulation was the subject of an objection from Federal Environment Minister Svenja Schulze, which meant that the bill was not approved as planned on 20 November 2019.

On 15 January 2020, a meeting was held at the Chancellery between representatives of the federal government – Chancellor Angela Merkel, Deputy Chancellor and Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, Economy and Energy Minister Peter Altmaier, Environment Minister Svenja Schulze, and head of the Chancellery Helge Braun – and the minister-presidents of federated states where brown coal mines and power plants operate: Armin Laschet of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dietmar Woidke of Brandenburg, Michael Kretschmer of Saxony, and Reiner Haseloff of Saxony-Anhalt. At the meeting, approval was obtained for a timetable that the federal government had negotiated with the operators for the closure of brown coal power stations and compensation for earlier closure of coal-fired units: in the Rhine region eight units of total capacity 2.8 GW were to be closed by the end of 2022, while in the Lusatian region plants would be shut down not earlier than 31 December 2028, and in the Central German region not earlier than 31 December 2034. The last plants should be closed by the end of 2038, but in 2026 and 2029 consideration would be given to the possibility of bringing forward the closure of units by three years. The operators RWE and EPH were to receive a total of €4.35 billion in compensation for the earlier closure of power stations. Other matters agreed at the meeting included compensation for workers at brown coal mines, payable for a transitional period between 58 years of age and retirement (out of the federal budget), and the signing of an agreement between the federation and the states guaranteeing the payment of €40 billion for the restructuring of coal mining regions (Bundesregierung 2020).

The departure from the recommendations of the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment was the subject of criticism. Eight members of that commission, in a letter of 21 January 2020 to Chancellor Merkel, stated their opposition to the agreed measures. The criticism concerned the timetable for closures of brown coal

power stations, which would accumulate ahead of the deadline dates (2022, 2030, 2038), as a result of which in 2034 the network would still contain almost a half of the present brown coal-based capacity, while the Datteln 4 coal-fired plant, added to the network against the commission's recommendations (Geinitz 2020), would be shut down in 2033. Criticism of the timetable for closures of brown coal power stations also came from environmental organisations and members of the German Association of Local Public Utilities (*Verband kommunaler Unternehmen*, VKU). According to the VKU's calculations, based on the provisions of the bill, electricity production using black coal will end in 2034, four years earlier than in the case of brown coal, which is more harmful to the climate. The VKU challenged the level of compensation to be paid to operators of brown coal power stations: while operators will receive a total of almost €4.4 billion for the closure of such facilities and of open-cast mines, the compensation for black coal operators will be significantly smaller. From 2027 onwards, black coal power stations will be closed in line with fixed criteria, without the award of compensation. In the VKU's view, the failure to provide adequate compensation will mean that municipal enterprises will lack funds for the conversion of local energy sources (Kreutzfeldt 2020a).

On 29 January 2020, the federal government approved a bill on the reduction and termination of coal-fired power generation and on the amendment of other acts (*Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Reduzierung und zur Beendigung der Kohleverstromung und zur Änderung weiterer Gesetze*). It contained principles and a plan for the shutting down of coal-fired units, and also set the end of 2038 as the date for ending the use of coal in energy production. According to the bill, the total installed power capacity of coal-fired power stations would be reduced to 30 GW in 2022, to 17 GW in 2030, and to 0 GW in 2038. Moreover, in 2026, 2029 and 2032 an analysis would be made of the possibility of ending energy production from coal in 2035. For the closure of brown coal power stations, operators would receive compensation totalling €4.35 billion. Up to 2026, the closure of black coal power stations would take place by way of auctions, in which the operators requesting lower prices per tonne of CO₂ emissions avoided would receive a premium (*Stilllegungsprämie*). The maximum amount of this premium per MW was to be lowered each year – from €165,000 in 2020 to €49,000 in 2026. From 2027 onwards, black coal power stations would be closed down by order, with no premium awarded. The bill no longer included regulations on the expansion of renewable sources of energy (BMWi 2020a).

According to the German Institute for Economic Research (*Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung*, DIW), the planned closure of black coal power stations within a short period would reduce CO₂ emissions. However, due to the later closure of those burning brown coal, emissions would be significantly higher than planned after 2030 – by approximately 134 million tonnes of CO₂, according to calculations. To enable Germany to meet its climate undertakings, completion of the phase-out of coal would have to be brought forward from 2035/2038 to 2030 (Wille 2020).

During work on the legislation, the coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD reached an understanding on premiums for operators of black coal power stations. In the act

on the cessation of energy production from coal, the period in which operators can apply for premiums via the auction procedure has been extended by a year to 2027, and the maximum premiums for 2024–2026 have been increased (to €89,000 per MW for the last auction). There is also an increase in the subsidy for conversion of cogeneration plants from coal to natural gas or biomass (to a maximum €390,000 per MW), with the amount of subsidy dependent on the age of the coal-fired units and the date of the conversion. These changes resulted from a fear that low compensation and inadequate incentives to develop facilities using alternative energy sources would prevent operators from making the necessary financial investment (BMWi 2020b, BMWi 2020c).

On 3 July 2020, the Bundestag passed bills on the cessation of energy production from coal, and on structural support for coal-mining regions. The new acts were approved by the Bundesrat on the same day. The former provides for the reduction of installed power capacity of coal-fired power stations to 30 GW in 2022 (black coal 15 GW, brown coal 15 GW), to 17 GW in 2030 (black coal 8 GW, brown coal 9 GW) and to 0 GW in 2038, with analyses to be made in 2026, 2029 and 2032 of the possibility of bringing forward the final phase-out of coal to 2035. For units shut down up to the end of 2029, the operators RWE and LEAG are to receive a total of €4.35 billion (€2.6 bn for RWE, €1.75 bn for LEAG), but they will not receive compensation for closures from 2030 onwards. The dates of power station closures and the principles that specify the terms and conditions of the compensation are laid down in an agreement between the federal government and the operators, which gained European Commission approval on 25 November 2020. The closure of black coal power stations up to 2027 will take place via the auction procedure, in which operators will bid to receive premiums. The maximum value of the premium per MW will be reduced each year: from €165,000 in 2020 to €89,000 in 2027. Successful bids will be those that provide the maximum reduction in emissions for the lowest amount. The act on structural support for coal-mining regions provides for the payment of €14 billion to the states in which brown coal power stations and mines are located (Saxony, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt and North Rhine-Westphalia). A further €26 billion is to be invested by the federal government in measures including the development of transport infrastructure in coal-mining regions and the expansion of research institutes. Moreover, €1.09 billion is to be allocated for restructuring in regions in which black coal power stations operate or which had black coal mines (Bundestag 2020).

The measures were criticised by opposition parties. The AfD raised the question of how energy production was to be secured given the simultaneous phasing out of nuclear energy and coal, and proposed the establishment of a special economic zone to enable the creation of new jobs in the coal-mining regions affected by the restructuring. The FDP claimed the “list of matters that have been wrongly regulated in the two acts” to be “infinite”, and called for greater competitiveness, limits on emission-producing energy sources, faster network expansion, and a greater focus on digitisation projects. In turn, Alliance 90/The Greens criticised, among other things, the amount

of compensation to be paid to power station operators. The Left (*Die Linke*) proposed a complete phase-out of coal by 2030 at the latest, the immediate shutdown of the 20 dirtiest coal-fired units, and a ban on the export of technology by coal companies (Bundestag 2020).

Acceleration of the development of renewable energy sources

Problems with the expansion of wind power motivated the federal minister for the economy and energy to make an active response. On 5 September 2019, a meeting took place, known as the Wind Summit (*Wind-Gipfel*), attended by, among others, the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy (Peter Altmaier), representatives of the wind power sector, environmental organisations and trade unions, and the energy ministers of six states. The discussions concerned the areas of action and the means necessary to increase the acceptability of the expansion of wind power and to accelerate the process of approving plans for new installations. While the meeting did not bring any concrete decisions, it contributed to the preparation of an action programme to accelerate the development of onshore wind power (*Aktionsprogramm zur Stärkung der Windenergie an Land*), presented by Altmaier on 7 October 2019. It was stated in the programme that attainment of the target of a 65% share of renewable sources in gross electricity consumption by 2030 would be possible subject to the condition of “greater social acceptance and legal certainty for existing and future wind power projects”. The programme contained 18 measures, naming the federal ministries responsible for their implementation, and indicated areas for action by the federated states. The measures included, for example, a regulation stating that wind turbines could be built at a distance of 1000 metres from the nearest residential neighbourhood, and the possibility – under a reform of property tax – for municipalities to obtain greater profits from the operation of wind power plants. This was intended to make local politicians more interested in campaigning for the building of new wind farms (BMW 2019e).

An important contribution to the discussion on the development of renewable energy was a letter sent to Chancellor Merkel in November 2019 by the minister-presidents of five federated states: Lower Saxony (Stephan Weil, SPD), Bremen (Andreas Bovenschulte, SPD), Schleswig-Holstein (Daniel Günther, CDU), Hamburg (Peter Tschentscher, SPD) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Manuela Schwesig, SPD). The letter expressed concerns about the future of wind power, and set out an 11-point plan for support for that sector, including, for example, a decisive expansion of the use of offshore wind energy, the privileging of real “civic” wind farms with local participation, the utilisation of all possible areas for installations without a regulation on minimum distance from housing, optimised network expansion, and acceleration of the procedures for approving plans for new installations (*Zukunft der Windenergie... 2019*).

As noted above, the November 2019 bill on the reduction and termination of coal-fired power generation included a regulation setting a minimum distance of 1000

metres between wind turbines and buildings, applicable in the whole of Germany in the case of “neighbouring residential areas” consisting of more than five houses. The bill set a target of a 65% share of renewable energy sources in gross electricity consumption by 2030. The bill was criticised by the renewable energy sector and environmental organisations. According to the Federal Association of Renewable Energy (*Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie*, BEE) the planned minimum distance regulation was a further significant obstacle to the development of onshore wind energy. Meanwhile, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) expected that the number of wind power installations would ultimately decrease, particularly since the rules applied not only to new plants, but also to existing ones. Thousands of wind turbines will reach the end of their life cycle in the next few years, and because many of the older installations are within 1000 metres of residential neighbourhoods, their replacement would be impossible. The WWF called for the provisions on wind energy to be removed from the bill, and for a “Growth, Renewable Sources and Employment” commission to be appointed to work out measures to stimulate the development of that sector (Bauchmüller 2019).

The expansion of renewable energy has been a subject of disagreement within the federal government. A proposal from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in early 2020 provided for the issuing of permits by the federal states for wind turbines to be situated less than the national minimum distance from residential neighbourhoods. In other words, the proposal gave freedom to the states in designating land for the expansion of wind power installation, thus ensuring acceptance by the local community. Most of the states had been opposed from the start to a mandatory and uniform distance regulation. It should be noted that the distance regulation was originally proposed to be uniform for all states except Bavaria, where the so-called 10H Rule applies. Another problematic issue was that of the continued subsidisation of energy from solar panels, since according to rules made in 2012, after the total power capacity of installed panels exceeded 52 GW, further panels would not be eligible for a fixed tariff guarantee (*Solardeckel*). The CDU linked the abolition of the limit on solar energy subsidisation to agreement in the matter of the distance regulation (Bauchmüller 2020).

Finally, after many weeks of discussions, on 18 May 2020 an understanding was reached by the CDU and SPD concerning the distance regulation, essentially stating that the introduction and principles of application of the 1000-metre minimum distance from residential neighbourhoods would be decided by the federal states (*Länderöffnungsklausel*). There was also agreement to abolish the limit on the subsidisation of energy from small and medium-sized solar panels (Koalition einig... 2020).

A draft law to amend the Renewable Energy Sources Act (*Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes*) prepared by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, and seen by *Die Tageszeitung*, provided for a significant expansion of onshore wind energy: in the years 2021–2028 new plants were to be built with a power capacity averaging 4 GW annually, the value rising from 2.9 GW in 2022 to 5.8 GW in 2028. The proposal stated that if wind

turbines were not built within a given year, the upper limit for subsequent years would be increased by the corresponding amount. A necessary condition for expansion, however, would be the definition of a larger number of exceptions for wind energy in the law on species protection, which at the time had not yet been agreed between the federated states and the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Increased public acceptance for the expansion of onshore wind farms was to be ensured by the introduction of financial rewards for districts where new wind power plants are built. The proposal provided for growth in installed solar energy power from 63 GW in 2022 to 100 GW in 2030, and growth in biomass power to 8.4 GW by 2030. On 31 August 2020, the Federal Association of Renewable Energy presented its own proposal for the development of renewable sources, where in the case of onshore wind farms the proposed annual growth of 4.7 GW is only slightly higher than the figure contained in the ministerial draft, although the annual growth of 10 GW proposed for solar energy is more than twice that provided in the draft. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy projects that electricity consumption will be much higher in 2030, because transportation, heating and industrial processes will increasingly be converted to electrical power (Kreutzfeldt 2020b).

The bill amending the Renewable Energy Sources Act, approved by the federal government on 23 September 2020, projected a 65% share of renewable energy sources in gross electricity consumption by 2030, and climate neutrality for electricity produced and consumed in Germany (thus including imported electricity) by 2050. The bill contained a roadmap for the development of installed power capacity up to 2030: 71 GW for onshore wind energy, 20 GW for offshore wind energy, 100 GW for solar power, and 8.4 GW for biomass. It also contained provisions from the “Climate Action Programme 2030”, and in some matters, such as the planned development of solar energy, it even went somewhat further, indicating that the federal government had partially responded to the criticism directed against the proposal of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. It had initially been assumed that most solar installations on roofs would no longer receive the fixed tariff guarantee, but that tenders would be won by systems with the lowest costs. The solar energy sector feared that this would mean the collapse of its market. According to the approved bill, the new principle would apply to systems of capacity 500 kW and above, instead of the value being reduced to 100 kW as originally planned. The introduction of quotas for tenders for onshore wind power installations (15% initially, 20% from 2024 onwards) was expected to support expansion in southern Germany (BMWi 2020d). Moreover, the annual auction volume for biomass was changed from 225 MW to 350 MW. The government’s proposed amending bill was criticised by the opposition parties Alliance 90/The Greens and The Left, and also by environmental organisations and industry associations. Disputes concerned the roadmaps for particular renewable energy technologies, and the projection for electricity consumption in 2030 used to estimate needs for the development of those sources. According to *Deutsche Umwelthilfe*, to achieve a 65% share of renewables in gross electricity consumption by 2030, around

50% more new wind turbines and solar power installations would be required than the federal government planned in its bill (Kreutzfeldt 2020c).

Given the numerous points of dispute, it was expected that amendments would be made to the bill during its passage through the Bundestag.

On 17 December 2020, the Bundestag passed a bill amending the Renewable Energy Sources Act, and on 18 December it was approved by the Bundesrat. It came into effect on 1 January 2021. The numerous changes made to the government's bill are intended, among other things, to support the expansion of solar energy and to increase public acceptance for the building of new onshore wind farms. The new law contains a provision on the decarbonisation of the electrical energy sector by 2050, meaning that the electricity produced and consumed in Germany ought to be emissions-neutral by that date. A target is set for Germany to achieve a 65% share of renewables in gross electricity consumption by 2030. The new law lays down development paths for particular technologies up to 2030, including increases in the power capacity of onshore wind farms to 71 GW (from 54 GW), that of offshore wind farms to 20 GW (from 7.7 GW), and that of solar power to almost 100 GW (from 53 GW). Of particular importance for the development of solar energy are the favourable regulations and additional support instruments, including those that increase the attractiveness of investment in solar panels in towns. Meanwhile, public acceptance of the building of onshore wind farms is to be improved by the introduction of financial benefits for districts where new installations are built (the payment to municipalities within 2.5 km is to be 0.2 cents per kWh). The new law also introduces transitional subsidies for energy produced by units using renewable sources for which the 20-year subsidy period ends at the end of 2020, and new provisions on cogeneration and on energy sources such as biomass and geothermal energy. In a resolution accompanying the act (adopted with the support of the CDU/CSU and SPD, while the FDP abstained and the AfD, The Left, and Alliance 90/The Greens voted against), the Bundestag called on the federal government to introduce a further amendment in the first quarter of 2021. The law as further amended should contain, among other measures, more ambitious targets for the expansion of renewable energy sources, taking account of the new EU climate policy target for 2030, and a change in the system for financing them, with a gradual move away from the model based on the renewable energy sources charge (Bundestag 2020b).

The amended Renewable Energy Sources Act was criticised by opposition parties. The AfD pointed to the huge financial burden on electricity consumers, which was likely to increase still further in the future, and for that reason called for an end to support for the development of renewable sources. The FDP proposed an end to "manual control" of the expansion of renewables, and rapid abolition of the renewable energy sources charge. The Left, although it generally regarded the new law as a success (*Erfolgsgeschichte*), emphasised the still existing difficulties in the production of energy by citizens. In turn, Alliance 90/The Greens noted that the new law was insufficient for Germany to attain its targets for the expansion of renewable energy, as evidenced by the resolution by which it was accompanied (Bundestag 2020b).

CONCLUSIONS

There is a large divergence between the targets and proposed measures and the progress made to date in the process of energy transition. There is still debate over the question of balance between the ambitiously formulated climate goals and the real possibilities of their achievement, considering the instruments serving their realisation, in spite of the new legal measures, the creation of successive decision-making entities, such as the climate cabinet, and the extension of the process for monitoring the achievement of targets (appointment of the Expert Council on Climate Issues).

The focus so far has been mainly on the electrical energy sector, but climate protection requires a significant reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases from the various sectors of the German economy, and therefore a comprehensive transformation of the system of energy supply and a fundamental change with regard to climate neutrality in transport, construction, industry and agriculture. Achievement of the overall target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, along with the paths mapped out for particular sectors of the economy, is dependent on the effectiveness of the instruments contained in the Climate Package. In particular, the introduced national system of trading in CO₂ emission allowances in the fields of transport and heating is regarded as significant for the gradual but effective substitution of renewable energy sources for the fossil fuels that have been dominant in those sectors up to now. Among the measures with a great potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and thus to enable Germany to meet its climate protection obligations, is the phasing out of coal in energy production, linked to an accelerated pace of development of renewable energy. The move away from coal, in particular, will entail challenges in moving to a practical level, that is, in implementing the legal measures that have been adopted, especially since the structural changes in coal-mining regions need to be made in a relatively short time, which may lead to an unexpected increase in social costs and have an impact on political choices. Considering what has been the practice to date, in case of insufficient progress in attaining targets for reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, the federal government can be expected to come under pressure to act more ambitiously, and to introduce additional instruments and mechanisms for climate protection.

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Key words: Germany, energy transition, climate protection, greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy sources

ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on solutions developed in 2019–2020 by the German federal government (often in agreement with the federal states, or influenced by the CDU/CSU and SPD parliamentary groups) in the process of energy transition, with a view to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, i.e., promoting the numerous actions for climate protection. A description is given of the instruments adopted in the so-called Climate Package, the problem of the phasing out of coal for energy production by 2038, and the acceleration of the pace of renewable energy development, as embodied in the amended version of the Renewable Energy Sources Act. In addition, statistical data are presented on the development of renewable energy sources and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions – overall, and by economic sector – facilitating assessment of the progress of energy transition and its impact on the effectiveness of the German climate policy.

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THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT AND AIR POLLUTION IN POLAND

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997) states that public authorities have the duty to protect and improve air quality (Articles 5 and 74). However, critical air pollution levels or limit values have long been of little practical concern in Poland. In 2018, the Polish Chief Inspectorate for Environmental Protection recorded excessive levels of benzo(a)pyrene¹ (BaP) concentration at almost all air quality monitoring stations in Poland (excessive annual mean value in 96% of 46 air quality measurement zones²) and excessive levels of suspended particulate concentrations³ PM₁₀ in 85% of the measurement zones (taking into account 24 hour average) as well as PM_{2,5} (in 30% of the zones). In 2018, air quality in terms of the BaP and PM₁₀ concentration levels worsened in comparison to 2017. Excessive levels were recorded in more measurement zones (Kobus, Iwanek, Skotak 2019: 52, 93, 109). Citizens of Poland began to worry about their worsening quality of life and safety and have filed lawsuits against the State Treasury. Their point is protection of civil rights in the light of insufficient government action taken against smog.

¹ Benzo(a)pyrene belongs to the group of approximately 500 polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH). It is a product of the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels – especially coal and wood and refuse. It is adsorbed on dust particles. It can initiate and develop neoplastic changes in the human body (see Juda-Rezler 2006: 76-78).

² The assessment of air quality in Poland as part of state monitoring, pursuant to the Act of April 27, 2001, Environmental Protection Law, is carried out in 46 zones that make up agglomerations with populations of more than 250,000, cities with over 100,000 residents as well as the remaining areas of voivodeships which are not part of the foresaid agglomerations or cities (*Act of April 27, 2001, Environmental Protection Law: Art. 87*). The zones are indicated in the *Regulation of the Minister of the Environment of 2 August 2012 on zones where air quality is assessed*.

³ Particulate matter (PM) is a mix of small solid particles and drops of liquid suspended in the air, which make up pollution emitted directly to the atmosphere (it comes from natural sources such as forest fires as well as anthropogenic sources related mainly with the combustion of solid fuels). They are also part of secondary pollution which arises in the atmosphere as a result of chemical reactions. Particles are divided by size. Fine particles are less than 10 µm (PM₁₀) and very fine particles are less than 2.5 µm (PM_{2,5}) (see Juda-Rezler 2006: 65-70).

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether, in the current legal situation, citizens of Poland have the right to enjoy a healthy and clean environment in particular regarding air quality, and whether lawsuits filed in relation to this are justified. The assumption is that the research objective will facilitate answers to research questions. The first of these questions is whether the right to breathe clean air is a human right in the light of international agreements signed by Poland. The second is whether Polish laws recognise the non-economic use of the ambient air as a personal good. It is also relevant to consider whether the Polish public recognises ambient air protection as important. In the attempt to find answers to these questions methods used in legal and quantitative analyses have been used.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THEIR PROTECTION

After WWII positive law was extended to include the concepts of human dignity and its protection which were incorporated in international law and national law standards. This was a turning point in the appropriate and desired development of human rights (Rojowska 2019: 1). Relationships between the protection of human rights and the protection of the natural environment were recognised in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when attention was drawn to negative changes in the environment which threatened human well-being (for more, see Radecki 1987: 15-16). The international system for the protection of human rights traces its origins to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948. Article 25 of the Declaration provides that among fundamental, inalienable human rights is the right of all members of the human family “to a standard of living adequate for (the) health” (cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948: art. 25). The rights included in the Declaration are indivisible and interdependent and aim at guaranteeing the respect for human dignity. Disputes and controversies accompanying binding international agreements and the Declaration lasted a long time (Kuźniar 2006: 65-66) and the UN General Assembly adopted relevant multilateral treaties called the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as late as on 16 December 1966. In the ICESCR, environmental rights are part of the recognised “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (cf. ICESCR *Międzynarodowy Pakt* 1966: art. 12) and “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living” (Art.11). Poland ratified the ICESCR on 18 March 1977.

A consequence of the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) by member states of the Council of Europe on 19 January 1950. Ratification of this Convention within the timespan of 12 months is a prerequisite for all new members of the

Council of Europe (Matyasik 2009: 87). Poland ratified this Convention on 19 January 1993 and on 16 March 1993 it recognised the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to hear and rule on alleged breaches of the human rights enumerated in the Convention by a member state of the Council of Europe (Bieńczyk-Missala 2012: 210). In accordance with Article 91 of the Polish Constitution (Constitution 1997), the ECHR has precedence in the event of a conflict of laws. Adam Bodnar (former Commissioner for Human Rights in Poland) said on the 25th anniversary of the ratification of the ECHR by Poland that the European Convention: “takes precedence over [national] laws. Therefore, we should apply it in the country, before Polish courts - and not put off the arguments arising from it only at the end, when the national road has been exhausted.” (25. *Rocznica...* 2018).

Interpretations of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights have varied. The article provides that “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.” (cf. *Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka* 1950: art. 2). It then follows that the right to a clean environment is necessary and needed because the degradation of the environment is a threat to humans. Consequently, “the right to appropriate living conditions in natural environment should be a guaranteed, undisputable fundamental right”⁴ (Kierzkowska 2018: 210-211). In some academic publications, however, it is stipulated that “the right to life should not be viewed as a duty to protect against threats to life but only against depriving one of life intentionally” (Szymaniak 2009: 167).

Attention has been drawn to Article 8, paragraph 1, on the right of all people to respect for their private and family lives, their homes and their correspondence. In the case of *Giacomelli v. Italy*, Application no. 59909/00 from 2 November 2006, the European Court of Human Rights assessed that “the individual has a right to respect for his home, meaning not just the right to the actual physical area, but also to the quiet enjoyment of that area. Breaches of the right to respect for the home are not confined to concrete or physical breaches, such as unauthorised entry into a person’s home, but also include [...] noise, emissions, smells or other forms of interference.” (*Giacomelli ...* 2006). In addition, the Court also assessed that “Article 8 may apply in environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private-sector activities properly” (ibidem). From a review of ECtHR judgments it follows that positive legal obligations of States necessary to respect people’s private and family lives and homes include the setting of minimal limits on environmental pollution and ensuring compliance with the set limits (Jasudowicz 2018: 125). It should be stressed that in accordance with ECtHR jurisprudence, severe environmental pollution may adversely affect individuals’ well-being, private and family lives and prevent them from enjoying their homes without, however, seriously endangering their health. This means that demonstrating a negative impact on a person’s health is not a necessary condition for deciding that

⁴ Personal rights protect the values most closely associated with a human being. They concern the non-political sphere of personal, family and social life. They relate to a person’s physical and mental integrity and provide conditions for development and self-realization.

art 8, paragraph 1 of the UCHR has been violated as in the judgment of the case *López Ostra v. Spain*, (*European Court of Human Rights*, 1994).

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972 marked a turning point in the development of international environmental politics and the human right to a healthy ambient environment.⁵ Toward this end, on 16 June 1972 representatives of 113 States adopted by acclamation the Stockholm Declaration (Górbiel 1992: 95-96). Poland, together with other States of the Soviet bloc, did not take part in this Conference (Handle 2012: 2); however, a UN General Assembly resolution was accepted later in 1972. This resolution approved of the Stockholm Declaration. The international community agreed with Principle 1 of the Declaration that: “Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being” (cf. Declaration 1972: Principle 1), and that that the protection and improvement of the human environment is the duty of all Governments (Principles 2, 14 and 17, *ibid.*). As a result, governments of many States established government Ministries of the Environment responsible for the government’s environmental policies and the shape of the ambient environment. In 1972 the Polish Ministry of Territorial Economy and Environment Protection was formed (*Ustawa* 1972). Article 2 of this Act listed “protection of the natural environment, in particular protection of waters, greenery and air against pollution” (*ibidem*: art. 2). The Stockholm Declaration is a not a binding international law; however, its 26 Principles are about values accepted by the international community.

The right to a healthy and clean environment, including the right to clean ambient air is included in the category of third generation rights⁶ (also called solidarity or collective rights). The division into three categories was advanced by Karel Vasak in the early 1970s (Kunicka-Michalska 1992: 77). The implementation of the third category rights follows from cooperation of individuals, States, public figures and private persons, and the subject matter is values reflecting human aspirations, including a healthy environment.

THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT IN THE LIGHT OF POLISH LEGISLATION

The human right to a healthy environment can be constructed in national legislation both in constitutional law and a parliamentary act and ordinary legislation (Radecki 1986: 237). The necessity to protect the environment, which determines

⁵ On the basis of constitutional law, subjective rights are defined by doctrine as “rights that can be asserted in court and which are the basis for a procedural claim”, while under administrative law, subjective rights mean “the legal situation of a citizen (collective entity) within which a citizen (collective entity) on the basis of legal norms protecting its legal interests, may effectively demand something from the state or may, unquestioned by the state, do something” (Trzewik 2016: 63-64).

⁶ First generation rights refer to fundamental civil and political rights while second generation rights include economic, social and cultural rights (see Nowak 1993: 107-118).

the implementation of fundamental human rights, resulted in a growing inclusion of environmental protection into constitutional goals and obligations in Poland's Constitution. Articles 5 and 74 (paragraphs 1 and 2)⁷ of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 directly address environmental protection (*Constitution* 1997). At present legal doctrine postulates the approval for "a civil right to a healthy environment" pursuant to Article 74 of the Constitution from which personal rights derive. Article 81, in turn, provides that the rights specified in Article 74 may be asserted subject to limitations specified by statute including the Civil Code (Dziki 2015: 81). The human right to life in a healthy environment as a guaranteed personal right may also be derived from the Constitution: (i) the legal protection of life (Art. 38) which shall be identified with the prohibition to destroy it, also by ambient air when pollution limits are exceeded; (ii) the right to legal protection of private and family life (Art. 47); (iii) the right to healthcare (Art. 68 (1)) (Constitution 1997).

The Constitution of Poland does not mention the right to a healthy environment; however, Article 68 (4) provides that public authorities "shall [...] prevent the negative health consequences of degradation of the environment" (*ibidem*). Epidemiological research studies confirm the negative impact of air pollutants on the respiratory, circulatory, nervous and reproductive systems (Table 1 below). Exposure to ambient air pollutants contributes to a higher death rate and to shorter life spans (life expectancy). Vulnerable groups include children, the elderly, and people with cardiovascular diseases.

Table 1.

Selected adverse effects of exposure to air pollutants

Body part	Adverse effects	Main factors
Respiratory system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ higher vulnerability to infections, e.g. tuberculosis, bronchitis, pneumonia ▪ respiratory insufficiency ▪ worsening of asthma symptoms and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)⁸ ▪ higher incidence rates of asthma and COPD ▪ neoplasia 	ozone (O ₃), particulate matter (PM), nitrogen dioxide (NO ₂), sulphur dioxide (SO ₂), benzo[a]pyrene (BaP)

⁷ Article 5: "The Republic of Poland shall (...) ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, (...) and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development" Article 74 section 1 "Public authorities shall pursue policies ensuring the ecological security of current and future generations" and section 2 "Protection of the environment shall be the duty of public authorities."

⁸ As a result of COPD, there is an incompletely reversible restriction of airflow through the respiratory tract associated with a chronic inflammatory response of the respiratory system to harmful substances (for more, see Jędrak, Konduracka, Badyda et al. 2017: 44-47).

Cardiovascular system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ worsening of symptoms and progression of cardiovascular diseases ▪ higher incidence of cardiovascular diseases, e.g. coronary disease, ischemic stroke, hypertension ▪ increased risk of myocardial infarction ▪ deaths due to heart failure in the result of short exposure to polluted air 	fine particulate matter defined as particles that are 2.5 microns or less in diameter (PM _{2.5}), O ₃ , SO ₂ , NO ₂
Nervous system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ headaches, anxiety ▪ concentration difficulties ▪ cognitive and memory impairment in children ▪ dementia, Parkinson's disease 	SO ₂ , NO ₂ , PM
Reproductive system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ placental disorders (premature birth, low birthweight, higher newborn mortality) 	PM, NO ₂

Source: author's own table after Jędrak, Konduracka, Badyda et al. 2018: 77, Jędrak, Konduracka, Badyda et al. 2017: 74-78, Mazurek 2018: 36-37, 77.

While discussing the human right to a healthy environment in the Constitution of Poland, attention should be drawn to its Article 30, which concerns “the inherent and inalienable dignity of the person” and which by extension also refers to appropriate living conditions meaning a life in a natural environment free from excessive levels of air pollutants. Article 52 provides for the freedom of “the choice of place of residence and sojourn” within the territory of the Republic of Poland, which leads to the conclusion that appropriate living conditions apply to the entire territory of Poland.

Radecki notes that a civic right to a healthy environment in the Constitution or derived from it does not refer to its execution or the ways in which this right can be asserted before the courts or administrative authorities. Lower level legislation is needed to reinforce this right. Radecki considers two methods of constructing domestic law regarding the environment. One is a legal framework. Article 4(1) of the Polish Act on the Protection of the Environment, 27 April 2001 (see *Ustawa z dnia 27 kwietnia 2001 r. – Prawo ochrony środowiska*) grants everyone universal use of the environment for the purpose of meeting personal and household needs. The second method is legislation derived from legal measures in administrative law or civil law or both. According to Radecki, civil law can apply to legal (subjective) rights to a healthy environment related to law concerning the protection of personal rights (Radecki 1986: 238-240). The implementation of the said law in reference to the Polish Civil Code may include the following claims: (1) Article 24(1) [protection of personal rights] provides that a party whose personal welfare is adversely affected by someone else's action may demand that the action cease; (2) in the case of infringement of personal welfare they may also demand that the party committing the infringement perform the actions necessary to remove its effects (ibid.) and the aggrieved party may demand that the damage be remedied in accordance with general principles” (Art. 24(2); (3) in the event of an infringement, independently of the provisions referred above, the aggrieved party may also demand monetary compensation or that an appropriate amount of money be paid to a specific public cause. (Art. 24(1) and Art. 448) (Mazur 1999: 55).

Polish legislation does not define personal goods or well-being; however, in jurisprudence and legal doctrines the view is that “personal goods” do not refer to objects owned but to non-material goods essential to humans and their natural needs (and appropriately of legal persons) which secure their personal development and protection of their life (existence). Personal goods (Polish: *dobra osobiste*) are more adequately referred to as personal interests. They are listed in Article 23 of the Civil Code and include health, freedom, dignity, freedom of conscience, name or pseudonym, image, privacy of correspondence, inviolability of the home, and scientific, artistic, inventive or improvement achievements (cf. Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. Kodeks cywilny 1964). This list is not a closed catalogue (Partyk 2014). It has been accepted that environmental values are its elements free from defects which are prone to destroy the environment (Mazur 1999: 54). Ecological, cultural and health enhancing values of the environment, including breathing healthy, unpolluted air or drinking clean water, are personal goods whereas the right to healthy ambient air or to clean water are personal rights in the Polish nomenclature. Environmental values are inextricably linked with people because people’s physical and mental condition and the survival of humankind in a longer perspective depend on the quality of air. Human self-realisation in health threatening situations (such as polluted air or noise) seems to be significantly limited (Radecki 1986: 249-250). A value is recognised as a personal good on objective criteria this is on the social approval for protection of a given value and negative evaluation of conducts which infringe this value (Dziki 2015: 81).

The following section concentrates on the quality of ambient air in Poland and a search for the answer to the question of whether Polish people express their worry about the state of the atmosphere, recognising the protection of the value of healthy air.

AMBIENT AIR QUALITY IN POLAND AND THE SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION

Having recognised the negative effects of air pollutants on human health, on 24 August 2012 the Minister of Environment issued an important regulation concerning air pollutants⁹. Levels of twelve substances are monitored: sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen dioxide (NO₂), carbon monoxide (CO), benzene (C₆H₆), ozone (O₃), particulate matter (PM₁₀ and PM_{2.5} whose aerodynamic diameter is below 10 µm and 2.5 µm respectively), and pollutants in PM₁₀: lead (Pb), arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd), nickel (Ni) and benzo(a)pyrene (BaP). Analyses of regular assessments demonstrate that in 2018 the limits of benzo(a)pyrene in PM₁₀ and limits of PM₁₀ and PM_{2.5} were the most frequently exceeded of the substances.

⁹ The regulation introduces into the Polish legal system Directive 2004/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on arsenic, cadmium, mercury and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in ambient air and Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on air quality and cleaner air for Europe.

The concentration of BaP in Poland is the highest in Europe due to the high energy intensity of single family houses that prompts the owners to use the cheapest (solid) fuels. This results in higher emissions of air pollutants (households emit 96% of BaP in Poland, cf. Bebkiewicz, Chłopek, Doberska et al, 2020: 32). The set limit on BaP has been exceeded in almost all (96%) measurement zones. In 2018, the Chief Inspectorate of Environmental Protection reported exceeded PM_{10} limits in 85% of the measurement zones (24h) and $PM_{2.5}$ levels in 30% of the zones (Kobus, Iwanek, Skotak 2019: 52, 93, 109). The main sources of $PM_{2.5}$ and PM_{10} were again households responsible for 52% and 44% of the pollutants' emissions¹⁰ (Bebkiewicz, Chłopek, Doberska et al., 2020: 17, 23). The ozone level was exceeded much more rarely (8.7% of zones in Lower Silesia, Łódź, Silesian and Greater Poland voivodeships (provinces). The was also the case of nitrogen dioxide annual emission. Its limit was exceeded in 8.7% of zones (in the metropolitan areas of Wrocław, Kraków, Warsaw and Upper Silesia). The level of arsenic was exceeded slightly and only in two zones in Lower Silesian voivodeship: in the city of Legnica and in the so-called Lower Silesian zone (less urbanised). The limits set on the emission of sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide (CO), benzene, lead, cadmium, and nickel were not exceeded (ibid.: 22, 31, 37, 41, 47, 78, 81, 86, 90). The ultimate consequence of ambient air pollution is shorter life expectancy.

The level of air pollution in Poland is a threat to public health. According to the data collected by the European Environment Agency, in 2016, a total of 43,100, 1,500 and 1,364 people died prematurely due to exposure to $PM_{2.5}$, NO_2 and O_3 respectively. Years of life lost (YLL, a measure of premature mortality) per 100,000 people living in Poland was 1,364 due to $PM_{2.5}$ (only in Bulgaria was YLL higher), 49 due to NO_2 and 36 due to O_3 (European Environment Agency 2019: 67-69). The WHO estimates for 2016 were that in Poland deaths from air pollution included: 16,482 from ischaemic heart disease, 3, 733 from strokes, 3,059 from lung cancer, 2,995 from acute lower respiratory infections, and 2,897 from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) (Kleczkowski 2020: 264).

Badyda, Grellier and Dąbrowiecki (2016: 11-12) calculated the percentage of deaths which could have been prevented in 2006-2011 if $PM_{2.5}$ had been eliminated from ambient air in eleven Polish cities with a population of over 250,000. The most deaths from lung cancer and heart and lung diseases resulting from fine particulate matter in ambient air were in Kraków (41.3% and 29.1% respectively), Katowice (31.8% and 21.8%), Bydgoszcz (26.5% and 17.9%) and Warsaw (26.4% and 17.9%).

The issue of ambient air pollution was noted by the European Commission which in December 2015 referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the EU in Luxembourg over poor air quality (breaching the limit of airborne particles). In February 2018, the European Court of Justice issued a verdict finding the Polish authorities guilty of reg-

¹⁰ The figures given include, apart from households, the combustion of fuel in institutions and in the trade and service sectors as well as in agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Together, these industries create the category "fuel combustion in other sectors" (cf. Bebkiewicz, Chłopek, Doberska et al. 2020: 5).

ularly breaking the EU law in the period from 2007 to at least 2013. The Court pointed out that between 2007 and 2015 Poland regularly exceeded the daily limits for toxic fine particles (PM_{10}) in the air in 35 zones and the annual limit values in nine zones and that Poland failed to adopt and implement air quality plans that set appropriate measures so that the period of excess can be kept as short as possible (*Case C-336/16: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber)*, ECLI:EU:C:2018:94).

Undertakings by public entities to protect and improve the quality of ambient air and the actual pollution structure and levels are reported by the NIK (The Supreme Audit Office in Poland). The first report was published in 1994 and the second in 2000. In the second document it was noted that in spite of reduced emission of pollutants, efforts of public administration and business entities (35 enterprises were audited) to improve the ambient air quality in 1995-1998 were not effective enough and did not ensure “definite changes in the ambient air quality in Poland” (*Najwyższa Izba Kontroli* 2000: 3, 6, 14). This report included recommendations for voivodes, marshals of provinces, starosts and also the Minister of Environment, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Transport and Marine Economy, the Chief Inspector of Environmental Protection, the President of the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management and others. (*ibid.*: 16-17).

In the next report on ambient air protection between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2014 published in 2014, the NIK wrote: “In the opinion of the Supreme Audit Office, public authorities are ineffective in the area of air protection, not ensuring sufficient protection of people and the natural environment against the negative effects of air pollution. In the period monitored, the air quality standards adopted in the European Union legislation and implemented into the national legal order were still not met.” (*Najwyższa Izba Kontroli* 2014: 10). The audit was carried out in five voivodeships (Lesser Poland, Masovian, Opole, Pomeranian and Silesian) and included, inter alia, marshal offices, provincial offices, environmental protection inspectorates, provincial funds for environmental protection and water management. The efforts of the Ministry of the Environment were also assessed (*ibid.*: 9).

In 2017 the NIK presented the results of an audit it carried out in nine communes of Silesian Voivodeship. The objective was to examine the effectiveness of measures aimed at reducing the emissions of B(a)P, PM_{10} and $PM_{2.5}$ and harmful gases. Of interest were pollutants emitted by home boilers (hot water and central heating) and boilers centrally located in a commune during three heating seasons (2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016). The conclusion was that the measures were not effective enough because local authorities and City Guards had acted too slowly and the scope of their efforts was too small. (*Najwyższa Izba Kontroli* 2017: 9, 11). Another document from 2018 analysed the situation between 1 January 2014 and 30 June 2017 in five voivodeships (Lower Silesian, Lesser Poland, Masovian, Łódź and Silesian). The findings were that the standard levels of BaP, PM_{10} and $PM_{2.5}$ were commonly exceeded. The NIK critically assessed the performance of public authorities: “Public entities have not taken adequate and effective measures to protect ambient air [...]” (*Najwyższa Izba Kontroli* 2018: 12). Five marshal offices and thirteen municipal and

communal offices were audited, and among the central authorities three Ministries: of Environment, of Energy, and of Development and Finance (*ibid.*: 10).

It was probably the establishment of an association in 2012 under the name of Krakow Smog Alert (KAS) in 2012 that largely contributed to increasing the public awareness of the harmfulness of air pollutants. The founders of the organisation decided that only pressure from local inhabitants would persuade the authorities of Kraków and Lesser Poland voivodeship to implement effective remedial programmes needed to maintain the standard levels of particulate matter pollutants and benzo(a)pyrene. KAS has also aimed to strengthen public participation in all decision-making processes related to air quality in Krakow and Poland; popularise environmental education in the field of air quality and efforts for the protection of the environment and sustainable development in Krakow and Poland (Statute of the Association ... no data). KAS organised, *inter alia*, marches for healthy air, happenings in the form of funeral processions, symbolic activities such as putting anti-smog masks on monuments, and lobbied for the adoption of an anti-smog resolution at meetings with city and voivodeship authorities. (Guła 2019). Kraków was the first Polish city where the regional council adopted a resolution banning the use of coal, wood and other biomass solid fuel heating systems (Resolution No. XVIII / 243/16).

Residents of Wrocław and Zakopane recognised the importance of KAS and founded the Lower Silesian and Podhale Smog Alerts a year later. In 2015, these two associations together with KAS proclaimed a nationwide civic initiative called the Polish Smog Alert (PAS) (Piłat 2015). At present, there are forty-nine local smog alert associations in eleven voivodeships, the largest number, 15 each, is found in Lesser Poland and Silesian voivodeships.

The work of KAS and PAS has raised the awareness of the poor air quality in Poland and especially of the resulting health issues. Nationwide and local media became involved and informed the public about many instances of excessive concentrations of pollutant. This has further increased public awareness and knowledge about the condition of ambient air. For the Polish public the most important source of information about natural environment is television broadcasts and the Internet as well as newspapers and radio broadcasts.¹¹

The issue of smog has become a leading environmental topic in the media as confirmed by research done by the Institute for Media Monitoring IMM. From August 2018 to July 2019, the most publications on ecological issues were on smog (385,000), drought (122,000) and recycling (113,000) (Jędrzejewska, Jodłowski, Knap et al. 2019: 34-35). In 2012, the European Commission commissioned research

¹¹ According to research commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment, the main sources of information on environmental issues are (respondents could indicate up to three options): television (75% of responses in 2018 and 77% in 2012) and the Internet (42% in 2018 and 27% in 2012). In 2018, among the three main sources, apart from those already mentioned, radio was indicated by 17% of respondents, and in 2012 – the press by 22%. Books are not a significant source of ecological knowledge for the Polish public (4% in 2018 and 2% in 2012).

into public opinion about air quality. Only 32% of Polish respondents indicated that they were informed about air pollution (“very well informed” and “well informed”) (European Commission, 2013). In 2019, the percentage of informed Poles rose to 52%. Furthermore, the Polish public is convinced that poor air quality is responsible for serious health problems. In 2019, for example, 93% of Polish respondents judged that cardio-vascular diseases are a serious issue in Poland and 92% held the same opinion about pulmonary diseases (European Commission 2019: 12, 14).

According to a CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre opinion poll), in 2010 only 7% of respondents asked about the most troubling issues in their town or community recognised the importance of environmental issues (including air quality and smog). In 2018, these issues were important to 24% of respondents. In the 2010 survey the following issues were considered more important: the labour market situation, the condition of roads, the health care system, housing, public support for the poorest citizens, public transportation, sewage systems, public safety, the visual appeal of towns, problems in cleaning streets and public places. In 2018, only the situation in the health care system and the condition of roads (50% and 40% respectively) were judged more important than environmental issues. Environmental issues were especially important to people living in big cities. In towns with populations over 100,000, environmental issues were highly important to 36% of respondents and to 52% of respondents in cities with a population over 500,000. It follows that locally the worsening condition of environment has been perceived more strongly (CBOS 2018: 3, 9, 10, 12).

Research on the perception of environmental issues in Poland commissioned by the Ministry of Environment in 2012 and 2018 also points to growing concern about the condition of the environment. Respondents were asked to identify three areas where troubling issues were the most numerous and needed the involvement of public entities. Neither in 2012 nor in 2018 was environmental protection among the top three. In 2012, the most troubling areas were employment, social and family policies and economic development. In 2018, they were health care, employment, social and family policies, and fourthly the justice system. However, while only 7% of respondents pointed out environmental protection in 2012, by 2018 this percentage had grown to 18%. Then, respondents were asked to identify the three most urgent problems in the protection of the natural environment. In 2012, these were illegal waste disposal (49%), air pollution, water pollution and natural disasters (each of these three issues was pointed out by 34% of respondents). In 2018 this changed: respondents pointed to air pollution (62%), illegal waste disposal (47%) and climate change (39%) (Szatanowska, Kotlewska, Licznerska et al. 2018: 19, 24).

A report by the Kantar Group from September 2019 on human relations with the environment demonstrates that for the Polish public air pollution is the most or one of the most important concerns nationally and globally. Respondents were asked which of the listed environmental phenomena (three could be chosen) if any, worry them the most globally. A total of 47% of respondents chose waste, 41% air quality and 33% water shortages. Then the same question was asked in reference to Poland. 57% of

respondents worried most about air quality, 48% about waste and 33% about water shortage (Jędrzejewska, Jodłowski, Knap et al., 2019: 35).

Another confirmation that air pollution is recognised by general public as one of the most important ecological issues in Poland is the results of online plebiscites for the Word of the Year organised by the Faculty of Polish Studies of the University of Warsaw. Voters choose a word and concept they consider the most important. In 2012, this word was *smog*. In 2015 *smog* came second after *uchodźcy* (refugees) (Derwojedowa 2016). In 2017, *smog* came second after *rezydent* (resident) (Derwojedowa 2018).

EXAMPLES OF COURT DECISIONS

The first lawsuit against the State Treasury for the insufficient protection of personal rights, infringed upon as a result of the annual air pollution limits being exceeded, was filed in 2015 by Oliwier Palarz, a resident of Rybnik and an activist of the Rybnik Smog Alarm (Wantuch, Pietraszewski 2019). Palarz claimed 50,000 PLN in compensation for not being able to live in his house as he should (limitations such as not being able to open windows and air out his residence during the heating season), limited freedom of movement due to public authorities' recommendations to stay at home, the infringement of one's right to live in a healthy environment, and the infringement of the human right to health (complaints about respiratory tract irritation and conjunctivitis). The claimant also drew attention to his psychological discomfort and anxiety about his health due to pollutants in the ambient environment. In its judgement of 30 May 2018, the District Court in Rybnik dismissed the lawsuit. It held that the right to life in a healthy environment and to healthy, clean air is not a personal good. The Court also noted that: "Infringement of personal rights to healthy life results in bodily harm or health disorder, which is related to the harm the aggrieved party has suffered. In such a case, under Art. 448 of the Civil Code pursuant to Art. 24, paragraph 2.1, the aggrieved party may demand monetary compensation. Therefore, compensation is also due only in the event of violation of a personal interest – health, in the form of damage to the body or health disorder; it is not payable in the event of a threat of violation of this right" (*Wyrok Sądu Rejonowego w Rybniku* 2018). The Court decided that since the claimant had not proven that he had suffered bodily harm or a health disorder, he could not claim compensation. Recognising the claimant's involvement in environmental protection, the Court refrained from ordering the claimant to pay the costs of the proceedings. The judgement is not yet final (*ibid*).

The claimant filed an appeal to the second instance court in Gliwice and the Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) supported him. On 28 November 2019, at the second hearing, this Court decided to request clarification from the Supreme Court. The reason was that other courts had judged similar claims by citizens against the Treasury concerning polluted air to be justified (for one example see below). The Supreme Court was asked to resolve the legal issue (*Czy prawo do życia...* 2019).

The question was whether “the right to life in a healthy environment where ambient air meets quality standards defined in generally applicable law (and) in a place where a person stays for a longer time, in particular in their household, is a personal good under protection under Art. 23 of the Civil Code pursuant to Art. 24 and 448?” (*Zagadnienie prawne* 2020). This question reached the Supreme Court on 30 March 2020. On 28 May 2021 the Supreme Court ruled that the right to live in a clean environment is not a personal good (*Uchwała Sądu Najwyższego...*).

The District Court in Warszawa-Śródmieście interpreted the Civil Code differently. In 2018, Grażyna Wolszczak-Sikora, a Polish actress, filed a claim against the Treasury – Ministry of Environment and the local government of Warsaw¹² for its ineffective and delayed fight against smog in 2008-2018 which had been harmful for the health and lives of residents of Warsaw and, more generally, in Poland. The claimant had lived in Warsaw for thirty years and worked all over Poland. She claimed that due to ambient air pollution she could not pursue her hobbies and interests (such as biking or Nordic walking), which caused her psychological and emotional distress. In her opinion, inaction of the Ministry of Environment infringed upon her personal goods, such as the possibility of enjoying the advantages of an unpolluted natural environment, the right to the protection of private life, the right to freedom, privacy and due respect for the place of living.

In its judgement of 24 January 2019 the District Court in Warsaw Śródmieście upheld the claim in its entirety, ordering the Treasury to pay 5,000 PLN for the social purpose (organisation) named in the lawsuit. In the reasoning of the judgement, the Court did not share the defendant’s position on the non-existence of a personal right in the form of the right to the use of an unpolluted natural environment. Moreover, in the opinion of the Court:

“There is no doubt that the state of polluted air, which has persisted for years, has a negative impact on the quality of life of the claimant, who as she herself pointed out, is a person who cares about health and a healthy lifestyle. This causes the claimant discomfort and fear for her life and health as well as the life and health of those closest to her, especially taking into account her high level of awareness regarding the influence of polluted air on human health and life. Thus, in the opinion of the Court, there has been a violation of the subjective rights which constitute the human right to privacy, to freedom, to respect for the home as well as to life in a non-polluted environment, that is one which meets norms and values to an acceptable degree. The subjective rights cited are also individual rights within the meaning of Art. 23 of the Civil Code” (*Wyrok Sądu Rejonowego ...* 2019).

The court indicated that the State Treasury could have and still could take effective action but had not done so. The judgement is not final (*ibid.*) The Ministry of Environment announced it would appeal (Śmigiel 2019).

¹² The claimant, after a meeting with the mayor of Warsaw, R. Trzaskowski, and the city coordinator for sustainable development and green spaces, J. Glusman, during which, a program to combat smog in the capital was presented, withdrew the lawsuit against the city government, but without waiving the claim (Siałkowski, Śmigiel 2019, *Wyrok Sądu Rejonowego dla Warszawy-Śródmieścia* 2019).

On 28 May 2021, a hearing of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme took place, which in the resolution adopted stated that the right to live in a clean environment is not a personal good. Crucially, the resolution of the legal question does not close the door for citizens to act against the possible consequences of the violation of air quality standards because it is permitted to invoke such personal rights as the right to health, freedom or privacy. The second point of the resolution accepts that: “Health, freedom and privacy are protected as personal rights (Art. 23 in conjunction with Art 24. And Art. 448 of the Civil Code), the violation of which may be caused by violations of air quality standards as specified in legal regulations” (*Uchwała Sądu Najwyższego 2021: 1, art. 2*).

CONCLUSION

The considerations weighed here make it possible to conclude that Polish citizens have been granted the right to combat the effects of violations of environmental standards, including those regarding air quality, which they can pursue before judicial authorities, relying not on their personal interests in the right to live in a clean environment, but on the right to health and freedom or privacy, because non-compliance with air quality standards threatens these personal rights by endangering or violating them. This is evidenced by the answers to the research questions posed in the introduction:

- 1) Is the right to unpolluted air a human right in the light of international agreements to which Poland is a party?

In international agreements to which Poland is a party (the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ratified on March 18, 1977, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ratified on January 19, 1993), the human right to a clean environment was not directly expressed, but rather in connection with other human rights, especially the right to respect for private and family life and the home. It is worth noting that on 27 February 2020, a conference was held in the Council of Europe, the subject of which was the inclusion of the right to a clean environment in the catalogue of human rights, which can be expected when such a solution is proposed by either legal doctrine or by non-governmental organisations (Council of Europe 2020, Lambert 2020: 16-20).

- 2) Is there in Polish legislation a personal good consisting in the non-economic use of air that meets normative standards?

The court judgements presented here showed discrepancies in their rulings regarding the qualification of the right to live in a clean environment as a personal good. The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, in a resolution deciding a legal issue presented by the District Court in Gliwice ruled that the right to live in a clean environment is not a personal good. They justified this presenting the view that the natural environment of human beings is a common good for humanity (which will not be changed by the recognition of the right to live in a clean environment as a human right) and that the physical survival of every person and the satisfaction of humanity’s

basic living needs depend on its condition. It was noted that “individual states in their constitutions and international agreements declare that the environment is protected and they establish subjective public rights which are binding in a vertical relation to a clean unpolluted environment. (...) Omissions by legislators when it comes to the obligations imposed upon them by the constitution or irregularities in their implementation justify recourse to complaints against lawmakers before the authorities charged with the legal protection of rights. The same must be said about obligations entered into by the state, including the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. By signing them, Poland obliged itself to ensure the rights and freedoms specified in Chapter I of the Convention, including the right to life (Art. 2) for every person subject to its jurisdiction, as well as to respect private and family life and the home (Art. 8)” (*Uchwała Sądu Najwyższego* 2021: 10-12).

3) Does the Polish public recognise the protection of values in the form of clean air as important?

The results of public opinion polls make it possible to conclude that at present the Polish public more and more often (compared to the early 2010s) perceive the seriousness of environmental problems at both national and local levels. They consider it important to protect the value of clean air, which is an essential element for considering its use as a personal good. Among environmental challenges, they prioritise the issue of low-quality air because they are aware of the negative health consequences of exposure to pollution.

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Keywords: human right to the environment, personal right to clean air, enjoying the benefits of clean air, air pollution, Poland

ABSTRACT

In Poland, normative levels of air pollution concentrations have not been maintained for years. Citizens who are concerned about the deteriorating conditions of their quality of life and safety have filed lawsuits against the State Treasury for damages in connection with inadequate measures taken to reduce smog. The aim of the article is to investigate whether Polish citizens have the right to enjoy the advantages of a clean environment, particularly regarding one of its main components – the atmosphere, and to pursue this right in court. The considerations lead to the conclusion that the law stating that the use of clean air which meets normative standards is a subjective human right and a personal right protected by the provisions of the Civil Code. The method of legal analysis was primarily used to achieve the purpose of the research.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN PROSPECTS IN THE GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)¹ has again become a distinct region after the fall of the communist bloc in the years 1989-1991. It ceased being Eastern Europe and reoriented its policy goals toward integration with Western Europe based on democratic transformation toward a market economy. The addition of the adjective Central to the expression Eastern Europe served to distance it from the post-Soviet world, which found reflection in the consolidation of democracy contrasting with the dominant hybrid political regimes of Eastern Europe (Pietraś 2019). Over a quarter of a century, more than ten CEE countries have joined key western organisations, including NATO and the European Union (EU). Three decades have passed and a certain separateness of these countries can still be seen in Western European structures while the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) was supposed to strengthen the autonomy within the EU. At the same time CEE can be described as a sub-region of the EU belonging to the larger region although still not fully integrated and maintaining clear differences and its own identity.

From the beginning of the TSI, established at the 2016 summit in Dubrovnik (Orzelska-Stączek: 135-137), its principal leaders defined the interests of CEE as partly distinct from those of Western Europe. The political leaders of the TSI declare primarily pragmatic goals, including in particular the acceleration of the development of road, rail, transmission and digital infrastructure, without which intensive development is difficult in current economic conditions. The ambitions of the initiators of the TSI have also been revealed. They are in line, particularly, with a statement of the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda: “We want to be, and indeed we are, political practitioners, co-creators of a Central Europe which delivers, and which is an important player globally. That is why we are enriching regional cooperation with new components and new implementation instruments. [...] we want to be a significant player. We would like Central Europe to be a developed, well integrated and secure part of the Euro-Atlantic world” (*Speech by the President...* 2018).

¹ The question of which countries belong to CEE is fluid and subjective and therefore controversial. The subjects of this analysis are the post-communist countries which have joined the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The designation “Central” was surely used to even more decisively distance the region from the East. It should be underlined that the leaders of the TSI also presented data attesting to the great potential of the initiative: a market of 100,000,000 consumers and significantly more economic growth than Western Europe. They, however, avoid other numbers. The GDP of the TSI countries is 2.34% of the global product and about 15% of the EU, and after Brexit, about 17-18% (calculated on the basis of International Monetary Fund; no date). In many ways, the position of these countries within the EU is reminiscent of the semi-peripheral status in the model of Immanuel Wallerstein. The size of nominal salaries remains three or four times smaller and calculated according to purchasing power no more than a half (European Commission 2018). This has encouraged the economic immigration of millions of residents of CEE to the countries of Western and Northern Europe. The countries of the TSI are large importers of capital and so far have not invested much themselves. While it is true that, quite unlike the countries of the global periphery, they do not primarily supply raw materials, their level of development and the social services they provide remain far from the levels found in Western Europe. Some improvement of this situation is facilitated by transfers of European Funds which also point to the economic advantage of the West. The only more significant difference between the Wallerstein’s category of semi-periphery and the current economies of CEE is related to their clear pro-export nature and generally positive balance of payments. In accordance with Wallerstein’s theory, the situations of peripheral and semi-peripheral countries cannot be easily improved (Wallerstein 1979: 66-92). There are many obstacles, especially including the necessity of a multi-generational accumulation of capital, which is difficult to achieve more rapidly. Semi-peripheral status is complemented by alliance politics: some countries of the TSI conduct a clientelist security policy toward western countries, usually the USA.

The goal of this article is to examine the determining factors for the improvement of the CEE countries’ international position. To this end, internal and external factors have been considered in the context of the improvement, maintenance or weakening of this position. These factors were selected in terms of internal consistency or the lack thereof, potential for conflict, ability to keep allies and gain benefits from cooperation with major non-regional entities, especially in the context of potential competition for influence within the CEE area. Long-term demographic and economic trends have been identified, and historical analogies and interregional comparisons have been used, as is an analysis of the impact of the global balance of political forces on Central and Eastern Europe.

INTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING THE POSITION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Internal factors can fundamentally transform any political system, including the international balance of power. For example, more integrated actors can obtain a more favourable negotiating position. On the other hand, strongly conflicted entities con-

sume valuable resources and are more likely to succumb to unfavourable external interference. In the case of CEE, the first attempts of integration took place almost immediately after the fall of communism. The Visegrád Triangle was created (which later was transformed into the Visegrád Group), as was the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Both of these structures have been simultaneously integrative and exclusionary. The Visegrád Group, consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, opposed enlargement to other countries. It has also repeatedly experienced difficulties in coordinating foreign policy; for instance, in 2019, after offensive remarks by an Israeli minister about collaboration between Poles and Nazi Germany, Poland withdrew from participation in the Group's summit in Jerusalem while the remaining members did not cancel the visit, but only declared a change of its status to that of "bilateral talks" (Landau 2019). The attempt to create a joint television channel of the Visegrád Group also failed due to the lack of interest from the public media in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Pallus 2017). In turn, membership in CEFTA had to automatically lapse as a result of accession to the European Union since the EU took over the competences of trade policy, which meant the elimination of other trade agreements. Following the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, CEFTA practically became an organisation of the Western Balkans and Moldova.

A new impetus for integration in CEE could have been given by the TSI, initially introduced in 2015 and then proclaimed at the Dubrovnik summit in 2016. Since then, annual summits have been held and further steps have been taken. The Three Seas Fund, for example, has been established to complement EU funding by attracting private commercial entities. Cooperation agreements were signed with some state entities (such as gas and railway companies), working groups responsible for determining the details of cooperation at the enterprise level were established, a declaration of financial support was also obtained from the US Secretary of State (*Nawet miliard dol. od USA...* 2020), and even a special CEEplus index was created on the Stock Exchange, which includes over one hundred companies from seven countries of the Three Seas Initiative (*Powstaje indeks Trójmorza* 2019). However, political leaders are aware of the relatively lower material development of the region compared to Western Europe and counted primarily on favourable financial negotiations with the EU over the period 2021-2027, which would result in a doubling of EU funds to counteract the recession caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. The nature of the TSI in no way indicates advanced integration to the level of joint decision-making or with a common budget. In particular, the initiative is intended to accelerate the expansion and modernisation of transport by road (Via Baltica and Via Carpathia) and rail, transmission (connection of gas terminals in Poland and Croatia, which would provide a basis for the creation of a "hub", that is a relatively free gas transmission market) as well as telecommunications (the idea of a digital highway in the form of efficient international internet connections). If these ideas could be implemented within a decade or two, CEE countries could overcome internal divergences and potential political conflicts resulting from historical events and the ideological heterogeneity of political parties in different countries. A coher-

ent infrastructure would likely minimise centrifugal trends. However, there are no reliable forecasts that would give a chance to implement these large infrastructure projects in such in the short-term perspective.

According to researchers involved in regional studies, interstate integration usually takes place with the significant participation of an internal hegemon or leader, or in opposition to a strong external entity that creates a common threat (Fawn 2009: 29). Neither of these two situations occurred in the CEE region. Poland has no chance of regional leadership at the moment due to the higher level of development in several other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia, as well as negative historical experiences in relations with Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Other countries also have no chance at obtaining the status of leader, even if they enjoy local successes, such as Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, which has built media influence in several Balkan countries (Kačan 2018). CEE has been politically fragmented since the end of World War I, and the processes of disintegration in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have exacerbated this state of affairs. There is also no unified position in the TSI on the threat posed by Russian expansion. The neighbouring countries of Russia, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and in a sense – across the border of the maritime economic zone – Romania as well, perceive the threat from the east as serious and permanent. Countries distant from Russia usually do not share this feeling. This is shown, among others, by comparisons of public opinion polls in countries of the Visegrád Group (Kowalczyk 2014) and a review of the security discourse towards Russia in each of the CEE countries (Klin 2019). Discrepancies in the perception of Russia as a threat create a potential obstacle to the development of regional infrastructure since countries such as Hungary may not see the need to invest in gas infrastructure as their energy cooperation with Russia is progressing smoothly.

All political and economic issues in CEE are heavily influenced by demographic processes. The crises at the beginning of the 1990s resulted in a collapse in population growth. In 1988-2018, the total number of inhabitants of the region decreased by 7.4%, and in the most dramatic cases, that is in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, by more than 20% (calculated on the basis of: The World Bank; no date). In almost all CEE countries, the fertility rate dropped below 1.5, while a level around 2.1 is needed to guarantee the stability of the population. It has, however, increased significantly in the last decade. Still, this ratio is low enough that it indicates a significant and permanent decline in the population in subsequent decades. In 2040, the countries of the region will achieve the 1:2 ratio for the age of 65+ to 20-64 (based on: United Nations; no date). This will force difficult decisions, and these probably include raising the retirement age or lowering the value of pensions in relation to salaries, and certainly also a large influx of economic immigration. Political elites and some sections of societies understand this problem, but they are inclined to reach different conclusions. Some would like a considerable influx of immigration now, with a simultaneous emphasis on pro-immigration education, while others fear numerical and cultural domination of large groups of immigrants, hoping to improve fertility.

The issue of immigration has aroused great political and social emotions in CEE since the refugee crisis of 2015. It drives the popularity of nationalism, but also shifts the ideological and policy orientation of individual political forces. In many countries, centrist political parties remain silent about the issue of immigration or echo right-wing parties in opposing its adoption (Barry 2019, Cienski 2017, Lindsay 2019). Nationalism in its ethnic or even nativist version finds visible social support, intensified by the refugee crisis of 2015-2016. Since then, support for nationalist parties in some countries in the region has declined significantly, reflected especially in the election results in Slovakia. Cycles of growth and decline in support of extreme right parties are also noted. However, it is difficult to define the public's approval of nationalism, because at the same time some radical positions are being adopted by more moderate parties (Bušítková 2018). It is worth considering what international effects would be brought about by a high level of popularity for anti-immigration nationalism. Certainly, the CEE countries would limit immigration, but the reference to the regional integration of the TSI and possibly further integration of the EU may be equally important. The example of Hungary, which is prone to nativist nationalism, is telling. Viktor Orbán has not so far undermined the idea of membership in the EU and NATO, but rather works to transform the model of integration. Orbán benefits from the economic support of Russia and China, since he does not see them as a threat, but rather as an additional source of gains. Orbán declares the need to renew Western civilisation (*The West will fall ...* 2018), not to dissolve it. However, this is ambiguous, because his support for Hungarian minority populations raises concerns about destabilisation in neighbouring countries, such as Romania. This may renew the history of a century ago, when Hungary's neighbours formed the Little Entente to defend themselves against its expansion. Even if this does not happen again, Hungary's actions are rather disintegrative. They do not strengthen the region, although they do not undermine the idea of the TSI as a support forum for investments in infrastructure.

Importantly, in the countries bordering Russia, right-wing parties, nationalist or partially invoking nationalist slogans, are anti-Russian and pro-American in nature, or they focus on strengthening state sovereignty in relations with the EU. Latvia's national-conservative parties: the National Alliance and the New Unity (Raš 2018) are in favour of strengthening the presence of American armed forces. In turn, the nationalist Conservative People's Party of Estonia joining the government coalition legitimises pro-NATO, and therefore pro-American foreign policy (Hyndle-Hussein 2019). Nationalist parties are virtually absent from the Lithuanian political scene. The pro-American attitude of the right wing in Poland is well known, and pro-Russian sympathies have been declared by smaller factions of extreme groups. So if right-wing parties prefer good relations with the USA, antagonistic tendencies towards neighbours remaining in the same alliance will be inhibited by the USA. However, the discourse regarding security in more distant countries has a different tone. For example, the Czech SPD, which is considered to be national-democratic, sees Russia as a "valuable ally" in the context of the fight against terrorism, but this does not portend a complete reorientation of its security policy (*SPD: zahraniční polityka*; no date).

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been intellectual debate on the essence of the present international order, and there are no prospects for it to end. The global order has lost the intellectual simplicity that was commonly accepted until the collapse of the USSR (Buzan, Wæver 2003: 31-32). A significant number of researchers point to the economic resources of the great powers as a basis for the selection of allies and enemies, but there have also been considerations about the relative autonomy of individual regions of the world (Acharya 2014: 79-105) or limited, unequal globalisation, in which regions follow different paths of integration (Telò 2007: 320). International policy researchers usually focus on great powers, but the position of smaller players is also interesting. It has been repeatedly pointed out that they rarely remain passive and many of them take part in shaping the international system (Aron 1995: 131), in particular, taking advantage of the opportunity to join forces in coalitions in international institutions, or by deepening economic integration in international organisations.

Groups of nations such as the Three Seas Initiative also benefit from changes in the global political and economic arena. Efforts to attract US investment and at the same time the acceptance of China's proposal to create a 16+1 consultation forum were meaningful (Kaczmarek 2015). Whether the benefits outweigh the losses, however, especially in the context of a potential US-China economic conflict, cannot be easily determined. First, the diagnosis which indicates the ever-stronger dominance of the USA and China over other great powers is important. This is indicated by the size of the economy, relatively good long-term growth prospects compared to other powers, the increasing advantage of their military budgets in relation to other powers, and even the mutual perception of the USA and China as the highest-ranking powers (Zala 2017; Gaiser, Kovač 2012). Over the past decade and a half, both powers have made efforts to enlarge and strengthen their political blocs. The US still has significantly more allies, but China has entered into a partially formalised alliance with Russia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the BRICS, bilateral military cooperation or the award of the Confucius Prize to Vladimir Putin. Both powers attract authoritarian countries with slogans of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. It is doubtful that history will repeat itself and there will be a new version and a copy of the two-bloc system from 1945-1989, but its seeds are visible. There are two dominant leaders, which are the USA and China, many allies with different levels of status, noticeable ideological differences – although these are not comparable to the antagonism between capitalism and communism. In this situation, a question arises about the position of CEE in such a not entirely clear-cut international balance of power.

What counts for weaker actors is strategic location (or the lack thereof), distance, historically shaped interests, and ideological similarities or differences to the great powers. In the short term, other factors are important, including the economic situation and the period before or after elections. When it comes to geographical distance,

CEE is closest to Western European powers and Russia, while it is separated from the USA and China by distances of about 7,000 kilometres (Gleditsch; no date). Distance is of great importance for the perception of threats (Mearsheimer 2001: *passim*), which is related to the prioritisation of interest in specific regions. It is therefore doubtful that the Three Seas will become an area of vital interests for the two most powerful global powers, and this has both positive and negative consequences. For centuries, this region has had a strategic character for Russia; hence, four great invasions have taken place against it. These are the Polish intervention in the 17th century, the attack by Napoleon and two German offensives during world wars. Russia's status as an international power also led to interest in the region, especially in the context of hegemonic thinking, that is having spheres of influence and satellite countries, as well as the doctrine of the near abroad. It can be mentioned that Russia has repeatedly intervened militarily in Central Europe and in the Balkans, and gained historical allies, especially Serbia (Diec 2015: *passim*).

In the present epoch, however, a fundamental ideological factor has emerged, which can also be described as differences in political culture and attractiveness of image: until recently, the dominant part of the CEE political class viewed the West as a model of the political system and economic development. The last decade has raised doubts in this respect due to recurring economic and political crises, including the crisis in the euro area. In some countries, this creates a tendency to publicly express pro-Russian sympathies. Hypothetically, the degree of democratic consolidation may have some significance here, that is the higher these democratic standards are, the more pro-Western and anti-Russian policy will be, especially in the field of defence and political discourse (Klin 2019). The highest degree of democratic consolidation is attributed to the strongly anti-Russian states of Estonia and Lithuania, but also to the Czech Republic and Slovenia, which are more restrained in their anti-Russian discourse. The lowest democratic standards are attributed to relatively pro-Russian Hungary, and to a lesser extent also Bulgaria and Romania (Freedom House 2020). The dependence therefore remains weak, and it is not possible to draw far-reaching conclusions on its basis due to the limited number of examples. The ideological and historical background is also of some importance as even authoritarian tendencies in Poland do not result in changes to the fundamentally anti-Russian political discourse, although susceptibility to Russian influence, including hidden impact, is more difficult to detect and therefore more debatable. Clearly, the perception of the threat related to the geostrategic location is of greatest importance in anti-Russian activities and discourse (Klin 2019).

Over the last decade in the CEE region, as in other parts of the world, there has been a tendency for democratic standards to deteriorate (Freedom House 2020). However, even if the historical cycle of the interwar period were repeated in terms of rapid democratisation followed by a gradual authoritarian transformation of the region, most countries still distance themselves from Russia. The best known counterexample is Hungary, but even Hungary limits its undertakings in cooperation with Russia. Still, democracy and individualism are the key values shared in CEE and throughout the

West. The Three Seas Initiative also has historical ties with the West: worthy of mention is the strong support of the United States at the end of World War I for the creation of nation states at the expense of existing empires, and support for the democratic anti-communist opposition after World War II. Today, capital and trade exchange make for strong connections. It is estimated that by 2017 American companies had invested at least USD 29 billion in CEE, and taking into account the intermediation of companies registered in other countries, certainly much more (*Kto i gdzie inwestuje...* 2017). The volume of Three Seas trade with the dominant global powers varies – the value of exports to the USA in 2019 amounted to USD 25 billion, while for some countries, such as Slovakia and Hungary, the USA was the largest non-EU export market, and for the remaining countries it was usually the second or third. On the other hand, exports from CEE to China amounted to only about USD 11 billion. Imports from China are of course many times larger. The imbalance in the trade relations is noticeable, especially for Poland and the Czech Republic imports from China are eleven times (!)

higher than exports, while there is practically no imbalance between these two countries and the USA (based on *Trading Economics*; no date). So, trade with China is high, but this is not a desirable developmental model for several reasons. Above all, it promotes dependence on certain goods or intermediates, as highlighted by widespread concerns about access to medicines at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. In turn, in the event of a suspension of capital inflow to Poland, the trade imbalance would affect the balance of payments, even leading, in extreme cases, to a currency crisis. Perceiving by some groups the trade imbalance with China as a threat to domestic production and jobs is also of some importance.

There are strategically important links between the USA and CEE, especially arms purchases. Poland stands out here, since it has acquired, inter alia, fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft sets and frigates from the United States. These are expensive weapons that require specialised servicing and, in the distant future, probably modernisation. In addition, this will exert pressure to maintain good relations with the USA. American fighter aircraft were also bought by Slovakia and Romania (used aircraft in the latter case). Strategic purchases are limited by the unfavourable economic situation in most CEE countries after the 2008 crisis or the size of their economies, which impedes financing such expensive military hardware. In return, the USA offers the stationing of its own troops in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, and repeated military exercises within NATO, also in the Baltic countries, where troops from non-US states of the Alliance are permanently stationed, as well as the presence of the navy in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea (Gotkowska 2020). CEE did not enter fully into the US sphere of influence, but in the geostrategic dimension it has come closer to this status.

It matters whether it is possible for this status to fundamentally change. In history, there have been cases of states have challenging spheres of influence, as exemplified by the successes of communism in Central America and the Caribbean after Fidel Castro took power – Cuba and Nicaragua became “gates” for Soviet influence (Cohen 2003: 137-139). Through a historical analogy, one can wonder if the superpower China would follow the path of the USSR, which was trying to compete with the USA

around the world. China is increasingly attracting states to its development model. The possibility of resigning from the US military presence in CEE can be considered, which, due to the small military sector, would not be a logistical problem, while maintaining some economic presence outside strategic sectors. Such a “strategic gap” could encourage China to change its security approach. However, this is unlikely for the reasons set out above. Even the isolationist Donald Trump only limited the scale of US military interventions in various parts of the world, but did not abandon the tools of influence used by his predecessors.

A scenario in which the two leading global powers, the USA and China, compete for influence in CEE seems more likely. The 2016 election campaign, in which Trump and Hillary Clinton competed, highlighted the growing anti-Chinese nature of the American political class (Babones 2016). Contradictory key values, including the individualism-collectivism axis and human rights-state sovereignty, facilitate the exacerbation not only of various geopolitical tensions, but also economic disputes, especially in East Asia. It is interesting that the research conducted so far does not show that China is behaving like a revisionist power as it acts against universal norms less often than does the USA (Chan, Hu, He 2019). It is known, however, that China is gradually building up its influence through institutions alternative to those dominated by the West. In CEE, it has already established 27 Confucius Institutes (*Confucius Institutes ... 2020*), by means of which they strengthen a favourable image in the field of culture and education (Pepermans 2018). Along with the concept of the “new silk road”, China also created the 16+1 forum. Its image-building efforts are paying off: both Hungary and Croatia have refused to support EU institutions in their criticism of China for human rights violations (Klose 2019: 436).

Economic competition between China and the USA is intensifying. The American campaign against Huawei, to which some of its allies have been drawn, can be regarded as a breakthrough. While Huawei denies having been engaged in political or even espionage activities (Brown 2019) and no convincing evidence has been found, the conflict shows US elite concerns about China’s potential dominance in high-tech sectors such as the fifth-generation network. China, in turn, eliminated key American corporations (Facebook, Amazon, Google) from its market, replacing them with its own, Chinese government-controlled substitutes. Along with the Chinese government ignoring intellectual property protection, the US maintains that Chinese competition is “unfair”.

In the CEE region, the US has proved the effectiveness of its pressure on weaker partners. In addition to the sale of expensive weapons, often outside of a tender procedure, as in the case of F-35 aircraft, Poland and the US organised a conference on the Middle East, which resulted in public criticism of Poland by the Iranian authorities (Orzechowski 2019), and at the same time the conference did not bring Poland any tangible or reputational benefits, as evidenced by the sending of lower-ranking representatives by Western European countries precisely because the conference was perceived as anti-Iranian (Wintour 2019). Other countries in the region do not show such open subservient behaviour towards the United States, but the increase in stra-

tegic ties will certainly limit their actions. It is highly likely that the USA may also use covert pressure, which is not visible in the public sphere, in order to discourage pro-China activities.

However, open US compulsion against its satellites in Europe is rare. American elites prefer more subtle soft power methods, including financial support, investments, visa facilitation, and even public praise of states and regions, as evidenced by Donald Rumsfeld's statement about the "new Europe", better and more attractive than Western Europe (Case 2009: 112 -114). On this basis, it seems likely that the USA will maintain its influence through non-coercive actions, which in the context of China's use of soft power methods outside East Asia indicates a favourable scenario for the Three Seas Initiative as both leading powers may compete for influence through investment projects, economic aid or other benefits. The distance between CEE and China lowers the risk of perceiving China as a threat, so the countries in the region may succumb to US pressure to block China's access to certain strategic sectors, but in others, some Three Seas countries will most likely benefit from Chinese loans and investments.

Of course, there is also the unlikely scenario of a military confrontation between the USA and China, which would have negative consequences for the entire world, for example in the form of a deep global recession. There are a number of arguments against this; historical knowledge about the costs of such confrontations is disseminated in the USA and China by universities and think tanks; the growing global problems of humanity, especially climate change, should encourage cooperation; the risk of a devastating nuclear war also discourages confrontation. Finally, there is also an argument regarding the immediate vicinity of the TSI. Even recently, there has been a joint action by US, Russian and EU diplomats, which led to the formation of a new ruling coalition in Moldova (Nowakowski 2019). Powerful states can therefore work together to influence the political situation in small states. Perhaps the USA and China will, from time to time, divide their influence in some countries. It is all the more possible as there are moderately pro-American factions in China, as evidenced, for example, by the analysis of the beliefs of former Chinese president Hu Jintao, who primarily focused on US-Chinese cooperation in the era of globalisation (*China's Hu Jintao ...* 2011).

In the 2000s, China normalised relations with Russia and then they both gradually built a moderately advanced alliance without defence pact. From the CEE point of view, the question of Russia's influence is fully justified. Russia's power and aggressiveness in foreign policy have fluctuated significantly since the collapse of the USSR. The first decade of Vladimir Putin's rule was of particular importance, when Russia returned to the superpower game with more resources thanks to the export of energy resources (Cooper 2009). However, since the annexation of Crimea, its economic situation has deteriorated significantly, due to Western sanctions and relatively low oil and gas prices, and from 2020 also the collapse of the fuel market due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the demand for Russian energy resources, especially gas, which is less environmentally harmful, will probably not significantly decrease

in the coming decades. Therefore, it is likely that Russia will remain an economically influential power also in the TSI. Although the Polish authorities plan to abandon gas imports from Russia, this is difficult to achieve (Jakóbiak 2019). It is also difficult to see any signs of a transformation of Russian foreign policy into a strictly pro-Western stance or a defence policy aimed towards demilitarisation. Russia will be present in the economies of many countries in the region, or it will have an impact on the situation of strategic proximity to its armed forces.

Nevertheless, it seems that Russia's continuing economic troubles may eventually end the era of its expansion in Europe. The growing assertiveness of NATO and the European Union will limit Russian influence. Examples include the forwarding of new military units to the Three Seas countries, intensified military exercises in the region, and opening up to the export of modern weapons from the US. In turn, the EU has already taken anti-monopoly measures against Gazprom (Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003) and contributed to Bulgaria's resignation from the construction of the South Stream pipeline through the Black Sea (Norman 2014). Pro-Russian politicians in the CEE region, such as the Czech presidents Miloš Zeman and Bulgarian president Rumen Radev, usually resort to a discourse that does not cover real changes. Actions that were clearly beneficial for Russia were taken only by Hungary in the form of a 10-billion loan for the construction of a nuclear power plant by the Rosatom group (Stefanini, Hirst 2017).

In the West, the opinion is expressed that there are contradictions in the Sino-Russian alliance, and even that China could be a great threat to Russia (Jacobs 2015). This seems to fall under the category of wishful thinking. So far, both countries have significantly improved relations (Korolev, Portyakov 2019), and the prospects are good due to the complementarity and diversification of their resources in the energy market, weapons, increased efficiency in industrial production, and even in security matters (Korolev 2019). As long as Russia is similarly anti-Western, resulting in distrust of the West (Sokolov, Inglehart, Ponarin et al. 2018), it will remain mentally "Eastern" and therefore more prone to authoritarianism and collectivism. Regarding China's alleged massive expansion into Russian Siberia, so far China has only shown aggression in areas which it officially recognises as part of China: Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands and the South China Sea, and in relations with South Korea. There is no evidence of aggressive actions towards supra-regional domination (Bolt 2014). The forecasts concerning future great Chinese migration to Siberia are also incorrect, because the demographic boom has already ceased in China, and an accelerated aging of the population has begun, which is not conducive to emigration with colonial features.

In view of the above, it can be assumed that the moderate alliance between China and Russia will continue in the coming decades, however, it is still uncertain how the relations between the two powers in the CEE region will develop. For Russia, the region is one of the most important – historically, a sphere of influence that was an important element of the former Russian and Soviet powers, and modern Russia has made a great effort to partially restore its influence, mainly through its actions in the

energy market. On the other hand, the position of the TSI in the hierarchy of China's interest can be predicted on the basis of economic dependencies, because the 16+1 Forum (with Greece 17+1), although political in its essence, was created to coordinate economic activities. The Three Seas market with the Western Balkans accounts for about 3% of global income, which is much less than areas such as ASEAN, Sub-Saharan Africa, Mercosur or the Persian Gulf region. For China, the Three Seas has some strategic importance in the context of the "new silk road" project as an overland corridor to Western Europe. However, it is still only one of many important regions, as China plans and implements infrastructure projects, such as sea channels in Thailand and Nicaragua, or communication and transmission lines in Central Asia. Thus, if China gradually increases its share of extra-regional security to protect its investments through military aid or military bases, CEE will surely remain off its list of priorities. It also seems likely that China does not see the need for involvement in the field of security, since its ally Russia is interested in the region, especially with such strong arguments from the western side, which already has advanced integration projects in CEE, military structures and long-term arms contracts.

Western Europe will certainly not resign from maintaining its influence in the TSI, because the region already belongs to the European Union, despite some Western European elites' tendency to exclude it as not "European" enough in terms of values (Dimitrova 2018). This view has been bolstered by the recent actions of Hungary and Poland in the area of the rule of law, and even of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which in the last years have featured significantly weakened indicators of journalistic freedom (Pietraś 2019: 24). However, the interdependence of Western Europe with the region is constantly growing. The euro was adopted as the official currency in five countries, in the following order: Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Two more, Bulgaria and Croatia, joined the European Regulatory Mechanism II, and Romania expressed its readiness to do so. This, despite the tightening of the accession criteria related to counteracting banking crises (Słojewska 2019), gives a good chance of three more countries adopting the euro within a few years. Another important binding element is the level of profit transfer, which after the accession of the Visegrád Group countries to the EU amounted to 4-7.5% of the annual GDP (Piketty 2018), which amounts to 30-40 billion euro annually for companies from Western Europe.

Some Three Seas countries have economies that are so export-oriented that it will be difficult for them to maintain a confrontational course towards EU institutions. Slovakia and the Czech Republic export six times more to the EU market than outside the EU, Poland and Hungary four times more, Romania and Slovenia three times more, and other countries except Lithuania twice as much (*Intra-EU trade in goods ...* 2019). For as many as six countries: Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia and the Czech Republic, the level of exports produced by foreign companies is over 50% of total exports (Jirasavetakul, Rahman 2018: 10). This is due to the long-term import of Western European capital. For example, almost 70% of investments in the Czech Republic came from companies from the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and France. For Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, approx. 40% of capital

comes only from companies from the Netherlands and Austria, and another 40% from other EU countries. The share of Swedish companies comprises 15-25% of foreign investments in the Baltic countries (ibid.: 8). With all the geographic diversity, these data shed much light on the degree of CEE economic integration within the EU. Although the interdependencies are heterogeneous and asymmetric, their scale on both sides makes it difficult to really think about cutting off political and economic ties.

Two unresolved issues remain. The first is the violation of European values by Hungary and Poland. It is difficult to predict what will happen as the governments of these countries are determined and have strong domestic support, which usually remains decisive. The determination on the western side is less visible, but at some point, crossing new boundaries must provoke a reaction, otherwise EU values are threatened with becoming a simple façade, which is unacceptable. There is no procedure for expelling a country from the EU, violations of values are rather threatened with financial penalties and deterioration of the climate of political and ultimately economic cooperation. Prime Minister Orbán has repeatedly proved his readiness to partially withdraw from the most controversial legal and political changes in order to weaken the will of the West to punish Hungary. Economic interdependence also acts on the Western side as a deterrent to deteriorating relations.

The second unresolved issue is the amount and method of financing for further EU financial prospects. There was a negative scenario in which some CEE countries become net contributors, which could lead to a decline in public support for staying in the EU. This is especially true of the richest countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. In turn, Poland is in a situation of a relatively high and growing contribution to the EU budget and the possibility of introducing conditions for transfers from EU funds, which in the context of violations of the rule of law may result in Poland achieving the status of net payer. At that point, anti-EU populism could intensify enough for leaving the EU to remain an open question. A small margin of votes in a referendum could be decisive. This would have to result from a set of circumstances that, while possible, still do not seem particularly probable. The EU countries looked at how unyielding EU institutions and the Member States themselves were while negotiating the Brexit agreement (Herszenhorn, Barigazzi, von der Burchard 2019), and leaving the EU may, in the extreme case, result in a lack of access to the EU market, which would probably dampen the enthusiasm of EU opponents.

Economic interdependencies with Western Europe will continue to discourage disintegration. But it seems fairly certain that the Three Seas countries will benefit from Chinese investments, and some from Russia as well. It is interesting which countries they may be. It seems that they would have to meet certain characteristics: the governments would probably be formed by conservative, nationalist or right-wing populist parties that prefer realistic thinking about international relations, such as the belief “there are no friends, there are only interests”. Orbán, of course, is a template in the region, having publicly praised an authoritarian model of development (*Full text of Viktor Orbán's speech ...* 2014), but new cynical leaders can emerge. This would be a policy based on the calculation of large gains from economic integration with

the West and additional gains from selective cooperation with the East. It seems that such a mixed policy would rather be pursued by larger and richer countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and possibly Romania, which are capable of a certain assertiveness in relations with Western Europe. Smaller states are much more economically unstable and therefore more integrated in the EU. This was reflected in the readiness of Slovenia, Slovakia and the Baltic states to quickly join the euro area, which contrasts with the abandonment of such actions by Poland and the Czech Republic.

Historical analogies lead to interesting conclusions. The most pro-Chinese state in communist Eastern Europe was Albania, which resulted from two important conditions, namely ideological rapprochement and Albanian economic independence from both capitalist and communist European economies. Neither of these conditions occurs in any of the Three Seas countries. The economic dependencies have been described previously. On the other hand, a realistic-cynical vision of international politics or an aversion to violating patriarchal social relations connects some conservative factions with Putin's Russia, but this does not clearly result in a pro-Russian, let alone pro-China economic policy. In the case of Poland, a strictly pro-Western and anti-Russian security policy, combined with the attractiveness of Chinese investments, may pose a challenge. For the Baltic countries, afraid to be abandoned by their allies, the pressure on the pro-Western economic policy will probably be even stronger.

FINAL REMARKS

The common communist past connects the CEE countries, but communities of fate and ambitions are insufficient for dreams of close integration, let alone becoming important regional players. The discrepancies in the level of economic development remain too clear (the Czech Republic is nearly twice as prosperous as Bulgaria in GDP per capita), same as ideological preferences (right-wing populism vs pro-Western liberalism) or the perception of threats (strongly anti-Russian Poland and the Baltic states vs relatively pro-Russian Hungary). Close coordination of the foreign policy of the Three Seas countries seems unlikely, and many countries are still unable to completely overcome their historical resentments and grievances towards their neighbours. Slow depopulation will undermine economic growth, putting pressure on governments to seek external financing as well as economic immigration. China's acquisition of the status of the world's first economy according to the purchasing power parity exacerbates the country's global rivalry with the West. Thus, CEE has a chance to take advantage of the economic competition between large economic centres, while relying on security from the West, especially the US. These guarantees are important primarily to Russia's neighbours, and not to the entire Three Seas Initiative.

The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has challenged widespread belief in the effectiveness and predictability of globalisation. It will probably be restored in the long term, but in the coming years, undermined globalisation may result in a tendency to

integrate even more in the immediate region. The proximity of Sweden to the Baltic states or Germany and Austria to the Visegrád Group will encourage efforts to keep Central and Eastern Europe within Western structures. It is more difficult to assess whether this may be conducive to improving the coordination of the economic policy of Central and Eastern Europe. The pandemic has brought about a recession that is likely to worsen the ability to finance key infrastructure investments in the Three Seas Initiative. However, the global US-Chinese rivalry and regional rivalry for influence between the EU and Russia are unlikely to end. Thanks to this, despite unfavourable demographic trends, CEE still has a chance to obtain significant outside funding for the gradual development and improvement of the state of regional integration, although there is no prospect of imminent achievement of the status of an important player by the Three Seas Initiative.

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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the situation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as a region in the future global order. The article has been inspired by declarations from political leaders from the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) on improving the international position of their member states. The purpose of the article is to scrutinise conditions and opportunities for the improvement of CEE's position. Internal variables analysed in the paper regard CEE's regional integration, demographic and economic factors and the problem of nationalism. External variables are related to four global centres of power, namely the USA, China, Russia, and Western Europe considered as a relatively well-integrated part of the European Union. The influence of these four centres on CEE results from their relative development, rivalry and/or cooperation between the centres, as well as ideological factors such as perceptions of globalisation. The paper identifies long-term demographic and economic trends, it uses methods of historical analogies and interregional comparisons, and it considers consequences of the global polarity on CEE.

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ON THE EMERGENCE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN A BORDERLAND

THE EXAMPLE OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (AND ITS RESULTS) IN DIVIDED TOWNS¹

INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, many hypotheses have been formulated concerning the changes that have occurred in divided towns during this time. Most of them have pointed to deepening cooperation between their parts, residents getting to know each other, the integration of urban structures and inhabitants, the creation of cross-border ties and mutual dependence as well as the appearance of the “miracle” of normalcy (Jajeśniak-Quast, Stokłosa 2000, Schultz 2005, Makaro 2007, Székely 2007, Joenniemi, Sergunin 2011, Jańczak 2012, Kaczmarek 2011, Kulczyńska 2014, Zenderowski, Brzezińska 2014, Dębicki, Doliński 2017, Opiłowska 2017, Sternberg 2017, Tamáska 2017, Dolińska, Makaro, Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2018).

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought about changes which have influenced, in a fundamental manner, the lives of individuals, the functioning of institutions and the activities of cities and countries. In border areas, where such conditions have been unknown for years, the situation has had an additional aspect – a keenly felt lack of freedom and the ability to carry out daily activities on the other side of the national border.

The issue of restrictions in crossing the borders that mark territorial and political separations has been so far been brought up in the literature primarily when describing

¹ This article was written as part of the research project “(De/Re)Konstruowanie granic – narracje i imaginacje o miastach podzielonych w Europie Środkowej w perspektywie porównawczej” ((De/Re) Constructing borders – narratives and imaginings on divided cities in Central Europe from a comparative perspective) financed by the National Science Centre Poland in the OPUS call for research projects, agreement no. UMO-2018/29/B/HS6/00258.

the specifics of such borders – especially in the context of their instability. This has included the degree of their permeability, depending on factors such as geopolitical changes, actions of political decision-makers at various levels, ongoing social process as well as polysemicity related to the thesis that “in practice borders do not mean the same thing for everybody” and crossing them occurs within a context of differentiated social axes (Dolińska 2020). The objectively existing situation, which can be described by the laconic phrase “the free crossing of national borders is not a given for all time” became for researchers an opportunity to participate in something akin to a natural experiment and, at the same time, a chance to test how places such as divided towns are (or are not) resistant to changing functions performed by borders. In other words, an opportunity arose to examine how a sudden change in the functioning of political lines running through a city which indicate that it belongs to two countries translates into the principles and manners of social co-existence, a developed socio-cultural order as well as a functioning system of connections, all of which had been worked out over decades.

In Polish-Czech and Polish-German divided border towns the closing of the borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic became an occasion that made it possible to verify the hypothesis that these towns were becoming multicultural while the form and content of the reactions to the disruption of the ongoing cross-cultural order can be recognised as indications making it possible to carry out this analytic goal. Hence, it is necessary to first identify the reasons for social protests against the border closures. Secondly, the entities which were (with attention paid to the socio-cultural capital held) particularly interested in a return to “normalcy” and which, from that viewpoint, signalled their opposition should be identified. Thirdly, the disproportionate nature of the advance of certain social processes in border areas should be shown along with the reflexive nature of the central authorities, whose arbitrary decisions did not take into account the specifics of the socio-political order established in recent years in Polish-German and Polish Czech divided border towns. The main object of interest here then is the daily pandemic reality and the COVID-19 pandemic itself is treated as a variable that reveals the specifics of divided towns.

The theoretical inspiration for the attempt to grasp *in statu nascendi* what is happening in divided towns in relation with the pandemic – with particular attention paid to Słubice and Frankfurt (Oder) along with Cieszyn and Český Těšín but also to Gubin and Guben as well as Zgorzelec and Görlitz – is Andrzej Sadowski’s concept of societal evolution from cultural diversity through pluralism to multi-culturalism. Its assumptions make it possible to accept that in the Polish-German trans-border area there are hypothetically “processes creating a pluralistic society, which will comprise a strong lobbying group directed also toward political and state organs, a group which supports the creation of the legal and institutional foundations of a pluralistic society in Poland and Germany” (Sadowski 2019: 183). We believe that this hypothesis can be broadened in the Polish-Czech border region, where, especially after the ascension of Poland and the Czech Republic to the European Union, the number and nature

of cross-border relations facilitates the perception of the values and practices being formed and shared on both sides of the border, which are those characteristic for a pluralistic situation.

BORDERLANDS AND CROSS-BORDERLANDS

In order to understand the essence of the topic under discussion, which depends upon limitations on state border crossings, which have serious repercussions and which had been almost unimaginable for well over 10 years, it is necessary to examine the key theoretical categories that describe this border reality. It is possible to begin from the increasingly accepted concept of *borderscapes*, which proposes a departure from treating and analysing borders as lines in favour of a broader perspective in which attention is paid to the landscapes spreading out around them. The popularity of this proposal, which contains the philosophy, spirit and elements of thought regarding borders expressed earlier in different aspects of the concept of borderlands (without regard to whether they are located by the border, on one or on both sides), is greater in western literature on the topic than in that of Central Europe. This can be explained by divergent research traditions and different historical premises, standing behind the formation of states and nations. The latter have encouraged particular researchers to give value either to borders or rather borderlands (Kurcz 2014, Kurczewska 2005). The perspective of borderscapes allows for the recording and description of tensions between the sufficiently clear durability of old borders and the dynamic elements that accompany it – especially those new (cross)border forms, functions and practices that have appeared in recent years (Brambilla 2015: 20).

Divided cities are found in many border areas and create a framework for the phenomena described in this text. The uniqueness of these centres is built by their histories – at one time they functioned as single urban organisms in one country until a border was demarcated between them (as a result of global political decisions), often running along a river. This type of division resulted in the newly created individual parts being deprived of their urban functionality. History shows that with time both towns “turn around” to face the river, and at the same time, each other, and the bridges that join them once more become part of the urban circulatory system. In many cases – such as in the divided borders lying on the Polish border –there has been, beginning in the 1990s, an increase in cooperation and integration of the towns and their inhabitants (Makaro 2020). The advancement of these processes and the concomitant transformation of divided towns is connected to the formation of cross-borderlands.

In the domestic literature, taking into account the specifics of Central European borders, border areas as a theoretical category have been approached in many ways (Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2020); for the needs of this article, however, we persist with its general meaning, indispensable for the problem presented in it. A border area is therefore a transitional space connected to a border (administrative, but also socio-cultural), where ethnically differentiated communities come into contact. However, it is

not only space that describes what the border is but rather the relations between the representatives of different cultures and the border “enscribed” in these relationships. In the examples described here, the Polish-Czech and Polish-German borders which are changing their functions as a result of the limitations placed on crossing them are of key significance for those in the vicinity of the border.

In both examples which interest us, the relations occurring in borderlands (between borderlands) have brought about, over time, a cross-borderland. This is a supra-border construction, which can be constituted by borderlands on both sides of the border, upon which common goals and aspirations are shared by the residents, independently of the “differences between nation-state and national borders” (Dolińska, Makaro, Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2018: 86). Its existence, as argued by Zbigniew Kurcz (2009: 9-10), is determined both by institutional actions undertaken by the elite which build a framework for actions below as well as by the activities of the residents themselves – through daily practices and the experiences of being neighbours. Apart from differences in concepts,² it should be borne in mind that the consciousness of borderland residents is formed in the conditions of institutionally ordered “large scale and constant flow (penetration) of the border by people, their economic potential, but also the cultural patterns and values, in conjunction with activities aimed at maintaining or developing these contacts by the neighbouring states and societies” (Sadowski 2019: 181). As the result of earlier defined social processes occurring between the representatives of different cultures, cross-borderlands – as stressed by Sadowski – indicate not only practices carried out over and across borders but also the assimilation of the context in which they occur. If, in a neighbouring country, the degree of “advanced intercultural relations” is higher, then this may act as a hindrance, or – as in the scenario under discussion – become a reference point to which the neighbours orient themselves (Sadowski 2019: 179). This second variant explains why we measure the formation of pluralistic communities in divided towns, which from a Polish perspective are not typical, but rather insular, for the country.

CROSS-BORDERLAND IDENTITY IN DIVIDED TOWNS

The claim regarding a greater (than in the rest of the country) degree of advancement of divided towns (and borderlands) in arriving at a state of multiculturalism is justified by several arguments which are the *de facto* characteristics of these towns. The first of these refers to the recognition that since they lie on the border and their everyday urban life develops in its proximity, they are an important part of the cross-borderland. The second is related to the understanding of border territories as ethnically mixed, which occurred earlier in the case of the transitional Polish-Czech borderland,

² A detailed “maturation” of the Polish sociology of cross-border studies was described by N. Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak (Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2020; also see Dolińska, Makaro, Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2018).

while in the case of the Polish-German linear borderland, this was just beginning to form after many years and was (and still is) difficult to definitively determine.³ In 1999, Władysław Kwaśniewicz, pointing out the long term nature of mixing ethnic elements, foresaw the possibility of diversifying the ethnic structure on the Polish side of the border due to attractive land rental rates for neighbouring Germans. “After 20 years, it is possible to say how generally accurate and specifically inaccurate this prognosis was. It has so far happened in reverse, it has been Poles who have more and more been moving to the German side of the border” (Dolińska, Makaro, Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2018: 89). And finally, the third circumstance makes it possible to understand not only the separateness of divided towns but also their transformation over recent decades. The essence of these divided residential systems is derived not only from the historical fact of being one town, later divided, but the exposure – beyond the spatial question – of the social aspect of the rapprochement of neighbours (Schultz 2005). This is aptly illustrated by the concept of the transformation of towns by the border into border towns (Sadowski 1991), which speaks of the transformation (domination) of relations between residents in accordance with the formulas from material to personal, from uncommon to common, from instrumental to autotelic, from the public sphere to the private sphere (Dolińska, Makaro, Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2018).

CENTRAL EUROPEAN MULTICULTURALISM

All the above *differentia specifica* of divided towns make them eligible to be “laboratories” of multiculturalism. Looking at studies concerning the multiculturalism of Central European countries, a noticeable problem is the imposition of models primarily describing the ways that ethnic diversity is handled in Western Europe or more rarely (which is understandable) in those countries recognised as the “cradles” of multiculturalism. This type of procedure points to the omission of the different political and geographic contexts in which multiculturalism was constituted as well as a failure to take into account the diverse range of pronouncements on multiculturalism especially in its genealogical and ecological dimension. This should also sensitise theoreticians and researchers both to its origin and the specifics of its nature. It occurs then differently in societies formally defined as multicultural (Canada and Australia).⁴ It takes on a different nature, however, in the societies of Western Europe, where it is of immigrant origin as modern movements for sovereignty among national

³ The term ‘linear borderland’ refers to an area where clearly distinguished ethno-linguistic groups co-exist while a ‘transitional borderland’ is one where related groups co-exist (Chlebowczyk 1983: 30-31). While the territorial reach of transitional borderlands encompasses a sphere shaped as a result of intercultural contact and is therefore usually “very significant”, linear borderlands are rather small in area (Sadowski 1991: 5).

⁴ Often, the United States of America is also placed in this category of multi-cultural societies although in the opinion of Anna Śliz this country is more appropriately described as being a case of cultural pluralism (2017: 45-46).

minorities and ethnic groups make themselves known while immigrants and refugees search for a “chance to survive”. Multiculturalism occurs yet differently in Central and Eastern Europe, where it had a chance to appear only as a result of the process of democratisation along with the appearance of freedom and equality (Śliz 2017: 41-46). Theoretical and methodological sensitivity to many aspects of multiculturalism (along with empirical exemplifications) is also offered in reference to the range of its conceptual meanings. Distinguishing, within its framework the level of real differentiation, whether related to ethnicity, consciousness, politics or marketing, points to the necessity of analysing different social phenomena and utilising different research strategies. As a consequence, the opportunity arises of examining the mutual relations between the levels indicated (revealing, for example, multiculturalism in a monocultural – in terms of real criteria of differentiation – reality). At the same time it makes possible the specification of “multiculturalism as a complex cultural and social phenomenon in a Central and Eastern European context” (Dolińska, Makaro 2011: 88), which is particularly important, and at the same time justifies the requirement to avoid “treating it as a ‘copy’ of its Western version” (ibidem: 100).

The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not then arenas of

“large-scale international immigration” but “a type of analytically understood multiculturalism, although (...) in a manifestly obvious way, is completely different than in technologically and highly economically developed Western countries. There are cases, however, of strong internal displacement of populations of different ethnic backgrounds, with the issue of the intertwined nature of different neighbouring cultural groups in local communities. In some cases, this intertwining is centuries old, in others it is very new” (Mucha 2015: 65-66).

Therefore, the fact that the multiculturalism of Central and Eastern Europe is not “ideological”, that is, connected with a policy of multiculturalism (as in Western countries), does not bring into question the analysis of multicultural “islands” of multicultural Eastern European regions, taking into account the social awareness and acceptance of ethnic differences – an example may precisely be cross border regions (Jendrzey-Gawlicz 2007: 105).

THE “MULTICULTURAL TRIAD” AND DIVIDED TOWNS

A proposal by Andrzej Sadkowski appears to offer an accurate and interesting analytical tool for the present understanding of multiculturalism. It both takes into account the nature of the countries of Central Europe and distinguishes social and political phenomena. It emphasises the processuality of “multiculturalism” - assuming a stage of development (implementation) of intercultural and inter-ethnic coexistence, referred to here as the “multicultural triad” and at the same time it sensitises the observer to the different tempos and conditions in which it can occur. The term “multicultural triad” used here is intended to be a category covering three stages of transformation of social reality and corresponding types of societies, from cultural-

ly diverse (corresponding to a culturally diverse society) through cultural pluralism (corresponding to a pluralistic society) to multiculturalism (corresponding to a multicultural society). These are meant to describe the changes in Central European societies in democratic conditions (Sadowski 2019). An empirical key to examining the direction of these transformations as well as the factors fostering and hindering them can be the manner in which individual and collective subjects approach these changes (Sadowski 2011: 51), how they react to the changing reality around them and – worth paying special attention to – how they behave in situations of risk – toward challenges requiring the management of unexpected social changes (Wojakowski 2019: 515).

In accordance with this model, transformations connected to intercultural coexistence begin from a culturally diverse society in which there is a dominant group created by an ethnicity and there are also minority groups. Relations are regulated through formal solutions, not necessarily (for different reasons) actually respected. This indicates *de facto* inequalities between particular cultures which have the ability to publicise and externalise their separateness only in democratic conditions. Democracy then emerges as a key category presented as a condition and context for the reformation of culturally diverse societies into pluralistic societies. The second stage – cultural pluralism – which is rather a demand of cultural minorities but also occurring in some borderlands or cross-borderlands, depends on the recognition of differences of minorities and a cessation of their assimilation by the dominant group and the creation of conditions for development in partnership of both groups while one of them maintains the dominant position. The change outlined does not indicate revolution, but rather evolution in thinking about the social order and makes it possible to join the “legitimation of ethnic separateness” of minorities and the privileged position of the dominant group with growing freedom of choice regarding group membership and respect for the principle of self-determination by others. The complexity of the pluralistic situation is, however, great, and tensions between cultural diversity and homogeneity, between a country based on an ethnic community and a country based on civic nationality can seem to be impossible to overcome – which is why this change cannot be based on emotional processes but on processes that are controlled and for which the state bears responsibility, for example, by skilfully utilising developments in pluralising borderlands. The final stage, which societies that transform in accordance with the assumed logic should reach, is multiculturalism. However, this is not simply about the manifestations of this – even empirically identified, but rather about the creation of a multicultural society, characterised by, among other features, a “multi-dimensional social and cultural identity” (Sadowski 2019: 202), whose design “involves not only multicultural policies but also normative systems which exclude domination and subordination from the public sphere with respect to specified cultural values as well as with new types of personality [...]” (*ibidem*: 208). It should be emphasised that achieving equality among cultures is a long-term process demanding coordination. An analysis of the situation in the communities of Central Europe could strengthen the conviction that the end of dominance of one culture toward others in this area will be particularly difficult to achieve.

A consequence of accepting Sadowski's proposal must therefore be the application of different concepts for the description of the subsequent stages of the formation of multiculturalism, exemplified by a specified level of advancement of social relations, whose essence is the degree of recognition of ethnic differences and the method used to "manage" them.

The situation in divided towns on the Polish-German and Polish-Czech borderlands, in accordance with the assumptions made here, can be described as an exemplification of cultural pluralism, corresponding with the formation of pluralistic communities, in partially differing conditions (some political and some related to the different socio-cultural contexts shaping the nature of the borderland). Democratisation therefore became the catalyst for processes leading to the acceptance of ethnic differences among residents, turning them into resources that serve the building of local communities with the participation of those ethnically "different" – both in the institutional dimension and grassroots dimensions, related to the specific nature of the border area and its daily neighbourly existence. Having in the beginning the status of an expected community – postulated and realised chiefly in the institutional dimension – it gradually undergoes a transformation in a socially established direction without, however, prejudging at what stage it is. A particular role in this process is played by social networks (whether they are the result of personal contacts or through institutions), which are very important for the creation of "orientation in a borderland" (Kurczewska 2005) and for the symbolic shifting of the territorial boundary of locality and this process gradually supports the a posteriori recognition of ethnic difference.⁵ It should be noted that the transformations occurring in the twin-towns of interest to this article are certainly being formed somewhere between global processes which create a more fluid, reality constructed in narratives, which is characteristic for borderscapes (Szlachciowa 2019, Brambilla 2015) and "local projects which fragment and distinguish the socio-cultural space of the modern world" (Dudziak 2001: 151). An ever more important link in this puzzle has come to include the residents – members of cross-border communities. Internalising to different degrees for different reasons the principles of life "above borders" (designated by both formal and informal rules) and having at their daily disposal the resources created thanks to the open border in the area around it, they have become the co-authors of a narrative of life in divided towns and at the same time the articulators of the interests that insure the durability of these pluralistic communities.

⁵ Recognition of difference is a category utilized in the description of relations in culturally diverse societies. Its origins are found in multiculturalism as a policy serving the defence and maintenance of ethnic differences perceived as valuable. Of particular importance for this political project is the concepts by the Canadian philosophers Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka (cf. Szahaj 2010: 24-33) even though their assumptions are not free from problematic theoretical, conceptual, political and ethnic considerations (Bobako 2010: 149-160).

THE PANDEMIC AND LIFE IN DIVIDED TOWNS

Due to the developing COVID-19 pandemic, the Polish government closed the borders to foreigners on 15 March 2020 and all citizens returning to the country were required to undergo a 14-day quarantine (by the end of March this was expanded to cross-border workers, who originally had been able to cross the borders both ways). Residents of divided towns were not spared this type of restriction although their life activities were based in different daily domains often carried out in the neighbouring part of a twin-town (which is not identified with migration, which requires difficult decisions and logistics, but rather with small-scaled actions closer to habits that are hard to break). They had done this by taking advantage of the conditions made possible by the borderland. That is, people could decide to work outside the borders of the country and not suffer any negative consequences for their family life or children's education. Decisions concerning various spheres of life, and therefore daily practices on both sides of the border, could be separated from each other (Roose, Kaden 2017: 41). Suspending parts of them should be recognised as creating a burden for residents in the entire country; blocking, however, the ability to work outside the country's borders in neighbouring parts of twin-towns indicates a severe – from an individual perspective – change. This resulted not as much from the destabilisation of workplaces but from making the realisation of professional duties impossible precisely due to the closure of borders, which had seemed to that point to them to be “invisible” or “intangible” so that local residents felt that they lived “above them”. Upsetting this cross-border order that had formed over years, and which had qualities that made it possible to be described as pluralistic, brought about consequences so onerous for the divided towns in question and their inhabitants (as well as the broader border area) that they led to social protests and appeals by the local elite.

The decisions taken by national authorities and their consequences, which involved physically strengthening the visibility of political borders as well as their heightened tangibility in individual experience, influenced the cross-border community and raised questions on its nature and durability, including socio-cultural borders whose susceptibility to that political context could not be denied. The border area including divided towns as particular representatives of the border reality are sensitive indicators of either the political will for cooperation or flight back to state fortifications (Klatt 2017: 126). On the other hand, however, they are a testament to the strength of will of its inhabitants and local elites in the areas of maintenance and development of the elaborated framework as well as cross-border cooperation and the formation on its basis of the supra-border community.

The daily reality of divided towns on the Polish-German and Polish-Czech border areas is full of cross-border practices and experiences related to them (Dolińska, Makaro, Niedźwiecka-Iwańczak 2018, Dołzbłasz 2015, Kulczyńska 2019). They are what led to the formation of pluralistic communities that recognise ethnic distinctions and possess the mechanisms for coping with that type of difference and for utilising it as an immanent part of the trans-border order in which they live. This caused

the effects of closing the border in the local reality to be felt far more intensely as it shows greater sensitivity to this type of restriction. Its sources have axiological foundations because the reactivation of members of supra-border communities that can be observed in the media are practiced in different spheres of values, which are recognised, and/or felt, instrumentally directed and autotelic, related to everyday life and festivities.

EMPIRICAL EXEMPLIFICATIONS

Limiting the permeability of the border along with the various social and institutional reactions to this became, as indicated in the introduction, an occasion that made it possible to verify the hypothesis regarding the situation in divided towns (still somewhat conventionally treated as a type of whole) which is approaching a state of multiculturalism. This position will be argued by referring both to the fulfilment of the idea of multiculturalism with defined content and the way it is practiced – in other words, to the subjective elements making it up: “autonomous value in the process of organising positive multicultural coexistence”, as well as objective ethnic differentiation and its consequences (Sadowski 2019: 88). The form and content of reactions which are a result of the closure of the borders and the obligatory quarantines for those returning from abroad (and thus a disruption in the existing socio-political order) are, however, indications that make it possible to check the hypothesis formulated. Since the topic of interest is such performative acts as social protests, the appropriate methodological approach is that of borderscapes, which proposes examining the construction of borders “through narratives, visualisations, imaginings and their interpretation” (Brambilla 2015: 28).

This questioning of the ways of neighbouring carried out under the conditions elaborated in divided towns over the last three decades was noticed and raised the resistance of those whose life and material interests were threatened as well as the resistance of those whose values and possibilities of freely expressing and practicing them were limited. The opposition voiced by these subjects, although with various motivations, is part of the anti-re-borderisation discourse. The circumstances of its expression were different in nature on both sides of the border – there were loud demonstrations carried out by many people (in Cieszyn called “walks against the border”) or banners hung in silence next to rivers, accompanied by groups singing “Ode to Joy” or individual glimpses of witnesses from the other part of the town.

In order to show how advanced the processes leading to multi-culturalism in divided towns are, we questioned inhabitants about their reactions to the disruption of the bi-urban social order, the shaking of the durable external pluralism and the external interference in it. Limited possibilities for conducting field research during the pandemic led us to make use of available recorded data – communications present in the area of divided towns and recorded in photographs. We analysed the contents of short rather telegraphic communications, examining who was passing information to

who, but also – paying attention to the implicitly expressed meanings – we searched for the values that the senders were referring to (Szczepaniak 2012).

Verbal messages found in different media were analysed. These included cardboard signs, banners made of different materials hung on fences, bridges, river banks, etc., back lit posters placed at public transport stops (*citylight*), or A4-sized pieces of paper held in people's hands. These messages were recorded in photographs and films as well as being placed on the internet on town websites, press sites or Facebook. Reactions to reduced cross-border mobility were formal in nature (open letters, petitions, official documents) and informal (banners, posters, papers with messages etc.), and it was exclusively the latter that were of interest to us. Their form was appropriate to the circumstances – they were usually created out of very pressing needs, without professional support, often directed to recipients living on the other side of the river or to the media, thanks to which the message could reach a larger circle of recipients.

From the materials collected, which illustrate the symbolically changing space of the divided towns of interest to us as well as the opposition expressed – both in the form of worker protests whose instrumental interests, above all those allowing them to provide for their families were infringed but also in the form of expressions of longing, which were articulations of resistance to being deprived of internalised values leading to a “bad state of mind” – it is possible to distinguish two types of communication. The first of these refers to the concrete problem at the border, the second – more general, addresses the topic of disturbed neighbourly relations.

During protests, not only in Cieszyn and Ślubice, but also in Zgorzelec, Gubin or at the border crossing in Lubieszyn, it was mainly the interests of cross-border employees and students that were presented. For them the necessity of undergoing a two-week quarantine after crossing the border made daily trips for school or work impossible. Therefore, the slogans used were rather short, to the point and thematically limited, taking the form of exclamations. The use of capital letters indicated the areas of life which were especially difficult for residents of the border area communicating about the situation “on the border”. This is illustrated by the slogan “Wpuśćcie nas do PRACY, do DOMU, Keine GrenzeN” (Let us in for WORK (Polish), No BorderS (German)) (Gadomska 2020) written on a large piece of material hung on a Polish Żuk vehicle. Some of these messages were given in both languages of divided towns – “Wpuśćcie mojego męża do domu!!!; Lasst meinen Mann nach Hause!!!” (Let my husband (come) home!!!) (Pazda 2020), “Wpuśćcie nas: do pracy, do domu; Last uns: zur Arbeit, nach Hause” (Let us go to work, to home) (Gadomska 2020). Home and work are the basic spheres of human life, which are mentioned in the following forms: “Chcemy do pracy” (We want to go to work); “Chcemy do domu” (We want to go home); “Wpuśćcie nas do pracy, do domu” (Let us go to work, let us go home) (Bounaoui 2020); “My nie chcemy jałmużny, dajcie nam pracować” (We don't want charity, let us work) (Koleśnik 2020). Apart from these, those protesting ascribe similar importance to the border in its role as a state marker – making it the central character in the following messages (apart from the previously mentioned “keine Grenzen”: “Żądamy otwarcia granicy” (We demand the opening of the border); “Otwórzcie

granice” (Open the border) (Gadomska 2020); “Otwórzcie granicę”/“Otevřete hranice” (Open the border; no date).

The problem of disturbed neighbouring relations is expressed in messages along a continuum, one end of which can be labelled “neighbour relations in the private sphere” and the other – “neighbour relations in the public sphere”. An exemplification of the first of these is the slogans indicating close cross-border relations which are autotelic, personal and belong to the private sphere. One banner hung on the Czech side of the Olza river read “Agnieszko, moja princeznicko, weźmeš si mnie?” (Agnieszka, my princess, will you marry me?) (Furtak 2020). A similar message was hung in Görlitz on the Nysa river “Cześć Lucyna, Marek, Julek, Robert, Ola, Remik, Kathleen, Anja, Renata” (Hello Lucyna, Marek, Julek) (Gadomska 2020). Images of the second sphere can be found in the contents which refer to the institutional unity of the towns “Zgorzelec Görlitz jedno miasto” (Zgorzelec Görlitz one town), “Co lud złączył niech państwo nie rozdziela. Zgorzelec Görlitz = 1 miasto” (What the people have joined together, let no state put asunder) (ibidem) indicating, at the same time, the role of the local community in creating a cross-border social group (showing the internal factors determining this process), their agency and efficiency based on local interests; similar contents are expressed in the slogan: “Wir bestimmen der Staat furt nur aus”.⁶ The disturbed, more general Polish-German neighbourly relations are the subject of a rather hermetic but very deft message: “if pl !=de: return error” (Koleśnik 2020). The slogans referred to can, at the same time, be read as testimony to the feeling that the central authorities did not understand the nature of life “on the border”. Between the extremes of this so-constructed continuum are found appeals and messages that bear witness to the internalisation of the idea of an ethnically diverse community and its transfer to an extra-institutional context which indicates the intensity and advancement of inter-ethnic relations and an already existing pluralism: “Tęsknię do Görlitz. Ich vermisse dich” (I miss Görlitz. I miss you) “Bleibt gesund, Freunde” (Stay healthy, Friends) (Pazda 2020), “Polska, brakuje nam ciebie” (Poland, we miss you), “Chybíte nám, Poláci!” (We miss you, Poles!) (“Tęsknie za tobą, Czechu” - *sąsiedzka akcja...* 2020); “Stýskáse mi po tobě, Čechu” (I miss you, Czech) (*Tęsknię za tobą, Czechu*). *Mieszkańcy Cieszyna...* 2020) “I ja za tobą Polaku” (And I miss you, too, Pole) (ibidem) – these last two were the first such messages in public space (hung on both sides of the Olza), which showed that limitations on border crossings did not have to mean a lack of communication and this could even occur in the language of the neighbour. A similar symbolism can be ascribed to the slogan “Im Herzen vereint und gemeinsam stark. Wir sehen uns bald wieder” (Frankfurt und Słubice 2020)⁷ as well as on the message seen on citylight posters at public transport stops in Frankfurt “Besser Glück finden als halt suchen, oder. Komm zuruck nach Frankfurt

⁶ Translation: “We decide, the state only implements.”

⁷ Translation: “United in (our) hearts and strong together. We will soon see each other again”.

(Oder). Wir unterstützen dich!”⁸ Both the contents and their relatively long-term placement in places available to residents in both parts of the towns suggest that inhabitants of divided towns are not indifferent to their neighbours.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that opposition to the disturbance of the status quo of the time, and support for the values defining the cross-border community was expressed by all residents. In narratives concerning the towns located on the Polish-German and Polish-Czech borders, the loudest voices belonged to those particularly interested in a return to normality, those residents who due to material assets and disposition – important from the point of view of life on the border – are engaged in the process of building a cross-borderland and at the same time strengthening pluralism. They are not universal since they belong primarily to the local elite, cross-border workers as well as “community spokespeople” (Dolińska 2018), people oriented toward the borderland and not the border (Kurczewska 2005), which suits the values and practices typical of pluralistic societies. The content of their message is conditioned by resources in the form of the personal experiences of the narrators as well as locally available and comprehensible discourses and the way they sound is dependent on the narrative framework typical for a given community (institutions, organisations), and the intermediary and decisive expression of its members (Gubrium, Holstein 1998: 164). The daily life of divided towns – experienced and (co-)created by the residents working in both formal and informal roles – is therefore related with regard to local narrative models, among which, an essential meaning is held by that whose content is “supra-border community” and “integration”.

Therefore, in order to not call forth a false image of cross-border towns, it is also necessary to indicate who has created particular narratives. Referring to the already proposed division of messages, it is possible to indicate that what differentiates them is the type of emotion that motivated their creators – actors, who as a result of internalising (for different reasons) the values important for and justifying a supra-border community, articulated the necessity of a return to normalcy. Therefore the narratives of cross-border employees were dominated by demands to open the border and allow free movement between the workplace, school and home, although it is necessary to note that this social category also proclaimed slogans stressing the unity of divided towns. The slogans in reaction to the disturbed neighbouring relations were created outside the “usual” residents by another category of actors – persons involved in building close neighbourly relations in divided towns and the institutions called forth for development and cooperation. Among these was Stefan Manka – co-organiser of an action of hanging (on barriers over the Olza river) a banner perfectly visible from a distance reading “Tęsknię za tobą, Czechu”/Stýská se mi po tobe, Čechu” (I miss you, Czech)⁹ or a cross-border institution such as the Słubicko-Frankfurckie Centrum

⁸ Translation: “It’s better to find luck than merely search (for it), or. Come back to Frankfurt (Oder). We support you!”.

⁹ S. Mańka, cultural and social activist, co-organiser of *Stýská se mi po tobě, Čechu* (I miss you, Czech), creative director of the association *Člověk na hranici* (Person on the border).

Kooperacji (the Słubice-Frankfurt Cooperation Center),¹⁰ whose banner (placed on the border bridge connecting Słubice with Frankfurt an der Oder) read: “Im Herzen vereint und gemeinsam stark. Wir sehen uns bald wieder! / Razem łatwiej przetrwać najtrudniejsze chwile. Do zobaczenia wkrótce!” (In (our) hearts united and strong together. We will see each other again soon! / Together we can get through the most difficult times. See you soon!).

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic and the border closures of spring 2020 motivated researchers of borders and border regions to actively comment on the situation of the time, not only in the form of academic publications but also in reflexive social commentary (Böhm 2020). In the descriptions and interpretations presented, the question of new definitions of the function of state borders gained in importance as did thinking of them in terms of the defence of national interests and assuring a feeling of security and treating them as a symbol of the political order and stability as well as the articulation of force by nation states understood in substantive terms (Opilowska 2020, Klatt 2020). In a very short period of time, borders became (once more) essential not only in the functioning of policy but also in the daily lives of residents of regions close to national borders, whose cross-border world was suddenly violated by the border closures and police control points (Wille, Kanesu 2020: 4),¹¹ although the spreading virus – as a signal for reflection on the “end of common space” – “certainly did not function in accordance with the logic of national epidemic” (Berrod, Wassenberg, Chovet 2020: 42).

The events occurring in divided towns in the Polish-German and Polish-Czech border areas even over the first few weeks displayed a certain disparity between the advancement of some of the processes in the border region and the reflexive nature of the central authorities. To echo the words of Michał Buchowski, regarding the arbitrarily taken decisions concerning border closures, “the so-called centre” had forgotten about “the so-called periphery” – no consideration was given to the needs of border residents, how they lived, what their ambitions were, or how “they simply want to be able to move around in their area the same way that people want to move between the Mazowsze or Wielkopolska voivodeships (...). Therefore, events of the

¹⁰ The Słubice-Frankfurt Cooperation Centre is a “common urban administrative office for both towns. The Cooperation Centre is a contact-advisory point for Polish and German institutions, residents and organizations in the Twin Towns” (*Słubicko-Frankfurckie...* no date). Among other activities it has a Facebook page “Frankfurt und Słubice: Doppelt schön. Podwójnie piękne” (Frankfurt and Słubice: Doubly beautiful.)

¹¹ The authors of the volume edited by C. Wille and R. Kanesu address the problem of transforming (not only state) borders as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, taking into account thematically and spatially diverse approaches. Their reflections were the result of observation of what was happening on the borders during the closures of April and May of 2020.

type that occurred in Słubice, or especially in Cieszyn (...) draw attention to the fact that these decisions did not need to be good at all for (...) the millions living in the border areas".¹²

The functioning of a nation state in its borderlands (and researching this topic), as argued by Sadowski (2019: 61-62), "may be an important litmus test regarding the ability of the dominant ethnic group to construct working relationships with other ethnicities within the country. If there are difficulties and problems with cooperation in the borderlands, then there is a high degree of probability that structural problems and problems with openness toward arrivals can be expected". The phenomena analysed in this text show that troubles and difficulties were institutional and external and not of a grassroots and local nature. When central authorities ignored the specific nature of the borderland and its pluralistic daily reality, it provoked a reaction from the "people of the borderlands" (Sadowski 2020), who expressed their dissatisfaction from the questioning of their daily practices and the values that were important to them. However, the protests and their contents were understandable mainly for the residents of divided towns (more broadly – the border area), who knew the specifics of the local situation and the narratives related to it – close to their experiences but at the same time limited to that location (Gubrium, Holstein 1998: 164-166). These reactions simultaneously showed the progress achieved in the building of a multi-cultural cross-border urban communities.

The formal limitation of supraborder locality offers two diagnoses for the situation described here. The above analysis inclines the observer to look at divided towns more as socio-spatial phenomena which are more open, with advanced pluralism – unlike other parts of the country. But at the same time the case made becomes an argument for the unhappy and somewhat sarcastic finding of Martin Klatt that researchers have returned to the roots of borderland studies, in which the borderland is peripheral, provincial and backwards and borders are a defence against the unknown, foreign and dangerous "other" (2017: 126-127). This ambivalence strengthens the conclusions regarding the events that took place in the night from 12 to 13 June in Zgorzelec and Görlitz. Due to the lifting of border crossing restrictions, the mayors of both towns decided to open the Old Town Bridge (Most Staromiejski/Altstadtbrücke) with a celebration. At midnight, accompanied by many residents from both towns, they cut the chains holding up a metal fence placed on the bridge. The ceremony brought up memories of those that had taken place when Poland joined the EU, which on the one hand shows the process, first questioned and then initiated, of de-borderisation, and on the other hand, however, shows how important it was for government and residents to return the pluralistic *status quo ante*.

¹² Excerpt from an online debate in the European Solidarity Centre (Europejskie Centrum Solidarności) entitled "Tęsknię za tobą Czechu. Zawieszane sąsiedztwo, rozdzielona Europa" (I miss you Czech. Suspended neighbours, divided Europe) from 20 May, 2020. (Europejskie Centrum Solidarności 2020).

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Keywords: divided towns, borderland, COVID-19, border, pluralism, multiculturalism

ABSTRACT

One consequence of policies aimed at combating the growing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic was the decision to temporarily limit unrestricted cross-border movement to and from Poland. Our thesis is that this decision, among many others announced by the national government, resulted in a particular kind of resistance, although mainly in border regions and in divided border towns. This resistance stemmed from the disruption of the daily lives of local residents, who engage in their everyday activities (such as work and education) on both sides of the national border. Referring to A. Sadowski's conceptual framework, we posit that cultural pluralism (a pluralistic society) has

emerged in these towns and, as a result, they are approaching the state of multiculturalism. On the basis of the existing data illustrating the protests that took place in divided towns, we analyse what arguments appeared and by whom they were used in messages addressed to the Polish government, which described the de facto destruction of the existing cross-border social order in divided towns. The analyses have shown disparities between the advancement of certain social processes in the borderland and the reflexivity of the central government, which made arbitrary decisions without factoring in the nature of socio-political order developed in recent years in the divided towns of the Polish-German and Polish-Czech borderlands.

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A SKELETON IN THE CLOSET – A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE UNCRITICAL STALIN MUSEUM IN GORI

“... he isn't dead ... he is alive and will live as long as you defend him. He is alive and will carry on disrupting society. ... this isn't a house, it's a grave.”

Repentance (1984), directed by Tengiz Abuladze

APPARENT DILEMMAS AND SEVERAL QUESTIONS

An article published in 1974 by Yi-Fu Tuan titled “Space and Place: Humanistic Perspective” (Tuan 1974: 233–46) formed the basis for a book that appeared three years later under a slightly different title: *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Tuan 1977). In it the author reflected on the ways in which humans experience their surroundings. In parallel with the work of representatives of humanistic geography, especially Carl Sauer, followed by others such as Tuan, David Sopher, Allan Pred and David Lowenthal, ideas concerning the reception of space were developed by sociologists, who – in the case of Poland, following the example of Aleksander Wallis – aimed to popularise the findings of colleagues representing other scientific disciplines and to conduct a dialogue with them. The case of Wallis would appear to be of particular importance here, as it shows the bravery of stepping outside the schemes of thought defined by the borders of the sovereignty of the discipline, in favour of theoretical and methodological pluralism. This gesture proved necessary in the field of spatial sociology, which concerns spatial social processes, and involves research into ways in which places are constructed and received by groups and communities.

The noun “space” and the adjective “humanistic” defined certain directions of development – of sociology in the former case and of geography in the latter. They attracted varying levels of interest, as is shown by the example of humanistic geography, also called cultural geography, which in the United States in the 1970s became a leading research field (due to Sauer's students at Berkeley), while in Western Europe at the same time it enjoyed little interest (as in France) or none at all (as in Britain) (Ley 1981: 249). What the two disciplines had in common, apart from the subject and field of their research, was that they rejected the fetishisation of quantitative methods, instead

recognising the value of qualitative methods. This trend was particularly marked in geography, where the adoption of a humanistic perspective on the experiencing of space was a reaction to the dominance of studies based on calculation, which were found to be disappointing and inadequate (Wojciechowski 1987: 5). As regards sociology, the “humanistic element” in relation to space had long been present, as is illustrated by the work on social ecology done in the interwar period by the Chicago school, represented by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess and Roderick D. McKenzie (for example, *The City* 1924). Ideas for a theory of social spatial relations different from that of Park’s school were put forward in the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War by Florian Znaniecki (Wallis 1975: 10), a sociologist and philosopher of culture from Poznań University. This Polish scholar, in a text titled *Socjologiczne podstawy ekologii ludzkiej* (“Sociological foundations of human ecology”), noted that “the researcher of culture must learn to conceive of space quite differently than a mathematician or natural scientist, [...] he must take space [...] together with the humanistic factor, that is, how it is experienced by those humans whose culture he is studying” (Znaniecki 1938: 90). Znaniecki was thus not interested in the physical quantities characterising space, but the ways in which it was experienced socially. He referred to these qualities as “spatial values”; examples were provided by the dichotomies full/empty, cramped/spacious, measurable/immeasurable, near/far, etc. (Znaniecki 1938: 91). These functioned in relation to a non-spatial system of values which enabled them to be identified. In Wallis’ view, the recognition of close relations between spatial and non-spatial values, and the proposal to translate one into the other, constitute the most interesting idea in the whole of Znaniecki’s paper (Wallis 1975: 14).

Antecedents of the humanistic understanding of space can be sought in the work of Immanuel Kant. According to that tradition, space with the humanistic factor appears as a subject of study of interest mainly to sociologists, and much more rarely to geographers, cultural scientists, ethnologists and philosophers (for example, Quinn 1950, Duncan O.D. 1964, Duncan B. 1970, Hawley 1981, 1986, Kaplan, Holloway, Wheeler 2014, Castells 1983, Feagin, Smith 1987, Frey 1990, Jordan-Bychkov, Domosh, Rowntree 1994, and among Polish authors, Jędrzejczyk 2004, Majer 2010). It is surprising that this list includes few political scientists, for whom spatial social processes, reflecting power relations, would appear to be a niche needing to be filled. However, the political nature of social space and of the processes taking place within it remains a poorly understood and rarely explored area in Western political science, and a marginal one in Polish scholarship.¹ If it arises, it generally does so among researchers interested in the engaged humanities, carrying out postcolonial studies and subversive criticism, but primarily analysing the phenomenon of the city. Maybe, then, political science is not a discipline whose field of study includes or ought to include the social construction and reinforcement of spatial values? This seems, however, to be only an apparent dilemma, which applies to all academic disciplines that

¹ One of the first Polish political scientists to consider questions of space in the theory of international relations was Andrzej Gałganek (1989).

attempt to deal with a subject and field being more transdisciplinary than interdisciplinary, assuming here that interdisciplinarity means the free use of the categories and research methods of different disciplines, while transdisciplinarity implies an attempt to create a metalanguage as a tool for describing phenomena that go beyond existing conceptions. While the first approach may lead to the annihilation of theories due to a lack of understanding among researchers communicating in idiolects, the second and more ambitious approach replaces methodological eclecticism with syncretism. Transdisciplinarity thus means the recognition of problems that go beyond the existing divisions of sciences and an awareness of the context of time and place, namely the historical entanglement of every classification, resulting in a proposal to reconfigure the disciplinary status quo (for more see Nycz 2006: 28–30).

The study of spatial values (not limited to physical quantities), in combination with non-spatial ones, is an attempt to achieve the objective of transdisciplinarity. Where, then, can there be a place here for political scientists? It must be a place where socially constructed spatial values exemplify a non-spatial system of values, at whose heart lie the relations of power and subordinacy, namely politics and the ideology serving it, together with – following Michel Foucault – the disciplining of bodies and symbolic violence as understood by Pierre Bourdieu. A place also where the institutions of culture play a fundamental role in creating national values, recreating historical, political and social relations through their narratives (Johnson-Cunningham 2018: 1). The trail is the same. Following that trail, the aim of this article is to identify the spatial and non-spatial values of the State Museum of Josef Stalin in Gori (hereafter referred to as the Stalin Museum), which in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union has retained its monumental character, being an emanation of the cult of the individual. As such, it is an exceptional case of a survival of a totalitarian system in a democratic state, serving as one of Georgia's tourist attractions. The fundamental question is: what non-spatial values are evoked by the architecture of the Museum, or – to reverse the perspective – how are specific spatial values constructed and perpetuated by non-spatial values? The need to choose one question or the other is another mere apparent dilemma, since it cannot be proven either that non-spatial values are primary with respect to spatial values, or that the latter determine the former. This brings to mind, in the spirit of Foucault, the impossibility of dividing knowledge from power, since one results from the other, and “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations” (Foucault 2009: 29).

The research question implies a research strategy, by which I understand a research schema, giving direction to the applied procedures (Creswell 2013: 37). It will be a strategy most closely resembling that of a case study. That requires, however, an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of a particular phenomenon together with the context in which it functions (Strumińska-Kutra, Kołodkiewicz 2009: 2, cf. Denzin, Lincoln 2009). An analysis will in fact be made of the spatial relations of only two parts of the exhibition: the mausoleum hall in one of the main rooms on the upper floor, and a small room under the staircase, along with the narrow corridor leading to it, which are devoted to Stalinist

crimes. Thus, if we are to follow the strategy of a case study, then it will rather be one of case studies within a case study, or a variant form of case study that rejects the classical practices whereby it is held necessary to make a comprehensive investigation of the whole. What I have made the subject of study consists, in Bent Flyvbjerg's typology, of extreme or deviant cases – standing here as antitheses to each other, and thus having significant information potential (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230). Everything reduces, though, to the epistemological question: what can one learn about this museum? The choice of a case study strategy was thus the result of a desire to understand a single phenomenon, namely the Stalin Museum in Gori. I will call this investigation, following Robert E. Stake, an “autotelic case study” (Stake 2014: 627). The aim is not, then, to give a representation of a wider class of phenomena, nor is it to give a description for the sake of description, a practice denounced by David Silverman (2012: 170). In spite of the frequently expressed preference for research aimed at generalisation over analyses limited to exceptions (see, for example, Yin 1984), I share Stake's view that an autotelic case study may serve the making of generalisations and the building and verification of theories (Stake 2014: 630). It is hard to make judgments about this at the beginning of the work, however, and it should not be made the fundamental objective of the research; the objective is in fact to learn more about a single (and unique) case. Everything else is potentiality and (possible) added value.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A METHOD


The starting point was the making of photographic documentation of the Stalin Museum in Gori during the author's field research carried out in late July and early August 2017. With the aim of writing up the collected empirical material, I sought to create an original qualitative method, which I have called the method of **political topography**. This does not correspond to the traditional understanding of political topography as a map showing the administrative division of a country together with the distribution of support for particular political parties (for example, Alabama votes Republican), but denotes an analysis and interpretation of **anthropogenic field objects** in which – referring to Foucault's concept – power is manifested. This is a broad category, including not only buildings, but also elements of spatial planning, structures and technical devices. All of these are created or transformed by humans. A school, a prison, a garden, a road – these are teleological “media” which, apart from the function implied by their name (for example, a school houses an institution devoted to education), also serve another purpose – they serve as a tool for the mastery of humans over other humans or over nature. My interest is less in those that employ physical coercion (for instance, a prison with a system of segregation of prisoners), and more in those that represent symbolic violence, as understood by Pierre Bourdieu, namely the imposition by a privileged class of cultural content that legitimises its authority and naturalises the dominant–subordinate relationship. An example of this is museums, whose diffused authority is manifested at least in the broadly defined visual sphere, which consists of the broad shape, the interior,

and external impressions – namely, in that which is seen (Foster 1988: IX), although the way in which people “see” in a museum is not obviously either ahistorical or uniform (Hetherington 2000: 447; cf. Lindberg 1976, Panofsky 1997).

Wherever the spatial solutions applied constitute a manifestation of symbolic violence, the method of political topography may be found useful. Using this method, the research procedure consists of four stages: first the collection of selection of empirical materials, and then the acquisition, analysis, and interpretation of data from unwritten sources (Fig. 1). This procedure “privileges the eye” as a tool of cognition. This results from the assumption that in the contemporary world visual experience is dominant over the other senses, which – according to Tuan – leads to a broadening of the scope of that which is seen, at the cost of reduced complexity of other sensory experiences (Tuan 1982: 115).

Figure 1

Research procedure using the method of political topography




Source: author’s own work.

The collected empirical material is subjected to selection, in order to create a corpus of unwritten sources – a collection sufficient to carry out the research. For the purposes of the method of political topography, unwritten sources are classified as primary (Fig. 2) or secondary.

Figure 2

Unwritten sources that can be analysed by the method of political topography



Source: author’s own work.

The enumerated types of object do not form a closed list. Anthropogenic field objects that may be studied by the method of political topography must fulfil two criteria: they must be material, and they must be public. The Stalin Museum in Gori is an example of such an object.

By recording an image of a given object, one can obtain empirical material with potential use as a secondary unwritten source. This category consists of photographs and films, presenting what was seen and what was considered worthy of recording. They may be made using analogue or digital technology, either during a researcher's own field work, by or on behalf of an institution, or by private third parties (not being researchers and not working for an institution). Materials other than those produced by oneself can be accessed when they are placed on a medium of some kind (photographic film, memory card, etc.) and then made available in printed form (in albums, information leaflets, guides, promotional materials, etc.) or digitally (irrespective of the standard used) on private or institutional websites or social media profiles.

The materials of interest should not have been processed by means of graphics software, at least not to a significant degree. The initial (preparatory) stage thus consists of selecting empirical material according to a criterion of authenticity and credibility, analogous to the procedure of external and internal critique of sources undertaken by a historian. This applies equally to the researcher's own photographs and films and to those made by others. The researcher looks through and compares the items, choosing those that present the specified topic (for example, the front of building X) in a way that is characteristic (typical) for the medium in question and its users. If it is frequently encountered, it is regarded as a secondary unwritten source – a visual document containing information about the primary unwritten source. This implies a close link between credibility and representativeness, as a necessary selection criterion. Artistic photographs of the front of building X, although they fulfil the requirement of authenticity, may lack credibility. Due to the effects of lighting, cropping and other treatments, they may have little analytical potential from the standpoint of this method. What is being studied is not the medium – the photograph or film – but what is recorded on it, equally with that which has been omitted. It is a type of visual record of an observation concerning existent spatial solutions. Only empirical material that fulfils the criterion of effectiveness, from the perspective of the applied method, can be given the status of a source.


Juxtaposing my own photographs with images available on the Internet, I selected the most typical and frequent illustrations of the outside and the interior of the Stalin Museum, including the main stairs with a statue of the dictator, the half-rotunda with an exhibition presenting the victory of Stalinism over Nazism, and the mausoleum hall with Stalin's death mask. I considered these photographs to be effective secondary unwritten sources, and thus as adequate for investigation. I omitted photographs of the first two exhibition rooms on the upper floor, which are hard to distinguish due to the similarity of their spatial arrangements, as well as photographs of the outside of

the building showing a saloon car in which Stalin (who was afraid of flying) frequently travelled, the Museum House also called the “shoemaker’s cottage” (the element of the museum complex that is most often photographed and posted online), and the dictator’s monument.

Among more than 500 photographs returned by the Google search engine on entering the query “Stalin Museum, Gori”, there are none showing the corridor and the small room below the main staircase, with an exhibition devoted to the crimes of Stalinism; these are included in my own photographic record. I regarded this deficit as typical and – in accordance with the method of political topography – equally important as the dominant themes. I thus selected for further analysis exhibition elements that are antithetic with respect to each other, namely the mausoleum hall that is frequently photographed and posted online, and the rarely posted corridor and room below the stairs (Figs. 3 and 4).

Figure 3

Stalin Museum in Gori: the mausoleum hall with Stalin’s death mask (upper floor)



Fot. M. Lorenc, 2017

Figure 4

Stalin Museum in Gori: corridor below the staircase with an exhibition on Stalinist crimes



Fot. M. Lorenc, 2017

The great interest exhibited in the first case, and the lack of interest in the second, caused me to ask about the implications of the identity of the picture-taker for the subject and form of presentation. These are problems relating to the author's distance and status. The first results from difficulties in placing oneself at an adequate distance within close surroundings, when the stimulated senses generate strong emotions, and it is not easy to perform a selection of impressions (Tuan 1995: 166). The second, which has been known to ethnographers for decades, concerns the status of the author as a person from the "outside" or from the "inside" with respect to the object of study. In the present case, the great majority of photographs available on the Internet were taken by non-Georgian tourists, and thus by people from outside the cultural context being recorded. Such a person – it is claimed by some – makes not a "record of culture", but a "record concerning culture" (Magala 2012: 144). Only a person from the "inside" is considered capable of producing an artefact symbolic for a given culture, as happened in the case of the classic anthropological visual project *Through Navajo Eyes* by Sol Worth and John Adair, dating from the late 1960s (Worth, Adair 1972). At the present time, however, it is hard to support this view (unless it concerns a tribe living in isolation). While I consider the distinction between persons from the outside and from the inside with respect to the subject of study to be supportable, it seems to me dubious that such affiliations have implications for the character of the empirical material that such persons create. This is a result of the general availability of recording techniques and access to the Internet. The effect is a standardisation of presentation that makes all photographs and films into "records concerning culture" and at the same time "records of culture", regardless of whether they are made by a researcher or by a tourist, a Georgian or a non-Georgian. Thus, if the common themes appearing in photographs of the Stalin Museum do not include the corridor and the room below the stairs, the implication is that these locations, although seen, were not noticed or regarded as worthy of recording. This also proves the usefulness of the researcher's own field studies, from which the empirical material constitutes a significant point of reference during the selection of sources. What was overlooked by tourists was recorded by the researcher.

The second stage represents the start of the research proper, using the method of political topology. The aim is to obtain, from a secondary unwritten source, visual data relating to the primary unwritten source – that is to say, by studying a photograph, we may draw conclusions about the object pictured in it. This is done with the use of topographic categories, having regard to spatial relations, forms and features and to points of orientation.


According to an encyclopaedic definition, topography – from the Greek τόπος (*topos*) 'place', and γράφω (*grapho*) 'description' – is a branch of geography dealing with the shape and features of the surface of the Earth or of other planets or moons. Topography also involves making a record of the shape of the land and identifying specific landforms. The resulting topographic maps, irrespective of the method used, are drawings marked with conventional signs – that is, a graphical presentation of topographic data selected according to the intended purpose, the scale and the adopted

editorial principles, accompanied by a legend that identifies and explains them. For the present purposes, topographic categories are restricted to spatial relations. These include many properties, including the density of objects in a given area, as well as distances, adjacency relations and other links between objects (Żyszkowska, Spallek, Borowicz 2012: 120). In the case of the Stalin Museum in Gori, the spatial relations between the mausoleum hall and the corridor and small room below the stairs were treated as key topographic categories, making it possible to obtain visual data that could be usefully examined by the method of political topography. The visual data include information about the location of these two spaces relative to each other, as a basis for inductive reasoning about the whole of the spatial arrangement of the museum.

The mausoleum hall is on the upper floor of the building, and the corridor and small room are on the ground floor, below the grand staircase. A top–bottom relationship, like those of vertical–horizontal, front–back, right–left, refers to the positions and coordinates of a human body, which are then transferred to a space (Tuan 1977: 35) (Fig. 5).

Figure 5

An upright human body as an ordering system, as proposed by Yi-Fu Tuan, applied to the building of the Stalin Museum in Gori



Source: Y.-F. Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota-London 1977, p. 35.

In Tuan's view, a person subordinates a space to a scheme. Cultures differ in this regard, but they have a common core, namely the structure and values of the human body. A horizontal posture is associated with passivity, and a vertical one with activity. A person achieves his full human stature when he stands upright (Tuan 1977: 37). "High" and "low", marking the two poles of the vertical axis, are qualitative adjectives. Meanings of the first include: (1.1) having a large vertical dimension; (1.2) having large importance, enjoying respect, also used as an honorary title; (1.3) situated at a great height; (1.4) of sound: having a large frequency; (1.5) having a large content of something (usually an implied feature). Meanings of the second, on the other hand, include: (1.1) having a small dimension in the vertical direction; (1.2) small in comparison with others on a scale of some value; (1.3) judged negatively in a moral sense. The two words have antithetic connotations – "high" is valued positively, and "low" negatively. Spatial values are reflected in non-spatial values. An example of the rela-

tion between the two groups of values can be found in architecture. The Italian term *piano nobile* (noble floor) and the French *bel-étage* (beautiful floor), known chiefly from Renaissance, Baroque and Neoclassical palace interiors, refer to an upper level (usually the first floor of a building) containing representative rooms and the living quarters of the owners, with a grand staircase leading to them. These interiors have higher ceilings than those on the other floors, larger windows, and rich mouldings and furnishings. The spatial solutions applied, together with the arrangement of the interiors, were intended to underline the owners' high social position. Analogous practices are seen in the nineteenth-century residential buildings of the great European capitals. The city centre houses of Paris or Berlin, usually having four or five floors, were a reflection of social stratification. While the ground floor contained shops, restaurants, and the living quarters of caretakers, the first floor belonged to the best-situated. The higher up one went, the poorer the people one would find living there. The lowest social classes occupied the attics. Also significant was the density of inhabitants, which increased with each successive floor. The prestige associated with the first floor was a consequence of the palace architectural tradition, but also of practical considerations – privacy combined with accessibility. The quarters on the first floor were isolated from the street, but they could be easily reached via a grand front staircase. These factors became less important with the invention and widespread installation of elevators. Today, the highest situated apartments are among the most desirable. When accessibility is no longer a problem, key importance attaches instead to location, floor space, and view. The last of these, in densely built-up metropolitan districts, is provided by high-rise buildings.

The location of the mausoleum hall on the first floor, and the corridor and room with the exhibition on Stalinist crimes on the ground floor, is of fundamental importance for the way in which the space is experienced and evaluated. An imaginary line joining these rooms marks the central line of the whole system of spatial elements of the museum, imparting significance to them within the framework of a non-spatial value system. A position “higher”, “above”, “on top” is ennobling, while a position “lower”, “underneath”, “at the bottom” is deprecating. The right–left division also carries some importance here. While “right” is the sacred sphere, corresponding to manly and lofty forces, “left” is associated with impure and dangerous forces. The latter has been identified in the Christian tradition with *profanum* (Durkheim 2010, Swoboda 2010: 307–308²). According to heraldic standards, taking the perspective of the building (and not of an observer standing in front of the building), the corridor and the small room below the stairs are on the left-hand side. Moreover, they are located “at the rear”. According to Tuan, who refers to Chinese sensitivities (Confucian rather than Taoist – for more see Tuan 2002: 95–96), such a space is *yin* – feminine, dark, profane (Fig. 5) – and belongs to the past (Tuan 1977: 40; cf. Granet 1973: 49). The rooms here are “hidden”, meaning that their place in the museum's spatial

² Swoboda refers to Jeremy Biles concerning the first edition of Georges Bataille's *L'histoire de l'œil*.

arrangement isolates them from the main route taken by visitors. This is confirmed by the absence of photographs of these two spaces among the materials available on the Internet. It may thus be assumed that visitors to the museum overlooked them, or else considered the exhibitions within them to lack values worthy of being recorded. The situation is quite different in the case of the mausoleum hall, which is an integral part of the visiting route. In this function it is an emanation of *yang*, the masculine element – a future-oriented space associated with *sacrum* (Fig. 5). Although the hall is in semi-darkness, it remains visible, as proved by the numerous photographs posted online.

The third stage of the procedure based on the method of political topography requires the use of “political categories” to analyse visual data. This concerns any manifestations of power in the sense of Michael Foucault, but chiefly coercion and discipline. The canonical text here is Foucault’s 1975 work *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, in which the French scholar analysed the disciplinary mechanisms applied by, among others, penitentiary institutions. The basis for a genealogical description was Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth-century design for a prison, called the panopticon, in which the measures applied were to serve the creation of “docile bodies”. An analogous goal was pursued by other institutions too, such as schools and psychiatric clinics, which aimed to construct and reinforce norms and to correct any deviations from them. In the words of Foucault: “From a shapeless dough, from an unfit body, there was formed the very needed machine”; behaviour was trained step by step (Foucault 2009: 131). Such a body can be manipulated, subordinated, used and transformed. Every social institution thus makes use of “normalising power” (Rorty 1998: 34). This purpose is assisted by the institutional apparatus, which includes elements such as technology and spatial measures. These manifest a power that is exercised rather than possessed, with attributes including depersonalisation, diffusion, relativity and anonymity (Dreyfus, Rabinow 1983: 192). Analogous practices can be observed in museums, and are particularly visible in the case of historical museums, such as the Stalin Museum in Gori. Its political nature results from – in the spirit of Foucault – firstly, its function as a public institution, and secondly, an ideological entanglement that is more visible than in the case of museums with different profiles.

The State Museum of Joseph Stalin (in Georgian, ოსებ სტალინის სახელმწიფო მუზეუმი) is located in Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili’s home town of Gori. It is a complex surrounded by a low wall with decorative metal elements, and includes the museum building, a monument, and the “shoemaker’s cottage” – a house where Stalin’s father rented a room – covered by a roof with a classically inspired colonnade, an “armoured” saloon car in which Stalin travelled to, among others, the Yalta and Tehran conferences, and a green. Originally there was a local museum on the site, opened on 10 November 1937. The present building dates from the 1950s, and was intended to provide conditions for a new exhibition dedicated to Stalin. Its construction began in Stalin’s lifetime, in 1951, but was completed in 1957, four years after his death. In the years of *perestroika* the exhibition was updated to include mentions of Lenin’s critical assessment of Stalin, and of Leon Trotsky (Walker 2012). The

character of the exhibition did not change even after the Rose Revolution of 2003. Only in 2010, during the second presidential term of Mikheil Saakashvili, was the exhibition expanded into a corridor and room below the staircase, with exhibits relating to Stalinist interrogation practices. It was planned at the time to transform the Stalin Museum into a museum of Stalinism (in the sense of Stalinist crimes) (Walker 2012). However, these plans had not been realised by the time of Saakashvili's exile from Georgia in 2013, and his successors did not share the former president's determination in the matter of removing Stalinist symbols.

The monumental structure in neo-Renaissance style may be interpreted as an allusion to the Golden Age of Georgian statehood and culture, which came in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, during the reigns of David IV ("the Builder"), Demetrius I, George III, and finally Queen Tamar of the Bagratid dynasty.³ As Tuan notes: "Architectural space reveals and instructs. How does it instruct? In the Middle Ages a great cathedral instructs on different levels. There is the direct appeal to the senses, to feeling and the subconscious mind. The building's centrality and commanding presence are immediately registered. Here is mass – the weight of stone and of authority – and yet the towers soar. These are not self-aware and retrospective interpretations; they are the response of the body" (Tuan 1977: 114). The purpose is therefore a didactic one.

The shape of the building recalls the urban palaces of fifteenth-century Italian architecture. Inspirations from that style are particularly visible in the front façade, the columned portico, the semicircular arches, the cross vaults, the arcaded archivolt, the pinnacle attic, and the stone cladding of the elevation. In the interior, apart from the grand marble staircase itself, a historical element is the coffer ceiling placed above it. It is surprising that there are no visual references to medieval Georgian architecture, as exemplified primarily by the cathedrals of Bagrati in Kutaisi, Svetitskhoveli in Mtskheta, and Alaverdi in Kakheti. Built or altered in the first half of the eleventh century, these stand as testimony to the art of Georgian builders and architects. David Marshall Lang wrote that they rose against the background of the snow-capped mountains of the Caucasus, and thanks to their majestic setting are probably unequalled anywhere in the world (Lang 1972: 107). It may be presumed that it was the religious character of those buildings that caused inspiration from them to be rejected in the communist and atheistic Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Among other factors to consider is the small number of surviving secular buildings from the Golden Age, representing a "special type of palace construction, to some extent alluding to Byzantine models" (Baranowski, Baranowski 1987: 71). This refers to two-storey palaces of elongated rectangular shape, where the lower storey served residential and functional purposes, while the second – topped with a dome and leading to a terrace – played a representative role. These buildings were destroyed in raids carried out by Mongols and Chorasmians, and above all by Tamerlane.

³ The problem of historical periodisation concerns the whole of the Christian southern Caucasus, when considered alongside the conventional Western European divisions.

The Renaissance inspirations visible in the external form of the Stalin Museum do not apply, apart from the coffer ceiling over the main staircase, to the architecture of its interior. Stylistic eclecticism (taken to mean variety, and not as the name of a specific style) is manifested in the Neoclassical first rooms on the upper floor, accompanied by a corridor on the same floor that resembles a concrete bunker.

The red carpet on the main staircase unambiguously indicates a route for visitors, leading from the ground floor up to the mezzanine and then the first floor. This vertical arrangement provides the axis of the museum's narrative on the greatness of Stalin.

THE MNEMOTECHNICS OF THE STALIN MUSEUM

Paraphrasing Jacek J. Jadacki: "One who stands in the room under the stairs in the Stalin Museum in Gori feels cramped there. Asked about the source of this feeling, he replies that he has *experienced* crampedness. Someone else claims that, although he was in the same room yesterday, it was also cramped there. He refers to the fact that he *remembered* it as being so." In epistemology, the reception of impressions is the fundamental cognitive state of the senses. "It is a state of stimulation into which a sense is brought as a result of the action or effect of a specific state of affairs. Here, a given sense x receives a specified impression z , when a certain state of affairs y acts on or influences that sense x " (Jadacki 1985: 40–41; cf. Stępień 1971: 32). "Crampedness" is then an indicator of experience – a direct reference to sensual data. The fundamental cognitive state of memory, on the other hand, is remembering. Thus, if one remembers the next day that the room under the stairs was cramped, it means that this experience was recorded, as expressed by – for example – one's referring to it as a "little room". This recalls the exercises in the art of memory, known as mnemotechnics, that featured in the European tradition from ancient times. Leading representatives of the *ars memorativa* are said to include Simonides, Quintilian and Cicero, and above all the unknown author of *Ad Herennium*.

Mastery of the art of memory was a requirement made of orators. The basic principle was to observe the importance of vision – that sense became the main tool of remembering. But because, with the invention of printing, that art became less significant and came to be forgotten, it is important to recall the basic practices governing it. Frances A. Yates, enumerating Quintilian's principles of mnemotechnics, noted that the first stage was the impression in the memory of a system of *loci* or places. In order to remember something, it was necessary to imagine a large building with rooms having different functions (bedroom, living room, etc.), with a host of details, interior furnishings, etc. Then, whenever it is necessary to bring certain facts to life in the memory, one's mind goes through all of the places and addresses them as "curators", asking them to supply the appropriate "deposits" (Yates 1977: 7, 14). The system of interiors thus enabled the precise recreation of the order of a speech, through the recalling of specified architectural arrangements and the content "placed" within them. Although Quintilian's advice, addressed to ancient

orators, referred to an “artificial” memory, it is also applicable in relation to the real museum in Gori. Personal reminders of Stalin, such as his uniform or his shaving equipment, but also historical relics such as his first desk at the Kremlin and diplomatic gifts, are “deposits” in Quintilian’s sense. Their role, however, is not limited to recalling something to the memory. These things, as exhibits, have a value that was foreign to the mnemotechnics of the ancients, namely an “aura” resulting from their authenticity (the importance of which has been written about by, among others, Walter Benjamin, although in relation to works of art). For Krzysztof Pomian, this means that they are semiophores (carriers of signs), and the space in which they are situated has a symbolic character (for detail see Pomian 2006: 115f.). They produce sensual impressions, that is, they stimulate the imagination, and thus may serve as a suggestive bridge between observer and object or between present and past (Assmann 2013: 255). A special place among these artefacts is occupied by one of twelve death masks of Stalin, cast in bronze just after his death. It is exhibited on a raised platform and surrounded by a marble colonnade. The spectacle is made more dramatic by a ray of light that picks the mask out of the semi-darkness. The object defines the function of the room, making it a cenotaph (from Latin *cenotaphium*, a symbolic grave) in the sense of both a *tumulus inanis* (empty grave) and *tumulus honorarius* (honoured grave). It is a symbolic tomb–monument of commemorative significance, created to honour the memory of Stalin as a dead hero.

One’s presence in the building at 32, Stalin Street is a physical experience – it is not an imaginary presence, as in Quintilian’s description. However, the objective in this research is not just to register or reconstruct a physical sequence of spatial behaviours of people present in the museum, but to consider Znaniecki’s proposed “humanistic coefficient”, namely the significance ascribed to particular activity by the actor and by other people in the actor’s social environment. It would appear useful here to refer to Jeff Malpas’ notion of “Proust’s principle”, which posits a close relationship between place and identity (2018: 180). This applies both to individuals and to communities, in which case a change in one is linked to a change in the other (for more on identity–place relations in American and Chinese cultural tradition, see e.g. Tuan 1996: 5–7 and corresponding chapters). The experiencing and remembering of places and spaces is associated with evaluation, that is, with the application of axiological categories. Because the museum’s spatial layout imposes specific behaviours, a key factor in this regard seems to be the aesthetic telic value of usefulness. For the ancients, this was a synonym for utility and aptness, and was closely related to one of the types of beauty. In this sense it appears in Socrates’ conversation with the armourer Pistias, whose artistry was evidenced by the fact that he made armour tailored to the customer’s individual needs and form, however inharmonious it might be (Xenophon 1962: 130). What was beautiful, then, was what was most useful – in accordance with its intended purposes. Significant here is Socrates’ dispute with Critobulus, famed for his beauty, over which of them was more beautiful. Xenophon, through the mouth of his master Socrates, links the beauty of things to their appropriateness for their purpose, and considers, for example, large mouths to be most beautiful, being best for

taking bites and giving kisses (Xenophon 1967: 278/7).⁴ The counterpart of Socrates' large mouths at the Stalin Museum in Gori is the mausoleum hall, whose intended purpose is to create and reinforce the cult of the individual. It is notable that Socrates lost the debate, leaving open the question of the criteria for evaluating beauty understood as usefulness.

Usefulness, like other aesthetic values, is justified intuitively or inferentially. Intuitive judgements imply use of the sense of taste, while those of the second kind require knowledge (Jadacki 2003: 155) about how, within particular public institutions, the functionality of space is identifiable with the action of authority, in Foucault's sense, or symbolic violence, in the spirit of Bourdieu. Because both of these phenomena are difficult to observe, I denote them by the term *indicatum*. In the humanities and social sciences, *indicatum* is a phenomenon or property pointed at by an indicator (Pawłowski 1969, chapter 5). In this case the indicator will be the behaviour of those visiting the museum. The behavioural correlates of *indicatum* are indicators of a "hidden property" and are called inferential (Nowak 2007: 168). Certain movements, such as visiting the mausoleum hall while omitting the room under the stairs, and their practical effects, namely the taking of photographs and their posting online, or the omission of such actions, are thus inferential indicators. The statement of their relationship with the *indicatum* can be justified mostly indirectly, drawing conclusions from observed correlations and on the basis of adopted theoretical assumptions (Nowak 2007: 168).

Differently than in the case of mnemotechnics, usefulness as an aesthetic telic value in the case of the Stalin Museum in Gori chiefly concerns communities. Because the institution is in Georgia, it is run by Georgians, and the languages of the exhibition are Georgian and Russian, it may be assumed to be addressed to Georgians as a nation. According to social constructivism, a nation is something that is created; it is more a practice than – as phenomenologists would prefer – a thing in itself. The situation is analogous with regard to collective memory as a component of national identity. Aleida Assmann reports that the historian Marc Bloch has claimed, in a review of a book by Halbwachs, that the concept of "collective memory" is "convenient" but somewhat fictitious (Assmann 2013: 47). Indeed, collective memory is hard to maintain from a substantial perspective, but not when conceived as a practice involving training of the memory of individuals in order to reinforce specific views of the world that are ideologically determined and serve political aims. This, in Nietzsche's terms, is memory of the will (Nietzsche 2011: 54). It differs from individual memory in that it leaves no room for spontaneity and ambivalence, because it is deliberately constituted and symbolically constructed (Assmann 2013: 48). As such, it requires media serving the training of the memory, including places and monuments. The Stalin Museum is such a place and monument.

⁴ The later Greeks purposefully denoted beauty by the word *πρέπον* (*prepon*), while the Romans denoted a beautiful thing, with regard to its purposefulness and usefulness, as *decorum* or *aptum* (Tatar-kiewicz 1962: 124).

In Wallis' view, a monument is a phenomenon with a very strong identity. He asks how it is that monuments maintain their ideological and political power even though centuries have passed since their unveiling – with the changing of generations, world views and political systems – and why they are not reconstructed, destroyed, removed, or at least relocated (apart from obvious exceptions that history has noted) (Wallis 1981: 225). It is not possible to agree with this. History supplies examples of widespread devastation of monuments symbolising a contested order, such as statues and busts of Marx, Lenin and Stalin or the dictators of countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the time of the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The same pattern is seen in other cultural traditions. The most spectacular example of the toppling of a monument in the past two decades was the destruction of the statue of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in 2003. Analogous cases of the devastation of monuments of former leaders under new political conditions are found in every epoch, regardless of geographical location. Meanwhile the Stalin Museum's mausoleum hall remains unaltered, along with the whole museum concept, serving as a medium of collective memory. It is characterised by incompleteness and selectivity in creating a picture of the past. An intrinsic feature of memory, then – according to Assmann, citing Nietzsche – is forgetting, in this case forgetting about Stalin's crimes. Because this is a conscious gesture, the aim is presumably to exclude content that does not accord with the constructed story about the victor of the Great Patriotic War. One enters the mausoleum hall from a half-rotunda decorated with photographs from the victory parade that took place in Moscow's Red Square on 24 June 1945. During that event Soviet war veterans threw down Nazi banners before Stalin in a symbolic gesture, honouring the military genius of the *generalissimus* who had ensured the Red Army's victory over the forces of the Third Reich.

In the case of the Stalin Museum in Gori, usefulness as an aesthetic value is thus correlated with ethical values. These are negative political values, namely enslavement and subordination. The institution, through the spatial solutions it applies, exposes the people present in it to a violation of freedom. Enslavement is the antithesis of freedom, a special value in the tradition of European thought. In the case of someone who is physically free, it is said that their actions do not come up against external obstructions. Psychological freedom, on the other hand, means – in simplified terms – that volitional acts are not determined by external factors. A distinction is made between positive and negative freedom. Someone lacks negative freedom, or is enslaved, when they act under coercion – they perform an act though they do not wish to. The coercion may be external – coming from someone else – or internal, when we impose something on ourselves, out of habit, for example (Jadacki 2003: 143–144). Thus, if it is not our wish to participate in Stalin's apotheosis, but we are compelled to do so by the spatial layout and visiting route put in place in the museum to his memory, we experience enslavement and act under external coercion. One may ask in that regard why we should visit it at all, if we already know the profile of the exhibition; this is exemplified, for example, in headlines found in *The Independent*: "Stalin Museum: The creepy attraction in Georgia that still worships the communist leader like

a God” (Beatley 2017), and in *Atlas Obscura: Stalin Museum. A museum glorifying the life of Stalin, located in the city of his birth* (Stalin Museum 2019). A basis for an answer is provided by Tuan’s statement that: “An important service of museums is to create didactic illusions” (Tuan 1977: 195). Etymologically, the word ‘illusion’ (from Latin *illusio*) originally meant a joke or mockery, and only later took on the meaning of something that gives a false impression. The didactic illusion of the Stalin Museum in Gori can thus be understood as the teaching of a deformed vision, involving the construction and reinforcement of a cult of the individual, by the same token mocking his victims.⁵ According to the message conveyed by the museum, Stalin won World War II thanks to his strategic genius, was friends with Lenin, loved children, lived modestly, and was a talented poet and magnificent orator, and even a fine singer. Moreover, as Koba (a pseudonym alluding to the Caucasian robber from Alexander Kazbegi’s novel *The Patricide*), he was a Georgian Robin Hood. In photographs he accompanies Lenin, who usually occupies a central position, while in the paintings inspired by those photographs, Stalin is presented as more important than Lenin. This image of the Soviet leader was officially sanctioned until the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (14–26 February 1956), the first since Stalin’s death, at which Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee, read his paper *On the Cult of the Individual and its Consequences*. According to the document presented to delegates on the night of 24 February 1956:

[...] it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism–Leninism to elevate one person, to turn them into some superman having supernatural features like those of a god. That person supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, is able to do anything, is infallible in his actions. Such a view of a man, specifically of Stalin, was cultivated here for many years. [...] We are now concerned with a question having huge importance for the party in the present and in the future – how the cult of Stalin’s person was gradually created, a cult that at a certain stage became the source of a whole series of immeasurably serious and grave perversions [...] (*On the Cult...* 1956: 3).

Khrushchev’s secret paper ended, according to the version “exclusively for the use of party organisations” issued by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party: “(Long, tumultuous applause turning into an ovation. Everyone stands)”⁶ (*On the Cult...* 1956: 71). The *Unpublished materials delivered to delegates to the 20th Congress of the CPSU* also included passages from the so-called testament of Lenin, containing “personal characterisations of some members of the Central Committee” (*Unpublished...* 1956: 3), including Stalin, who:

“is too brutal, and that fault, which can be fully tolerated in our environment and in relations between us communists, becomes intolerable in the post of general secretary. I therefore propose to comrades that they consider a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing in his place

⁵ A critical commentary on the exhibition, according to a report by Shaun Walker published in *The Independent* on 6 June 2012, was a temporary banner displayed in front of the entrance to the museum, with the words “This museum is a falsification of history” and “It is a typical example of Soviet propaganda and it attempts to legitimise the bloodiest regime in history” (Walker 2012).

⁶ With the original parentheses, concerning the reaction of the congress delegates.

another person who, in all respects, would differ from comrade Stalin in one virtue, namely – greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater courtesy and a more attentive attitude to comrades, a less capricious disposition, etc.” (*Unpublished...* 1956: 8, also: *On the Cult...* 1956: 6–7).

These words were dictated by a bedridden Lenin on 4 January 1924, with the “express wish that his notes⁷ after his death [which followed on 21 January 1924 – M.L.] be made known at the nearest party congress” (*Unpublished...* 1956: 3). This and other notes, through Nadezhda Krupskaya (Lenin’s wife and a communist activist), found their way to Lew Kamenev and were read at the party’s 13th Congress in June 1924. On that occasion: “The delegations decided in favour of leaving Stalin in that post, expecting that he would take on board Vladimir Ilyich’s critical remarks and succeed in overcoming those faults which had aroused Lenin’s serious concerns” (*On the Cult ...* 1956: 7). Lenin’s opinion of Stalin was reiterated 32 years later, when Khrushchev “informed the party, and swiftly the whole world, that yesterday’s leader of progressive humanity, inspiration of the world, father of the Soviet nation, great figure of science, the greatest military genius and the greatest genius in history in general, had been a murderer of millions, torturer, paranoid, and at the same time an ignoramus in military matters who had led the Soviet state to the edge of a precipice” (Kołakowski 2009: 472).

More than 60 years after that watershed event, the Stalin Museum in Gori is still an exemplification of a lack of critical reflection on the fatal consequences of the cult of the individual, and by the same token an interesting subject and place of research. The method of political topography makes it possible to describe how such a didactic illusion is created, making the museum of Stalin into a Stalinist museum. The attempt to construct and apply that method was dictated by a desire to remain faithful to the Foucauldian tradition, through the formulation of questions beginning with the word “how” and the giving of answers to those questions in descriptive form. A weakness of this approach, however, is the impossibility of explaining why such a didactic illusion is maintained, especially since Stalin – though a Georgian – showed no leniency to his compatriots. Favourable sentiments towards the dictator, as exemplified in the museum in Gori, thus remain incomprehensible. The fact of his origin seems an insufficient argument to explain it, given the scale of the sacrifices made by the Georgian nation as a consequence of decisions taken, inspired, or approved by Stalin. That is therefore a question for another paper, using different methods, especially since few Georgians visit the museum; they see it as an attraction for foreign tourists, who – unable to make use of the information provided in Georgian and Russian – are assisted by English-speaking guides. The latter, in turn, present a story born of myths and legends, featuring a narrative structure and conveying the clear message⁸ that Stalin was a great man. The effect is completed by a gift shop, offering mugs, magnets, pipes (a permanent attribute of the dictator), miniatures of the Jughashvilis’ house, busts, T-shirts, pens, key-rings, etc., featuring Stalin’s likeness.

⁷ Being a *Supplement* to a letter of 24 December 1922.

⁸ This sentence comes from a characterisation of collective memory by Aleida Assmann (2013: 48).

IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION

The “skeleton in the closet” referred to in the title of this article is a shameful secret that is kept hidden. The expression alludes here to the 1984 Georgian film *Repentance* (Russian *Покаяние*) directed by Tengiz Abuladze, being an example of an artistic riposte to the cult of the individual. The convention adopted by Abuladze combines symbolism with the grotesque, and in places even with surrealism, with the aim of condemning the pathological nature of totalitarian government. Its embodiment is a deceased mayor, one Varlam Aravidze, who is a synthesis of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin. A significant thread of the film is the repeated exhumation of the dictator’s remains by one of his victims (whose words are quoted in the motto at the beginning of this article) in a gesture of protest against the failure to settle accounts with the past and the ceremony that accompanies successive burials. It is a moralistic picture, dealing with the consequences of avoidance of responsibility for crimes committed and the lack of punishment and repentance.

The museum in Gori exemplifies the position represented in the film by the henchmen of the late tyrant. The institution provides an apotheosis of Stalin as the victor of the Great Patriotic War. What we see is a synthesis of museum, funeral and commemorative practices, the best example being the mausoleum hall with the dictator’s death mask, situated on the upper floor and being the most important point on the visiting route. It imparts a sacred character to the whole of the museum complex. This is a reality petrified from before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which Khrushchev denounced the fatal consequences of the cult of the individual. In the matter of the victims, in the course of a visit to the museum, as in the film, one can hear that “for many of the things ascribed to him he does not bear responsibility” (words spoken by Abel, son of Varlam Aravidze, about his father). The only “crack” is the part of the exhibition in the corridor and in the room under the stairs, devoted to Stalinist crimes. This is a covert place, located away from the main visiting route. The spatial arrangement used causes it to be bypassed by visitors, and the “shameful secret” does not come out. The Stalin Museum is still a Stalinist museum, despite the passing of 66 years since the dictator’s death.

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Keywords: Stalin Museum, Stalinist museum, Gori, commemorative museum, politicality of museums, political topography method

ABSTRACT

This paper contains a critical reflection on the Joseph Stalin Museum in Gori. The fundamental question is: what non-spatial values does the museum evoke? Or, to reverse the perspective: how are certain spatial values constructed and perpetuated by the non-spatial values of this ideologised commemorative institution? To answer these questions, the author prepared in situ photographic documentation during her own field study, and then compared it with photographs available on the Internet. To research the collected empirical material, the author developed her own qualitative method, which she calls the method of political topography. The research procedure in which it is used involves four stages: the selection of the empirical material, followed by acquisition, analysis and interpretation of data from unwritten sources. The theoretical framework of the study consisted of three conceptions: Michel Foucault's power-knowledge, Pierre Bourdieu's symbolic violence, and Yi-Fu Tuan's spatial relations. Combining them, it was demonstrated that the spatial arrangement used in the museum in Gori serves the apotheosis of Stalin as the winner of the Great Patriotic War. It is a synthesis of museum, funeral and commemoration practices. The paramount example of this approach is to be found on the upper floor of the museum, which constitutes the most important part of the exhibition, namely a mausoleum hall with a death mask of the dictator, which imparts a sacred character to the entire museum complex. This is a reality petrified from the times preceding the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at which Khrushchev denounced the disastrous effects of the cult of the individual.

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THE BIRTH AND DEMISE (?) OF THE AMERICAN ERA

WILSONIANISM AND ITS LEGACY VS. THE US INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

Having toured the United States for merely nine months in 1831 and 1832, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that in the future the world would be divided between two great nations, i.e. Americans and Russians (De Tocqueville 2002: 343). He argued that all of the other nations had reached their natural potential and would only strive to maintain their own power. It was only Americans and Russians who had the prospect for further growth albeit their expansion was based on the utilisation of different tools. While Americans made their conquests with ploughshares and aimed to bring freedom, Russians used swords and strove to enslave the conquered peoples. De Tocqueville's views were prophetic in nature: not only did he predict the American era and the American strategy encouraging democracy promotion but he also anticipated that the world would be divided between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. De Tocqueville's opinions prove that he was an acute observer and researcher;¹ they also show that at the cornerstones of the United States was the ideology of liberal idealism that reflected American identity. It is this ideology that gave rise to a nation which, since its birth, has maintained a sense of its own uniqueness. However, some essential changes were required, if the United States was to become a superpower and begin to play a key role on the international stage.

These changes were possible due to two factors. Firstly, of profound significance was rapid economic growth, which by the late 19th century had made the US an economic power. The United States was an economic colossus but at the

¹ This approach reflected previously expressed opinions. In 1817, the then American Ambassador in London and later the Secretary of State and sixth President of the United States, John Quincy Adams, claimed that in Europe it was generally believed that America was experiencing enormous population growth and an increase in power. This was coupled with the fear that in case of internal unification, the US would become a very dangerous member of the international community (Kagan 2006: 3).

same a diplomatic and military dwarf (Preston 2019: 42). It was only a matter of time before it was possible to transfer economic power into political significance on a global scale. The second, and probably decisive, factor which had contributed to the rise of the US as a global power was the essential transformation of the American international strategy, launched by President Woodrow Wilson during World War I. As the eminent US political scientist and politician Henry Kissinger argued in the 1990s, “[i]t is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march to this day” (Kissinger 1994: 30). That approach prevailed despite Wilson’s failure to convince the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. However, what remained and took root was the view that America has a mission to promote democracy, which could contribute to the establishment of a more peaceful policy in a global dimension. Drawing upon Wilson’s version of liberal internationalism, the future US presidents, starting with World War II, pursued various initiatives. This approach embraces, among other such efforts: the founding of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system, the democratisation of Germany and Japan, the Marshall Plan as a prerequisite for the economic and political stability of Western Europe, the establishment of NATO, John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress initiative to promote economic development in Latin America, Jimmy Carter’s human rights crusade, Ronald Reagan’s freedom crusade, George Bush’s and Bill Clinton’s support for new free-market democracies through the enlargement of NATO and the World Trade Organisation and Barack Obama’s doctrine of “just war” for human rights worldwide (Smith 2017: 150).

In view of the above, the main objective of this paper is to analyse continuity and change in American foreign policy, from the time of President Woodrow Wilson up to the present day, including US policy towards Europe. Doubtless Wilson’s internationalisation of that strategy had an essential impact on the rise of the American era in foreign policy during World War II, with the US achieving the status of superpower. It was mainly thanks to Wilson that the process of redefining the US international strategy was launched, putting an end to the era that had lasted since President George Washington’s farewell speech of 19 September 1796. As a result of the two world wars and the declining status of Europe on the global stage, the United States became a hegemon in the liberal world order it had created. The transatlantic context was of paramount importance not only to the US decision to enter the war in 1917 but also to the formation of the ideological foundations and development of American foreign policy.

A hundred years later, views that the American era had come to an end became increasingly common. They grew in popularity under Donald Trump’s presidency in 2017-2021 as he fundamentally questioned the foundations of American foreign policy laid by Woodrow Wilson. How was Wilson’s approach related to the American foreign policy formulated by the founding fathers and pursued in the 19th century? What was Wilson’s contribution to defining the intellectual foundations of global US foreign policy? How was Wilson’s legacy interpreted and implemented by his succes-

sors? Are we currently witnessing the demise of the American era and the emergence of a new world order in which the US could become an ordinary country?² These are not the only questions that the present paper seeks to address.

THE PRINCIPLES OF US FOREIGN POLICY VS. ITS INTERNATIONALISATION –
WOODROW WILSON'S REVOLUTION

President Woodrow Wilson's decision in April 1917 that the US must enter World War I significantly altered US foreign policy. It was largely revolutionary in nature as it marked a departure from the traditional foreign policy adopted with the emergence of the United States in the late 18th century and developed throughout the entire 19th century. However, the messianic rationale for Wilson's decision was not created in a vacuum. For this reason, it would be legitimate to view Wilson's approach in terms of both significant change as well as continuity³ in foreign policy. Wilson follows the tradition of thinking about the American people and its mission; however, he abandoned a more isolationist approach in favour of one that was designed to enhance the security and economic growth of the United States. Wilsonian idealism was firmly rooted in the sense of exceptionalism and destiny of the American people, which was developed with the emergence of the United States and the War of Independence. Together with unilateralism and expansionism, exceptionalism was one of the three core principles of US foreign policy adopted in the period spanning the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1775 and the end of the war with Britain in 1815 (Preston 2019: 6). It was the idea of exceptionalism, which defined American national identity⁴, that had been employed to pursue a more internationalist approach to foreign policy since the turn of the 20th century (Restad 2012: 55). What distinguishes Wilson from most of his predecessors was his emphasis on the internationalisation of US efforts.

Unilateralism was the second principle of US foreign policy. It was defined in George Washington's farewell address of 19 September 1796. In it, Washington called for America not to interweave its destiny with any part of Europe, not to entangle its peace and prosperity in European ambitions and conflicts, and to avoid permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world (*Washington's Farewell Address... 1796*: 22). Even though this approach was typically regarded as isolationistic, Washington himself was not an isolationist and his appeal was unilateral in nature, which largely resulted from the US geopolitical position and the outgoing president's conviction.

² The use of the term ordinary country may even at present appear quite provocative. However, that term was used as early as 1976 by Richard Rosecrance, who defined the United States as a superpower which was heading towards the model of an ordinary country (Rosecrance 1976).

³ The claim regarding continuity is obviously debatable albeit it is not uncommon. It is made, for example, by a well-known political analyst with neoconservative views, Robert Kagan (2006).

⁴ The idea of exceptionalism is defined in various ways; however, it is assumed that it was instrumental in the development of American identity. Nevertheless, it is controversial among historians, who are often critical of this idea (for more see Onuf 2012).

tion concerning the weaknesses of the new state (Mansbach, Taylor 2017:33, Ruggie 2006: 2). Although Washington's farewell speech was ideological in nature, it was at the same time a manifestation of pragmatism and focus on American interests, which were defined as divergent from those of European powers (Quinn 2010: 51-52). That US foreign policy should not be labelled isolationist is confirmed by the words of the third US president, Thomas Jefferson, who in his inaugural address of 4 March 1801 very strongly emphasised the need for the growth of peace, trade and honest friendship with all nations, yet without entering into any alliances (*Thomas Jefferson First Inaugural Address* 1801). Unilateralism meant a lack of engagement, that is neutrality towards European affairs in a political sense as the United States wanted to maintain autonomy and shunned any involvement in European conflicts.⁵ Neutrality was also a prerequisite for the growth of trade with all European power states. As argued already in 1776 by Thomas Paine⁶ in his work *Common Sense*, neutrality was to serve not only American prosperity but also its security (Ruger 2018: 138-139). As a result, George Washington, defining the so-called great rule of conduct, claimed that commercial relations should have as little political connection as possible.

The unilateral approach in American foreign policy was confirmed in 1823 by then President James Monroe's declaration of the doctrine that bears his name⁷, which in many ways was a response to the threat of European recolonization of the Latin American states. The Monroe Doctrine confirmed America's distance from disputes and conflicts in Europe while establishing the western hemisphere as the US sphere of influence, that is the area no longer subject to European interference (Kissinger 1994: 35-36). As argued by the influential US historian William Appleman Williams, the United States pursued a policy of "imperial anti-colonialism", both internally and externally (Sexton 2011: 5-8). Anti-colonialism was opposed to the expansion of European powers in the western hemisphere, which allowed for the establishment of 19th century American empire.⁸ "Imperial anti-colonialism" was reflected in US expansionism on the American continent, which was conducive to the US's rise to the status of a world power.

It was expansionism that constituted the third principle of American foreign policy in the 19th century. It led to the rightful (in the view of Americans) conquest and

⁵ In general, 19th century US politics is described as isolationist. This term is quite commonly employed albeit it is not especially adequate as the United States did not assume complete social, economic and cultural self-sufficiency. The term unilateralism can also arouse doubts. Another concept used to describe US foreign policy is restraint. Regardless of the terms employed, foreign policy grounded in the ideas of America's founding fathers is based on two pillars: (1) strategic independence (i.e. neutrality or not entering into alliances); (2) military non-interventionism abroad (Ruger 2018: 135-136).

⁶ Thomas Paine (1737-1809) is considered to be one of the partly forgotten founding fathers of the United States.

⁷ The draft doctrine is credited to the then Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, who urged the president to proclaim it. In 1825, Adams went on to become the sixth president of the United States.

⁸ "This imperialist process entailed not only voluntary white settlement and migration, but also the removal of native populations, the expansion of slavery (until 1861), and the conquest of territory held by other nations, particularly during the Mexican War in the 1840s" (Sexton 2011: 6).

annexation of new territories on the American continent to the south and west of the newly established country (Preston 2019: 25). Expansionism largely resulted from the exceptionalism of the American people and was part of what was called Manifest Destiny. The phrase itself did not appear until 1845 but the conquest of new territories was deemed to be the destiny of the emerging nation prior to the establishment of the United States. At the core of Manifest Destiny lay the belief that the American people and institutions had special virtues, that America had a mission to redeem the world and remake it in its image, and that there was a divine destiny to accomplish this magnificent aim (Miller 2006: 120).

The turn of the 20th century was significant for the later radical transformation of the global balance of power. While in the late 19th century, the United States did not play a key political or military role on a global scale, it was undeniably becoming an economic power, a process achieved through rapid industrialisation and the growth of agricultural and industrial production. As emphasised by Fareed Zakaria, it was domestic pressures generated by industrialisation that led to the beginnings of the modern American state in the 1880s and 1890s (Zakaria 1998: 11). This resulted in the strengthened authority of the president at the expense of Congress, which also brought a more explicit and active foreign policy.

A radical change in the approach to defining the international strategy as well as to the need for establishing a strong army occurred as a result of the Spanish-American War, which was fought in both Cuba and the Philippines in 1898. The war is regarded, by historians and political scientists, as a starting point for the emergence of the US as a great power (Hodge, Nolan 2007: 192). In the wake of the American victory over Spain, Cuba became a protectorate of the United States, which at the same time took control of the Philippines. President William McKinley's (1897-1901) decision, made under public pressure, strengthened the faction of expansionists, who included, among others, future President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), and the most important American strategist of the 19th century (as he is regarded) and naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan. In the context of transatlantic relations, the war with Spain initiated a closer partnership with America's earlier rival Great Britain, which openly supported the United States. The subordination of the Philippines was undeniably a starting point for America's century in Asia (Preston 2019: 48).

The turn of the 20th century marked the beginning of the noticeable internationalisation of US activity on the global stage, with Theodore Roosevelt playing a key role in this process.⁹ The basic goals of his foreign policy were to considerably strengthen the US international position, significantly develop its maritime power, and consolidate partnership with Great Britain (Hodge, Nolan 2007: 192). While the president's international efforts were conspicuous primarily in Eastern Asia and Latin America,¹⁰

⁹ Theodore Roosevelt assumed the US presidency on 14 September 1901 because, as the sitting vice president, he took office following the death of William McKinley a few days after the attempt on his life.

¹⁰ Theodore Roosevelt gave the Monroe Doctrine its most interventionist interpretation by proclaiming, on 6 December 1904, a corollary, under which the United States could exercise internation-

they were closely connected with his way of thinking about European countries and the international system (Krabbendam, Thompson 2012: 4-8). Hence, it can be argued that the origins of modern transatlantic relations can be traced back to the Theodore Roosevelt presidency since Europe was a key point of reference in the development of the American international strategy. It was Roosevelt who established the general principle that Great Britain was to be an irreplaceable partner. Germany, in turn, which he regarded as a rival, was to be a barometer of transatlantic relations: good relations with Germany were to provide reassurance to the entire transatlantic area. Roosevelt was strongly inclined towards the realist paradigm of international relations, viewing America as potentially the greatest world power, which could not, however, preserve the peace through the practice of civic virtues alone (Kissinger 1994: 39-40). For America should take action in accordance with its national interests, which Roosevelt completely identified as the balance of power theory.

A completely different approach (from that of Roosevelt) to the role of the United States on the international stage was taken by Woodrow Wilson, who served as president from 1913 to 1921. While his ideas were very deeply rooted in the American tradition because it referred to the sense of the exceptionalism and destiny of the American people, due to the departure from unilateralism, it was doomed to failure once put into practice. This is because Wilson failed to win the Senate's approval for US membership in the League of Nations. However, he managed to develop a long-term US international strategy for the 20th and 21st centuries. Under this approach, Wilsonianism can be placed, according to David Clinton, in a transatlantic historical framework spanning the period from the early 17th century to the mid-20th century (Ambrosius 2018: 358-360). Wilsonianism is thus part of transatlantic history which is considerably longer than its links with the president's ideas and his legacy alone. The events which had had an impact on the development of liberal internationalism as a permanent component of US foreign policy were the founding of the first permanent British settlement in Jamestown in 1607; the Declaration of Independence in 1776; the adoption of the Constitution in 1787; Wilson's addresses to the Senate of 22 January 1917 and to Congress of 2 April 1917, when he requested a declaration of war against Germany; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928; and the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947.

Even before the decision about the need for US military engagement in World War I, Wilson laid down the outline of America's global approach, which had nothing to do with isolationist sentiments, an accusation made by his critic Theodore Roosevelt. Wilson's plan led to a crusading ideology that came to be known as Wilsonianism (Kissinger 1994: 44-47). This new American strategy was largely formulated in Woodrow Wilson's two addresses to Congress: the first one of 2 April 1917, when the president requested a declaration of war against Germany, the other one of 8 January 1918, when he proposed a peace programme for the world, known as the Fourteen

al police powers in the Western Hemisphere to restore internal stability to the nations in the region (Kissinger 1994: 39).

Points. The January address is one of the most important speeches in the history of American diplomacy and, with just a few exceptions, it laid the foundations for US global activity to date (Preston 2019: 55-56). Wilson viewed the mission to change the world order as a messianic task given to America by God (Shipoli 2018: 54). No other US president has developed such an influential foreign policy approach that would merit its own proper name.

Wilsonianism was based on several key components. It boiled down to the belief that America should provide a path for the rest of the population, that democracies in their foreign policies strive for peace, and that state morality should not be different from individual morality. Wilson endeavoured to establish a universal international organisation, a League of Nations, based on a model of collective security. This was an expression of liberal internationalism, which meant forfeiting traditional unilateralism. "Wilson had two transformational objectives: to change American foreign policy and to change the very nature of world politics; and he linked the two together" (Nye 2019: 66).

There are several direct reasons why the United States joined the war effort on the side of Great Britain and France.¹¹ The decision to enter the war was supported by an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress; yet the call was eventually made, however reluctantly, by Wilson himself. "Entering the war was the best if not only way to pursue Wilson's goals of democracy, self-determination, and collective security" (Gompert, Binnendijk, Lin 2014: 75). In his 2 April 1917 address Wilson emphasised that the United States had to wage war for the world to be safe for democracy while peace had to be based on the tested foundations of political liberty (Wilson 1917). He spoke of the United States as a country that defended humanity, had no selfish goals, and did not seek conquest, dominion or material compensation for its losses. Wilson very strongly outlined his liberal vision of the world order and, as he emphasised himself, he adopted a more moral approach to US foreign policy (Nye 2019: 64-66). This is what distinguished him from Theodore Roosevelt, who in his pursuit of a different political philosophy, interpreted international relations in realistic terms of the balance of power. Roosevelt was highly critical of Wilson's efforts for what he called unrealistic idealism since, unlike Wilson, he did not shun violence or war.

However, the term 'unrealistic idealism' can raise doubts. Historian and leading Wilson expert Arthur Link did consider the president to be an idealist, who subordinated goals and material interests to superior ethical standards and moral purposes. Moreover, his thinking about international relations resulted from his aversion to war. Yet in many ways Wilson was a realist as he used military forces to achieve diplomatic goals, understood the concept of the balance of power and appreciated the signifi-

¹¹ Of greatest significance was the German U-boat campaign in the Atlantic against American merchant and passenger ships as well as the Zimmerman Telegram dispatched on 16 January 1917 by the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who proposed an alliance between Germany and Mexico against the Allied Powers and the United States. In return, Mexico was to recover former territories in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona (Gompert, Binnendijk, Lin 2014: 75-76).

cance of material interests. He believed that sometimes there is no other alternative and the people need to use force; however, war should be fought to achieve some higher goals, and not out of fascination with it (Link 1998: 155-156). Similar views about Wilson are shared by Tony Smith, who highlights that reducing Wilson to being “messianic” or “a crusader” is tantamount to caricaturing the man whose record was far more realistic in analysis and efforts than it seems to be (Smith 2017: 22). With regard to Roosevelt, who was critical of Wilson, he was accused of an imperialist approach. However, in some ways he was inspired by the same ideas that contributed to the Wilsonian vision of a new world order. As emphasised by Adam Quinn, it is difficult to regard Roosevelt as “an evangelist” of democracy, but he made a significant contribution to democracy promotion, broadening the horizons of American foreign policy (Quinn 2013: 38). Thus, he initiated a process that made the United States an assertive global power, which keenly made interventions (based on democratic values) in the internal affairs of other countries. This kind of approach was based on the belief that the US had a civilisational mission to carry out, which resulted from Roosevelt’s acceptance of American exceptionalism, which was also shared by Wilson (Nye 2019: 64). Roosevelt thought that America could serve humanity but, unlike Wilson, he believed that this goal could also be achieved by force.

Wilsonianism can be associated with the Americanisation of Europe and the world when it comes to the export of liberal values (including, above all, democracy promotion) even if Wilson’s approach to democracy as the source of the international world order was never complete (Thompson 2013: 53-68). Wilsonianism is not an explicit ideology,¹² and Wilson himself during the Paris Peace Conference, of which he was one of the main architects, had to make various compromises over the core principles of his ideology to achieve his primary goal, which was the establishment of a League of Nations as an integral part of the peace treaty (Thompson 2010: 35-37).¹³

Wilson, however, finally suffered defeat as he failed to persuade the US Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The isolationist option prevailed; its main proponent was the influential Republican senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a close associate of Theodore Roosevelt. The Republican senator did not believe that the League of Nations could contribute to establishing an international order of peace. He also thought that the new organisation could break the diplomatic tradition established by George Washington and that it could interfere in the affairs of the western hemisphere, which under the Monroe Doctrine, was America’s primary sphere of influence. Even though the League of

¹² For example, even though Wilson was associated with liberal ideas, he was also a proponent of race politics and white supremacy both domestically and overseas. The principle of self-determination was linked with the need for promoting a Western imperialist civilising mission in the primitive East while the mandate system in the League of Nations was in fact colonialism by another name. It should be remembered though that the racist approach was highly influential in the 19th century up to the mid-20th century (Acharya, Buzan 2019:93).

¹³ Woodrow Wilson’s attitude during the Versailles negotiations could have been affected by illness brought about by the Spanish flu, which the president suffered from while in Paris (Barry 2005: 384-388).

Nations was considered to be a mechanism for the prevention of future wars, it was feared that US membership in this organisation of collective security would lead to unwanted entanglement in conflicts worldwide and would limit America's freedom to act (Thompson 2010: 37). Moreover, Americans were not convinced of the need to promote democracy and implement the principle of self-determination. This is what led to Wilson's defeat as president; however, his ideas had a profound impact on his successors, including even Richard Nixon, as Henry Kissinger admits, who considered himself a disciple of Wilson's internationalism even though in his foreign policy he followed a number of Theodore Roosevelt's guidelines (Kissinger 1994: 54).

THE IMPACT OF WILSONIANISM ON US FOREIGN POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II AND AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE COLD WAR

Due to President Woodrow Wilson's defeat in the US Senate, the interwar period is often described in terms of a return to isolationism. However, this approach can be disputed because the United States was engaged on the global stage both politically and economically. Not only did the United States develop its diplomatic activity, for example, by initiating the Kellogg-Briand Pact,¹⁴ which tried to eliminate war as an instrument of foreign policy, but it was also becoming a global financial power as the US dollar was gradually replacing the pound sterling as the main international reserve currency (Mabee 2013: 27-28). However, the US did not implement Wilsonianism as the American version of liberal internationalism, which embraces such elements as: economic openness, multilateralism, US leadership and democracy promotion (Smith 2017: 11-22). These developments occurred only as a result of another tragic world war, which broke out twenty years after World War I, a military conflict that was not fully settled from the perspective of establishing a new stable world order.¹⁵ Doubtless the events of World War II led to the start of the American era, which was based primarily on Woodrow Wilson's ideas. They became the foundation of foreign policy pursued not only by Democratic but also Republican presidents, which proves the universal nature of Wilson's legacy.

Doubtless an important link between Wilson's legacy and the US assumption of an active global role in the Cold War period was Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who served as president from 1933 to 1945. Both Roosevelt and his vice president and successor Harry Truman (1945-1953) considered themselves Wilsonians, establishing the liberal world order that prevailed after 1945 (Nye 2020: 5). During his first term, Roosevelt was not too actively engaged in foreign policy besides the official recognition of the

¹⁴ The Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed on 27 August 1928 in Paris by 15 states, with another 47 joining at a later time. It was a joint initiative of the French foreign minister Aristide Briand and United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg.

¹⁵ Assessing the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch remarked: "This is not peace; it is an armistice for 20 years" (Plowright 2007: 11).

Soviet Union since his main goal was to pull out the US of the great economic depression. The situation began to evolve in 1936-1937, when the New Deal programme had stabilised the US economy and Germany and Japan were clearly becoming revisionist powers. For Roosevelt these countries posed a threat not only to the security but also to the survival of the United States and the American way of life. Contrary to the US Congress's isolationist efforts, Roosevelt understood that due to the globalisation of the international system even remote threats can endanger US security.¹⁶ In 1935-1939, Congress passed several neutrality acts that banned US involvement in foreign military conflicts. They were supported by the pacifist movement but they also resulted from the widespread belief among Americans that interference in European wars was fruitless (Leuchtenberg n.d.). Due to the exacerbation of the international situation, President Roosevelt, driven by liberal internationalism, sought to revise those acts. In his January 1939 State of the Union address to both houses of Congress, he emphasised that storms from abroad challenged three complementary and supportive institutions, that is religion, democracy and international good faith (Roosevelt 1939). The president very clearly stressed that neutrality could have unfair effects as it could actually support the aggressor and deny aid to the victim. In his view, survival, and even decreasing the probability of attack, was only possible by providing prior assurance of adequate defence and armament (not after the attack begins).

Wilsonian ideas were very clearly reflected in President Roosevelt's approach to defining the foundations of the post-war world order. That approach was laid down in the Atlantic Charter, a joint British-American statement signed by Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt on 14 August 1941, that is before the United States entered World War II. Its principles concerning post-war security were derived from Wilsonianism and did not include any geopolitical elements (Kissinger 1994: 390-393). This was because Roosevelt understood that in order to convince Americans that the US should become engaged in the war effort, he –like Wilson before him – needed to appeal to their idealism.¹⁷ Therefore, he disregarded the balance of power and thought that a future peace settlement could only be guaranteed through the creation of a world community that would be consistent with American ideals of democracy and social order. After the signing of the Atlantic Charter and particularly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, he embarked on a programme designed not only to defeat the enemy but also to establish a liberal world order that would ensure peace and security.

¹⁶ In February 1939, the isolationist Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg admitted that “time and space are relatively annihilated”; however he thanked God for two insulating oceans (Kissinger 1994: 385). In January 1945, Vandenberg announced his conversion to internationalism and thanks to his close cooperation with President Truman it was possible to achieve the fundamental objectives of US foreign policy, from the birth of the United Nations up to the establishment of NATO (Podraza 2019: 87).

¹⁷ In May 1940, 64% of Americans thought that the preservation of peace was more important than the defeat of the Nazis. Shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, in December 1941, the same view was held by a mere 32% (Kissinger 1994: 392).

At the centre of Roosevelt's vision was an international organisation whose project began to be developed with the approval of the Atlantic Charter, and which the president himself called the United Nations at a meeting with representatives of 26 countries over the Christmas 1941 holidays in Washington (Hamilton 2016: 19). However, if the United Nations was to avoid the fate of the League of Nations, it was necessary to ensure not only their participation but also strong leadership, which was linked with the concept of the four policemen including – besides the US – Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. This idea led to the establishment of the United Nations Security Council. Roosevelt's project to establish the United Nations was thus a modification of Wilsonian ideas as to some extent it came to include a realistic approach. However, the degree of departure from Wilsonian idealism was modest since the future role of the great powers was to enforce international law in the spheres of influence under their control (Brand 2019: 643). The use of the term sphere of influence, as declared by Roosevelt himself during the Yalta Conference in February 1945, had nothing to do with a realistic mechanism of the balance of power since the new universal organisation, whose goal was to secure peace, should put an end to the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances and spheres of influence.

The UN, which was founded after the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that is on 24 October 1945 with the signing of the Charter of the United Nations, could not fulfil all of his hopes. This was largely because Roosevelt wrongly assumed that Stalin had a similar perception of the world. Roosevelt was not fully aware that Stalin had created a totalitarian state and had been responsible for murdering millions of people, signing a pact with Hitler as well as exterminating and enslaving neighbouring peoples (Nye 2007: 120). The confrontation of Roosevelt's approach with Stalin's expansionist policies resulted in the need to modify US policy. Soon afterwards, President Harry Truman had to revise the fairly careful approach adopted by Roosevelt, who was opposed to stationing American troops in Europe and US assistance in the economic reconstruction of European countries after World War II (Kissinger 1994: 394-396). A breakthrough came in 1947, when the United States embarked on the policy of containment to prevent the spread of communism primarily in Europe, which embraced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as well as the establishment of NATO in 1949 (Podraza 2016: 259-266, Podraza 2019: 72-80, 85-89).

Thanks to these initiatives, the United States achieved two goals. Firstly, by providing economic assistance, the US contributed to the economic reconstruction of western European countries, thus stabilising them economically and politically as these countries were developing as market economies and liberal democracies. Secondly, through the establishment of NATO, the United States provided security to their European allies, keeping American troops in Europe. This led to the establishment of an Atlantic system involving Americans and Europeans, also allowing the latter to initiate the process of integration. Thus, the second half of the 1940s saw Wilsonianism being adjusted to the new reality both worldwide and in Europe. Truman established a liberal world order in which the United States became a hegemon. In

doing so, he implemented all elements of Woodrow Wilson's approach. That applied to the establishment of multilateral institutions, democracy promotion, international economic openness, and last but not least, close US involvement in world politics.

WILSONIANISM VS. AMERICAN POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

No doubt the end of the Cold War largely resulted from the effectiveness of the US international strategy after World War II and led to the new wave of democratisation across the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A large contribution to the peaceful end of East-West rivalry was made by President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), whose doctrine concerning democracy promotion was the quintessence of Wilsonianism. Tony Smith called Reagan the most Wilsonian president since Wilson himself (Tucker 1993/1994: 84). However, for the United States, the end of the Cold War could paradoxically be associated with the beginning of the end of the American era. The United States became the only superpower and, as the most world's powerful country, was gaining advantages over others in political, military, economic, technological and cultural terms. However, its significance has relatively declined due to the emergence of an increasingly interdependent world, the dispersion of power in world politics and the rising importance of new political or economic centres, such as the European Union, China, India and Japan.¹⁸

The rhetoric of the George Bush (1989-1993)¹⁹ and Bill Clinton (1993-2001) administrations "echoed the Wilsonian spirit of Reagan's farewell address" (Smith 2017: 187). Their political programs included such elements of liberal internationalism as democracy, open markets, multiculturalism, and, obviously, American leadership, all of which were guarantees of world peace. However, their implementation was of limited in nature. Bush was successful in transforming NATO after the end of the Cold War (contrary to popular views held by politicians and international analysts, who were inclined towards realism and prophesied the end of the North Atlantic Alliance)²⁰ and supporting countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the democratisation process. Clinton essentially made a very difficult decision on NATO enlargement, as a result of which in 1999 the North Atlantic Alliance expanded to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.²¹

However, the implementation of an assertive multilateral approach in world politics did not bring the expected results if only because the European Union did not

¹⁸ While the issue of a relative decline came up as early as the 1960s., it became hotly debated from various points of view after the end of the Cold War and in the 21st century (Podraza 2018: 14-19).

¹⁹ Joseph Nye calls George Bush a pragmatic realist, who used Wilsonian language with reference to collective security and a new world order (Nye 2019: 69).

²⁰ For more, see Podraza 2018.

²¹ In the early 1990s, the prevailing view was that NATO should not acquire new democracies. For more on anti-enlargement arguments see Taylor 1992. For more on arguments from that period on the enlargement of western security institutions see Podraza 1992.

become a real US partner as it was unable to put an end to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Podraza 2014: 62-63). In view of that, Clinton had no choice but to use force in a more unilateral way and to adopt the indispensable nation approach, which contributes to the restoration and maintenance of world peace and security. With regard to democracy promotion, which was one of the three goals of the US global strategy, Bill Clinton followed pragmatic idealism, which also allowed the use of force.

However, the assessment of the impact of the Wilsonian agenda on the development of the world order in the 1990s is not fully conclusive. The United States managed to aid the democratisation process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but failed to do so in the case of Russia and China.²² Even though Wilsonianism contributed to considerable and permanent change in the 1990s, the end of this decade saw its limitations, departures from this approach and the need for its redefinition with regard to the construction of the world order (Mead 2002: 286-292). That state of affairs resulted not only from the misjudgement of the international context, but also from the traditional or even the internal limitations of Wilsonianism. They concerned the logic of Wilsonian policies which led the United States to highly unpopular interventions in the context of lacking sufficient political resources in the US itself (due to often divergent views on the need to use force). Hence, Wilsonianism can be affected more severely by its internal limitations than by the actions of hostile external powers.

The George W. Bush presidency (2001-2009) can provoke disagreements as to what extent it implemented Wilsonianism. Bush's pressure on the issue of democracy promotion, even in the case of the unilateral use of military force²³, can lead to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine reflected liberal internationalism (Ikenberry 2008: 2). However, there are also opposing views that the essence of Wilsonianism came down not to the spread of democracy but to a world order based on partnership- and rules-based world order, which Bush generally rejected. Consequently, Bush's approach, called the new unilateralism, can thus be regarded as a modification of Wilsonianism since it was a blend of American idealism (peace through democracy) and *Realpolitik* (unilateral use of military force) (Podraza 2014: 64-66). The Bush Doctrine, manifested in the war on terror with the unilateral and preventive use of force, led to internal divisions in Europe into countries supporting the US (Great Britain) in its invasion of Iraq, and others, such France and Germany, that were strongly opposed to this con-

²² The United States had very restricted opportunities to impact the situation particularly in China. As a result, soon after taking office, President Bill Clinton gave up on rhetoric about democracy promotion with regard to this country. In 1994, Clinton made a decision to delink human rights and trade with China even though administration officials kept emphasising that "increased US trade and investment in China would be an important force for political liberalization" (Carothers 2000: 3).

²³ The use of force in democracy promotion arouses controversy. While some point to Germany and Japan as countries that were transformed into democracies thanks to military intervention in World War II, the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan from the Bush presidency confirm the general claim that interventions may not be effective or may even have a negative impact on democratisation (Downes, Monten 2018: 80-81). Detailed analysis of US efforts in the area of nation-building from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush can be found for example in Dobbins, Poole, Long et al. 2008.

flict. Moreover, the European Union adopted a completely different approach to the world order, called effective multilateralism, which was based on the development of a stronger international community, international institutions and international law (European Council 2003, Council of the European Union 2019).

The possibility of overcoming the impasse in transatlantic relations was linked with the 2008 election of Barack Obama as president (2009-2017). In his efforts, Obama attached great importance to the multilateral approach, yet more in a global than in a transatlantic dimension; moreover, he made a clear turn to Asia, calling himself America's first Pacific president (Podraza 2014: 64-67). Considering the most important elements of Wilsonianism, for Obama, multilateralism was a prerequisite for the development of US diplomacy; yet although he perceived the use of force as a last resort, security interests prevailed over democracy. Barack Obama's foreign policy was pursued in an increasingly post-American world. Obama was a pragmatic internationalist who was aware of the limitations that the US encountered on the global stage. Hence, the president emphasised the need for greater engagement of other countries in peacekeeping and international security. Obama strongly argued that he did not need any new grand strategy, but only the right strategic partners, stressing, among other things, a very important issue of burden-sharing within NATO (Popescu 2017: 178).

Doubtless a great challenge to pursuing Wilsonianism as the foundation of US foreign policy was the election of Donald Trump and his taking office in January 2017. His campaign slogan *America first* was perceived as isolationist as it echoed the slogan of the opposition movement against President F.D. Roosevelt's decision to involve the US in World War II (Calamur 2017). However, it should be remembered that the first president to have used the phrase *America first* was none other than Woodrow Wilson himself, who in a Philadelphia address in June 1916 appealed to his fellow citizens to put America first in their feelings (Haglund 2020: 21-23). However, the claim put forward by Haglund, who tries to draw a parallel between Trump and Wilson, should be viewed as a scientific provocation since, as the author himself admits, Trump is generally associated with illiberal nationalism whereas Wilson with liberal internationalism. It can thus be argued that the Trump presidency deepened the process of departing from Wilsonianism as the foundation of the American era even though the US in the post-Cold War era can be regarded as a hyperpower. The role of the United States as the leader of the liberal world order had eroded as "[f]or the first time since the 1930s, the United States has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal internationalism" (Ikenberry 2018: 7). In crisis were transatlantic relations, which since the Harry Truman presidency had been the main axis of the US global strategy. It is true that Trump drew attention to some issues that have been and still are problematic in relations between Americans and Europeans. For example, he raised the problem of burden-sharing within NATO, which was a major issue back in the Cold War era. However, he did this in a ruthless and transactional manner, suggesting the limited nature of US commitments as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which resulted from the US abandonment of the missionary sense of responsibility

for the Western world (Kiwierska, Kubera, Morozowski 2017: 81-83). Moreover, his individualism in making key decisions, unpredictability and lack of clearly defined foreign policy objectives raised concerns about US global leadership and intentions towards European partners within transatlantic relations.

Donald Trump's defeat in the 2020 elections and the election of the Democrat Joe Biden, former vice president to Barack Obama, are bringing hope that the United States will return to a more constructive foreign policy that will allow more scope for partners from various corners of the globe, including Europe. As Biden announced at the start of 2020, during his presidency he would "take immediate steps to renew U.S. democracy and alliances, protect the United States' economic future, and once more have America lead the world" (Biden 2020). While there are traces of Wilsonianism in this statement, a complete return to this approach is not possible. This is because the United States needs to face serious threats and global challenges, notably Russia's aggression against Ukraine, strategic competition with China and termination of the COVID-19 pandemic. Particularly with regard to China, US interests are not identical to the approach of many European countries. A potential cold war with China would be very different from the US-Soviet rivalry. Furthermore, a complete departure from Donald Trump's policies will not be easy as the previous president followed a line of thinking about the US role on the global stage which, on the one hand, was at odds with Wilson's approach and legacy, but, on the other hand, was also rooted in the American tradition.

CONCLUSION

For decades Wilsonianism has been an extremely influential approach in the implementation of the US international strategy. It is deeply rooted in the American tradition even though Woodrow Wilson abandoned the unilateral approach, which prevailed in the 19th century, and showed the need for the United States to take global leadership. While Wilsonianism is associated with liberal internationalism, the way successive US presidents employed this approach shows that there were many elements identical with the realistic paradigm in international relations. The current events, including the coronavirus pandemic, raise a wide range of crucial questions about the changing world order and US leadership. Will there be a cold war between the US, which has experienced a decline in importance, and China, which is rising in the world and becoming increasingly assertive? What should be an adequate response to the rebirth of Russia's neo-imperial policy and aggression against Ukraine? How is it possible to tackle new and surprisingly changing security threats and challenges? There may be far more such questions. In view of the above, it may be worthwhile to re-embrace Wilsonian recipes, i.e. to create solutions and conditions that will make the world safe for democracy. Time will tell whether this will happen, and this will have a decisive impact on whether the American era in world politics can be continued.

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ABSTRACT

The main goal of this paper is to analyse continuity and change in American foreign policy with special emphasis on President Woodrow Wilson's approach and its impact on the US international strategy during World War II, the beginning of the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. It is argued that Wilson's approach was not created in a vacuum and although it put an end to the era that was inspired by President George Washington's farewell address from 1796, it fits very well in the traditional thought regarding the American people and mission, as well as other elements that are at the core of US international activity. Wilsonianism, understood as liberal internationalism, has been a very influential concept in the development of American foreign policy for decades and during World War II it contributed to the rise of the American era in international politics. Due to the transformation of the global order after the end of the Cold War and also in the wake of the Donald Trump presidency, it may be considered whether or not the American era has come to an end. The analysis of US foreign policy takes into account both liberal theory, referred to by Woodrow Wilson, as well as realism theory, associated with Wilson's predecessor, President Theodor Roosevelt.

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**THE WORK OF KAZIMIERZ PAPÉE IN THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG
AND HIS CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT HERMANN RAUSCHNING,
IN THE LIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS
FROM 1933–1934**

With the end of the Great War, the Republic of Poland began gradually to make its return to the map of Europe. The borders of the reborn nation had to be fought for by means of both arms and diplomacy. One of the problems faced by those building the new order was the question of Polish access to the sea. As a result of the measures adopted in that regard, the Free City of Danzig came into being. Throughout the lifetime of this peculiar creation, Poland was compelled to fight to uphold its rights on that territory. Many dedicated themselves to that struggle; one of them was the Polish diplomat Kazimierz Papée.

This article analyses the diplomatic activity of Kazimierz Papée in the Free City of Danzig in the years 1933–1934. It is not the author's intention to describe the entirety of the work done by that figure in the period in question; the focus will be on Papée's contacts with President Hermann Rauschning and the attendant circumstances, in the light of the reports – mostly previously unknown – sent by Papée to Warsaw. Rauschning was President of the Senate of the Free City in 1933–1934. This was a period of significance in Poland's relationships with Germany and with Danzig, as was reflected in the activity of Poland's Commissioner General in the Free City, the post held at the time by Papée. The actions he undertook were relevant not only to international politics on a large scale, but also had to be confronted with the particular conception of those politics on the Danzig microscale.

KAZIMIERZ PAPÉE (1889–1979)

No complete historical account has yet been given of Papée's life and work in the field of international relations. To date, his diplomatic activity has been studied only in small parts, in spite of its rich total legacy. Papée was born in Lviv on 10 January 1889, studied at the Faculty of Law of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, and in 1913 earned the title of Doctor of Laws (Żukowski 2008: 60). During the Great War he served in the Polish Legions, and after the war ended, in September 1919, he joined

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mikos 1974: 179). Before being posted to Danzig in 1932, he had gained experience in various posts in the Polish diplomatic service: in The Hague (1920–1922), Berlin (1922–1923), Copenhagen (1924), Ankara (1928–1929), Tallinn (1929) and Königsberg (1929–1932) (*Rocznik służby...* 1938: 212). Between his foreign postings, he also served at home. Formally, Papée worked for the longest period at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw – from December 1924 until the end of 1927 (*ibidem*), in the Eastern Department (Mikos 1974: 179). There, almost from the start, as deputy head of that department (*Rocznik służby...* 1938: 212), he played an active part in the conclusion of numerous international agreements concerning Poland's relations with the countries coming under the department's auspices (Mikos 1974: 179–180). Papée was appointed Polish Commissioner General in the Free City of Danzig on 25 February 1932 (*PDD 1932*: 132), remaining in that post formally until 15 December 1936 (*PDD 1936*: X). Later he would serve as Poland's envoy in Prague, playing an active part in discussions between the Polish and Czechoslovak sides on the issue of Zaolzie (Żaryn 1998: 6). Following the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and the closure of the Polish diplomatic mission there, on 15 July 1939 Papée was appointed Poland's ambassador to the Vatican (Michowicz 1995: 51–52).

In 1958, as a result of a shake-up following the death of Pope Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli), the Polish government-in-exile's representative in the Vatican lost the status of ambassador. The embassy remained open, however, and from early 1959 Papée was given the title of "embassy head" (Żaryn 1998: 9, 42–43). It was not until 1972 that the Polish diplomat was informed, through the Vatican Secretary of State, that his embassy was to be closed. This happened at a time when the Vatican was pursuing a conciliatory policy towards the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Kazimierz Papée died in Rome on 19 January 1979 (Kornat 2006: 131; Wyrwa 1990: 59).

As noted above, the years 1933–1934 were a period of significance in Polish–German relations. Following a Polish diplomatic initiative, in early May 1933 two official communiqués were published in Berlin and Warsaw, which – among other things – expressed a hope for improvement in bilateral relations. From that time on, Poland and Germany prepared the ground for the realisation of that wish. Soon afterwards, at a time when the situation in the international arena favoured it, Poland took a decisive step. At the initiative of Józef Piłsudski, in mid-November 1933 a meeting took place between Poland's ambassador to Germany, Józef Lipski, and Adolf Hitler. This led to a public declaration that neither side would resort to force against the other, and that they would enter into appropriate negotiations. These in turn produced the Polish - German non-aggression declaration of 26 January 1934, which not only excluded the use of force in the resolution of disputed matters, but also provided a basis for political cooperation between Warsaw and Berlin in relations with other states. Indirectly, it also enabled Poland to gain economic benefits (Skrzypek 1995: 461–463, 467, 470–471).

The aforementioned events were not without impact on the events taking place on the political stage in the Free City. Following the elections to the Danzig Volks-

tag on 28 May 1933, in which the pro-Hitler grouping enjoyed considerable success, on 20 June a new Senate was appointed, with Hermann Rauschning as its president. From then onwards, real power in the Free City lay in Nazi hands, and thus the political leadership was dependent on orders sent from Berlin, in both external and internal affairs (Wójcicki 1976: 203, 205).

It is significant that the time of the formation of the first Danzig Senate dominated by propagators of Nazi ideology coincided with Poland's adoption of a new approach to its relations with the Free City. This was manifested, among other things, in Papée's appointment to head the Polish Commission General in Danzig. At the time, the Polish government's preference was for a policy of *fait accompli* rather than methods of persuasion. Moreover, its policy towards Danzig was taken over entirely by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and made subordinate to Polish-German relations (Mikos 1971: 245, 248). It was in these circumstances that it fell to the new Commissioner to represent Poland in its dealings with the authorities in Danzig.

PAPÉE'S VIEW OF RAUSCHNING

As noted above, Papée's arrival in the Free City coincided with a new approach to Polish-Danzig relations. The pursuit of *fait accompli* politics required greater decisiveness. In early March 1932, in a conversation with the French ambassador, Józef Beck described the new Commissioner as a calm man, but characterised by great determination and resistant to provocations (AAN, MSZ, 108: 18; *PDD 1932*: 137). The Polish foreign minister still held to that assessment of Papée's character many years later (Beck 2015: 64). This determination is visible when one reads the reports written by the Commissioner General in relation to his duties in Danzig.

The same feature came to the fore in his relations with the Senate President. It was manifested in the directness with which the Commissioner spoke to Rauschning – Papée was little inclined to veil his meanings. He even allowed himself to exact clear declarations from the leading senator. This cannot be regarded as a mark of disrespect, however. The Commissioner noted that Rauschning “strove consistently from the very beginning to make the atmosphere less tense in relations with Poland” (APG, KGRP, 918: 157). After Rauschning's removal as president, Papée described him in a report as the only individual and the only politician of a “certain format” within the Danzig executive (*ibidem*: 497; *PDD 1934*: 740). Writing to Beck in September 1933, Papée described the Senate President as someone striving to realise a certain ideological mission, contained in a desire for Danzig to serve as a link between Poland and Germany (*ibidem* 917: 443; *ibidem 1933*: 535). The picture of Rauschning thus painted by the Commissioner General for the chiefs of Polish foreign policy was, in this case, an accurate one. The president himself, before the outbreak of World War II, would write: “From being a sensitive pivotal point of German - Polish relations, the Free City should have become something of the kind of a connecting motif, an experimental field for cooperation” (Rauschning 1939: 326). Born in Thorn (Toruń)

in 1887, Rauschning had moved to the Free City in 1926, and four years later joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party. This decision probably sprang from a desire to rebuild strong authority in Germany, not from total acceptance of the Nazis' programme (Kornat 2000: 256–257). He was a restrained and polite man, and at a time of reduction of conflicts with Poland, these were attributes that Hitler found to be desirable (Mikos 1979: 282).

Just as Papée positively assessed the Senate President's personality after the latter left office, so their mutual relationship also got off to a positive start. Even shortly before the appointment of the new Senate, the Commissioner had an opportunity to hear the speeches of Danzig figures with links to the Nazi movement, including that of Rauschning. In the conclusion of a report prepared on that occasion for Beck, Papée noted that the Nazi programme had much in common with the actions taken by the Danzig Senate hitherto with regard to Poland. He was unsure only about the methods by which the programme was to be put into practice, which could not be foreseen at that time (APG, KGRP, 917: 323, 325, 327). This reflection is regarded as a realistic assessment of the political situation in Danzig (Mikos 1971: 272). Papée very quickly became persuaded that the methods presented in the declarations of the new Senate President represented a certain novelty. He expressed this directly in his first conversation with Rauschning, which took place on 21 June 1933. The course of this conversation implies that Papée accepted the new methods, and in expressing hope for their effectiveness in improving Polish–Danzig relations, indirectly encouraged the Senate President to apply them. Unfortunately, the Commissioner did not specify precisely how he then understood those methods. Based on his report on his first conversation with Rauschning, it seems probable that what he had in mind was only the latter's good will and belief in an improvement of relations between Poland and Danzig (APG, KGRP, 917: 329, 331). If this was indeed the case, then Papée would put them to the test just a fortnight later.

THE FIRST EFFECTS OF COOPERATION

At a subsequent meeting with Rauschning, the Polish representative agreed to move immediately to the topic of Polish–Danzig relations. By setting out Poland's expectations in the first place, he came to see that the Senate President was most concerned with economic matters. Papée nonetheless aimed to prioritise matters relating to Article 33 of the Paris Convention,¹ which he justified by the significant advances made in discussions with the previous Senate. The lack of resistance on Rauschning's part meant that the Commissioner was able to get his way fairly easily. Knowing also

¹ The Paris Convention of 9 November 1920, signed by Poland and the Free City of Danzig, detailed the entitlements of Poland within the Free City that were set out in general terms in Article 104 of the Treaty of Versailles. Under Article 33 of the Paris Convention, the Polish minority in the Free City received the same rights as were due to national minorities in Poland (Mikos 1979: 83; Wójcicki 1976: 71–72).

that the High Commissioner of the League of Nations would shortly have to issue a decision on the question of full use of Danzig's port,² he suggested to Rauschnig that it would be desirable to attempt to reach a short and provisional agreement on that matter. Papée wished to undertake such an effort because he knew that the League's Danzig representative would be constrained in his decision by sections of the expert report on the issue that were unfavourable to Poland. He thus counted on obtaining more favourable terms through direct negotiation with the Danzig side. He also ordered the drafting of a proposed agreement. In a report of 6 July 1933, in which he described the conversation to Beck, Papée revealed the existence of two opposing forces that drove his diplomatic actions. On the one hand, he demonstrated initiative and a talent for improvisation, as he himself had proposed the idea of such an agreement to Rauschnig. On the other hand, in his full account of the matter written for Beck, he confirmed his dependence on the latter's directives (*ibidem*: 361, 363, 365, 367). Stanisław Mikos, in his work on the activity of the Polish Commission General in Danzig, expressed the view that the second of these two forces was the dominant one (Mikos 1971: 247). The Polish diplomat proposed the most logical solution possible, intended to provide his country with clear benefits. Nevertheless, as is often the case, by doing this he opened the door to other problems.

Papée strove to resolve the matters raised without allowing further questions to be added to the list. He justified this by referring to technical issues, which would have undoubtedly hampered the realisation of his plan. Thus, he did not allow work to begin immediately on the economic matters that Rauschnig wished to raise, even though the full use issue belonged to that category. In a conversation with the Senate President on 10 July 1933, Papée learnt that the latter's efforts to address economic questions were a result of party pressure. The Commissioner did not exclude the possibility of future discussions on that matter, but nor did he retreat from his position that negotiations should take place in stages. He gave an assurance that his intention was, as he himself put it, to negotiate in a continuous manner. It would transpire that this statement was not made by chance. Papée also proposed that, after the completion of negotiations on the matters put forward by him, a Polish government visit to Danzig should be organised, which in his view would have a positive effect on further stages of the negotiations (APG, KGRP, 83: 6). This may be interpreted as a desire for clear delimitation of the negotiation stages, which would conform to the strategy applied by Papée. In one of his letters to Beck it is implied that this strategy was his own initiative (*ibidem*: 917: 363). Papée was able to tell Rauschnig a few days later that he had personally obtained the Prime Minister's approval for a Danzig visit, which might take place in late September 1933. This being the case, he himself encouraged

² The dispute over Poland's use of Danzig's port began on 9 May 1930. "The Senate presented to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig a note with a demand for Poland to make full use of the port. In 1932, League of Nations experts made precise the obligations of the Polish government to transport through Danzig all goods whose trade lay in the hand of the Polish authorities [...]" (*PDD 1933*: 547).

the Senate President to use the month preceding the visit to work further on improving the atmosphere of Polish–Danzig relations (*ibidem*: 371).

This encouragement did not go unanswered. On both sides there was a desire to reach an understanding. As early as 5 August, Papée wrote that an agreement relating to Article 33 of the Paris Convention and the question of full use was almost ready for signing (*ibidem*: 83: 53). This is synonymous with the fact of Beck's approving his idea for the conclusion of a provisional agreement on Poland's use of the Danzig port. It also implies, however, that the matter had been linked to the negotiations on Article 33. This was a danger resulting from the proposal made previously by the Commissioner General. An agreement on the use of the port was signed on 5 August 1933, and gave immediate benefits to the Free City, although work on an executive protocol to the agreement was still continuing. On the same day an agreement pursuant to Article 33 of the Paris Convention was initialled, relating to the treatment of Polish citizens and other persons of Polish origin or tongue in the Free City of Danzig. If either of the parties wished, by 18 September, to renew the dispute over full use within the auspices of the League of Nations, this would simultaneously nullify all that had been achieved thus far in both matters (*Zbiór dokumentów...*, cz. IX, 1934: 21–23). In this way, "Danzig made the final signing of an agreement on matters concerning the Polish population dependent on acceptance of the executive protocol to the full use agreement" (Drzycimski 1978: 331). Thus, the thing that Papée desired the most became a hostage to his own initiative, undertaken in good faith. In spite of this it brought positive results, since the final commitment made by the Polish side concerned only certain reloaded supplies (*PDD 1933*: 547). The agreement on full use was nevertheless a compromise. It restricted the scope and speed of development of the port in Gdynia (Hajduk 1981: 194). Undoubtedly, the conclusion of an agreement concerning protection of the Polish population was also a defining moment in Polish–Danzig relations. The problem, though, was the fact that the real value of that agreement was dependent on its implementation by Danzig's administrative authorities (Drzycimski 1978: 348). Papée was aware of the compromise nature of the solution finally adopted in the matter of full use (APG, KGRP, 918: 177).

REALISATION OF RAUSCHNING'S PRINCIPAL AIM

Apart from the work on the matters that were formally addressed in the agreements of 18 September 1933, the Polish Commission General, with Kazimierz Papée at its head, did not forget about Rauschning's principal wish. A letter from the Commissioner General dated 5 August 1933 implies that preparations were already then under way for discussions with the Senate on economic matters. Papée knew that the final stage of these discussions would not be reached immediately, expecting this to happen in September (as it turned out, he was very much mistaken). He wrote: "Although I think that economic matters will not be the subject of final discussions until September, to the outside we maintain the impression – and in the same spirit

reason with the Senate – that the negotiations are on a continuous basis” (ibidem, 83: 53 – *verte*). Papée was thus engaged in a psychological game with the Senate. He well knew what Rauschning wanted the most. In trying not to allow a break in the negotiations on economic matters, he strengthened Poland’s position in its effort to implement the aforementioned agreements. In this way he also protected them against a possible renewal by Danzig of the full use dispute before the League of Nations, which would have written off the whole enterprise. It was thus entirely justified for Papée to introduce a staging strategy in the negotiations with Danzig.

In mid-September 1933, instead of reporting on the expected final phase of discussions with the Senate on economic matters, the Polish Commissioner General wrote of Rauschning’s insistence that the visit of the Polish Prime Minister to Danzig should take place in that same month. The Senate President saw this as an impulse for the faster implementation of economic plans. Papée perceived that these were, for Rauschning, another stage in the realisation of his vision of *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland.³ He also saw that Rauschning linked the completion of that process to his own continued political *raison d’être* in Danzig (ibidem: 917: 449). The visit by Prime Minister Janusz Jędrzejewicz, which the Commissioner General had proposed earlier, did indeed come to fruition relatively quickly. It took place on 22 September 1933, and is described in the literature as the closure of a certain stage in relations between the Free City and Poland following the appointment of a Nazi-dominated Senate (Mikos 1971: 272). Thus was fulfilled the strategy adopted several months earlier by Papée, whose outcomes were interlinked with the Senate President’s vision of *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland. This was not, however, the only process taking place within the Free City of which the Commissioner was aware.

In a letter to Beck of 5 November 1933, Papée indicated that the Danzig Senate was conducting a process of *Gleichschaltung*⁴ with the Reich. He described this explicitly as a threat to Poland’s most vital interests in the Free City. He also made clear his view that, if Poland’s policy towards Danzig was to continue to “pay off”, then the aforementioned process ought to be stopped (APG, KGRP, 917: 539, 541). It may be wondered what Papée meant by “pay off”. Perhaps what he had in mind above all was pure material profit. This seems to be implied by his proposals made to Beck in the above-mentioned letter. A few weeks earlier the Commissioner had set out a point of departure for action by the Polish government to counteract that process, namely Poland’s right to use the Danzig port (ibidem: 517, 519). Papée developed this thought further in a letter of 5 November. He suggested to Beck a four-point plan of preventive action for the near future. The first two proposals

³ This slogan reflects Rauschning’s objective of a normalisation of relations with Poland (Mikos 1971: 295).

⁴ *Gleichschaltung*, or ‘forcing into line’, refers to the system of legal and political transformations effected in Nazi Germany with the aim of ensuring the dominance of Nazi ideology in all areas of life (Górnicki 1993: 86; Kulbat 2005: 105).

concerned the person of the Gauleiter, Albert Forster, and the Volkstag, which will be considered below. The next two were directly related to Rauschning's desired economic negotiations. Papée's third point read: "Break down the system of Danzig laws and regulations aimed towards economic separation from Poland and the creation of a *sui generis* autarchy, by concluding appropriate agreements with Danzig to create a contractual Polish–Danzig economic system (first and foremost in the supply of agricultural produce to Danzig)." This was followed by a fourth point: "Carry out reorganisation of the customs service in the spirit of our theses of assimilation and strengthening of Polish *empire*, where this must be treated as a key matter in view of its importance for progress on a whole range of disputed economic matters between Poland and Danzig." Papée also asked his superior to set a date for a visit by Rauschning to Warsaw. The reason given for this request was the dispute existing between the Danzig Senate and the League of Nations, which Papée proposed exploiting for the positive realisation of Polish demands towards the Danzig executive body (ibidem: 541, 543, 545). The Senate President did indeed visit Warsaw not long after, on 11 December 1933 (Wójcicki 1976: 212). Following his departure from the Polish capital, the negotiations on economic matters visibly picked up speed (Wojciechowski 1980: 94). On 9 January 1934, Papée sent a written reply to Rauschning's memorandum presented during the Warsaw visit. As regards economic matters, it coincided with the proposals that had been made by the Commissioner General in early November (AAN, MSZ, 2370: 1–2, 8–9; PDD 1934: 21–24).

It transpired that, contrary to Papée's original predictions, the economic negotiations with the Danzig Senate dragged on for a considerable time, and eventually stalled. They were certainly not easy, since – as the Commissioner noted – they also had a political subtext. Papée spoke to the Senate President on 4 April 1934. Both expressed the desire to resume the discussions as soon as possible, so as to achieve concrete results in an effective manner. The Commissioner's words show that he remained faithful to his own vision as presented to Beck several months earlier. In the matter of the organisation of the customs service, which he considered a key issue, he told Rauschning directly that the Danzig side must put its cards on the table. He thus once again displayed his direct conversational style and his decisive character. However, in conducting the negotiations in accordance with his guidelines, he foundered on Rauschning's need to maintain a good political position, which did not allow him to make excessive concessions. Papée consequently stated that his goal was not, in his words, to endanger the Senate President's position. Nonetheless, certain principles had to be adhered to in the new organisation of the customs service to ensure some uniformity in comparison with the existing state of affairs (APG, KGRP, 86: 79–83; PDD 1934: 284–285).

In spite of the many difficulties, Rauschning wanted to reach an understanding with the Polish side. In a telegram of 9 April 1934, Papée notified the foreign ministry of a speech given by Rauschning two days earlier, which he interpreted as a tactic calculated to influence the further course and tempo of the negotiations. It had been stated in the speech that if the negotiations failed, the Free City would have to seek other

paths. The telegram painted for Warsaw a picture of Rauschning as a partner holding to a moderate position. He foresaw that these “other paths” would mean actions not outside the law, but within a framework of its interpretation. In the circumstances, Papée did not wish to be groping in the dark. He asked the ministry for directives in a whole set of matters relating to the economic negotiations and the Senate President’s speech (ibidem, 918: 111–112). From a report made by the Commissioner on 13 April, we know that Beck furnished him with appropriate instructions. Clearly once again the latter chose a tactic of directness and decisiveness, which his subordinate was capable of implementing. In a further conversation with Rauschning, Papée said that with regard to policy towards Poland, an authentic interpretation of his speech was required. In reply, the Senator revealed his motivations, stating that the speech had been another attempt to express his desire to reach an understanding with Poland, but also a notice that in the last resort, Danzig would defend itself. He did not conceal that he judged the situation with the negotiations to be deteriorating, and added that he regarded the measures referred to in his speech as an undesirable last resort. Rauschning displayed good will, and presented drafts of the understandings that were of interest to both sides. Papée did not wish to shatter this good impression, and refrained from mentioning the issues on which the negotiating parties might have differing viewpoints. He was fully aware that not all of the Senate’s proposals were in accord with Polish interests.

On Beck’s instructions, Papée set the negotiations in motion by inviting a Danzig delegation to Warsaw (ibidem, 86: 91 – *verte*). At the same time he made his superior aware that Rauschning’s position in the whole matter was not an easy one, since the break in negotiations meant that the Senate President had to contend with harsh criticism from the party as well as economic depression (ibidem, 918: 123). Papée wrote to Beck on 4 May 1934 concerning another of Rauschning’s speeches, this time from late April, noting that this time much stronger language had been used than previously, although the content cited in the report does not give that impression. The Commissioner considered that a threat had been made against Poland, although in very generalised terms (ibidem: 141). Irrespective of the correctness of the interpretation, the Polish Commissioner General gave Warsaw a sense of rising tension in Danzig, which might have motivated the Polish decision-makers to action. Unquestionably, given the situation in the Free City, this was an entirely proper way of proceeding.

The aforementioned speeches of Rauschning have been evaluated by some authors as anti-Polish and deviating from previous declarations of friendship and a desire for cooperation. The speeches should be seen as attempts to test Polish reactions (Mikos 1979: 299–300). Papée, in accordance with what has already been noted, was inclined to persuade Beck that such behaviour on Rauschning’s part represented a call for faster action, but at the same a call for help – particularly since Papée had already informed his superior that the Senate President linked the achievement of *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland with his survival on the Danzig political scene. Moreover, Rauschning had told the Commissioner that what he desired most was real results from the economic negotiations, something that the latter did not fail to report

to his superior (APG, KGRP, 918: 123). It should be noted that Papée had already written to the foreign ministry, on 26 February 1934, about some entirely different negotiations with the Senate relating to Poland's conducting the Free City's foreign affairs. In that letter he stated that Rauschning had withdrawn from the agreements at the last moment, fearing public opinion (*ibidem*, 883: 145). The Commissioner thus made clear to the chiefs of Polish foreign policy what situation the Danzig Senate President found himself in. This knowledge was a trump card that might be played to good effect in political dealings with Danzig.

In early July 1934, Papée informed Beck of an improvement in the previously tense situation, based on the different tone of speeches given by Rauschning (*ibidem*, 918: 155, 157). Moreover, in a report written some days earlier, he had noted in the Senate President a need to make a positive impression to the outside, related to his striving for an "optical" improvement in one of the proposed articles of the economic agreements that were in preparation. The Commissioner also agreed with Rauschning as to the strategy of earlier signing of other agreements (one of them concerned social security, for example), so that their importance could be emphasised in the press, thus creating a suitable atmosphere for the completion of the economic negotiations (*ibidem*, 86: 168–170). The Senate President's desire, as indicated at the very start of his dealings with Papée, soon became a reality. This occurred on 6 August 1934, when Poland concluded several simultaneous agreements with the Free City of Danzig, signed by the Commissioner General among others. One of them regulated certain customs matters; another concerned the Free City's participation in transport supplies; while four more were of a more detailed nature, concerning trade in agricultural, horticultural and fishing produce, regulations on foodstuffs and items of everyday use, trade in animals, animal parts and produce, serums and vaccines, and regulations on plant protection (*Zbiór dokumentów...*, cz. X, 1934: 2, 10, 31, 40, 45, 62). The final wording of those agreements, worked out over time, was to serve as proof of whether Papée's strategy aiming to halt the process of *Gleichschaltung*, as suggested to Beck, had been fully applied.

It turned out that the realisation of that strategy was hampered by the policy of rapprochement with Nazi Germany. For this reason, the agreements of 6 August 1934 took on features of a compromise (Hajduk 1981: 255). As has been mentioned, in line with Papée's suggestion, the matter of the reorganisation of the customs service was dealt with together with the other agreements. However, while the agreement in that matter was of great importance for the normalisation of customs relations, it did not lead to any changes in the organisation of the customs administration within the Free City (*ibidem*: 254). The Commissioner General had also proposed that a system of agreements between Poland and Danzig should counteract the process of the Free City's economic separation from Poland. He drew particular attention here to the supply of agricultural produce to Danzig. In fact, under the terms of the agreements of 6 August, the Senate was able to regulate the import of such products (as well as others) in accordance with its own needs and political strategy. Finally, Poland recognised in practice the Free City's separate economic status (*ibidem*: 240). Thus, given

the Polish foreign ministry's preferred direction in international politics, Papée placed his signature beneath agreements which went against his own views. The question remains to what degree he was aware of this. In one of his letters to Beck he assessed the August agreements as important and as a possible start of a new epoch (APG, KGRP, 918: 331). He also noted that they opened up many opportunities for Danzig. He saw in them forms which, if they could only be filled out with "effective content", would contribute significantly to the further development of Polish–Danzig relations (ibidem: 353). It may thus be presumed that Papée did not see the economic agreements that he had signed as an ideal remedy for the problems between the two sides. Rather, he viewed them as a means to create a thread of understanding in the area of his diplomatic work, where in that process much depended on the Free City itself.

Polish policy towards the process of *Gleichschaltung* had the aim of ensuring that it did not collide with Poland's economic rights in the Free City and the situation of the Polish population there (Wojciechowski 1980: 94). The arguments presented by Papée are in line with this reasoning. The Commissioner also frequently intervened with Rauschning in relation to failure to respect the rights of Poles in Danzig. In accordance with these principles, Papée was indifferent towards the Nazis' crackdown on the opposition in the territory (Wójcicki 1976: 226). He was fully aware of this problem, which he did not conceal from Warsaw (APG, KGRP, 918: 335). Nevertheless, he remained faithful to the Polish policy towards *Gleichschaltung* in cases of internal wrangling in Danzig. In reality, the condition of Polish interests in the Free City remained dependent on the apparently purely internal politics of the Senate (Drzycimski 1978: 308–309). However, considering the mission of the Polish Commission General, which was to ensure respect for Polish rights in Danzig (Mikos 1971: 7), Papée's behaviour as described above can be assessed as not going beyond the permitted scope of his competence.

PAPÉE'S ATTITUDE TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RAUSCHNING AND FORSTER

Papée regularly sent reports to Warsaw on the conflict between the Senate President and the Gauleiter, Albert Forster, often making predictions as to the future course of that conflict based on information he had obtained. The Commissioner sometimes asked Rauschning about the development of the situation and about the steps the latter was taking to eliminate his rival. The Senate President treated Papée as a trusted person in this matter, asking for his discretion. In this case the Commissioner was able to establish especially close relations with Rauschning, where he was even able to ask half-joking questions about the latter's position on the Danzig political stage (APG, KGRP, 917: 455). Papée saw, however, that Danzig's public was on Forster's side. In spite of this, he suggested that it would be best for Poland to wish victory on Rauschning (ibidem: 491, 493).

Albert Forster was a confidant of Hitler, and was sent by him to the Free City in 1930, where he became head of the Danzig branch of the Nazi party. His task was to

strengthen the party's activity (Mikos 1979: 246). The Commissioner found it hard to make a precise assessment of the conflict between Rauschning and Forster, which was significantly influenced by Berlin. Until the very end, he was not able to predict its outcome (APG, KGRP, 918: 427). He did not view it as a purely personal conflict. Papée wrote to Beck on 26 February 1934: "It is also visible that today the so far mostly personal antagonism between Rauschning and Forster has crystallised in the form of a fundamental, material difference of opinions as to the structure of economic life in Gdańsk [...]" (ibidem: 103). It can be suspected that, since he accented the economic basis of the conflict, the Polish diplomat might well have tended to evaluate it in those terms. Papée also informed the foreign ministry that in Nazi circles in both Berlin and Danzig, the agreements of 6 August 1934 had not been universally assessed in a way favourable to Rauschning. He suspected that this fact, and the Free City's difficult financial situation, would be well exploited by Forster, both in Danzig and in Berlin, to show Rauschning's political and economic programme in a negative light (ibidem: 331, 333; Mikos 1971: 296–297). Papée did not hide the fact that the development of the situation against such a background would have political consequences for Poland (APG, KGRP, 918: 103).

The root cause of the conflict between Rauschning and Forster was still the subject of debate many years later (Kornat 2000: 258; Andrzejewski 2003: 171). The Commissioner was uncommitted on this question probably until the end of Rauschning's presidency, and did not indicate in a fully unambiguous and definitive manner what that cause was. In the aforementioned four-point plan of action that Papée had suggested to Beck, the first item entailed the removal of Forster from Danzig (APG, KGRP, 917: 541). This also involved defending Rauschning. Beck, however, warned his subordinate not to engage in action against Forster, although he was permitted to support the Senate President (ibidem, 918: 323; Mikos 1971: 297). The Commissioner well understood that such support could not be given directly. He also attached some significance to a conversation between Józef Lipski and Joseph Goebbels that took place near the end of Rauschning's career in Danzig (APG, KGRP, 918: 321). Lipski's report reveals that the conversation represented an attempt in Berlin to defend the Danzig Senate President, an effort in which Papée's Commission General also played a part (AAN, ARPB, 795: 210–212). The Commissioner also told Beck that he believed Rauschning attached weight to the Polish interventions in Berlin (APG, KGRP, 918: 329; Mikos 1971: 297). Nevertheless, the development of the situation led to the Senate President's resignation on 23 November 1934 (APG, KGRP, 918: 447). This meant that Papée's aim of removing Forster from Danzig, as an element of the protection of Polish influence there, became much harder to achieve. It should be added that in the four-point plan of action to counteract *Gleichschaltung* that the Commissioner had presented to Beck, the point referring to the Volkstag stated that elections to that body were to be avoided (ibidem, 917: 543). In this too success was not achieved, although defeat did not come until several months after Rauschning's resignation (*PDD 1935*: 150).

PAPÉE'S INTERVENTIONS WITH RAUSCHNING IN DEFENCE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE POLISH POPULATION

When Kazimierz Papée made requests to the Senate President to respect the rights of the Polish population in the Free City, he found the latter's attitude to be sympathetic. Rauschning indicated to the Commissioner that the many years of inflamed relations between the Poles and Danzig had left their mark on the people living there. It was thus necessary for some time to pass in order for some people's attitudes to change. Papée's reports to Beck show that he agreed with Rauschning's logic. He also observed, however, that the Polish population was an obstacle to the implementation of *Gleichschaltung* (APG, KGRP, 917: 377, 379, 381). Papée considered the Senate President to be sincere in his efforts towards *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland and his exertion of an influence on his subordinate administration in that spirit (ibidem: 441, 447, 449). He was nonetheless compelled to intervene in matters relating to the ongoing *Gleichschaltung*. In this context, Rauschning assured the Commissioner that the Senate had no intention of handicapping the Polish population and was ready to work on providing it with cultural and economic autonomy, although he acknowledged at the same time that "in that way he was going in the direction of creating some kind of state within a state" (ibidem: 571, 573; *PDD 1933*: 698–699).

Before those words came to be spoken, however, Papée sometimes had to bring to the Senate's attention a range of situations that made the life of Poles in Danzig difficult (APG, KGRP, 917: 579, 581). The issue raised by Rauschning of autonomy for the Polish population remained unsettled; he explained this in conversations with Papée by the fact that such a law was difficult to prepare due to a lack of precedents (ibidem: 635). The Commissioner also had to draw the Senate President's attention to Danzig's failure to comply with the agreement of 18 September 1933 on education (ibidem, 918: 173). Papée also placed emphasis on preventing further attempts by the Senate or police authorities in Danzig to exploit divisions among the Polish population (ibidem: 185). However, the Senate President's sincerity, as perceived by Papée, in carrying out *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland was not subjected to a decisive test of time. Matters were taken over by Rauschning's conflict with Forster.

Papée's aforementioned interventions show that he was fully aware of the contradictions at work on the Danzig political scene. In supporting Rauschning, he also stood behind his slogan of *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland. He could not conceal, however, that he was aware of the ongoing process of *Gleichschaltung*, which he regarded as harmful to Poland. The Commissioner did not overlook a statement from the start of Rauschning's career about the Nazis' intention to uphold the Free City's political and economic independence. Papée noted that the Senate was distancing itself from Poland (ibidem, 917: 497, 499, 501). Faced with two slogans, Forster's *Zurück zum Reich* and Rauschning's *Danzig bleibt Deutsch*, the Polish representative logically counted on the second, as it gave a greater guarantee of the normalisation of Polish–Danzig relations (ibidem: 491, 493). Although this slogan merely entailed Danzig's retaining its German character (Mikos 1971: 295), Papée considered it only

superficially innocent. In his view, it was a means of achieving *Gleichschaltung* with the Reich (APG, KGRP, 917: 487, 489).

In this period, Papée was well aware of the processes taking place in the Free City. He also gave an indication of whose side he was on, although he knew that the chosen option was not perfect. We can assume, however, that he did not fully understand that choice, just as he probably did not fully understand the Senate President's ideological mission, which he mentioned in a letter to Beck. Stanisław Mikos described the leading senator's ultimate goal in these words: "Rauschning, aware that Germany was not yet prepared for war, was a supporter of the gradual taking of control over that city, without visible complication of relations with Poland. These assumptions were in line with the policy of slow *Anschluss* of Danzig to the Reich" (Mikos 1979: 303). He also noted that this tactic was too slow for Hitler, who lost confidence in the Senate President for that reason (*ibidem*: 305). Marek Kornat writes that the assessment of Rauschning as a person who did not treat relations with Poland opportunistically has become quite widespread among historians (Kornat 2000: 278). It seems that at the time, such an assessment could not be found among Papée's words in his reports to Warsaw.

CONCLUSION

Kazimierz Papée, a diplomat whose destiny was intertwined for several years with the Free City of Danzig, devoted himself to defending the rights of the Polish Republic on that territory. He did this in particular during the presidency of Hermann Rauschning, which was a significant time for Polish–Danzig relations. Among the means by which he carried out his task was his cultivation of personal relations with Danzig's Senate President. These relations were subject, on both sides, to the impact of overall Polish–German relations. In his numerous reports sent to Warsaw, Papée provided information on the results of these contacts and the wider backdrop against which they took place. The Commissioner's letters also contain personal reflections. All of this makes up a varied picture of Papée's diplomatic activity in the period in question. There is no doubt that he was concerned about the future of relations between Poland and Danzig. Making use of his decisiveness of action, he took good advantage of Rauschning's personality and his desire for *Generalbereinigung* of relations with Poland. The Commissioner succeeded in establishing fairly good relations with the Senate President, while at the same time observing the changes in his political position, which was necessary in order to correct the course of Polish actions on the Danzig political scene. It would be hard to dispute Stanisław Mikos' assessment of the thoroughness of Papée's reports (Mikos 1971: 318). This resulted from the Commissioner's ability to notice the varied processes taking place around him. He was also able to show the contradictions between these processes, but was not always able to predict the course they would take in the longer term.

In view of the priorities laid down in the policy of the Polish foreign ministry, the view that Papée's role was a limited one (*ibidem*: 318) is undoubtedly accurate.

It should be noted, however, that he was working in a difficult and unique territory. For this reason, it seems more justified to view his dependence on Beck's directives, as referred to above, as a positive feature in his working environment. The evidence given of his active approach to diplomatic work shows that this dependence did not thwart his capacity to act on his own initiative. He did not even refrain from setting out his own vision of the future actions that Poland ought to take. However, given Papée's position, his individuality could not be manifested too strongly. It might be justified to take away some of the negative connotations of the statement that the Commissioner was a person "not manifesting too much initiative or independence in his work" (ibidem: 247). On the one hand, some of his views were fully in line with Beck's policy, but on the other, a certain part of them was sacrificed to the overriding principle of maintaining good relations between Poland and Germany. In any case, the observations made in Papée's reports provided Warsaw with the possibility of shaping its current strategy. He himself, given what he had proposed to the leaders of Polish foreign policy, and observing Rauschning's fall from power, was probably not entirely satisfied with the outcome of his work. The normalisation of Polish–Danzig relations carried out partly through Papée's interactions with Rauschning was imbued with the spirit of compromise to a much greater degree than the Polish diplomat presumably expected. The small part of Papée's diplomatic career discussed in this article, set in the difficult territory of the Free City of Danzig, may from a perspective of time serve as an example of cooperation and understanding, while also causing one to reflect on the limits to the concessions that can be made in name of achieving consensus.

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the diplomatic activity of the Polish diplomat Kazimierz Papée (1889–1979) in the Free City of Danzig in the years 1933–1934. It focuses on Papée's relations with Danzig's Senate President, Hermann Rauschning, including the accompanying circumstances. The historical sources used and analysed in this study are, in a large part, previously unknown reports prepared by Papée and sent to Warsaw.

Papée was the Commissioner General of the Republic of Poland in the Free City of Danzig from 1932 to 1936. He sought to preserve Polish rights in Danzig. He carried out his work in particular during the presidency of Rauschning, who was the first politician associated with the Nazi party to hold the post of Senate President. Both Papée and Rauschning worked in conditions where Polish - Danzig relations were subordinated to relations between Warsaw and Berlin. Each of them had their own vision of how relations between Poland and the Free City should be shaped. Rauschning was remembered as a politician who sought to reach a settlement with Poland. That being so, the question arises of how Papée handled these circumstances and what particular actions were taken in his dealings with the Senate President. An assessment is also made of the outcome of these efforts, taking account of the overriding objective pursued by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely the maintenance of good Polish - German relations.

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THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUGGLE TO INCORPORATE GREATER POLAND INTO POLAND AFTER WORLD WAR I, IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

THE CASE OF POLISH HIGH SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS IN USE AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES

The political and military struggle to incorporate Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) into Poland, whose main highlights were the Greater Poland Uprising and the Paris Peace Conference, belongs, along with the Silesian Uprisings (1919–1921) and the Polish–Soviet War (1919–1920), to a group of events which have an established position not only in scholarly publications but also in the Polish collective memory (Kwiatkowski 2018: 94–95). And although 1919 is a date which did not make a mark on the memory and consciousness of Poles – being clearly overshadowed not only by 1918, a year unequivocally and universally associated with the regaining of Poland’s independence, but also by other important caesuras such as 1926, 1930 or 1939 – it is worth reminding ourselves of its significance at every opportunity, as has recently been rightly pointed out by some historians (Chwalba 2019: 8).

In response to these arguments, this paper attempts to verify the “presence” of the events related to the struggle to incorporate Greater Poland into Poland in the most popular school history books used by young Poles at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For this purpose, an analysis has been made of a dozen or so textbooks used by the largest numbers of Polish high school students in the period in question. In fact, these were books that had gained the approval of their history teachers, as it was up to them to decide what textbooks their students should use. It should be explained here that the selection of the textbooks was based on information obtained in surveys of teachers’ own preferences as to the choice of textbooks, conducted between 1997 and 2010. Use was also made of a quantitative analysis of the websites of 86 high schools, covering the period between 2004 and 2010. The websites, which were representative of the different types of schools at that level of education and the sizes of urban centres, provided information on the textbooks selected for students and used in teaching. This made it possible to select a set of textbooks that were among the most widely used in school history education.

It should also be mentioned that, apart from the first few years after 1989 when there was still relatively little competition in the market for school history books, in the following years, and especially since the early years of the twenty-first century, several major educational publishers have competed to attract the attention of teachers and students. It should also be emphasised that the school books commissioned by the above-mentioned publishers, besides their narrative, were distinguished by a much higher quality of the iconographic materials included and a generally much better standard of other elements of the didactic framework. Unfortunately, the opposite trend could be observed in relation to the standard of textbook narration, that is, the information conveyed by the main text. For these reasons, this paper can be classified as belonging to the discipline of history didactics (Maternicki 2004: 43). With all this in mind, it is time to proceed to the analysis of the subject matter, preceded by a synthetic review of the most important issues related to the analysed source materials, namely school history textbooks.

Research carried out in many European countries clearly shows that traditional paper history textbooks are still a primary source of students' knowledge about the past (Bieniek 2009: 72; Chorąży, Konieczka-Śliwińska, Roszak 2008: 162). This is still the case despite the steadily increasing opportunities for students to use extracurricular sources of information, among which the Internet has occupied a special place in the last two decades. However, in the period to which the present analysis refers, namely the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first, this phenomenon was not yet as widespread as it is today, which means also that the role of the traditional paper history textbook was much greater.

The design of modern textbooks, which in addition to the author's text, supplementary texts, historical iconography and cartographic materials, also include multimedia CDs, website links, and above all extensive problem-solving sections based on numerous questions and topics for discussion, makes them a teaching system that has little in common with its precursor (Skrzypczak 1996: 251–260). In tandem with these changes, as Alojzy Zielecki noted at the beginning of the twenty-first century, "[...] didactic emphasis shifted from the ready-made school historical narratives – usually textbooks – to the creation of historical narratives by students themselves based on selected sources and studies" (Zielecki 2007: 83). In this way, the student acquires the ability to obtain basic information from sources, to separate it from interpretations and persuasion, and to absorb facts and narrative structures from the texts.

Nobody should be indifferent to what textbook the students use, because for many of them it is, sad to say, the only history book that they will encounter not only during the few years of their school education, but also throughout their lives. This is why it is so important that the books used by students are not only suitable in terms of their content and editing, but also meet the requirements of modern history teaching. While strongly supporting all kinds of proposals made by teachers with the aim of indicating the most appropriate solutions in textbook writing, it is also worth noting here one of the latest proposals put forward in this area and presented by Dr Grzegorz Chomicki at the 12th Toruń Teaching Meetings in 2017. Among the objectives that should guide

textbook authors, he pointed out the desire to improve the content of school books so as to achieve “perfect flawlessness”, the right choice of material based on a profound reflection upon individual topics and their mutual connections, communicativeness of the message in all its respects, with a particular emphasis on terminology and style, and finally, the creation of structurally transparent textbooks in which textual and non-textual means are linked coherently. In conclusion, he called for the conscious construction of a system of well-defined ideas and historical concepts (Chomicki 2018: 77–78). While approving of these proposals, it is also worth remembering that the use of a textbook at school provides the history teacher with many opportunities to share with young people not only factual information, but also their own model of intellectual work.

Moving on to the main part of the analysis, let us mention once again that it was based on a dozen or so selected textbooks. They can be divided into two groups, the first of which consists of textbooks published and used in the last decade of the twentieth century. The second group includes books that were prepared for high schools following the reform of the educational system at the end of the last century, published between 2002 and 2009 and used in *licea* (grammar schools) until the end of the 2013/2014 school year and in technical high schools until 2014/2015. It is to be hoped that the opinions and evaluations presented here will serve not only as a scientific and didactic analysis of the contents of the textbooks, but will also, at least for some authors of the textbooks yet to be written, as well as for the history teachers and students using them, serve as recommendations or guidance and in some cases a warning against the use of unverified information. Contrary to popular belief, the latter did not appear with the invention of the Internet, but unfortunately has been disseminated over the centuries, by history textbooks as well.

When describing the battle to incorporate Greater Poland into Poland after the First World War, history textbooks published after 1989 often compare the situation in that region with that of Poles in Upper Silesia at the time. All textbook authors agree that the most important difference was that Greater Poland, unlike Silesia, had been part of Poland at the time of the Partitions. This fact greatly contributed to the different attitude of Poles in the region towards the struggle against the Germans. In a section preceding the description of the fighting on the Polish–German border, this issue was discussed at length by Witold Pronobis, the author of unquestionably the most popular book on twentieth-century history used in high schools in the first half of the 1990s. He judged that the Polish national movement in Greater Poland was in a better position than that in Pomerania or Silesia. The reason for this, as clearly indicated by the author, was the fact that, unlike Greater Poland, Silesia, for example, had not been part of the Republic of Poland for a long period before the Partitions, which significantly undermined the struggle to incorporate that region into the reborn Polish state. Moreover, as he stated: “(...) the Polish population in Silesia, although dominant in ethnic terms, was almost completely devoid of intelligentsia, who in other regions (*vide* Greater Poland) played such a great role in maintaining and promoting national awareness” (Pronobis 1990: 52).

According to the majority of the authors of the analysed textbooks, the Polish population in Greater Poland, despite the Germanisation policy of the Prussian authorities (German after 1871), which manifested itself in the Germanisation of education, the judiciary and administration, had managed to preserve its own language, religion, culture and tradition (Pankowicz 1996: 302). It was of key importance for the future of Greater Poland that Poles at the beginning of the twentieth century continued to represent the majority of the population on the Warta River, in both villages and towns (Pronobis 1990: 47; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 70). According to the authors, the fact that the traditions of Polish statehood were firmly instilled in Poles' minds in Greater Poland had a major impact on this situation (Szelągowska 1997: 95). Anna Radziwiłł and Wojciech Roszkowski, in their extensive analysis of the situation of the Polish population in the Grand Duchy of Poznań, stressed that it was in that region that the "longest war of the Polish nation" was waged (Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 81–82).

We learn from Witold Pronobis' textbook that already in October 1918, Wojciech Korfanty and Władysław Seyda, speaking as members of the "Polish Circle" in the Reichstag, demanded that the lands of the former Prussian partition be incorporated into the re-emerging Polish state (Pronobis 1990: 48). Such speeches, and Germany's surrender, meant that – according to the authors of one of the textbooks – from November 1918 onwards an unstable Polish–German dual power persisted in Greater Poland (Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 437). This state of affairs, according to the authors of the textbook published by Operon, was tolerated by the German administration, since the official aim of the actions taken by the Polish Councils was the protection of public order (Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 71).

The authors of the school books regarded the decision of the Allied Powers, which when dictating the terms of the armistice to Germany in November 1918 did not order the withdrawal of German troops from Greater Poland, as unfavourable for the Poles in that region (Pronobis 1990: 48). This, in turn, allowed the Germans, as Andrzej Pankowicz stated in his book, to hope to retain their pre-World War I borders in the east (Pankowicz 1996: 324; Szelągowska 1997: 270; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185). Some authors concluded that this was the direct cause of the starting of preparations for a possible uprising (Pronobis 1990: 48).

The school books also describe the circumstances that helped the people of Greater Poland in their efforts to become reunited with their mother country. The authors most often point to the fall of the Hohenzollern monarchy and the consequent establishment of a republic as factors that enabled the Poles to engage in an almost open political struggle (Pronobis 1990: 48; Sierpowski 1997: 20; Szelągowska 1997: 270). Mikołaj Gładysz added to the list the revolutionary chaos that engulfed Germany at the end of 1918 (Gładysz 2007: 241), while Jan Wróbel noted that after Germany's defeat "the French were looking merely for a pretext to weaken it further" (Wróbel 2003: 153). Poles in Greater Poland had high hopes for American President Thomas W. Wilson. As Stanisław Sierpowski wrote, it was he who had said, in point 13 of his New Year's speech to Congress in January 1918, that the areas of "indisputably Polish majority" should be delineated (Sierpowski 1997: 20).

In the textbooks reviewed here, Stanisław Sierpowski seems to have given the most precise description of the Supreme People's Council (NRL). His work recounts that it was formed on 10 November 1918, when the Central Citizens' Committee, which had worked closely with the Polish National Committee in exile, came into the open. In a letter to the Reich government, its members made it clear that, trusting the German authorities, they would wait for a decision on the territorial affiliation of Greater Poland until the convening and final decisions of the Paris Peace Conference. The same author also referred to the talks held in Warsaw between the members of the NRL and Józef Piłsudski between 15 November and 2 December 1918. The purpose of the talks, which ultimately failed, was an attempt to form a coalition cabinet. The insurmountable obstacles were the excessive policy differences and the political aspirations shared by the Belvedere camp (Piłsudski's supporters) and the NRL members, most of whom sympathised with or were directly linked to National Democracy (*ibid.*). As befits a historian affiliated with a Poznań-based academic institution, Sierpowski made a mention of the District Sejm (local parliament) that sat in Poznań from 2 to 5 December 1918. The results of the Sejm's proceedings included, among others, the establishment of an eighty-member legal body constituting the NRL, and a six-member Commissariat (Sierpowski 1997: 20–21; Garlicki 1998: 262; Choińska-Mika, Skibiński, Szlanta et al. 2009: 81). We also learn from Sierpowski's account that the District Sejm recognised the Polish National Committee in Paris as a representative abroad of the Polish population in the Prussian partition, which clearly revealed the conflict between Greater Poland and the Warsaw government and the Provisional Chief of State (Pankowicz 1996: 324; Szelałowska 1997: 271; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72).

The conflict between the NRL and Warsaw was also highlighted by other textbook authors. Grażyna Szelałowska stressed that Józef Piłsudski and the governments of Ignacy Daszyński and then Jędrzej Moraczewski, which supported him, did not win the recognition of the people of Poznań, among whom the national-democratic camp was most influential (Szelałowska 1997: 199, 270). The same aspect was emphasised in the Operon textbook, adding that the Polish population in the Prussian partition was distrustful of Piłsudski, as it remembered that during the war he had collaborated with the Austro-Hungarian and German authorities for a long time (Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72). A similar opinion was expressed by Andrzej Pankowicz, who stressed that Ignacy Jan Paderewski's arrival in Poznań and the outbreak of the Uprising allowed Piłsudski to break the impasse, as confirmed by the appointment of Paderewski as Prime Minister. The same author added that this was the first government to which the KNP (Polish National Committee) made itself subordinate, which in turn resulted in the recognition of the Polish central authorities by the Allied states (Pankowicz 1996: 322).

According to Witold Pronobis, the affiliation of the Poles of Greater Poland, together with the inhabitants of Silesia and Pomerania, to the Supreme People's Council was an important political step. The author of the book *Poland and the World in the 20th Century* drew attention to the fact that local People's Councils were quickly

formed in practically all major cities and towns of the former Prussian partition (Pronobis 1990: 48). It turned out that the members of the individual Councils successfully took over the local administration, which increased the tension between the Polish and German populations, the latter being supported by the popular *Grenzschutz Ost* (Border Guard East) (ibid.). The increase in anti-Polish sentiments was also described by other authors in much the same vein (Szelągowska 1997: 271).

All of the analysed texts indicate that the immediate cause of the Uprising was the German response to Ignacy Jan Paderewski's arrival in Poznań on 26 December 1918 (Pronobis 1990: 48; Pankowicz 1996: 324; Szelągowska 1997: 271; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185; Wróbel 2003: 153; Gładysz 2007: 241). "He was greeted like a king", we read in Garlicki's textbook, which goes on to say that the still German-administered city "was decorated with Polish flags, and a crowd of thousands gathered in front of the Bazar Hotel, where he was staying. Patriotic songs were sung and shouts were raised in honour of the great Pole. Paderewski spoke from the hotel's balcony, which excited the crowd even more" (Garlicki 1998: 262). The date 27 December 1918 is given as the outbreak of the Uprising in practically all texts (Pankowicz 1996: 324; Sierpowski 1997: 20–21; Szelągowska 1997: 271; Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 437; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72; Gładysz 2007: 236, 241). On that day, as we can read in one of the textbooks, the Germans organised anti-Polish demonstrations in Poznań, during which Polish flags were torn down, the NRL premises were smashed up, and the hotel where Paderewski was staying was fired upon (Garlicki 1998: 262). The Polish side did not intend to watch these events passively, and responded with military action.

In describing the causes of the outbreak of the Uprising, historians highlight various aspects. They do the same when they take on the role of authors of school history books. Thus, Stanisław Sierpowski wrote that the fighting in Greater Poland was fomented by "[...] radicalised elements of both nationalities", suggesting that it was not spontaneous (Sierpowski 1997: 21). The opinion that the Polish side was well prepared for the Uprising is supported by Andrzej Pankowicz, one of only a few authors to indicate that there were Polish underground formations (the Polish Military Organisation, the People's Guard, the Citizens' Guard and the Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies) operating in Greater Poland. These organisations, according to Pankowicz, were ready to fight for the liberation of the region. The same author noted that the core of the insurgent forces was made up of soldiers of Polish nationality who had served in the German army (Pankowicz 1996: 342). On the other hand, at the beginning of his description of the Greater Poland Uprising, Mikołaj Gładysz wrote that "While Polish diplomats sought favourable decisions of the superpowers, Poles back in the country chose a policy of faits accomplis by fighting for the state borders with guns in their hands" (Gładysz 2007: 241). In most accounts, however, the authors suggest that the outbreak of the Uprising was spontaneous. Andrzej Garlicki and Jan Wróbel, who also subscribed to this opinion, added that the timing of the Uprising was "perfect" or "good" (Garlicki 1998: 262; Wróbel 2003: 153).

The extent of the Uprising and the course of the fighting in particular parts of the region occupy relatively little space in the textbooks. For example, one of them states that “[...] the Poles took Greater Poland by mid-January” (Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 437). Only three books can be considered exceptions. In the first of these, Grażyna Szelałowska writes that during the first few days, the fighting took place in the Poznań region from the Noteć river to the borders of Upper Silesia. She also states that the insurgents were encouraged by a combination of favourable circumstances, among which were the exhaustion of the German army, the element of surprise, and the riots provoked by the Spartacus League in Berlin. The author also pointed out that in areas with a predominantly Polish population, the German authorities were removed relatively quickly, while in others, where the NRL took control only on 8 January 1919, the insurgent troops took the lands after heavy fighting (Szelałowska 1997: 272).

Some interesting facts about the progress of the fighting can be found in Andrzej Garlicki’s textbook. He gave the date on which insurgent troops took full control of Poznań (6 January 1919). He also pointed out that “the Polish government could not officially support the insurgents as this would result in an armed conflict with Germany. Warsaw, especially in view of the pending peace conference, could not afford to ignore the Entente’s position. So officers and small units were discreetly sent there, but that was all” (Garlicki 1998: 262–263).

Anna Radziwiłł and Wojciech Roszkowski, the authors of the third of the accounts mentioned above, clearly outlined the course of insurgent fighting and its specific nature. They were among the few to list the towns where the fiercest fighting took place (Chodzież, Inowrocław, Nakło). They also gave the date and directions of the German counter-attack against the insurgent army, which took place in mid-January 1919 (Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185). Only a few books mention the first commander of the Uprising, Major Stanisław Taczak, adding that he was appointed to the command by the NRL Commissariat (Garlicki 1998: 262; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185). Most of the textbooks indicate that from mid-January 1919, the insurgents were commanded by General Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki (Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185; Wróbel 2003: 153; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72; Gładysz 2007: 241; Choińska-Mika, Skibiński, Szlanta et al. 2009: 81–82). Few of them mention, however, that he was sent to Greater Poland from Warsaw (Szelałowska 1997: 271). Only one author pointed out that this was the result of a conflict between the Provisional Chief of the Polish State and the general, who had served in the Tsar’s army, and whom Piłsudski wanted to remove from Warsaw at any cost (Garlicki 1998: 262). As stated in several works, Dowbor-Muśnicki can be credited, among other things, with rapidly reorganising the insurgent troops into a regular army, which quickly became very successful (Pronobis 1990: 48). Even fewer books note that the Greater Poland army commanded by Dowbor-Muśnicki quickly came to number more than 70,000 soldiers (Pankowicz 1996: 324; Gładysz 2007: 241).

The analysed texts indicate that during the Uprising the members of the Supreme People’s Council, the Polish National Committee and the Polish government took

vigorous diplomatic action to incorporate the entire region into independent Poland (Sierpowski 1997: 21; Szelałowska 1997: 272; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 185; Gładysz 2007: 241). The efforts of the central authorities are mentioned in only one textbook, but it should be borne in mind that the Polish government was officially unable to engage directly in the issue of the territorial affiliation of Greater Poland until the final decision of the Allied Powers (Pronobis 1990: 48). It was due to their efforts, according to Stanisław Sierpowski's account, that the negotiations between the Allies and Germany concerning the extension of the truce of 11 November 1918 also covered the Greater Poland front, which fact the German delegation had to accept on 16 February 1919 in Trier (Sierpowski 1997: 20–21). Like Stanisław Sierpowski and the authors of the PWN textbook, Grażyna Szelałowska, in discussing the terms of the truce, wrote that this was only possible because the German army was too weak to renew the war with the coalition of Allied states (Szelałowska 1997: 272). Yet, when referring to this question, the majority of the authors state only that, at the request of the Allies, the conditions of the truce with Germany were extended to the eastern front in mid-February 1919 (Pankowicz 1996: 324). Andrzej Pankowicz added here that according to the will of the coalition, the area liberated by Polish soldiers was to remain under the NRL's administration until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Witold Pronobis described the circumstances of the end of the insurgency in a slightly different way. According to his account, "when, despite the mounting German counterattack, the insurgents managed to keep their gains [the author does not specify which gains – M.B.] in February 1919 Marshal Foch, seeing the decisive attitude of the local Polish population, forced the Germans to extend the terms of the truce to the eastern front during the negotiations in Trier" (Pronobis 1990: 48). Similarly, Andrzej Garlicki pointed to Foch's personal involvement. He added, however, that "in this way the French saved the Greater Poland Uprising from being crushed by German troops" (Garlicki 1998: 263; Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 437). The authors of the textbook published by WSiP (the largest textbook publisher in Poland) in 2009 considered the Greater Poland Uprising to be the only Polish insurrection that fully achieved its objectives. Favourable international circumstances, they wrote, had a great influence on this outcome. The book states: "Germany still remained weak after having been defeated in the Great War. At the same time, for the Weimar Republic government, the communist uprising that broke out in Berlin at that time was a more important problem than the fighting in Greater Poland. In addition, at that time France was trying to weaken defeated Germany at all costs" (Choińska-Mika, Skibiński, Szlanta et al. 2009: 82).

In most of the textbooks examined, students could learn that the question of which country Greater Poland should be part of was finally decided by the leaders of the victorious powers at the Paris peace conference in 1919 (Pronobis 1990: 48; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski, 2000: 186; Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 437; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72; Gładysz 2007: 241). Stanisław Sierpowski briefly noted that the Treaty of Versailles "sanctioned the territorial gains of the Greater Poland insurgents, thanks

to which almost the whole of Greater Poland became part of the reborn state” (Sierpowski 1997: 21, 33). Przybyliński, on the other hand, saw the anti-German uprising in Greater Poland as an important asset for the Polish delegation in the diplomatic negotiations at the Paris peace conference (Przybyliński 2007: 131).

In an article analysing school history books, it is not possible to ignore the additional didactic elements contained in the particular books, and in particular, the source materials with which individual authors and publishers enriched their work. When discussing the Greater Poland Uprising, six out of the twelve textbooks included maps showing the area covered by the insurgent fighting (Pankowicz 1996: 324; Szelałowska 1997: 273; Garlicki 1998: 263; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 191; Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 438; Gładysz 2007: 243). In this context, the map in Andrzej Pankowicz’s textbook is the best presented. In the vast majority of the analysed books, it is close to impossible to find any source texts referring to the Uprising. An exception is the textbook prepared by Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe, which contains an anonymous German report on the outbreak of the Uprising. This short yet interesting text is accompanied by three questions formulated by Mikolaj Gładysz referring to the genesis of the Polish uprising and to the public face and military preparation of the Polish insurgents (Gładysz 2007: 246).

In the books under consideration, the presentation of iconography relating to the Greater Poland Uprising is somewhat better than that of written sources. Two books include photographs of Ignacy Jan Paderewski (Sierpowski 1997: 21), but only one of them shows the arrival of the famous pianist in Poznań (Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 186). Photographs of Wojciech Korfanty can be found in four textbooks, but in the context of the Silesian Uprisings rather than the Greater Poland Uprising (Pankowicz 1996: 328; Sierpowski 1997: 35; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 187). Illustrations of the fighting during the Uprising are provided in one textbook (Szelałowska 1997: 271), along with images of Greater Poland insurgents in full gear with their banners, a review of the insurgent troops made by General Dowbor-Muśnicki (Wróbel 2003: 153), and the parade of Greater Poland officers which took place during the swearing-in ceremony of the insurgent army on the streets of Poznań in January 1919 (Przybyliński 2007: 131). One of the textbooks contains a picture of the Monument to the Greater Poland Insurgents in Poznań (Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72).

Regrettably, only three textbooks offer exercises and tasks enabling students to try to analyse the selected topics on their own. Notable is an exercise in Grażyna Szelałowska’s book in which students are asked to describe the badge of the 59th Infantry Regiment from Greater Poland, where Polish and German symbolism (white eagle, Pickelhaube spiked helmet and broken border pillar) is clearly visible (Szelałowska 1997: 272). Unfortunately, several of the analysed textbooks contained neither source materials on the Greater Poland Uprising nor exercises or suggestions encouraging students to work creatively on their own. This group includes, among others, the works by Witold Pronobis and Andrzej Garlicki.

The authors of school history books often state that the Greater Poland Uprising was the only victorious insurrection in the history of the Polish nation (Szelałowska

1997: 272; Garlicki 1998: 263). This is hardly surprising, as many scholarly studies and academic textbooks present the Greater Poland Uprising at the turn of 1918 and 1919 quite similarly. Therefore, it is all the more important to remember that there are also other examples of independence campaigns which, like the Greater Poland Uprising, brought tangible benefits to Poland and Poles and whose participants gained recognition from both their contemporaries and future generations. Jan Wróbel discussed this issue at length in his book. He wrote that because of the later dramatic fighting in the east, the anti-German uprising in Greater Poland seemed to fade into oblivion. Further on, the author says that this is a great pity, because “[...] this was the first Polish uprising to get a taste of victory, both in military and diplomatic terms. A military victory because most of the lands covered by the Uprising came under the authority of the Polish Supreme People’s Council. A diplomatic one because first the Entente forced the Germans into a ceasefire, and then the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles signed with Germany (June 1919) turned out to be advantageous to Poland” (Wróbel 2003: 154).

The first example showing that this is not entirely true might be the history of the Third Silesian Uprising, which brought tangible benefits to the Poles in terms of changing the unfavourable division of the region proposed by the British and the Italians, who were unsympathetic to Poland. An armistice bringing the military operations to a close was signed on 5 July 1921, although the warring parties had already been separated by a cordon in early June. This was done by the French and Italian armies, in support of the Inter-allied Administrative and Plebiscite Commission in Upper Silesia, which had operated since February 1920. Another example, though very poorly publicised, is the uprising of the people of Greater Poland in November 1806, who thus responded to the call of General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski and Józef Wybicki to organise an anti-Prussian insurrection. Thanks to the action taken at the time, the Napoleonic troops entering Poland did not have to fight against Prussian troops, which among other things enabled them to reach Warsaw quickly, and in the long run indirectly contributed to the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw.

The second theme to which we should refer when considering the efforts to incorporate Greater Poland into Poland is the course and decisions of the aforementioned Paris Peace Conference. Its proceedings, inaugurated on 18 January 1919, have been widely discussed in specialist literature. Bearing this in mind, it is hardly surprising that so major an event takes an important place in history textbooks. In the analysis of the content and the framework of the textbooks, it is seen that the Polish–German battle for Greater Poland is one of several issues referred to in the context of the Paris talks.

The convening of a peace conference, as the authors of the textbooks agree, was an essential condition for the development of a new post-war order. In the textbooks examined, the authors stated that defeated Germany and its allies had not been invited to the conference, and that the decisions made were to be communicated by ordering them to sign the provisions agreed upon (Przybyliński 2007: 102). Regrettably, only

two books make it clear to students that such a situation was something of a novelty in international diplomacy, as important political matters of the nineteenth century were decided upon at international congresses attended by both the victors and the defeated. After World War I, however, the victorious powers did not intend to allow formal equality between the parties. This problem was resolved by the convening of a peace conference, a form of meeting which was considered to give an exemption from the obligation to invite all of the defeated states (Pankowicz 1996: 102; Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 41). According to the authors of some textbooks, the absence of the German delegation caused the Treaty of Versailles to be referred to in Germany as a diktat (Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 152). While describing the events of the Paris conference, some authors stressed that the process of shaping a new map of the world and international relations was undertaken under complicated conditions and in a turbulent atmosphere, with the result that the conference was often presented as “[...] a gigantic Tower of Babel where everyone fought with everyone for everything” (Sierpowski 1997: 25). In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the rivalry between the former Great War allies was closely watched by the defeated states, which tried to take advantage of differences of opinion, particularly noticeable between the French and British delegations.

In most of the analysed texts, the authors gave an exact date at which the conference proceedings began (18 January 1919), but did not explain, with a few exceptions, that this was due to the events of 1871 when uniting Germany humiliated France (Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 153). The exact date of the end of the Paris conference, often mistakenly identified with the date of signing the Treaty of Versailles, as if subsequent treaties were not the effect of the talks started in January 1919 seemed to pose a serious problem for many authors. The problem was described in yet another way by Grażyna Szelągowska, who wrote that “The terms of peace agreed upon in Paris during the year of the conference, were included in five treaties concluded with the central states or their heirs” (Szelągowska 1997: 174)

The authors of the textbooks placed special emphasis on the actions of the English delegation at the Paris peace conference. According to them, both the open and behind-the-scenes actions of the British delegation led to a change in the draft treaty favourable to Poland, which provided for the incorporation of not only Gdańsk Pomerania, but also Upper Silesia and a part of Warmia and Mazuria into Poland (Pronobis 1990: 38, Sierpowski 1997: 23, Garlicki 1998: 269, Kochanowski, Matusik 2004: 439). Describing British policy in Paris, Grażyna Szelągowska stated that “between Wilson’s illusions and Clemenceau’s aggressive retaliation there was D. L. George’s position”, which, being a compromise (the question being whether it was good for Poland), ultimately shaped the peace treaties (Szelągowska 1997: 174). Later in her textbook, the author emphasised that in this case, Lloyd George took advantage of the inconsistency in the proposals put forward by the Polish delegation, which referred on the one hand to the ethnic principle, but on the other to the pre-Partition borders. In his textbook, Jan Wróbel described Great Britain’s policy as downright hostile to Poland. In his opinion, Roman Dmowski was aware of this attitude and therefore “[...] his

efforts were fully deployed in securing the support of the American President Wilson” (Wróbel 2003: 155).

Poland was well prepared for the conference. This is an opinion that can be found in most of the analysed textbooks. Authors such as Andrzej Garlicki pointed out that this was largely thanks to the Polish National Committee (KNP), which had begun working on preparing the relevant source material for the post-war peace conference even before the Great War had ended. Jan Wróbel, on the other hand, stated that the activities of the KNP, along with the voluntary enlistment of Poles into the army being formed in France, were in fact the only ethical arguments that the Polish delegation could wield at the conference (ibid.). In contrast, Maciej Przybyliński allowed students to evaluate for themselves the contribution of the KNP to the preparation of the Polish position at the conference, by citing a large passage from Roman Dmowski’s book *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa* [Polish Policy and the Rebuilding of the State] which describes the activity of that distinguished socio-political organisation (Przybyliński 2007: 146–147). Ignacy Jan Paderewski and Roman Dmowski, the official Polish delegates at the Paris conference, are mentioned in practically all of the analysed texts. In one of the textbooks, the information on the handling of the Polish question at the Paris conference begins with a reference to the meeting of the Supreme Council held on 29 January 1919, at which Dmowski gave a speech in French that lasted several hours and which he simultaneously translated into English. According to Grażyna Szelągowska, this had an impact on the draft agreement on the future Polish–German border, which the Polish delegation prepared in accordance with the KNP leader’s incorporation programme (Szelągowska 1997: 261).

Analysing Polish efforts to ensure a favourable position of the future borders of the Republic of Poland, the authors of several textbooks devoted considerable space to the work of a commission appointed for this particular purpose. It was headed, as we can read in the texts, by the former French ambassador to Berlin, Jules Cambon (Garlicki 1998: 267; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 72). The Polish side did not have to wait long for the results of the commission’s work, because, as stated in one of the books, it presented its proposals for the position of the Polish–German border on 19 March 1919. According to the author of the textbook prepared for Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne (a Polish publisher specialising in textbooks, manuals and pedagogical literature) they were very favourable to Poland (Szelągowska 1997: 261). This assessment was due to, among other things, the original plan to grant Poland almost all of Upper Silesia, Polish parts of Lower Silesia, Greater Poland, Gdańsk Pomerania and four counties on the right bank of the Vistula, as a result of which the railway line connecting Gdańsk (Danzig) and Warsaw would lie within Polish territory (Garlicki 1998: 269). Further in the textbook, students could learn that this plan was opposed not only by the German delegation, who voiced their opinion at the end of May 1919, but also by the British and American sides (Pankowicz 1996: 240). All this meant that the establishment of the future Polish–German border was one of the most difficult problems faced by the participants of the Paris conference, and Poland’s

access to the Baltic Sea was one of the most crucial issues (Szelągowska 1997: 177, 261; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 186).

In all of the textbooks selected for the analysis, the authors discussed the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in a more or less detailed way, placing particular emphasis on those points in the document which referred to the future Polish–German border. Therefore, irrespective of the history textbook they used, students could learn about the granting of Greater Poland to Poland, the creation of the Free City of Danzig, and the plans to hold plebiscites in Warmia, Masuria, Upper Silesia and Cieszyn Silesia (the last being disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia). Some books mention the granting to Poland of access to the sea in Gdańsk Pomerania, stressing that it was, however, just a 70-kilometre coastal strip (excluding the Hel peninsula) (Sierpowski 1997: 33–34; Burda, Halczak, Józefiak et al. 2005: 73). Unfortunately, when discussing the Treaty provisions, only a few textbooks mentioned that Poland was forced to pay for the state property seized in the area of the Prussian partition and to settle some German debts (Garlicki 1998: 270; Gładysz 2007: 240).

As in the case of the Greater Poland Uprising, reference should be made here to the illustrations, maps, tables and classical source texts included in the textbooks. When discussing such a topic as a peace conference that had a huge impact on the new geopolitical order, possibilities of supplementing the text with interesting illustrative material seem to be practically unlimited. Sadly, in the textbooks examined, the iconography relating to the Polish question at the Paris peace conference is relatively modest. By far the most frequent iconographic materials included in the selected textbooks are portrait photos or reproductions of paintings depicting Paderewski and Dmowski, the Polish delegates in Paris, which, however, were used in only a few textbooks as a didactic element supplementing the discussion of the peace conference (Szelągowska 1997: 262). Other iconographic materials related to the Polish question at the conference include a photograph of KNP members, which can be found in as many as five of the books under consideration (Pankowicz 1996: 319; Sierpowski 1997: 13; Garlicki 1998: 245), and the Polish ratification document of the Treaty of Versailles, signed by Józef Piłsudski.

Maps showing the division of Europe taking account of the changes made under the provisions of various treaties drawn up at the Paris peace conference are absent from many of the textbooks. The situation is partly remedied by the inclusion of maps labelled *Europe after World War I*, which show the territories affected by the conference's decisions. This remark also applies to the majority of maps showing the shaping of the Polish national borders between 1918 and 1922 (Sierpowski 1997: 40; Szelągowska 1997: 273; Garlicki 1998: 263; Radziwiłł, Roszkowski 2000: 191; Gładysz 2007: 243). The inclusion in several of the textbooks of extensive excerpts from the Treaty of Versailles, in some cases supplemented by a set of interesting tasks to encourage students to work independently and creatively, should be highly appreciated.

There is insufficient space in this article for an in-depth analysis of the latest textbooks that have been used in high schools since the 2012/2013 school year. Their use in schools will end in two years' and three years' time in *licea* and technical high

schools, respectively, and that would be an appropriate time to evaluate them just as their predecessors have been evaluated in this paper. To sum up, the analysis of the history textbooks points to a few conclusions which, it seems, should be taken into account or at least discussed during the preparation of the textbooks to be used by students of the “new–old” four-year *licea* and five-year technical high schools in two years’ time. First of all, it should be noted that the textbooks used by students in the four-year *licea* that existed before the 1999 reform presented the political and military battles to incorporate Greater Poland into Poland in a much more comprehensive and detailed manner. Furthermore, there is a great variety in the way the material was presented in the textbooks for the three-year *licea* and four-year technical high schools, and indeed in the quantity of material that could be found there. This refers mainly to factual information. A serious drawback of almost all of the analysed textbooks is their didactic framework, which for several authors, despite the interesting factual content, proved to be a proverbial Achilles’ heel. It is hard to blame the authors exclusively for this, however, since it is publishers, almost as much as authors, who are responsible for creating books that do not encourage the student to self-study, for example by analysing source materials. The line of defence used by publishing houses facing such accusations, citing the huge costs associated with source materials, especially images, cannot justify the high profit margins and disregard for problems which are as important in teaching as dry dates, names and facts. The final conclusion has already been referred to in this paper, but should be highlighted again. If even the authors of school books found it difficult to acknowledge that the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918–1919 was not the only Polish struggle for independence that brought tangible benefits to Poland and Poles, their successors should at least try to give a proper account of its role and importance, as it would be unreasonable to expect our western neighbours to help us in this respect. This is in spite of the fact that our relations today are undoubtedly better than at almost any other time over the last two centuries.

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ABSTRACT

The vast majority of historians view school history education as extremely important. They emphasise that it plays a key role not only in shaping young people's knowledge about the past, but also in defining the historical awareness of the whole of society, because often what students learn at school determines their lifelong knowledge about many historical issues. Unfortunately, awareness of these obvious statements does not go hand in hand with respect for the achievements of history didactics. This is a scientific discipline in which one of the most important research areas is the analysis of school history textbooks, which are still basic sources of students' knowledge about the past, alongside history teachers and the Internet.

Bearing the above in mind, the author of this article decided to analyse about a dozen of the most popular history textbooks used in Polish high schools at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, with a focus on how they present the political and military struggle of 1918–1919 to incorporate Greater Poland into Poland. The work uses mainly the philological and comparative methods. By isolating the main themes of the Greater Poland Uprising and selected themes of the Paris Peace Conference from the textbooks, it is shown that in the analysed textbooks these issues received attention adequate to their importance and occupied as much space as required by the curriculum frameworks for history teaching in the 1990s and the core curricula in operation since the beginning of the present century. Practically all of the analysed books contain, along with brief commentary and sometimes also a didactic review, the basic facts about the background, course and significance of the Greater Poland Uprising.

The analysis shows that the school history textbooks used in the 1990s were certainly more accurate, but also offered a more interesting narrative. Unfortunately, a relatively weak aspect of all of the analysed textbooks was the use of additional didactic elements.

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