

Looking westwards

The role of the Institute for Western Affairs in the construction of the Lubusz Land concept

On local historical policy and collective memory in Gorzów Wielkopolski

Cultural heritage against a background of transformation in 1970s and 1980s Western Poland

Polish interest in the early medieval past of Kołobrzeg

The Greater Poland Uprising in the French and British daily press

Rosa Luxemburg against war

Literary fiction and poverty. The example of Gustav Freytag's novel *Soll und Haben*

Coming to terms with the West German 68ers in the writings of the 85ers

The manuscript of the letter of the Polish bishops to the German bishops

Post-war migration from Upper Silesia to West Germany

Implanting memories. The example of the Emigration Museum in Gdynia

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Constructing the state's geopolitical position in Central Europe

The principle of solidarity among Member States in European Union law

The Eurozone crisis

The problem of disintegration of international institutions

The cultural diplomacy of the EU and the idea of interculturalism

Franco-German visions of EU military integration

2020

Special Issue



Journal of the Institute
for Western Affairs
in Poznań

PRZEGLĄD
ZACHODNI

**Journal of the Institute
for Western Affairs
in Poznań**

Quarterly



Institute for
Western Affairs

PRZEGLĄD
ZACHODNI

2020
Special Issue

The publication of the English-language version of this issue of “Przegląd Zachodni” is financed under contract No. 642/P-DUN/2019 from resources of the Minister of Science and Higher Education allocated to science dissemination activities



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Dear Readers,

This special edition of the journal of the Institute for Western Affairs in Poznań is a collection of papers selected from the four issues of our quarterly *Przegląd Zachodni* published in 2019. The papers originally appeared in Polish, and have been translated into English for this edition.

Some papers concentrate on issues related to the Western Recovered Territories that were incorporated into Poland in the aftermath of World War II. These lands have been one of the areas of research carried out by our Institute since its establishment in 1944, and the first paper in this collection reflects on the history of this research. The consequences of the huge post-war experiment in resettlement and the territorial changes imposed by politicians continue to attract the attention of historians, cultural analysts and experts in social transformation. Younger researchers follow modern research schools, and above all have access to sources and materials that were scarcely accessible 30 years ago. Their contributions are characteristically local, referencing individual narratives and preserving the memory of “small homelands”.

The papers which follow address questions about memories preserved and motivations for actions, and concentrate on literary representations and individual and group testimonies of epochs and watershed events. Generational revolts, migration dilemmas, and once rare appeals for reconciliation are now viewed from the perspective of the subsequent huge changes which affected nations and societies.

The third group of papers addresses political and legal issues related to the current situation in Europe and the European Union. Their authors debate the seemingly omnipresent doubts about the efficiency and sustainability of institutional integration of the Old Continent and the political will of EU members to cooperate. However, the main feature of the descriptions and conclusions is the multiplicity of what has been achieved and the advanced forms of cooperation undertaken. For a Europe experiencing many crises, it is necessary to recognise the motivations for improvement and appreciate all the achievements that have been made, including the most recent.

We wish you a stimulating read.

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THE ROLE OF THE INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN AFFAIRS (INSTYTUT ZACHODNI) IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION OF THE LUBUSZ LAND CONCEPT IN 1945–1948

Concurrently with the final operations of the Second World War, the first initiatives were undertaken to rebuild the Polish state and to bring all spheres of life back to normal. The numbers of specialists were much depleted, and both the political situation of Poland and the issue of its territory were unclear. In spite of these circumstances, there were efforts to institutionalise research on the Western Territories that were to become part of Poland – known from 1945 onwards as the Recovered Territories (*Ziemie Odzyskane*).¹

REGIONS OF THE RECOVERED TERRITORIES

The notion of the Recovered Territories encompasses four regions which were adjoined to Poland after WWII. The decision to establish Polish administration there was made in February 1945, and a temporary administrative division into four administrative areas: Opole Silesia, Lower Silesia, Western Pomerania and East Prussia (Śląsk Opolski, Dolny Śląsk, Pomorze Zachodnie and Prusy Wschodnie) was introduced on 14 March 1945 by a resolution of the Council of Ministers.² Later this administrative division was modified. The four regions shaped in the 1940s were Warmia-Masuria (Warmia and Mazury) – initially called East Prussia Province (*Prowincja*

* This paper as originally published as: M. Dąbrowska, Rola Instytutu Zachodniego w konstruowaniu Ziemi Lubuskiej jako nowego regionu 1945-1948, in: *Przegląd Zachodni* 2019, no. 1, pp.19-36.

¹ I use the term Recovered Territories in line with the terminology used in the period discussed, and I distance myself from the ongoing discussion on the terminology. Cf. J. Jasiński, *Kwestie pojęcia Ziemi Odzyskane*, in: *Ziemie Odzyskane/Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne 1945-2005. 60 lat w granicach państwa polskiego*, ed. A. Sakson, Poznań 2006, pp. 15-26; H. Tumolska, *Mitologia Kresów Zachodnich w pamiętnikarstwie i beletryście polskiej (1945–2000)*, Toruń 2007; A. Sakson *Wielki symbol polskiej kłęski, czyli uwagi o demitologizacji Ziem Odzyskanych i marginalizacji Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych*, in: „*Ziemie Odzyskane*”. *W poszukiwaniu nowych narracji*, eds. E. Kledzik, M. Michalski, M. Praczyk, Poznań 2018, pp. 145-153.

² Protokół nr 19 z posiedzenia Rady Ministrów w dniu 14 marca 1945 r. Archiwum Akt Nowych (henceforth: AAN), Ministerstwo Administracji Publicznej, file 2424.

Prusy Wschodnie), and later the Masurian Province (Prowincja Mazury), Western Pomerania, the Lubusz Land (Ziemia Lubuska), and Silesia (Lower Silesia, and Opole or Upper Silesia – Górny Śląsk). The new nomenclature replaced the original one based on pre-war premises, and remains in use today, oftentimes provoking questions about the artificiality of the division and its sense.³

On 23 February 1945, the administrative plenipotentiaries of the later Lubusz Land were appointed: for its northern part Lt. Col. Leonard Borkowicz, the temporary Polish government representative to the First Belorussian Front, and for the southern part Col. Eugeniusz Szyr, the temporary Polish government representative to the Second Ukrainian Front.⁴ It followed that each of the two plenipotentiaries was responsible for about forty poviats, which were much larger administrative units than in the remaining part of the country. By the resolution of 14 March, the poviats of the later Lubusz Land were administratively assigned to the areas of Western Pomerania and Lower Silesia. The plenipotentiaries' competencies included the appointment of poviat plenipotentiaries. In spite of the temporarily defined administrative divisions, it happened that the competencies were exceeded and poviat administrative authorities were appointed in poviats assigned to the other area plenipotentiary. This issue was further complicated since the Poznań Voivode exceeded his authority in a similar way, in spite of the fact that the resolution did not grant the Voivode rights to make administrative decisions concerning these two areas. These misunderstandings may be attributed to communication and organisational difficulties in the period immediately following WWII; however, it should be emphasised that there was a kind of competition for the Lubusz Land area between its neighbouring regions. This led to a conference of area plenipotentiaries, which was held in Warsaw on 27 May. At this conference the proposal was made to extend the competencies of the Poznań Voivode to some of the recovered poviats.⁵ The first draft of a new administrative division extending the competencies of the Poznań Voivode is dated 7 April, about the same time that the Poznań-based Institute for Western Affairs sent a similar proposal to the Ministry for Public Administration.⁶

In this paper, I describe the role that the Institute for Western Affairs played in the application and spreading of the Lubusz Land concept. Today's Lubusz Land signifi-

³ Cf. for example M. Kielczewska, *Pomorze czy Prusy?*, in: *Przegląd Zachodni* 1946, no. 1; O. Kiec, *Pęknięta tożsamość. Ziemia Lubuska pomiędzy historycznymi tradycjami Śląska i Nowej Marchii*, in: *Ziemia Lubuska. Dziedzictwo kulturowe i tożsamość regionu w perspektywie powojennego siedemdziesięciolecia*, eds. T. Nodzyński, M. Tureczek, Zielona Góra–Gorzów Wielkopolski 2015, p. 199.

⁴ H. Szczegółka, *Przeobrażenia ustrojowo-społeczne na Ziemi Lubuskiej w latach 1945-1947*, Poznań 1971, p. 29.

⁵ This proposal met with extreme reactions. L. Borkowicz, in his letter to the Minister for Public Administration dated 7 June, was outraged by the actions taken by the Poznań Voivode, as they had no legal basis. S. Piaskowski, the plenipotentiary for Lower Silesia, reached a consensus with the Poznań Voivode and already transferred some of the disputed poviats to the Poznań Voivode on 15 June. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶ The exact date is not known. Later correspondence indicates the Institute for Western Affairs was involved because references are made to an earlier proposal for the administrative division.

cantly differs from the historical Lubusz region, and also from the concept which the Institute for Western Affairs wanted to introduce into the public consciousness after 1945. It is well known today that the Institute created and popularised the concept of the post-war Lubusz Land region. This concept, however, is not identical with the present shape of the Lubusz Voivodeship (Województwo Lubuskie). The initial enthusiasm of Poznań academics for the creation of a new region, which was to be a subregion of Greater Poland (Wielkopolska), the search for historical relations and to an extent the legitimisation of the name itself, diminished after the administrative reform of 1950 and the creation of the Zielona Góra Voivodeship, which incorporated the Lubusz Land. In this paper I present the stages of the shaping of the new concept of the region, as well as later attempts at its deconstruction.

Region as a historical concept refers to a defined place, a geographical space inhabited by people in a given time but not necessarily living within administrative units or identifying themselves with the given region.⁷ In other words, a region is by definition a construct born in the process of the conceptualisation of a space by historians. Henryk Samsonowicz wrote that “In general, however, a region is perceived as an area having a distinctive past [...]”,⁸ which in the case of the post-war Lubusz Land is disputable. Facing the abundance of available definitions, we will choose probably the widest and most universal, which states that a *region* is an area having definable characteristics.⁹ Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann and Thomas Schaarschmidt emphasise that regions are not static constructions, as they undergo continuous processes which can make them disappear and emerge; moreover, as is relevant here, an old region can be ‘re-invented’.¹⁰

The very process of conceptualisation of a region is based on three parameters: time, space, and the community living in a given territory.¹¹ Regions can also be defined on the basis of historical myths or top-down political decisions; however, the distinctiveness of a region as a unit must always be based on common historical grounds and local traditions.¹² In the case of the Lubusz Land, we may speak of the top-down administrative organisation of the territories adjoined to Poland after

⁷ M. Hroch, *Regional Memory: Reflections on the Role of History in (Re)Constructing Regional Identity*, in: *Frontiers, Regions and Identities in Europe (Thematic work group. 5. Frontiers and identities; 4)*, eds. S. G. Ellis, R. Eßer, J. Berdah, M. Řezník, Pisa 2009, p. 3.

⁸ H. Samsonowicz, *Historia regionalna*, in: *Małopolska. Regiony. Regionalizmy. Male ojczyzny*, Vol. 13, ed. Z. Noga, Kraków 2011, pp. 11–13.

⁹ M. Kulesza, *Rozważania na temat regionu geograficzno-historycznego*, in: *Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej*, 2014, vol. 3 (2014), p. 28; *ibid.* For a comprehensive review of definitions of a historical region see pp. 33–44.

¹⁰ D. Schmiechen-Ackermann, T. Schaarschmidt, *Regionen als Bezugsgröße in Diktaturen und Demokratien*, w: *Regionalismus und Regionalisierungen in Diktaturen und Demokratien des 20. Jahrhunderts*, COMPARATIV 13 (2003), Heft 1, eds. D. Schmiechen-Ackermann, P. Behrens, F. Hadler, T. Schaarschmidt, Leipzig 2003, pp. 9–10.

¹¹ M. Nowacki, *Strukturalna koncepcja regionu historycznego Jerzego Topolskiego. Szkic problematyki*, in: *Historia. Kultura. Muzeum*, ed. A. Maksymowicz, Zielona Góra 2012, pp. 46–47.

¹² M. Hroch, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

WWII. At the early stage, the Institute for Western Affairs was made responsible for the identification of its historical grounds. Because the creation or emergence of regions is a process, and its success can be judged only with the elapse of time, the issue of whether or not a Lubusz region exists will be side-lined here, and the focus will be on the first stage of the building of the Lubusz Land concept.

The identification of the Lubusz Land has already been considered by historians. In her study, Kerstin Hinrichsen analyses the possible motivations and initiatives behind its creation.¹³ Her work, based on a large study of archive material, focuses on a more general issue. Of course, Hinrichsen acknowledges the important role of the Institute for Western Affairs, but she did not use archival materials concerning that institution and did not examine its impact on the shaping of the Lubusz Land concept. Dariusz Rymar meticulously analyses the first stage of the establishment of Polish administration in the Lubusz Land.¹⁴ His paper is a valuable source of factual information on this first and complicated stage in the formation of regional authorities and their territorial reach in the Recovered Territories. It focuses, however, on the institutionalising of those lands' management. As regards the construction of historical regions, the joint work *Regionalität als historische Kategorie*¹⁵ offers both interesting comparative materials and an impressive review of current conceptualisations and methods. The traditions and work of the Institute for Western Affairs have earned attention too,¹⁶ in addition to publications of its primary archival resources, which may be one-sided, but provide much invaluable research data and information.¹⁷ It should be noted that as early as 1955, the Institute was aware of the need to review and underline its contributions to research on the Lubusz Land.¹⁸ Another very interesting perspective is offered by Markus Krzoska in his biography of Zygmunt Wojciechowski, the first head of the Institute for Western Affairs.¹⁹

¹³ K. Hinrichsen, *Die Erfindung der Ziemia Lubuska. Konstruktion und Aneignung einer polnischen Region 1945-1975*, Göttingen 2017.

¹⁴ D. Rymar, Ukształtowanie się Ziemi Lubuskiej jako jednostki administracyjnej w świetle sprawozdań pełnomocników rządu (luty – lipiec 1945), in: *Rocznik Lubuski*, Zielona Góra 2005, vol. 31, part 2.

¹⁵ *Regionalität als historische Kategorie. Ostmitteleuropäische Perspektiven*, eds. S. Jagodzinski, A. Kmak-Pamirska, M. Řezník, Osnabrück 2019.

¹⁶ A. Czubiński, *Instytut Zachodni (1944-1986)*, Poznań 1987; *Instytut Zachodni. 50 lat*, Poznań 1994; Z. Mazur, *Antenaci. O politycznym rodowodzie Instytutu Zachodniego*, Poznań 2002; B. Piotrowski, Dorobek naukowy Instytutu Zachodniego, in: *Przegląd Zachodni*, 2004, no. 2.

¹⁷ A. Pietrowicz, *Organizacja „Ojczyzna” 1939-1945*, in: eds. Z. Mazur, A. Pietrowicz, *„Ojczyzna” 1939-1945. Dokumenty. Wspomnienia. Publicystyka*, Poznań 2004; *Instytut Zachodni w dokumentach*, eds. A. Choniawko, Z. Mazur, Poznań 2006.

¹⁸ S. Zajchowska, Osiągnięcia nauki polskiej w zakresie badań nad Ziemią Lubuską, in: *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1954, nos. 11-12; M. Szczaniecki, Wkład Instytutu Zachodniego w badania nad Ziemią Lubuską i jej dziejami, in: *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1955, nos. 3-4.

¹⁹ M. Krzoska, *Für ein Polen an Oder und Ostsee. Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900-1955) als Historiker und Publizist*, Osnabrück 2003 (Chapter 9 in particular).

The publications referred to above are complemented by primary sources. The sources documenting the pioneering research on the Lubusz region after WWII are scattered. The Archive of the Institute for Western Affairs (AIZ) is both rich and largely unexplored. Only a tiny part of its resources has been published.²⁰ My archive research focused on the Institute's unpublished minutes of its general meetings in 1946–1948, together with expert reports and opinions of the Institute's employees concerning the Western Lands from 1948–1960, reports on the activities of the Institute in 1945–1952, and the activities of its branches and research units in Cracow, Leszno, Opole, Szczecin, Warsaw and Toruń. My analysis of these materials led me to propose certain theses concerning the role of the Institute in the creation of the new region. I also analysed papers of Michał Sczaniecki held in the Archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Sczaniecki was one of the editors of the first monograph on the Lubusz Land.²¹ My sources included not only documents, but also publications by persons collaborating with or representing the Institute. For the purpose of this paper, the Institute for Western Affairs is to be treated as a collective body if not indicated otherwise. My assumption is that the views expressed by individuals affiliated to the Institute are identical with the those of the Institute and its circle – by which I understand not only the Institute's employees and members, but also people who collaborated on the research and authors and editors of relevant publications. This is a necessary simplification, because an attempt to analyse the individuals active in this milieu would require separate studies leading to a substantial work detailing the internal relations between those involved and the changes in those relations.

These changes were clearly noticeable in the documents researched. Interestingly, the documents do not allow us to identify unambiguously the originator of the name Lubusz Land for the territory between Pomerania and Silesia. Similarly, they do not precisely identify the time when the name was introduced. According to later accounts, this name was proposed by Zygmunt Wojciechowski, which seems highly probable. Also Stanisława Zajchowska attributed the new concept of the Lubusz Land to Wojciechowski.²² It is more difficult to identify the time when the name was introduced. What is known is that was used in correspondence after 13 February and before May 1945. In the light of the documents, it remains unknown whether the name was earlier discussed among members of the Institute, and what the motives of the Institute for the creation of a new region were. It is certain, however, that the concept created in this period contributed to the creation of this new region, and many people involved with the Institute worked on it effectively for many years. The efforts to justify the distinctiveness and specificity of the new region, which aimed at differentiating it from Pomerania and Silesia, brought – in the late 1940s – a result unexpected by the Institute, namely the new region was to become independent of Greater Poland. The planned administrative change made the Institute alter its stance. The Institute tried

²⁰ *Instytut Zachodni w dokumentach...*

²¹ *Ziemia Lubuska, Ziemia Staropolska*, eds. M. Sczaniecki, S. Zajchowska, Poznań 1950, vol. III.

²² S. Zajchowska, *Nad środkową Odrą i dolną Wartą*, Warsaw 1959, p. 5.

to devalue the Lubusz Land concept and make it appear to be an artificial creation (which, *nota bene*, had been created by the Institute itself). My research indicates that the narrative on the Lubusz Land was purposefully aimed at creating the impression of the distinctiveness of this part of the Recovered Territories and at preserving the influence of Poznań in the borderlands. From my analysis of publications referred to below, it follows that some researchers consciously distanced themselves from the concept adopted in the spring of 1945, possibly because they disagreed with the view of this matter imposed from above. It should be noted that in spite of the deliberate efforts to create a new region, most sources contain arguments of a scholarly and far from propagandist nature. According to Rymar, the reason for Greater Poland's expansion to the West was "the desire by the elites of Greater Poland to preserve the borderland character of that region in the context of the change in the national borders".²³ For obvious reasons, it is impossible now to verify this hypothesis, and consequently the question of motives remains open and perplexing. Whatever the answer might be, Poznań, at least in the early post-war period, was perceived as the capital city of the Western Territories.

THE CAPITAL OF WESTERN POLAND

Poznań had even before the war been home to academics studying the Western Lands, and they continued their research during WWII. In 1940 the underground organisation *Ojczyzna* (Motherland), related to the Government Delegation for Poland (Delegatura Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na Kraj) – an agency of the Polish Government in Exile – recognised the need to establish the Oder/Neisse border as a post-war priority for Poland. (This organisation after WWII was the basis for the establishment of the Institute for Western Affairs.)²⁴ Members and affiliates of *Ojczyzna* began working on popularising knowledge about the postulated Recovered Territories and expanding the research which was to be used for territorial claims. To aid the management of these territories after WWII, *Ojczyzna* focused on the education of future personnel. This education was provided by the underground University of the Western Lands (Uniwersytet Ziem Zachodnich), Higher School of Social Sciences for the Western Lands (Pedagogium Ziem Zachodnich) and Advanced (HE) Journalism Programmes (Wyższe Kursy Dziennikarskie).²⁵ From 1941 two more underground institutions focused on the future Western territories: the Western Institute (Studium Zachodnie) led by Zygmunt Wojciechowski, and the Western Section of the Information and Media Department of the Government Delegation for Poland (Sekcja Zachodnia Departamentu Informacji i Prasy Delegatury Rządu na Kraj) led by Edmund Męclewski. These activities, initiated in the war years, resulted in the establishment

²³ D. Rymar, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²⁴ A. Pietrowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

of the Institute for Western Affairs in December 1944, when a meeting of representatives of these different but related organisations was held in Milanówek near Warsaw. This was the time of the first surviving written note mentioning the organisational principles of the Institute for Western Affairs.²⁶ The underground Institute for Western Affairs revealed its existence to the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin) on 13 February 1945.²⁷ From this date on, the activities of the Institute became ‘public’ and crucial for research on the Recovered Territories. The activities of the Institute were closely related to the concurrent political developments and the Polish *raison d’état*. Zbigniew Mazur concluded that the activities of the Institute were an example of “an extraordinary symbiosis between science and politics which took shape on the ground of Western-oriented thought”.²⁸ The Institute was of practical value to the new regime, and thanks to Wojciechowski’s efforts its activities remained freer for some years than those of other institutes with a similar focus.²⁹ One of the first tasks of the Institute was the scholarly ‘management’ of the Recovered Territories.³⁰ In the early post-war period (1945–1948), the key historiographical issue was the Slavonic-oriented study of the Western and Northern Lands, which underlined the links of the Recovered Territories with Poland.

In the case of the Lubusz Land, the issue of its links to Poland and the instability of the borders was underlined in the first monograph on the subject. To quote: “in contrast to other regions of Poland, covered by the term ‘Old Polish Lands’ (Ziemie Staropolski), the Lubusz Land was a land almost totally forgotten, whose borders were not stable and were, after 1945, given a new shape which largely departed from the original one.”³¹ The Institute undertook the difficult task of justifying the name Lubusz Land for a territory much larger and “different from the original”. As I have already pointed out, in the post-war temporary administrative division of the Recovered Territories, the establishment of an administrative region on the middle part of the Oder was not foreseen. It was the Institute – in preparing a proposal for the administrative division of the Recovered Territories – that suggested such a region, to be called the Lubusz Land. Moreover, the Lubusz Land was to be governed by the

²⁶ Pierwsza zachowana notatka dotycząca utworzenia Instytutu Zachodniego z grudnia 1944 r., in: *Instytut Zachodni w dokumentach...* pp. 39-40.

²⁷ Memoriał prof. Zygmunta Wojciechowskiego złożony na ręce premiera rządu „lubelskiego” Edwarda Osóbki-Morawskiego w dniu 13 lutego 1945 r., in: *ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

²⁸ B. Piotrowski, *op. cit.*, p. 68., Z. Mazur, *Antenaci...*, p. 9.

²⁹ J. Hackmann pointed out that “generally speaking, there were few substantial concessions for Stalinism on the part of the Institute for Western Affairs” and that the Institute largely resisted the state authorities’ interventions in academic work, offering instead some formally kind gestures. J. Hackmann, *Strukturen und Institutionen der polnischen Westforschung (1918-1960)*, in: *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung*, 2001, no. 50, p. 252. See also p. 245 there on the freedom granted from censorship, and M. Pospieszalski, *O różnych trudnościach wydawniczych w okresie PRL*, in: *Cenzura w PRL. Relacje historyków*, ed. Z. Romek, Warsaw 2000, pp. 169-181.

³⁰ B. Piotrowski, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³¹ D. Dolański, *Ewolucja regionalnej historiografii na środkowym Nadodrzu po 1945 roku*, in: *Rocznik Lubuski*, 2006, vol. 32, part 1, p. 52.

Poznań Voivode.³² This was decreed in the resolution of the Council of Ministers dated 7 July 1945.³³ Hieronim Szczegółą, a historian and an enthusiastic supporter of the Lubusz Land concept, emphasised that the then new division of the Recovered Territories introduced the concept of the Lubusz Land with its name “having been recalled by Poznań academics”.³⁴ In fact the decision of the Council of Ministers did not mention any new name for the poviats whose administrative affiliation was to be changed. They came to be known as the Lubusz Land thanks to the Institute’s popularisation of that name. It continued to be a common and unsanctioned name for the land that constituted a natural extension of Greater Poland to the west until the administrative reform of 1950. The reform created the new Zielonogórskie Voivodeship, autonomous from Greater Poland. The period during which the Lubusz Land was an administrative part of the Poznań Voivodeship was the time when the Institute’s work on the history and reconstruction of that region was most intense.

THE LUBUSZ LAND IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Today, for many people the Lubusz Land is an artificially created region.³⁵ While discussing that issue, one should be aware that the Lubusz region in the Middle Ages and the Lubusz Land today are entirely different geographic areas. The name Lubusz Land which was proposed and propagated by the Institute for Western Affairs in reference to the part of the Recovered Territories between Pomerania and Silesia had its origin in a mediaeval region whose history corresponded satisfactorily with the myth of the primaeval land of the Piasts. The Slavonic fortified settlement of Lubusz (Lebus) dates back to the 7th or 8th century. It is not clear who ruled it before the Peace of Bautzen (Budziszyn) was concluded in 1018. However, after this treaty the region was certainly controlled by Bolesław I the Brave. In 1102 the lands were divided between Zbigniew and Bolesław the Wrymouth, and it is not clear which of the two ruled the region in question. It is known that in 1109 the settlement was taken from Bolesław the Wrymouth by King of Germany Henry V.³⁶ A significant event, frequently recalled

³² Pismo dyrektora IZ prof. Zygmunta Wojciechowskiego z 14 maja 1945 r. do wojewody Feliksa Widy-Wirskiego z propozycją włączenia Ziemi Lubuskiej do województwa poznańskiego, in: *Instytut Zachodni w dokumentach...*, p. 50; Pismo dyrektora IZ prof. Zygmunta Wojciechowskiego z 22 czerwca 1945 r. do Biura Ziem Zachodnich w sprawie przyłączenia Ziemi Lubuskiej do województwa poznańskiego, *ibid.*, pp. 51–52.

³³ Uchwała Rady Ministrów z dnia 7 lipca 1945 r. w sprawie wyłączenia z Okręgów Pomorze Zachodnie, Mazurskiego (Prusy Wschodnie) i Śląsk Dolny niektórych powiatów i przyznania na terenie tychże powiatów wojewodom: Gdańskiemu, Białostockiemu, Pomorskiemu i Poznańskiemu uprawnień Pełnomocników Okręgowych Rządu R. P., in: *Monitor Polski*, 1945, no. 29, item 77.

³⁴ H. Szczegółą, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁵ Cf. O. Kiec, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

³⁶ For the Lubusz Land’s affiliation to the Piast House see G. Labuda, *Przynależność terytorialna Ziemi Lubuskiej w XII i XIII wieku*, in: *Roczniki Historyczne* 35, 1969; J. Spors, *Przynależność administracyjna ziem nad środkową Odrą i dolną Wartą w XII i I. połowie XIII w.*, in: *Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny*

in the context of the post-war Lubusz Land, is the establishment of the Lubusz diocese by Bolesław the Wrymouth in 1124 after he won lands to the west of the Oder river.³⁷ Lubusz was chosen to be the bishop's seat because of its central location in the region and the fact that it was a prosperous trading town (Bolesław planned further expansion to the west).³⁸ In 1138 the fragmentation of the Polish lands into provinces began, and disputes as to whether the Lubusz region belonged to Greater Poland or to the Silesian province have not been conclusively resolved.³⁹ In 1226 Henry I the Bearded, Duke of Silesia, granted Lubusz its town charter. However, the Silesian dukes fought one another, and in 1249 the Lubusz region was taken over by the margraves of Meissen and the archbishop of Magdeburg. The first known description of the borders of the region dates to that time. Until 1945 the region was part of the Brandenburgian and then German state.⁴⁰

The historical events of the Early Middle Ages could be easily linked to the "Polish" and Piast history of the Lubusz region so as to underline its links with the motherland. The problem was that the historical region of Lubusz lay on both sides of the Oder River, and after 1945 its old capital city remained on the German side (see map).

THE INSTITUTE FOR WESTERN AFFAIRS AS DESIGNER

Researchers generally accept that the new post-war concept of the Lubusz Land was first employed by Maria Kielczewska and Andrzej Grodek in the first publication by the Institute for Western Affairs (1945), which had been written before the war ended. Its title was *Odra-Nisa najlepsza granica Polski* [The Oder–Neisse the best border of Poland].⁴¹ It is important to note how the authors characterised the western lands: "Lands to the east of the Oder–Neisse border line are part of Polish geographical territory and are divided into three different lands: Pomerania, the Lubusz Land and Silesia." However a few pages later, in describing this territory, the authors write that "The area on the Oder is primarily Greater Poland, the land on the Warta river which is the main tributary of

"Sobótka", 1986 (1), p. 3, 1986; E. Rymar, *Klucz do ziem polskich, czyli dzieje Ziemi Lubuskiej aż po jej utratę przez Piastów i ugruntowanie władzy margrabiów brandenburskich*, Gorzów Wielkopolski 2007.

³⁷ Cf. K. Wasilkiewicz, *Templariusze i Joannicy w biskupstwie lubuskim XIII – XVI w.*, Gniezno 2016, p. 30 passim and the literature cited there.

³⁸ Ibid., E. Rozenkranz, Geneza miasta Lubusza, in: *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1953, nos. 9/12, 1953, pp. 278-309.

³⁹ See E. Rymar, op. cit., pp. 31–37 for a detailed review and criticism of various hypotheses.

⁴⁰ Agreement between Bolesław II the Horned (Bolesław II Rogatka) and Wilbrand von Kevernburg, the Archbishop of Magdeburg dated 20 April 1249, in E. Rymar, *Klucz...*, pp. 77-89.

⁴¹ This view was propagated in B. Krygowski, S. Zajchowska, *Ziemia Lubuska. Opis geograficzny i gospodarczy*, Poznań 1946, p. 7. Today, it can be found in A. Toczewski, *Historia Ziemi Lubuskiej: krótki zarys dawnych dziejów*, Zielona Góra 2012; M. Tureczek, *Ziemia Lubuska na Środkowym Nadodrzu*, in: M. Tureczek, *Ziemia Lubuska. Społeczny wymiar dialogu o przeszłości i tożsamości*, Międzyrzecz–Wschowa–Zielona Góra 2014, p. 75; K. Hinrichsen, op. cit., p. 54.

the Oder.⁴² Later, when writing about economic relations, the authors refer to the Nadodrze (land on the Oder) consisting of Silesia, Pomerania and... East Brandenburg!⁴³ This onomastic inconsistency and the lack of a definition of the Lubusz Land indicate that the authors' references to this region may not have been meant to deliberately support the concept. It seems that their references were to the Lubusz Land of the Middle Ages. The claim that the Lubusz Land concept was being promoted is doubtful for another reason too. The "Lubusz Land" is described in this first publication as a small region whose capital city is Lubusz (Lebus). In the aforementioned memorandum of Zygmunt Wojciechowski where he – as head of the Institute for Western Affairs – described the research and achievements of the Institute, the research areas covered by the Institute were identified: the history of Silesia, Western Pomerania, Gdańsk and East Prussia.⁴⁴ The Lubusz Land was not mentioned in any way, and consequently it appears that at that stage the new concept of the Lubusz Land was not yet a subject of interest. Nevertheless, for Olgierd Kiec this publication was the harbinger of the new concept of the Lubusz Land as a region and also as a subregion of Greater Poland.⁴⁵ Rymar, on the other hand, identifies the first public presentation of the name of the new region and its possible status as an interview given by Zygmunt Wojciechowski on 11 June 1945,⁴⁶ and this view seems more plausible. From that time on, publications about the Lubusz Land became more common. Krygowski and Zajchowska, in the first and so far only monograph on the Lubusz Land, justify the use of the mediaeval name in reference to the new region as follows:

In the new administrative division [1945] the right-bank part of the old Lubusz Land together with neighbouring poviats of Silesia in the south, the Neumark in the north, and partly of Greater Poland (formerly the Frontier March of Posen-West Prussia, i.e. the Borderland) in the east, all were included in the Poznań Voivodeship. There was the need to give one name to all these poviats in the western lands. At that time, historians recalled the name Lubusz Land. The fortified settlement from which this name derives is on the left side of the Oder; however the tradition and relevance of this land to Poland in the past was so great that with no hesitation the name has been used to cover the neighbouring poviats too. In the Middle Ages, the Lubusz Land was the strip of land connecting Greater Poland with the Oder to the west. In the course of many centuries, the border of Greater Poland retracted and its Oder foreground expanded to the east, north and south. Similarly to the situation in the Middle Ages, also today the Lubusz Land, although in a shape changed by the course of history, is the territory which links Greater Poland to the Oder.⁴⁷

The Lubusz Land concept remained questionable – for instance, not all affiliates of the Institute for Western Affairs were eager to use it. The group who objected the longest were geographers, who preferred to speak of the area of the Warta and Noteć

⁴² M. Kielczewska, A. Grodek, *Odra-Nisa. Najlepsza granica Polski*, Poznań 1945, p. 14.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 59

⁴⁴ See footnote 27. Memoriał prof. Zygmunta Wojciechowskiego..., p. 41.

⁴⁵ O. Kiec, *Od Marchii Wschodniej (Ostmark) do Ziemi Lubuskiej. Kilka uwag o konstruowaniu regionu i regionalnej polityki pamięci*, in: *Ziemia Lubuska. Rozważania o historii i tożsamości regionu*, eds. T. Nodzyński, M. Tureczek, J. Zięba, Zielona Góra 2014, pp. 37-38.

⁴⁶ *Głos Wielkopolski* 1945, no. 103, p. 3; D. Rymar, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁴⁷ Od redakcji, in: *Ziemia Lubuska...*, p. 5.

basin between Pomerania and Silesia as part of Greater Poland.⁴⁸ In spite of this, geographers did discuss and research issues related to the Lubusz Land. One example from 1946 was the aforementioned book by Krygowski and Zajchowska, which “provided an extensive geographical and economic description of 14 poviats in the Western Lands now forming part of the Poznań Voivodeship”.⁴⁹ In the first chapter the authors attempted to explain the modern concept of the Lubusz Land while mentioning “some scruples” related to the use of the new concept:

In spite of these scruples which unquestionably come to mind while discussing the name Lubusz Land, we use this name if only because every tradition which has survived in the ashes buried in the lands of our forefathers should be protected and respected with reverence, being for us sacred and invaluable, having fortunately survived the dreadful one-thousand-year turmoil.⁵⁰

The outposts of the Institute were equally sceptical. The view of the Cracow unit was presented more extensively, and this leads to the conclusion that the new concept of the Lubusz Land was born solely in Poznań. The Cracow circle questioned and refrained from using the name Lubusz Land while working on the Recovered Territories.⁵¹

The onomastic section was somewhat more supportive of the concept of the region’s creation. In 1946 this group concentrated on place names in the Lubusz Land and Western Pomerania.⁵² The Ministry of Public Administration appointed a Commission for the Establishment of Toponyms. Representatives of the Institute (against the opposition of those from Cracow) won “recognition of and respect for” the Institute’s work to date and provided “*via ficti* the position of the state commission on toponyms in the region of the Lubusz Land and Western Pomerania within its administrative borders together with the Lębork powiat.”⁵³ The onomastic section of the Institute worked much faster than the Commission itself, and this resulted in some independent action on the part of the Institute. Its onomastic section would distribute its proposals to the region prior to their approval by the Commission, and the voivodes of Poznań and Szczecin published the toponyms (for localities in the Lubusz Land and Western Pomerania respectively) in the official journals as temporary names.⁵⁴ In 1947 the Institute for Western Affairs published the Commission documents under the title *Skorowidz miejscowości Pomorza Zachodniego i Ziemi Lubuskiej* (Index of localities in Western Pomerania and the Lubusz Land). In 1946, the onomastic section of the Institute, in cooperation with the geographical section, prepared a map of the

⁴⁸ Cf. M. Kielczewska, L. Gluck, Z. Kaczmarczyk, Z. Wojciechowski (eds.) *O lewy brzeg Odry*, Poznań, Institute for Western Affairs, 1946, p. 17.

⁴⁹ Protokoły walnych zebrań członków IZ 1946-1948, n. pag., Sprawozdanie sekcji Geograficznej IZ O.T. za rok 1946, version II, AIZ, file 001/01; B. Krygowski, S. Zajchowska, op. cit.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁵¹ E.g. A. Kutrzebianka, Kraków wobec zagadnień zachodnich, in: *Przegląd Zachodni*, no. 6, 1946, p. 572.

⁵² An exception was K. Kolańczyk’s description of the section’s work on the land on the middle Oder “called widely but only partly rightly the Lubusz Land”.

⁵³ Sprawozdanie z działalności sekcji Onomastycznej IZ w roku 1946. AIZ, file 001/01, n.pag.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Lubusz Land,⁵⁵ which for the first time presented the newly introduced toponyms in all of the smallest administrative units (*gmina*).⁵⁶

The actions of the Institute's sections conformed to the initially adopted position that the Lubusz Land had to be visibly distinct from Pomerania and Silesia, but that it was to be emphasised as being inseparable from Greater Poland. This led to a certain dissonance, including in terms of its naming, as the Lubusz Land was often referred to or subtitled as western Greater Poland. This was also the situation in 1946, when the Institute for Western Affairs was profiling its academic journal *Przegląd Zachodni*, mapping out its research areas and organising its library. Here, references to the Lubusz Land were made in the context of Greater Poland, but separately from the rest of the Recovered Territories.⁵⁷

In the Institute's early research on the Recovered Territories, field visits played a significant role, and resulted in monographs on particular regions. In the preface to the first monograph in the series, the aim was clearly defined: "to create the assurance and confidence that we have returned onto the path of our old homeland".⁵⁸ The editors rightly emphasised that the work on the Lubusz Land was difficult because it was not backed up by tradition. They wrote:

It [this area] was not interesting to German academics, and Polish academics have not done research on it until now. This small land, whose borders were not stable, and which did not truly belong either to Greater Poland or Brandenburg, or to Silesia or Pomerania, was almost totally forgotten.⁵⁹

For accuracy's sake, it should be recalled that the pioneering nature of the Polish research was mainly a consequence of the new determination of the region's borders. Some research on parts of the region had been done earlier by both German and Polish historians.⁶⁰ Michał Szaniecki reported on a field visit to the Lubusz Land in which he took part in 1947 (although the report must have been written later).⁶¹ Interestingly, he mentioned that already in Milanówek, where the idea of establishing the Institute was discussed, it was planned that the Institute's activity

⁵⁵ This map was subtitled "Wielkopolska Zachodnia" [Western Greater Poland].

⁵⁶ Sprawozdanie sekcji Geograficznej IZ O.T. za rok 1946, version II, AIZ, file 001/01, n.pag.

⁵⁷ Sprawozdanie z działalności „Przeglądu Zachodniego” w czasie od I.I.1946 r. - I.III.1947 r., n. pag. AIZ, file 001/01. In this report, item 4 lists topics *Przegląd Zachodni* focused on, including Greater Poland and the Lubusz Land. AIZ, file 001/01, n.pag.; Sprawozdanie z działalności biblioteki Instytutu za rok 1946, AIZ, file 001/01, n.pag. The collection of Wilhelm Bickerich (a pastor from Lissa/Leszno) also contained a separate section of resources on Greater Poland and the Lubusz Land. See also *Ziemia Lubuska...*, p. 14.

⁵⁸ Z. Wojciechowski, Słowo wstępne, in: *Dolny Śląsk, Ziemia Staropolski*, Poznań 1948, vol. 1, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Od redakcji, in: *Ziemia Lubuska, Ziemia Staropolski*, Poznań 1950, vol. III, p. 7.

⁶⁰ Cf. O. Breitenbach, *Das Land Lebus unter den Piasten*, Fürstenwalde 1890; P. v. Niessen, *Geschichte der Neumark im Zeitalter ihrer Entstehung und Besiedlung. Von ältester Zeit bis zum Aussterben der Askanier*, Landsberg 1905; *Historia Śląska od najdawniejszych czasów do roku 1400*, ed. S. Kutrzeba, Kraków 1933.

⁶¹ Z ekspedycją naukową Instytutu Zachodniego na Ziemi Lubuskiej w 1947 r., Sprawozdanie 1947 r., Materiały Michała Szanieckiego, Archive of the Polish Academy of Sciences, item III-246/15, mnp.

would include research on the region stretching to the Oder and Neisse. In other words, the research was to cover the historical Lubusz Land.⁶² This was in line with the concept of Poland's original lands, and even before World War II Sczaniecki had included the historic Lubusz Land among these. Wojciechowski did not mention the differences between the historic Lubusz region and the Lubusz Land he visited in 1947. This produces the impression that he was referring to a single territory which had not undergone significant transformations. In the year that a monograph on the Lubusz Land was published in the "Old Polish Lands" (*Ziemia Staropolski*) series, the shape and administrative affiliation of the Lubusz Land foreseen by the Institute changed, and it developed into an autonomous administrative unit.



Source: *Od redakcji*, in: *Ziemia Lubuska*, eds. M. Sczaniecki, S. Zajchowska, Poznań 1950, p. 6.

⁶² Ibid.

BETWEEN DECONSTRUCTION, NEGATION, AND INDIFFERENCE

As Miroslav Hroch (2009) rightly notes, the borders of regions, especially those that are not firmly grounded historically, were and are fluid, are frequently described in general terms, and carry names that loosely refer to historical regions.⁶³ Their borders are frequently modified due to new criteria for the division of a given area.⁶⁴ This was exactly the situation of the Lubusz Land in 1950. Its borders as delimited in 1945, which the Institute justified on historical grounds, were changed due to the political situation in 1950. The Lubusz Land consisted of fourteen ‘recovered’ poviats which very shortly after WWII had been adjoined to Greater Poland. In 1950 it was decided that the northern poviats of Trzcianka and Piła would no longer form part of the region, while six poviats in the south (those of Głogów, Koźuchów, Nowa Sól, Szprotawa, Żagań and Żary, formerly part of Wrocław Voivodeship) were adjoined to it.

Already in February 1948, two conferences were held at the Institute for Western Affairs attended by Poznań Vice-voivode J. Szłapczyński. Their focus was on ensuring that the Lubusz Land would remain part of the Poznań Voivodeship. During the first conference it was decided that representatives of the Institute (Kaczmarczyk, Zajchowska, Tuchołka) would write a memorandum arguing for the present affiliation of the Lubusz Land to be retained.⁶⁵ The conference decided on seventeen points to form the basis for the document. The memorandum delivered consisted of 13 pages of typescript and contained arguments referring to all possible aspects of life.⁶⁶ The Lubusz Land was presented as a natural extension of Greater Poland to the west, and Greater Poland as its “higher-order geographical unit”. Arguments referring to natural conditions were followed by a description of the railway network, which “speaks against the separation of the Lubusz Land from the Poznań Voivodeship”. The next arguments referred to the security of the national border (the Lubusz Land required special care because of its strategic location, and “this care can fully be provided only by the Poznań centre, rich in human resources and experience”) and the closely related historical narrative: “The unification of the Polish state by the Piasts in the 10th century began with the incorporation and binding of Greater Poland with the Lubusz Land [...] the loss of the Lubusz Land was due to its breaking its ties with Greater Poland [...]”. After these arguments representative of the long-used narrative, more pragmatic arguments were advanced, namely the question of finances and the insufficient size of the Lubusz Land as a separate voivodeship. The adjoining of the Lubusz Land to the Poznań Voivodeship had had “an extremely beneficial impact on the development of its economy, civilisation and

⁶³ M. Hroch, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Konferencja w sprawie pozostawienia Ziemi Lubuskiej w ramach administracyjnych województwa poznańskiego z 21 lutego 1948 r., AIZ, file 061/02, n.pag.

⁶⁶ Memoriał Instytutu Zachodniego w sprawie pozostawienia Ziemi Lubuskiej w granicach województwa poznańskiego opracowany przez prof. dr. Zdzisława Kaczmarczyka, inż. Zbyszka Tuchołkę i mgr Stanisławę Zajchowską, AIZ, file 061/02, n.pag.

culture”; for example, through the propagation of the agricultural culture of Greater Poland among the conservative and low-skilled farmers who arrived from the lands in the former eastern regions of Poland. Another argument centred on the border issue: the adjoining of the Lubusz Land to Greater Poland served to erase the 1939 border, and this would have some significance in the international arena.

In addition to meeting strictly political needs, the Institute also pursued its academic objectives, wishing to centralise research on the Western Lands under its own aegis. The research done by the Institute covered a much larger territory, and researchers all over the country belonged to its branches, which were quite readily established. From 1945 much effort was put into establishing a branch in Szczecin.⁶⁷ Among the Institute’s first outside units was one in Leszno.⁶⁸ However, the establishment of a unit of the Institute in the Lubusz Land was not even considered until 1949. It was on 14 January 1949 that the branch office of the Poznań Voivodship in Gorzów Wielkopolski asked the Institute to establish a research unit in the Lubusz Land.⁶⁹ In the letter containing the request, reference was made to talks held earlier and involving Poznań Vice-Voivode Florian Kroenke, and it was declared that the new unit would receive as its seat the mansion with adjoining buildings and grounds in Jarnatów, in the powiat of Sulęcín. Professor Wojciechowski passed this letter to Kaczmarczyk and Zajchowska to respond to the proposal. The letter was archived with only the word “NO” written on it. The official response written by Kaczmarczyk and sent to the Gorzów officials was more elaborate. Kaczmarczyk kindly thanked them for the proposal and the efforts made. At the same time he pointed to the Institute’s limited financial resources and “the sufficient research activities” done on the Lubusz Land by the Institute in centrally located Poznań.⁷⁰

Polemics and discussions were also published in *Przegląd Zachodni* in 1948. The Institute clearly opposed plans to make the Lubusz Land a separate region, and expressed this position officially.⁷¹ Kaczmarczyk, Tucholka, and Zajchowska in their 1948 paper titled “Ziemia lubuska organiczną częścią Wielkopolski” (The Lubusz Land: an organic part of Greater Poland) strongly criticised the post-war concept of the Lubusz Land being an independent administrative unit. At the same time the authors emphasised its historical bonds with Greater Poland, arguing that the Lubusz region was acquired by the Brandenburg margraves because its natural ties with Greater

⁶⁷ Zgłoszenie oddziału IZ w Szczecinie do zarządu miejskiego 7.11.1945 r., AIZ, file 063/03, n.pag.; Zaświadczenie o zarejestrowaniu IZ w Szczecinie zgodnie z wnioskiem z 20.II.1946 r., AIZ, file 063/03, n.pag.; Pismo do Prezydium WRN w Szczecinie z 12 listopada 1960 r. w sprawie powołania w Szczecinie Stacji Naukowej Instytutu Zachodniego, AIZ, file 063/03, n.pag.; Notatka z zebrania, na którym powołano szczecińską filię Instytutu Zachodniego w Poznaniu 11 XII 1987 r., AIZ, file 063/03, n.pag.

⁶⁸ Pismo do starostwa powiatowego w Lesznie z 6 sierpnia 1945 r., AIZ, file 063/03, n.pag.

⁶⁹ Pismo Urzędu Wojewódzkiego Poznańskiego Ekspozytury w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim do IZ z 14.01.1949 r., AIZ, file 013/01, n.pag.

⁷⁰ Pismo Instytutu Zachodniego do Urzędu Wojewódzkiego Poznańskiego Ekspozytury w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim z 20.01.1949 r., AIZ, file 013/01, n.pag.

⁷¹ Z. Kaczmarczyk, Z. Tucholka, S. Zajchowska, Ziemia lubuska organiczną częścią Wielkopolski, in: *Przegląd Zachodni* 1948, no. 1.

Poland had been broken when the area was taken over by the Silesian princes. In this paper the name “Lubusz Land” is accompanied by the qualifier “so-called”, suggesting that the existence of such a distinct territory was at least doubtful.

After attempts at deconstructing the identity of the Lubusz Land, after 1949 the focus shifted to criticising the retention of its name in the light of administrative changes. The north-eastern parts of the then Lubusz Land were assigned to a different voivodeship, while some new territories in the south were adjoined to the region. These developments were used as an argument against the Lubusz Land’s separate existence. Zajchowska in 1946 still argued that the name “Lubusz Land” was justified and needed because of the “tradition which survived in the ashes buried in the lands of our forefathers”,⁷² but after the administrative changes she rightly argued that the new Zielona Góra Voivodeship consisted mostly of Silesian poviats and that “two Lubusz poviats among 18 cannot set the tone of the whole [voivodeship]”.⁷³ In general, the Institute continued to question the existence of the Lubusz Land, placing its name in quotation marks, giving it the qualifier “so-called”, or simply referring to it as western Greater Poland.⁷⁴ The rhetoric later changed, and in 1961 the Institute referred back to one of its pioneering works on the Lubusz Land. In a new work titled *Województwo zielonogórskie. Monografia geograficzno-gospodarcza* (Zielona Góra Voivodeship. A geographic and economic monograph), the first in a new series “aiming at a more insightful presentation of our years of research on and interest in this territory”,⁷⁵ references were made to the volume on the Lubusz Land in the “Old Polish Lands” (*Ziemie Staropolski*) series. There were no comments on the name used, but on successive pages one may read about the new voivodeship or the middle Oder region (Nadodrze). There was much emphasis on differences between the various parts of the “relatively small” voivodeship (eight parts were enumerated), and in a historical context it was argued that the “Zielona Góra Voivodeship is a conglomerate of territories which for ages belonged to various states and regions”.⁷⁶

The different approaches to the question of the Lubusz Land after 1950 also include a kind of indifference. The Institute continued its research work on the region and related topics, but the name Lubusz Land disappeared. In 1953, the Institute was reorganised. At that time Wojciechowski wrote, in a note specifying his tasks, that the Institute was to complete its *Ziemie Staropolski*, series of monographs and that future monographs on the regions of the Western Territories would be decentralised, because the required research on Silesia was different from the research on Pomerania.⁷⁷ This was as if the Lubusz Land had never been of interest to the Institute, was not part

⁷² B. Krygowski, S. Zajchowska, op. cit., p. 10.

⁷³ S. Zajchowska, *Nad środkową Odrą...*, p. 6.

⁷⁴ For example “the so-called ‘Lubusz Land’ of today”. S. Zajchowska, *Osiągnięcia...*, p. 339.

⁷⁵ *Województwo zielonogórskie. Monografia geograficzno-gospodarcza*, eds. F. Barciński, B. Krygowski, S. Zajchowska, Poznań 1961, Wstęp, p. XIII.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁷⁷ This research was continued by the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences, namely its Department for the History of Pomerania and Department for the History of Silesia.

of the borderland and was not part of the Recovered Territories.⁷⁸ In fact the name disappeared from the Institute's plans and work in 1951.⁷⁹ The question of whether the Lubusz Land should be recognised as a distinct region of the Recovered Territories has not been settled by subsequent reforms of territorial administration and the creation of the Lubusz Voivodeship in 1999, which in a way legitimised the post-war concept of a separate region. Today the usage or non-usage of the name Lubusz Land still requires additional explanations or clarifications.⁸⁰

CONCLUSIONS

History, as the academic discipline which interprets historical facts, quite often undergoes transformations and modifications. This applies to both national and regional histories. As Miroslav Hroch (2009) rightly notes, the extreme case is where the history of a region transforms into a national history. Similarly a regional history may evolve in different directions and become part of a national narrative.⁸¹ After WWII, the Recovered Territories constituted a pillar of Poland's national history. Unquestionably this situation was favourable to academics interested in undertaking research on those lands. Dariusz Dolański is correct in writing that:

Clearly the most propitious ground to practise history in this sense was the Middle Ages. For this reason, in the first decades after the war, historians interested in the past of the Western Territories concentrated on their most remote past, pointing to the fact that this territory formed part of the state of the first Piasts, and emphasising its bonds with Poland in next centuries.⁸²

This favourable ground was also explored by the Poznań circle of researchers. Taking advantage of the suitable circumstances, the Institute for Western Affairs constructed a new region – the Lubusz Land – which was to strengthen the status of Greater Poland as a borderland. The sources referred to in this paper show that the main task was to demonstrate that the Lubusz Land was distinct from Silesia and Pomerania, that its bonds with Poznań were firm and indissoluble, and that to an extent the Lubusz Land was intellectually dependent on the capital of Greater Poland.⁸³

⁷⁸ Memoriał Dyrektora IZ prof. Zygmunta Wojciechowskiego z 28 października 1953 r. w sprawach IZ, in: *Instytut Zachodni w...*, p. 134.

⁷⁹ Notatka Dyrektora IZ prof. Zygmunta Wojciechowskiego i prezesa Kuratorium IZ prof. Tadeusza Lehra-Spławińskiego z 9 lipca 1951 r. charakteryzująca położenie IZ, in: *Instytut Zachodni w...*, pp. 111–112.

⁸⁰ Vide B. Piotrowski, op. cit., p. 40: "Researchers and librarians and administrative staff of the Institute would go to Lower and Upper Silesia, to the lands of Pomerania, Warmia and Masuria." The accompanying footnote states: "Simultaneously the concept of the Lubusz Land was introduced into academic and official usage as a land bordering with Germany and being strategically important." Cf. M. Tureczek, op. cit.

⁸¹ M. Hroch, op. cit., passim.

⁸² D. Dolański, op. cit., p. 53.

⁸³ "The geographical location of Poznań in the heart of the new national Poland is decisive for its role. It is from here that slogans, thoughts and work are to go forth. How much will Poznań have to learn, amend, and do!" R. Roński, *Zachód*, in: *Życie Literackie* 1945, no. 1.

The concept initially promulgated ceased to be attractive once the political situation changed and territorial reforms unfavourable to Poznań were introduced. The denial of earlier perspectives and renunciation of the original concept of the Lubusz Land are visible in the Institute's activities after 1950. The question is whether the actions taken by the Institute were effective enough to permeate the political reality, or the pragmatic approach prevailed and the change was based only on the administrative rationale. As sources are lacking, these questions are still open. We may, however, answer the question concerning the Institute's further research on the Lubusz Land. The research was continued, but in a different light. Sczaniecki wrote that a field visit to the Lubusz Land in the 1940s made its participants interested in researching this region.⁸⁴ In contrast to the period 1945–1948, after 1950 the region's artificiality was emphasised, as well as the doubtful origin of its name and its very loose correspondence to the historical land of Lubusz. On the other hand, the name, once introduced in academic, journalistic and political discourse, has remained there until today.

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Keywords: Polish Western Territories, region building, Institute for Western Affairs, Lubusz Land

ABSTRACT

This article presents the role of the Institute for Western Affairs (Instytut Zachodni) in generating and publicising the concept of the Lubusz Land after World War II as a new region of Poland. The concept originated in 1945–1948 and underpinned the creation of the new region, a task to which a number of scholars associated with the Institute devoted the first post-war years. The paper aims to define the stages of the construction of the concept of the Lubusz Land, as well as later attempts to deconstruct this idea. It is worth underscoring that immediately after World War II, the Institute for Western Affairs was responsible for furnishing the rationale of the Lubusz Land as a region of Poland.

The methodology of the present study relies predominantly on the genetic method and analysis of source materials from the Archives of the Institute for Western Affairs and the materials of Michał Sczaniecki in the Archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Archival sources supplement the published materials of scholars associated with or representing the Institute, and in the latter case the philological method was employed. Study of the documents shows that, taking advantage of favourable circumstances in 1945, the Institute for Western Affairs conceived a new region – the Lubusz Land – which was to help preserve the borderland character of Greater Poland. The sources reveal that the Institute's main task was to demonstrate the distinctness of the Lubusz Land from Pomerania and Silesia, and at the same time its close and inextricable connection to Poznań, and in a sense also its intellectual dependence on the capital of Greater Poland. Although the concept was a top-down one, the administrative reform of 1950, seen as unfavourable from Poznań's perspective, led to a subsequent retreat from the original idea. In the activities of the Institute for Western Affairs after 1950 there is a marked tendency to negate previous theses and disclaim the concept of the Lubusz Land.

⁸⁴ *Z ekspedycją naukową...*

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BETWEEN THE NEUMARK AND VOLHYNIA: ON LOCAL HISTORICAL POLICY AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN GORZÓW WIELKOPOLSKI

INTRODUCTION

The subject of this article is the collective memory of the inhabitants of Gorzów Wielkopolski – a city with a population of over 100,000, and one of the two administrative centres of the Polish province of Lubuskie. Because of its location close to the German border, as well as the ethnic and cultural complexity of its social structure – resulting from processes of resettlement from 1945 onwards – Gorzów provides an interesting case study of the shaping of historical awareness on a local scale. A study is made here of selected places of memory, the local government’s historical policy, and media discourse. The means used for this purpose include historical and descriptive methods and discourse analysis. The main content of the article is preceded by theoretical considerations of collective memory and its carriers, and some details of Gorzów’s history, particularly the watershed of 1945 and its consequences for the contemporary city. The titular references to the Neumark and Volhynia are to be understood not literally, but as a metaphor expressing the thesis of the two foundations of the studied collective memory, namely a sense of continuity with the German history of the city, and a narrative relating to Poland’s former eastern borderlands, which is used increasingly often in the building of a local identity.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND ITS CARRIERS

Collective memory is among the most popular terms in the contemporary humanities and social sciences.¹ This trend is a product of the growing role played by the past in the life of societies. As Jacques Le Goff notes, “the whole contemporary world [...] is producing more and more collective memories, and history is written, to a much

¹ Cf. M. Saryusz-Wolska, *Wprowadzenie*, in: M. Saryusz-Wolska (ed.), *Pamięć zbiorowa i kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka*, Kraków 2009, p. 7.

greater degree than before, under the influence of those very collective memories.”² It is no surprise, then, that year by year there appear new books and articles devoted to the phenomenon, whether on a global, national or local scale. At the same time, the subject literature still fails to supply a precise definition of the term. Understandings of the notion of collective memory vary depending on researchers’ academic discipline or paradigm. Moreover, there exist significant differences with regard to the term itself. Some write of collective memory, others of cultural memory, still others of historical or social memory. It should also be noted that, in entirely different conceptual categories than in the United States and Western Europe, the collective acts of remembering and forgetting were productively studied by Polish sociologists, historians and literary scholars long before the rise of the present fascination with collective memory.³

What, then, is collective memory? It would appear that, in spite of the differences in definitions and in the term itself, it is possible to identify some fundamental traits of collective remembering and forgetting. Most researchers dealing with the phenomenon concur with Maurice Halbwachs, who writes that collective memory “is powered and renewed, strengthened and enriched without losing anything of its fidelity, to the degree that the society bearing it moves forward.”⁴ At the same time – according to the author of *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* – society “tends to remove from its memory everything that might divide individuals, put distance between groups.”⁵ Although the process of remembering and forgetting is thus attributed to the individual, one can also speak of its collective nature. Astrid Erll aptly notes that “our personal recollections are shaped socially, and one and the other would be inconceivable if there did not exist collective memory.”⁶ In both the individual and collective cases, memory may relate not only to events and figures with which we as an individual or group have had direct contact (temporally, geographically, etc.). It often happens also that we “remember” about people and events from the distant past, which for various reasons we consider to be important to our identity. Halbwachs identified family reminiscences as the basis of intergenerational transmission. Analogously, collective memory has an extraordinary ability to transcend time and space. Following Barbara Szacka, we may give a preliminary definition of the phenomenon as “a system of imaginations about the past of a given society, constructed by its members, with content of varied character and diverse origin, in a process involving complex sequences of social interactions (communication acts, participation in public activities, discussions on collective heritage, ex-

² J. Le Goff, *Histoire et mémoire*, translated as *Historia i pamięć*, Warsaw 2007, p. 152.

³ Cf. K. Kończal, J. Wawrzyniak, Provincializing memory studies. Polish approaches in the past and present, *Memory Studies* 2018, vol. 11, issue 4, pp. 391–404.

⁴ M. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, translated as *Spoleczne ramy pamięci*, Warsaw 2008, p. 291.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

⁶ A. Erll, *Memory in Culture*, translated as *Kultura pamięci. Wprowadzenie*, Warsaw 2018, p. 35.

change of experiences, negotiation of meanings) taking place according to socially and culturally determined rules.”⁷

Jan Assmann, one of the leading theoreticians of collective memory, distinguishes within it the domains of communicative memory and cultural memory.⁸ The former is created through everyday interactions, and consists of the experiences of contemporary people. It thus has a limited time horizon (up to a hundred years), and its content undergoes constant change. But while communicative memory is created and shaped in a somehow natural way, cultural memory is constructed for specific purposes, and it encompasses events and figures from the distant past. In other words, “in cultural memory, the distinction between myth and history is suspended. It is not facts that matter here, only remembered history. One might say that cultural memory transforms actual history into remembered history, and by the same token into myth.”⁹ In this manner, cultural memory – which we shall henceforth identify with collective memory – becomes susceptible to instrumentalisation and alteration. Paul Ricoeur consequently calls it “manipulated memory”.¹⁰ In the French philosopher’s view, the “use and abuse” of memory results from the fragility of contemporary identities, an emanation of the very nature of a community shaped by “accounts of war” and seeing the “other” as a threat. Ricoeur writes that “manipulations performed on memory are due to the action of a disconcerting factor, taking multiple forms, propagated between the demand for identity and public forms of expression of memory.”¹¹ Ricoeur identifies this factor with an ideology of which the main aim is to “legitimise the authority of order or government”.¹² For this reason too, the corpus of figures and events included in collective memory, and their interpretation, change depending on need. Collective memory should therefore be considered not in terms of its conformance with historical facts, but in terms of its functions in present-day politics.

The canon of figures and events – and their interpretation – are disseminated with the help of various carriers. Just as formerly the main transmitters and interpreters of the past were the family and the Church, at present the leading role in shaping collective memory is played by media, particularly the mass media. According to sociologist John Thompson, “as our sense of the past becomes increasingly dependent on mediated symbolic forms, and as our sense of the world and our place within it becomes increasingly nourished by media products, so too our sense of the groups and communities with which we share a common path through time and space, a common origin and a common fate, is altered: we feel ourselves to belong to groups and com-

⁷ B. Szacka, *Czas przeszły, pamięć, mit*, Warsaw 2006, p. 45.

⁸ J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*, transl. A. Kryczyńska-Pham, *Pamięć kulturowa. Pismo, zapamiętywanie i polityczna tożsamość w cywilizacjach starożytnych*, Warsaw 2008, p. 66.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁰ P. Ricoeur, *La Mémoire, l’Histoire, l’Oubli*, translated as *Pamięć, historia, zapomnienie*, Kraków 2012, p. 107.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

munities which are constituted in part through the media.”¹³ In the case of local collective memory, one cannot ignore the role played in its formation by various types of local media, particularly regionalist journals. In this case, their position depends not so much on their circulation, as on the very fact of the engagement of people – mostly not professional journalists – in the process of creating their own vision of a “little homeland”. Therefore, in contrast to those elements of collective memory that are imposed from above – by local or central government, for example – the figures and events promoted on the pages of such publications are truly of grass-roots character. They thus combine the features of Assmann’s communicative memory and cultural memory.

The list of carriers of collective memory is not restricted to the media, however. Pierre Nora introduced the notion of *lieux de mémoire*, variously translated as places, sites, realms or spaces of memory, which he identified not only with physical places that evoke in visitors certain memories or feelings, but with any other form (even virtual ones) referring to commemoration.¹⁴ A similar approach is taken by Marcin Kula, who compiles his own list of carriers of memory. On the one hand he includes material objects: among others, monuments, natural elements (such as rocks), photographs, tools. On the other hand, Kula argues that memory carriers also include nonmaterial things such as place names, personal names, and even actions: speeches, meetings, etc.¹⁵ In turn, Andrzej Szpociński classes carriers of collective memory as intentional or involuntary. In the first category he places all objects and actions “created with the explicit intention of commemorating, of protecting from being forgotten”.¹⁶ These will therefore include monuments, plaques, street names, and the like. Involuntary carriers, on the other hand, are “all objects and behaviours that in certain situations perform the function of stimulators of memory about the past, in spite of the absence of a corresponding communicative intention”.¹⁷ This category may include – subject to certain conditions – buildings, documents, and natural sites.

FROM GERMAN LANDSBERG TO POLISH GORZÓW (WIELKOPOLSKI)

The above theoretical considerations provide a foundation to analyse the contemporary collective memory of the inhabitants of Gorzów Wielkopolski. First, however, we shall recall some details of the history of that city, which has undoubtedly left its mark on the historical awareness of its present-day population. The origins of the city of Landsberg (later Landsberg an der Warthe) are dated by historians to 1 July 1257, when John I, Margrave of Brandenburg, of the House of Ascania, approved the build-

¹³ J. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity*, Cambridge 1995, p. 35.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Szpociński, *Miejsca pamięci (Lieux de mémoire)*, *Teksty Drugie* 2008, no. 4, p. 12.

¹⁵ M. Kula, *Nośniki pamięci historycznej*, Warsaw 2002.

¹⁶ A. Szpociński, *Nośniki pamięci, miejsca pamięci*, *Sensus Historiae* 2014, vol. XVII, p. 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

ing of a new town on the border with the castellany of Zantoch (Santok). Because of its strategic position, as well as its convenient location on the line of the Warta river, Landsberg soon became an important economic and political centre in what was known as the Neumark. This was an area on the eastern edges of Brandenburg which, at the peak of its expansion at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, reached as far as present-day Chojna, Myślibórz and Lipiany to the north, and Sulechów and Krosno Odrzańskie to the south.¹⁸ At the same time, finding itself at the intersection of competing cultures (Polish and German) and clans, it frequently changed its political allegiance. In 1319, after the extinction of the Ascanian line, the Neumark came under the rule of the Wittelsbachs, and then in 1373 it passed to the House of Luxembourg. The city and the whole of the Neumark later came under the control of the Teutonic Knights, before finally being incorporated into Brandenburg in 1454. In the early eighteenth century the Neumark, including Landsberg, became part of the Kingdom of Prussia. Under Frederick II the Great (1740–1786) the region received significant investment, which enabled it to overcome at least partially the peripheral nature of its geographical position.

The watershed date in the modern history of the city is 30 January 1945. It was then that Landsberg was captured by Soviet forces, an event seen as symbolising the end of the German city. Less than two months later the civil administration was in Polish hands, and the city was renamed Gorzów (for the moment without the suffix Wielkopolski). Most of the main offices were assigned to people from the operational group in Wągrowiec, who had long been prepared for such roles. According to the authorities at the time, until mid-1945 there were more than 29,500 Germans and approximately 2300 Poles in the city.¹⁹ From late June to mid-July, with the involvement of civilian officials, troops and police, the unregulated expulsion of the German population took place throughout the annexed territory.²⁰ In consequence, by the time the provincial authorities issued decrees implementing the Potsdam arrangements, there were only just over 3400 Germans left in Gorzów.²¹ The process of removal of the German population was finally completed in July 1947, coinciding with the end of the mass migration of a new Polish community into the city. According to available documents, in December 1945 the number of Poles in Gorzów already exceeded 19,000.

According to the orders of the central authorities, the process of resettlement was to involve “cohesive groups of people, for the purpose of maintaining former social bonds that would facilitate the process of adaptation and integration into the new envi-

¹⁸ E. Rymar, *Historia polityczna i społeczna Nowej Marchii w średniowieczu (do roku 1535)*, Gorzów Wlkp. 2015, pp. 18–19.

¹⁹ L. Kruszona, Gorzów, miasto wskrzeszone, *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 2002, no. 9, p. 404.

²⁰ Z. Czarnuch, Niemcy w Gorzowie Wlkp. 1945-1950 (cz.1), *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 1996, no. 3, p. 48.

²¹ Idem, Niemcy w Gorzowie Wlkp. 1945-1950 (part 2), *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 1997, no. 4, p. 84.

ronment.”²² However, because of the complexity of the process, these ambitious plans were not fully realised. According to historians, “the Polish population of Gorzów, as in all towns in the recovered territories with a new incoming population, constituted a conglomerate lacking any social bonds carried over from previous environments. In Gorzów the only exception was the districts of the city with rural-type buildings, which were largely settled by cohesive regional groups.”²³ We lack detailed information on the origins of the first Polish inhabitants of Gorzów. Applying a method of analogy, however, we may assume that, like in the whole of the Lubusz Land (the present-day Lubuskie province), approximately 40% of them came from the former eastern borderlands (Kresy), the remainder being former residents of Wielkopolska and central Poland.²⁴ At a later time, a group of Ukrainians was also relocated to Gorzów under the Operation Vistula resettlement programme.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN COMMUNIST-ERA GORZÓW

The culturally and socially diverse inhabitants of Gorzów had their own memories, referring to the events and places from which they came. Different memories were retained – even in relation to the years of the Second World War – by people from the former eastern borderlands, by those from Wielkopolska, by those from the Kielce region or Małopolska. Elżbieta Smolarkiewicz, who has researched identity among the inhabitants of the so-called Recovered Territories, records that “the past of the local communities of the Lubusz Land is a particular case of an absence of linear structure; their common memory goes back no further than 1945, when these communities were ‘called into being’.”²⁵ These particular memories were thus deliberately restricted to the private sphere – homes, family meetings, parishes, etc. In the centralized, propaganda-oriented public sphere, a new, common collective memory was cultivated. On the one hand, the authorities thereby avoided a rivalry between particular memories which might have exacerbated the already high level of distrust, and often even enmity, between different groups of resettles. On the other hand, the marginalisation of pre-existing memories served to facilitate the creation of a new memory. Ryszard Nycz writes that a “resettled, de-territorialised, dislocated community” is one in which “no one (almost no one) is at home, in their place, in their own environment; anyone can be deprived of their place at any time, and/or owes their place to the new authority.”²⁶

²² T. Frąckowiak-Skrobała, T. Lijewska, G. Wróblewska, *Gorzów Wielkopolski. Przeszłość i teraźniejszość*, Poznań 1964, p. 169.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

²⁴ Cf. E. Smolarkiewicz, „Przerwana” tożsamość. Odtwarzanie i tworzenie tożsamości w społecznościach postmigracyjnych, Poznań 2010, pp. 30, 39.

²⁵ E. Smolarkiewicz, Kształtowanie tożsamości lokalnej na Ziemi Lubuskiej, *Przegląd Zachodni* 2005, no. 3, p. 70.

²⁶ R. Nycz, PRL: pamięć podzielona, społeczeństwo przesiedlone, *Teksty Drugie* 2013, no. 3, p. 8.

The authorities founded their new collective memory for the people of Gorzów on a sense of “historical justice” in the return of Poles to the Recovered Territories. In the local newspapers *Ziemia Gorzowska* and *Ziemia Lubuska*, regular use was made of such expressions as “the Piast lands”, “immemorially Polish territory” and even “liberated lands”.²⁷ Alluding to Andrzej Leder’s *Prześlona rewolucja* (“The Dreamed Revolution”), we may reiterate that the narrative of the time, oriented towards a sense of continuing a historical mission, was intended to justify the fact of the newcomers’ taking over homes and other property that had recently belonged to someone else.²⁸ It also hinted at possibilities of a new sociopolitical system, wherein national borders had returned to their rightful place.²⁹ For the same purpose, emphasis was placed on – among other things – the history of nearby Santok. It was no accident that this was the place chosen by the provincial authorities to hold the Lubusz Land’s first regional harvest festival, which lasted from 8 to 10 September 1945. According to a correspondent of the Gorzów weekly *Ziemia Lubuska*, the three-day-long event left an “indelible impression on the whole community, its essence being the propaganda significance, the manifestation of Polishness. The Harvest Festival achieved its purpose absolutely.”³⁰

It should be noted that the post-war process of shaping the collective memory of the inhabitants of Gorzów was not limited just to press propaganda. Moreover, it was not only the official authorities that aimed to integrate society by creating a shared canon of places and figures. A major role in the “re-Polonisation” of Gorzów was played by, among others, the Polish Western League (*Polski Związek Zachodni*, PZZ), whose local branch began operating in mid-January 1947. Apart from running a social and cultural centre and a library, and participating in multiple propaganda campaigns, the PZZ itself took the initiative in removing some of the remaining traces of Germanness from Gorzów.³¹ This concerned not only the names of streets and squares, but also signs on buildings and other places of memory associated with the city’s German history. The organisation issued official declarations asserting that “not a single trace of German culture, customs, language or writing” should be left in the city.³² Another significant contribution to the shaping of local collective memory in the early post-war years was that of the Catholic Church. In October 1947 the Primate of Poland, cardinal August Hlond, paid a one-day visit to Gorzów. The authorities gave the visit

²⁷ Cf. R. Domke, *Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne w propagandzie lat 1945-1948*, Zielona Góra 2010.

²⁸ A. Leder, *Prześlona rewolucja*, Warsaw 2014, p. 18.

²⁹ K. Wasilewski, *Przemiany pamięci zbiorowej na Ziemi Lubuskiej*, in: T. Nodzyński, M. Tureczek (eds.), *Ziemia Lubuska. Dziedzictwo kulturowe i tożsamość regionu w perspektywie powojennego siedemdziesięciolecia*, Zielona Góra–Gorzów Wlkp. 2015, p. 169.

³⁰ Quoted after: D. A. Rymar, *Gorzów Wielkopolski – miasto na Ziemiach Zachodnich*, *Przegląd Zachodni* 2002, no. 3, p. 83.

³¹ Cf. Z. Nowakowska, *Z dziejów Polskiego Związku Zachodniego w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim w latach 1945-1948*, *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 1998, no. 5, pp. 159–188.

³² Quoted after: D. A. Rymar, *Pogranicze santockie na przełomie epok*, in: Z. Mazur (ed.), *Wokół niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, Poznań 1997, p. 164.

ceremonial status, as evidenced by the inclusion of city officials in the welcoming committee. In his homily, the cardinal stated not only that there were no reasons for the Church to desire the “depletion of the territory of the Republic”, but also that it supported the “Polish future of the Recovered Lands”.³³

The myth of the Recovered Territories continued to provide a foundation for the constructed collective memory in future years. It formed the kernel of other narratives about the past whose purpose was the integration of society – integration between particular groups of resettlers, as well as integration with the new, still foreign, territory. In the corpus of events and people of importance for local collective memory, a leading position was taken by the pioneers.³⁴ Emphasis of the role of the first settlers – irrespective of their origin or political viewpoints – made it possible to blur cultural differences and create a myth of a common beginning. Every year, around the anniversary of the establishment of Polish administration in the city, details about the pioneers appeared in the local press, memoirs and journals from the early post-war years were published, and so on. At the same time, the city street named to commemorate the pioneers, *ulica Pionierów*, was a mere side-street, and throughout the communist era it remained one of only a few places of memory alluding to the first settlers. More space – both in press discourse and in the urban space – was devoted to the Polish Second Army and its contribution to Gorzów’s “restoration” to Poland. This element of collective memory was linked in turn to commemoration of the heroism of Soviet troops and of the Soviet Union as a whole, as the guarantor of Poland’s western border.

In analysing the collective memory of the people of Gorzów in the communist era, we should bear in mind that it was built from above, mostly without the involvement of the inhabitants themselves. Places of memory were established by decision of the authorities, without regard to the views of the local community. An example of this is the aforementioned pioneers myth, which, although cultivated in the press, lacked corresponding material places of memory. An exception to this rule was the street named *ulica Walczaka*, commemorating the Polish policeman Henryk Walczak, who was killed by Soviet soldiers in 1945. Even in this case, however, the official narrative of the event differed from the public perception. In consequence, many elements of collective memory, among others those referring to events before 1945, were confined to the private sphere. Another feature of collective memory in those times was the total omission of the German legacy. Although with time the aversion to traces of Germanness in the city became less strong, until the second half of the 1980s official statements either made no mention of them or did so only in a negative context.

³³ Quoted after: D. A. Rymar, *Gorzów Wielkopolski...*, p. 87.

³⁴ W. Kwaśniewicz, *Nowe impulsy w socjologicznych badaniach społeczności ziem zachodnich i północnych, Przegląd Zachodni* 1991, no. 2, p. 94.

COLLECTIVE MEMORY AFTER 1989

The sociopolitical transformations that began in 1989 had an impact on the shaping of Poles' collective memory, at both national and local levels. We may even speak of a revolution in collective memory that had equally far-reaching effects as the changes in the country's political and economic life. The events and figures that had been the foundation of the nation's collective memory underwent a complete reorganisation. Many of them were erased from that memory, a direct symbol of this being the removal of street names and monuments dedicated to communists or to the Soviet Union. New places of memory were created, and old ones were reinterpreted. Furthermore, as Marcin Napiórkowski notes:

[...] the fact that a certain event had not been commemorated or had been misrepresented in the time of the Polish People's Republic may additionally increase its value as an anchor of identity. In commemorating, for instance, the Warsaw Uprising or the post-war pro-independence underground movement, not only do we recall certain events from the past, but we also – as is often argued by politicians – put up resistance to forced forgetting or hostile propaganda.³⁵

In this way, local memory after 1989 came to be dominated by elements that until recently had functioned only in the private sphere.

The first public signs of interest in the German past of the city and its neighbourhood could be observed in the second half of the 1980s. It was then that the local weekly *Ziemia Gorzowska* began printing a series of articles on the histories of particular villages and small towns in Gorzów province. The main purpose of the series was the integration of the still young province, but at the same time the public became aware of certain facts of history that had hitherto been marginalised or not spoken of at all in the public sphere. However, like in the whole of the Western and Northern Lands, a kind of “fashion” for the German past took hold in Gorzów only after 1989. The progressive decentralisation and democratisation of public life enabled the entry into the local collective memory of people and events of significance for the city that belonged to the German period of its development. Writing about the identity of Gorzów, Paweł Lewandowski accurately observed that in the early 1990s “the beginnings of the Polish People's Republic began to be presented in terms of ‘obtaining’ rather than ‘recovery’, indication was made of the political provenance of scholarly narratives on the western lands, and notice was finally taken of the fates of the former German inhabitants.”³⁶

It was not only the terminology that changed. In official narratives, more explicit emphasis came to be placed on the shared fate of Poles and Germans – expelled from their own homes by the Soviets. In 1985, a journalist on *Ziemia Gorzowska* had written in an anniversary article about the fanatical German residents of Gorzów,

³⁵ M. Napiórkowski, *Polityka pamięciowych analogii*, *Res Publica* 2017, no. 3, p. 11.

³⁶ P. Lewandowski, *Tożsamość lokalna Gorzowa. Między niemieckim dziedzictwem a polską codziennością*, *Przegląd Zachodni* 2012, no. 1, p. 172.

who had believed to the last in the “providential mission of the Führer”.³⁷ Exactly ten years later, the weekly published a new version of that article, this time based mainly on memories recounted by Germans. As the same journalist now argued, they were victims, as were the Poles arriving in the city: “The first days after the incursion of the Russians are remembered equally tragically both by the Germans and by the Poles, for whom it signified ‘liberation’.”³⁸

This fundamental change in the perception of a common history, expressed so openly in the text cited above, also became noticeable in the case of other carriers of local collective memory. In 1998, the regularly celebrated anniversary of the city’s “liberation” – the entry of Soviet troops into Gorzów on 30 January 1945 – was remodelled as a Day of Memory and Reconciliation. In the unanimous opinion of the local political and cultural elite, this was a natural consequence of the Polish–German rapprochement that had been taking place in the border lands since the late 1980s. *Gazeta Lubuska* thus reported that the Day of Memory and Reconciliation had replaced the “controversial celebration of the anniversary of the city’s liberation from German occupation and its takeover by the Soviet occupier”.³⁹ The programme for the first celebrations included an ecumenical religious service, and the laying of flowers by city leaders at the Soviet military cemetery and on the graves of German townspeople.⁴⁰ Attempts were also made from the start to involve those who had lived in the former German city, through the Association of Former Residents of Landsberg. For more than 10 years, the event has been celebrated next to the Independence Monument, transformed after 1989 from a monument to “brotherhood-in-arms” (among other changes, a star was removed from the monument). In September 2006, to begin the marking of the 750th anniversary of the founding of the city, which fell in the following year, a Bell of Peace was installed on the monument, funded by former and present inhabitants of Landsberg/Gorzów.⁴¹ Supporting the idea of reconciliation, Gorzów’s mayor Jacek Wójcicki expressed the meaning of the event in his 2018 speech, saying of the date of 30 January: “this celebratory day of the city, of its people – past and present – is not just an element of the cultivation of memory and acknowledgement of the difficult Polish–German history, the building of new relations in a different reality, but is a universal message of peace intended to reach further new generations.”⁴² Underlining the similar fates of the resettled former and present-day inhabitants, since 2006 a part in the official celebrations of the Day of Memory and Reconciliation has

³⁷ J. Zysnarski, Ostatni dzień miasta L., *Ziemia Gorzowska* 1985, no. 3, p. 5.

³⁸ Idem, Ostatnie dni miasta L., pierwsze dni miasta G., *Ziemia Gorzowska* 1995, no. 9, p. 18.

³⁹ “sc”, Pamięć i pojednanie, *Gazeta Lubuska*, 31 January/1 February 1998, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Cf. Z. Linkowski, *W Gorzowie*, in: Z. Czarnuch (ed.), *Samożwańcze konsulaty. Rzecz o emocjonalnym stosunku Niemców i Polaków do tego samego skrawka ziemi*, Witnica–Gorzów 2013, p. 63.

⁴¹ Cf. T. Jędrzejczak, Przemówienie z okazji odsłonięcia „Dzwonu Pokoju”, *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 2007, no. 14, pp. 9–17.

⁴² <https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/w-piatek-dzien-pamieci-i-pojednania-w-gorzowie-wielkopolskim> (accessed 13 March 2019).

been played by former residents of Landsberg, together with representatives of local organisations of expellees from the former Polish eastern borderlands.

The example of the Day of Memory and Reconciliation shows clearly that in the years following 1989 the city authorities played a key role in shaping the new collective memory of the people of Gorzów. It is partly thanks to local officials that in October 1993, on the site of the former German cemetery, which was converted to a park in the 1970s, a monument was unveiled “to the memory of the residents of our city buried in this cemetery in the years 1831–1945”. People involved in that initiative report that much emotion and debate was aroused simply by the question of how the city should be named on the monument. It was finally decided to use neither the name Landsberg nor Gorzów, but the neutral term “our city”. In the words of Krystyna Kamińska, who recalled those events, “after all, until 1945 it was ‘ours’ to the Landsbergers, and since 1945 it has been ‘ours’ to the Gorzowians”.⁴³

Also at the initiative of the then mayor Henryk Maciej Woźniak, the events marking the city’s 740th anniversary in 1997 included the restoration of the Paucksch Fountain, built in 1897 by local businessman Hermann Paucksch and demolished for military purposes in 1941.⁴⁴ Interestingly, in the collective memory of the German inhabitants the false belief had become established that the fountain was destroyed by Soviet troops. The reopening of the fountain was attended by the grandson and great-grandson of the original founder, Eberhard and Wolfhart Paucksch. As in the case of the Day of Memory and Reconciliation, the fountain was also intended to become a symbol of shared fates and thus a common memory, as was expressed by, among others, bishop Adam Dyczkowski: “Dear community, for we are after all a community. [...] We all acknowledge the history of this city, which began in 1257, but for some did not end by any means in 1945, and for others did not begin by any means only at the end of the war.” Among other initiatives of the city authorities, we might also mention the *Alte Kameraden* wind orchestra festival, inaugurated in 2007 in commemoration of the German composer of military marches, Carl Teike.⁴⁵ The composer was also commemorated by a plaque installed on the front of the house in which he lived.

It is worthwhile to ask whether, and how permanently, the collective memory of the people of Gorzów was shaped by the historical policy pursued by the local authorities in the 1990s. Lech M. Nijakowski rightly notes that “of principal significance for the policy of memory is the founding of monuments and plaques, proudly commanding the public space.”⁴⁶ It is not surprising, then, that it is these two memory carriers that were at the centre of the actions undertaken by Gorzów’s government

⁴³ K. Kamińska, *Landsberg an der Warthe – Gorzów Wielkopolski*, *Pro Libris* 2009, no. 1, p. 96.

⁴⁴ Cf. M. Pytlak, *Gorzowska fontanna na Starym Rynku w świetle nadzoru archeologicznego prowadzonego w czasie jej remontu w 2010 roku. Glosa do historii ratusza*, *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 2012, no. 19, p. 122.

⁴⁵ K. Kamińska, *Landsberg an der Warthe...*, pp. 100–101.

⁴⁶ L. M. Nijakowski, *Polska polityka pamięci. Esej socjologiczny*, Warsaw 2008, p. 76.

in the first period of political transformation. The everyday attitudes of residents, as well as the framework of the discourse space in which the debate about the past takes place, indicate a broad assimilation of the narratives and symbolism directed towards acceptance of the shared history of Poles and Germans. The Day of Memory and Reconciliation has permanently replaced Liberation Day; it should be noted, however, that the date of 30 January (although commemorated in a street name as early as 1945) never became established in the memory of the city's contemporary inhabitants. It is hard to argue, then, with those who draw attention to the low turnout of locals during the ceremonies and the superficial nature of the anniversary celebrations.⁴⁷ At the same time, however, we may observe an increasing awareness among Gorzowians of a common heritage. When in 2010 the city authorities announced the restoration of the Paucksch Fountain and the planned replacement of the historical sandstone base with pink granite, a grass-roots protest was instigated to demand the retention of the original materials.⁴⁸ Among the comments appearing below articles on the fountain's renovation, voices in support of the preservation of heritage prevailed. "We cannot simply throw old monuments on the rubbish tip. It doesn't matter that they are not listed on a register. Out of respect for the original founder of the fountain and the former residents of Gorzów, the fountain should be left in the form it was in, after appropriate renovation" – this statement by one resident can be regarded as typical of the majority of comments.⁴⁹ As a result of strong public pressure, the city changed its position and decided that the restored fountain would retain all of its previously existing elements.

In parallel to local government policy went civic initiatives. It is these elements of collective memory, which arise somehow spontaneously, through grass-roots action, that prove to be the most durable and most resistant to political changes. Among local people with an interest in history, including teachers and officials, among others, there appeared true leaders of social memory, complementing in a natural manner the historical policy pursued by the local authorities.⁵⁰ Moreover, many of the officially sanctioned places of memory and ceremonies had their beginnings in the actions of regionalists, who often inspired and shaped particular actions of the authorities. In 2004 a Social Committee for the Building of Monuments was formed, transformed ten years later into a Gorzów Appreciation Society. Because of the actions of this organisation's members, numerous monuments were erected in Gorzów commemorating people connected with the city – both Germans and Poles. They included, in chronological order, the city tramp Szymon Gięty, the speedway rider Edward Jan-

⁴⁷ D. Barański, Czy gorzowianie wiedzą, co się wydarzyło 30 stycznia 1945 r.? I czego nas to może nauczyć w 2019 r., *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 January 2019, <http://gorzow.wyborcza.pl/gorzow/7,36844,24409364,czy-gorzowianie-wiedza-co-sie-wydarzylo-30-stycznia-1945-r.html> (accessed 24 March 2019).

⁴⁸ R. Ochwat, Budowlancy zniszczyli starą fontannę, *Gazeta Lubuska*, 25 March 2010, <https://gazetalubuska.pl/budowlancy-zniszczyli-stara-fontanne/ar/7844557> (accessed 14 February 2019).

⁴⁹ T. Rusek, Na czym stanie Maria? Ciąg dalszy sporu o cokół fontanny Pauckscha w Gorzowie, *Gazeta Lubuska*, 26 March 2010, <https://gazetalubuska.pl/na-czym-stanie-maria-ciag-dalszy-sporu-o-cokol-fontanny-pauckscha-w-gorzowie/ar/7845337> (accessed 24 March 2019).

⁵⁰ Cf. Ł. Skoczylas, *Pamięć społeczna miasta – jej liderzy i odbiorcy*, Warsaw 2014.

carz, and the painters Ernst Henseler and Jan Korcz. The Society also put in place a commemoration stone to the city's synagogue (demolished in 1938), as well as Nelly's Bench, commemorating the heroine of the novel *Patterns of Childhood* by Landsberg-born writer Christa Wolf. In 2015, a bust was unveiled of Zenon Bauer, who had chaired the presidium of Gorzów National Council (the city's communist-era authority) in 1958–1969.

The growing circle of regionalists worked to restore the city's history – and its residents' memory – through the publication of popular and scholarly papers, as well as magazine articles. As with the shaping of collective memory in the city space through the establishment of monuments and commemorative plaques, here also we may observe a symbiosis between memory leaders and institutions. In 1991 a group of regionalists began publishing the journal *Trakt* as a “guide to the little homeland and its various issues.”⁵¹ Three years later appeared the first issue of *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny (NRHA)*, the “Warta Lands Historical and Archival Yearbook”, published jointly by the Society of Friends of the Archive and Relics of the Past in Gorzów Wielkopolski and by the National Archive in Gorzów. Since that time the periodical has become a forum for the popularisation of knowledge about the history of the city and its neighbourhood, and for the exchange of experiences between amateur and professional historians. A decade later, in 2004, the Provincial and City Public Library began publishing *Zeszyty Naukowe. Nowa Marchia – Prowincja Zapomniana* (“Scientific Collections. The Neumark – the Forgotten Province”), now titled *Zeszyty Naukowe. Nowa Marchia – Prowincja Zapomniana – Ziemia Lubuska – Wspólne Korzenie* (with the addition of the words “Lubusz Land – Common Roots”), containing the texts of papers given at seminars under the same title. A bibliography of the contents of *NRHA* in the years 1994–2013 indicates a prevalence of articles devoted to the history of the city and its surroundings up to 1945, with particular emphasis on the Neumark context.⁵² This was a result of the dominance of mediaevalists, as well as the aforementioned fascination with history that had until recently remained marginalised. For the same reasons, similar proportions can be found on the pages of *Zeszyty Naukowe*.

Similarly, texts devoted to the past of the “little homeland” regularly appeared in the local press. Most were written not by professional journalists, but by people with an amateur interest in regional history, particularly teachers, educationalists, librarians, officials and other hobbyists. The weekly *Ziemia Gorzowska* published series titled “From the history of our little homeland” and “People from our lands”, produced by regionalists and presenting the former history of the city and its inhabitants, at the same time emphasising the connection between German Landsberg and Polish Gorzów. Another phenomenon of recent years is the activity of regionalists on

⁵¹ Z. Czarnuch, Gorzowski „Trakt”, *Przegląd Zachodni* 1995, no 3, p. 212.

⁵² Cf. G. Kostkiewicz-Górska, D. Zielińska, *Bibliografia zawartości Nadwarciańskiego Rocznika Historyczno-Archiwalnego oraz innych wydawnictw Archiwum Państwowego i Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Archiwum i Pamiątek Przeszłości w Gorzowie Wlkp. za lata 1994-2013*, Gorzów Wielkopolski 2013.

social media. Taking advantage of almost unlimited possibilities of communication and community formation, profiles dedicated to local and regional history are enjoying record popularity. For example: on 2 April 2019 the Facebook profile *Gorzów Wczoraj* (“Gorzów Yesterday”) was being followed by 27,000 people, while a second similar profile *Dom Historii Miasta – Gorzów – Landsberg* (“Home of City History – Gorzów – Landsberg”) had 11,000 followers at that time.

Thus, in the first two decades after 1989, the Polish–German heritage of Landsberg/Gorzów became a new foundation for collective memory in local historical policy. In a somewhat natural way, it replaced the former vision of a “recovered” city whose history had begun in 1945. A significant role in this process was played by the aforementioned local memory leaders, who – through numerous publications in the press and in regionalist journals, and through the stimulation of actions of the local authorities – have left a visible mark on the topography of the memory of Gorzów and its inhabitants. By emphasising shared fates and the city’s centuries-long history, attempts have been made to overcome the problem of severed memory that had accompanied the local community since 1945. This has made it possible not only to “recover” the memory of the city – Landsberg/Gorzów – but also finally to assimilate a foreign cultural landscape.⁵³ While in the communist era this was impossible, because any element of collective memory that did not fit within the narrow framework of official propaganda could function only within the private sphere, with the socio-political watershed of 1989 it began to undergo a process of adaptation to the public sphere.

A consequence of this was the marginalisation of other elements of collective memory from the communist period, including the pioneers myth. It is true that 28 March has been designated Pioneer Day, and in 2006 a monument to this group of people was unveiled, but the extent and scale of events associated with them remain small.⁵⁴ The pioneers were given greater attention only in 2015, during celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of Polish administration in Gorzów. Even then, the subject of the pioneers was bound up in a broader discourse relating to the former eastern borderlands, as will be described below. The situation was similar with regard to the military campaigns of the Red Army and the Polish Second Army, a topic that dominated the pre-1989 landscape of local collective memory, but was subsequently almost completely expunged from the public sphere. Nevertheless, while there were few voices of opposition to the changing of street names commemorating communist-era Polish and Soviet military leaders, attempts to remove monuments met with resistance in the local community. Complying with the Act of 1 April 2016 “on the prohibition of propagation of communism or another totalitarian system through names of public buildings, structures and devices” and with guidelines from the In-

⁵³ Cf. K. Biskupska, Pamiętam, że... O społecznej konstrukcji pamięci mieszkańców miast Ziemi Zachodnich i Północnych na przykładzie Wrocławia, *Opuscula Sociologica* 2017, no. 1, pp. 71–83.

⁵⁴ D. Barański, Pionierzy mają swój pomnik, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 1 November 2006, <http://gorzow.wyborcza.pl/gorzow/1,36844,3713416.html> (accessed 15 March 2019).

stitute of National Remembrance (IPN), city officials took a decision in July 2017 to move the Independence Monument (formerly the monument to brotherhood-in-arms) from the representative city square Plac Grunwaldzki to “another place”. When the plans were made public, a grass-roots campaign was launched – making effective use of social media – under the slogan “The monument is ours!”⁵⁵ At the same time, residents protested against the removal of the monument to the Polish Second Army standing on the square known as *Kwadrat*, which had been erected in 1978 on the 35th anniversary of the formation of the Polish People’s Army. In both cases the objections came more from a desire to protect the monuments as elements of the local memory space than from sympathy with their original symbolism. It was argued that the Independence Monument had become a “symbol of Polish–German friendship and of reconciliation”, while the monument to the Polish Second Army should be left in place because “Polish Gorzów equals Polish soldiers”.⁵⁶ The argument of the need to protect local heritage was also used with equal success in defence of the aforementioned street name *ulica Walczaka*, which – as a name commemorating a communist-era policeman – was supposed to be changed under the new law.

The past few years have seen increasing interest in history related to the former eastern borderlands of Poland, known as the Kresy. Organisations of Gorzów residents originating from those areas, and their descendants, have long been in existence in the city, but their activities were usually limited to taking part in official anniversary celebrations (both local and national);⁵⁷ they did not play a part in shaping local collective memory. Kresy history can be said to have first made a mark in the public sphere in 2013, following the nationally organised ceremonies to mark the 70th anniversary of the massacres of Poles in Volhynia (Wołyń). A further impulse was provided by the national discussion on the suppression of information on that crime, provoked by work on Wojciech Smarzowski’s film *Wołyń*, and later by its première and public reaction to it. Another visible factor was the popularity of successive volumes of *Kresowa Atlantyda* by Sławomir Nicieja, which described the rich history of Poland’s former eastern lands.

The growing presence of this element in local collective memory was also reflected in the local press. In 2012, *Gazeta Lubuska* began a series of articles titled “Your Kresy”. These include diaries, memoirs and historical articles concerning life in old eastern Poland. On one hand, the texts are dominated by nostalgic narratives idealising the past of the lost “little homeland”. Common subjects thus include recollection of the fates of the great noble families and manors, where “cultural life and a certain characteristic thread of tradition were concentrated”.⁵⁸ On the other hand, increasing

⁵⁵ Gorzowski KOD protestuje przeciwko zburzeniu Pomnika Niepodległości, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 September 2017, <http://gorzow.wyborcza.pl/gorzow/7,36844,22430653,gorzowski-kod-protestuje-przeciwko-zburzeniu-pomnika-niepodleglosci.html> (accessed 24 March 2019).

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁷ For instance, the Gorzów branch of the Wilno and Wilno Lands Appreciation Society, established in 1990.

⁵⁸ Cf. K. Wasilewski, *Przemiany pamięci zbiorowej...*, p. 174.

emphasis is placed on the tragedy of the massacres, which brought not only the deaths of thousands of people – forebears of the present-day inhabitants of the Lubusz Land, including Gorzów – but also the symbolic ending of the presence of Polish culture in the eastern lands.

The local discourse on the Kresy well represents the perception of that region in collective memory – as an important element of Polish history and culture – and at the same time of the trauma caused by the killings. This creates what Leder in *Prześlona rewolucja* calls an “imaginarium” of the old nobility, simultaneously emphasising the achievements of many centuries and the scale of the violence experienced by Poles, thus enabling people to build their own identity on the basis of a glorious past.⁵⁹ It is no accident, then, that the position of Kresy history in collective memory is growing in tandem with the phenomenon visible at national level (and elsewhere) whereby contemporary societies attempt to redefine their own identities. In February 2018, in one of the local parks, in the presence of representatives of central and local government and of the Church, a plaque commemorating the victims of the Volhynia massacres was unveiled. It was fastened to a stone which had until recently displayed another plaque, commemorating General Nikolai Berzarin, commander of the Soviet troops that entered Gorzów on 30 January 1945.⁶⁰ The proponents of the new plaque made no secret of the fact that its inspiration was not merely historical, but also political. According to Grzegorz Baczyński, a member of the Social Committee, the commemoration of General Berzarin had served as a “symbol of the rule of communism in Poland in alliance with the victorious Red Army.”⁶¹ In reference to the new plaque and the Volhynia massacres, he said that “in free Poland it was a taboo topic, and earlier in eastern Poland people were not permitted to talk about it. We want to remind people of those victims, and it so happened that just at that time there was a growth in propaganda related to Bandera.”⁶² We may thus speak of a direct “cannibalisation” of places of memory, whereby one plaque was removed and another installed in its place.⁶³ In contrast to the case of the aforementioned monuments, which were assigned a new meaning, the old plaque was simply replaced by a different one. Although in a geographic sense the place of memory remained the same, it underwent a complete transformation – not only its form was changed, but also the whole of the context surrounding it.

⁵⁹ A. Leder, *Prześlona rewolucja*, op. cit., p. 16.

⁶⁰ “db”, W Parku Siemiradzkiego odsłonięto tablicę poświęconą Rzezi Wołyńskiej, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 February 2018, <http://gorzow.wyborcza.pl/gorzow/7,36844,23003709,w-parku-siemiradzkiego-odslonieto-tablice-poswiecona-rzezi-wolynskiej.html> (accessed 10 April 2019).

⁶¹ Gorzów Wlkp.: uczczono ofiary mordów na Wołyniu, *eKai*, <https://ekai.pl/gorzow-wlkp-uczczono-ofiary-mordow-na-wolyniu/> (accessed 10 April 2019).

⁶² Ibid. Stepan Bandera was a controversial Ukrainian nationalist leader, considered in Poland to be partly to blame for the Volhynia massacres.

⁶³ B. Zelizer, *Cannibalizing memory in the global flow of news*, in: N. Motti, O. Meyers, E. Zandberg (eds.), *On Media Memory*, New York 2011, pp. 27–36.

CONCLUSION

Collective memory is a phenomenon that is hard to pin down. In this article, we have limited ourselves to presenting the most important places of memory, analysing the local authority's historical policy, and investigating the local discourse relating to figures and events of the past. By these means it has been possible to identify two foundations of the collective memory of the contemporary inhabitants of Gorzów Wielkopolski. The first is a sense of the continuity of the history of German Landsberg and Polish Gorzów. The grass-roots activity of regionalists and the systematic policy of the local government have caused this element of local history, which remained marginalised during the period of communist rule, to be reintroduced into the public sphere. The second foundation is the history related to the former Polish eastern borderlands, known as the Kresy, which for several years has been growing in importance in local collective memory. The local political discourse reveals an increasingly visible need for the shaping of identity through reference to the heritage of the Kresy, idealising the Polish presence in the east, while at the same time building a sense of national belonging by emphasising the trauma associated with the massacres in Volhynia. A part is also still played in collective memory – although not so intensely as was formerly the case – by the myths of the pioneers and of the campaign of the Polish Second Army; but as has been shown here, this takes place within an entirely different context and narrative than it did during the communist era. Attempts are also made to introduce national motifs into the local collective memory, such as the “cursed soldiers” of the post-war anti-communist resistance movement, and the legacy of the Solidarity free trade union.

Although the process of remembering is ascribed to the individual, societies nevertheless create their own corpora of places, figures and events which they “remember” and which they regard as important for their identity. It is also societies that decide who or what to omit from those corpora. We cannot ignore either the influence of nationwide trends in the politics of memory, which are also reflected on the local scale, although they have not been addressed in this article. The case of Gorzów and the collective memory of its inhabitants thus demonstrates the interpenetration of multiple levels: the private and public spheres, grass-roots activism and local government policy, media activity, and indeed the specific local features and activity of central institutions – and in the case of a border region, foreign institutions also. It is as a result of this interpenetration that the characteristic collective memory of the inhabitants of Gorzów comes to be formed, incorporating on the one hand reconciliation between Poland and Germany, and on the other the idealisation of the past of the former eastern borderlands.

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Keywords: collective memory, Gorzów Wielkopolski, memory policy, identity, migrations

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the collective memory of the inhabitants of Gorzów Wielkopolski, one of the two administrative centres of Poland's Lubuskie province. Because of its location near the German border, as well as its ethnically and culturally diverse social structure, the city provides an interesting case study of the development of historical awareness on the local scale. Subjects analysed include selected places of memory, the historical policy of the local government, and media discourse. Two foundations of the collective memory of the contemporary inhabitants of Gorzów are identified. The first is a sense of continuity between the history of German Landsberg and Polish Gorzów. The grass-roots activity of regionalists and the systematic policies of local government have caused this element of local history, which remained marginalised during the communist era, to be reintroduced into the public sphere. The second foundation is the history of the former eastern borderlands, the Kresy, which has gained in importance in local collective memory in recent years.

The author proposes the thesis that the case of Gorzów and the collective memory of its inhabitants reflects the interpenetration of multiple levels: the private and public spheres, grass-roots activism and local government policy, media activity, and finally the specific local features and activity of central institutions – and in the case of a border region, foreign institutions also.

Methods used in the research include, among others, historical and descriptive methods and discourse analysis. The main part of the article is preceded by theoretical considerations on collective memory and its carriers, and some details of the history of Gorzów, especially the watershed year of 1945 and its consequences for the contemporary city.

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CULTURAL HERITAGE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN 1970S AND 1980S WESTERN POLAND

“The history of protecting monuments is a history of how the present responds to the past”

Wacław Wagner

“The return of the Western and Northern Territories to Poland occurred not only as a result of historical legitimation and international arrangements. These lands, having been isolated from the Polish state organism, (...) had been drifting economically towards Poland. (...) The past had shown that, within the German state, the territories along the Oder-Neisse line and along the Baltic Sea were in economic decline. Their return to Poland, i.e. reunification with the Mother Country, brought them advancement, expansion and continuous development”

Wiesław Sauter

Research on the cultural heritage of the Polish Western Territories has predominantly concerned the assessment and adaptation of the German cultural heritage after WW2. The most frequently adopted timeframe is the 1945-1989 period, with the year 1956 marked by a political thaw.¹ However, relatively few studies to date have centred on the 1970s and 1980s.² Naturally, for many reasons, such a strategy is understandable: this kind of chronological approach does not arouse serious concerns given the difficulty in delineating specific periods that would provide grounds for offering definitions of transformations. Therefore, even more interesting is the question whether it is possible to propose an internal periodization in the context of the problem addressed here, and pose a question about possible transformations which would be helpful in providing directions for further research. As a result, another question arises: what criteria should be applied in this periodization procedure? Doubtless, a key

¹ Cz. Osękowski, *Ziemie Odzyskane w latach 1945-2005*, Zielona Góra 2006, p. 7.

² J. Kowalczyk (ed.), *Ochrona dziedzictwa kulturowego zachodnich i północnych ziem Polski*, Warsaw 1995; Z. Mazur, (ed.), *Wokół niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, Poznań 1997; Id., (ed.), *O adaptacji niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, Poznań 2001; T. Nodzyński, M. Tureczek, (eds.), *Ziemia Lubuska. Dziedzictwo kulturowe i tożsamość regionu w perspektywie powojennego siedemdziesięciolecia*, Zielona Góra – Gorzów Wlkp. 2015.

factor that needs to be taken into account is that of social transformations; i.e. the presence of the new generations already born in the Western Territories, which contributed to the natural evolution of attitudes towards the formation of local identities. Another component is the indisputable progress in research and in restricted, albeit continuing, conservation work coupled with the gradual dissemination of knowledge, which took place in a specific reality and made it possible to become familiarised and to start identifying with the existing (and still alien) monuments in this area.³ It needs to be emphasised at this point that this evolution took place in communities that were in some ways deprived of the past, that is of memory and tradition.⁴ However, the scale of these transformations was difficult to assess even into the 1990s, when the democratisation of life and the depoliticisation of heritage made it possible to voice these issues in public.

Naturally, it should be highlighted here that in the period in question, research, conservation work and, last but not least, the dissemination of knowledge (highly important in the social context of the protection and care of monuments) were largely focused on the sanctioning of the Polish (associated with the rule of the Piast dynasty) or Slavic roots in the Western Territories. Those endeavours concerned archaeological excavations⁵ as well as readjustment and reconstruction efforts in the cities and towns of the region. However, on the fringes of the mainstream, there were other components that were gradually incorporated into the ongoing discussion. Having reviewed the literature on historical monuments, one can question the view that the cultural heritage in western Poland had not been addressed in extensive research. What was essential was the interpretation and segregation of noteworthy findings; however, it would be unfair to argue that that heritage had been completely ignored. That such a view is unjustified is shown by the monumental volume entitled *Ziemia Lubuska (Lubusz Land)*, which was published as part of the series “Ziemie Staropolski” (“Old Polish Lands”) in 1950 by the Western Institute in Poznań. The volume includes an extensive chapter by Gwido Chmarzyński entitled *Sztuka Ziemi Lubuskiej (Lubusz Land Art)*. Of interest is also a 1976 publication by Stanisław Kowalski entitled *Zabytki Środkowego Nadodrza (The Monuments of the Middle Oder Region)*. At the time Kowalski served as the Voivodeship Conservator of Monuments in the city of Zielona Góra.⁶

The complex nature of the cultural heritage in western Poland made it necessary to attempt at least to provide reasons for downplaying the German origin of the local legacy. Hence, if a particular monument could not be classified as Polish, then its artistic values were emphasised so as not to disregard its existence. This approach can

³ O. Czemer, *Zabytki Śląska w Polsce dyktatury proletariatu*, (in:) A. Tomaszewski (ed.), *Badania i ochrona zabytków w Polsce w XX wieku*, Warsaw 2000, pp. 59-72.

⁴ M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Warsaw 2009, pp. 35-50.

⁵ J. Szreta, *Historia archeologii na Ziemiach Odzyskanych 1925-1960*, BA thesis, 2014, pp. 14-22, <http://www.academia.edu> [accessed: 10 February. 2019].

⁶ S. Kowalski, *Zabytki słuszne i niesłuszne. Ze wspomnień konserwatora*, “Siedlisko”, issue 2, 2006, pp. 7-16.

be seen in both of the aforementioned works. Obviously, this was not a rapid process, and it would not fit the contemporary research paradigm; however, the 1970s and 1980s show a marked difference compared to the first years after WW2 in the context of social changes and the attitude to the German past.⁷ Besides the above-mentioned social and research issues, the concept of protecting cultural property comes to include institutional and legal problems, which also continued to evolve in Poland during the communist era,⁸ putting the cultural heritage in the framework of specific efforts undertaken both at the local and central level. Finally, in the context of western and northern Poland, of paramount importance are the political circumstances (both internal and external), especially Polish-German relations and their transformations in the period in question.⁹

Looking at the determinants of the restrictions in a comprehensive manner, it is possible to identify constituents, which – in the author's view – will allow us to draw restricted conclusions that might in turn allow us to take a broader look at the problem in question. At the same time, the chronological, socio-historical and political reflections contained in this paper cannot be presented independently of each other as they all constitute a specific and relatively broad context.

Under the 1945 Potsdam Agreement,¹⁰ Poland's takeover of the German territories brought with it a number of consequences, some of which pertained to the takeover of the culturally alien legacy in the form of material culture such as monuments.¹¹ Much less attention in the present contribution will be given to the immaterial heritage, which was largely reduced due to the westward migration of the people who had lived there until 1945. It should be emphasised that all later as well as present attempts to reconstruct the immaterial aspects of the heritage have been solely secondary and selective in nature due to the social context, which was influenced by the almost complete population exchange resulting in an altered perception of these elements.¹²

The material heritage was much more difficult to erase. Even if in historical research, the material constituents were assigned specific interpretations or were totally ignored, the architecture, cemeteries or moveable artefacts, most frequently through their form or artistic qualities, bore clear features that linked them with their German origin. After all, it would have been difficult to reinterpret gravestones with German

⁷ A. Wolff-Powęska, (ed.), *Polacy wobec Niemców. Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945-1989*, Poznań 1993.

⁸ For more on this topic, cf. A. Merta-Staszczuk, *Niechciane dziedzictwo. Nieruchomości zabytkowe na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945-1989*, Warsaw 2018, pp. 241-286.

⁹ B. Rymaszewski, *Motywacje polityczne i narodowe związane z zabytkami*, (in:) A. Tomaszewski (ed.), *Badania i ochrona zabytków w Polsce*, op. cit., pp. 81-96.

¹⁰ Cz. Osękowski, *Ziemia Odzyskane*, op. cit., pp. 9-24.

¹¹ For more on the incorporation of the German territories into Poland cf. E. Cziomer, *Zarys historii powojennych Niemiec 1945-1995*, Krakow 1997, pp. 21-25.

¹² J. Kociuba, *Legends Pomorza. Podania, baśnie i opowieści prawdziwe z terenów Księstwa Pomorskiego, Szczecin-Stargard 2017*; R. Rudiak., *Baśnie, legendy i podania Ziemi Lubuskiej. Szkic monograficzny*, Zielona Góra 2018.

inscriptions, monuments with an unambiguous meaning or 19th century architecture, which, at the time of its construction, would clearly reflect the specific cultural and historical trends in that area. Commenting on these issues, one cannot help but notice that it is only now that, for example, 19th century architecture is perceived (also by art historians) as an essential component of the historic landscape. In communist Poland, these facts were intentionally overlooked even in the case of works by such eminent architects as: Karl Friedrich Schinkel, Friedrich August Stüler or Emil and Georg Zillmann and others. The prevailing tone emphasised the Polish identity of that territory and it was necessary to search for traces that would justify that image. Worth quoting is the announcer of the Polish Film Chronicle (PKF, 19A/58) who talks about the town of Nysa in Opole Silesia. The footage shows the town destroyed in the war and rebuilt from the ruins (in actuality, some of the ruins in the Old Town were demolished in the 1940s and 1950s for the purposes of stockpiling building materials¹³). Here is what the announcer says:

“(…) The first years of the town’s reconstruction. In the last weeks of the war two thirds of Nysa was destroyed. A very unusual reconstruction idea was adopted here: new districts are built on the medieval urban system. From among the ruins, only those monuments that, in addition to historical value, had a reasonably preserved structure were saved. In a harmonious manner new architectural plans were combined with the traditional image of the old Silesian fortified settlement (...) for thousands of young people who were born in Nysa after the war these walls evoke memories of their entire lives. It was here where they used to play, go to school, or run up to the river bank along Krzywoustego Street past Ziębicka Tower. So many times did they pass the stone lion in the tower recess, then lessons and secondary school final exams in the Carolinum building, where King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki had once received his education.

Another example is this description of Opole (PKF, 6B, 70):

“(…) January of 1945. Amidst the ruins of Piast Opole a dream was coming true: the dream of those who had for many generations remained loyal to this land against the German repression, and whose hearts had been with Poland for six centuries (...) Footnotes to the Polish origin of Opole: the Piast eagle of the 15th century crowns the chapel’s vault, the Chapel of St Anne in the Franciscans’ Church, founded in the 14th century by Duke Bolko I, the triptych at the head of the 14th century tombs of the Piast dukes (...)”

Our discussion cannot exclude an obvious barrier which is linked to the post-war attitude to German identity. The barrier influenced by war experiences left a deep mark not only on social relations but also on legal and conservation doctrines (which provided guidelines on what should be protected after the war and how) as well as on the existing political system. The 1990s, which saw the embracement of diversity in western and northern Poland, in contrast to the hostile comparisons of Poles and German in post-war official doctrines, emphasised the significance of region and a sense

¹³ Cf. T. Foltyn., *Zniszczenie zabytkowego śródmieścia Nysy*, “Śląsk Opolski”, issue 2 (39), Opole 2000, pp. 13-18; M. Krawczyk, *Architektura dawnej Nysy*, (in:) *Historia lokalna na przykładzie Ziemi Nyskiej*, Nysa 2014, pp. 64-85.

of regionality or even indigenosity as key factors underlying the new trends.¹⁴ It follows then that a change in attitudes to the heritage required time for them to be redefined. It is those factors, not the official doctrine of the socio-national unity in communist Poland, that have led to the approval of the cultural heritage. At the same time, this process, which occurred in a completely different socio-political setting, highlighted what was previously missing, i.e. what it takes to provide grounds for changing social and institutional attitudes in a broad sense. However, one cannot help but notice that the change of attitude to the cultural heritage in the 1990s had to be a longer process, and that it had to take some time for the local communities to embrace it and mature into a sense of “social shame” for the image of their surroundings in towns and cities. That process involved both opinion-forming groups and ordinary people, “neighbours” or even residents of palace complexes or residents of urban complexes in smaller towns.

Compared to the previous decades, for Polish society the 1970s was a time of indisputable social and economic modernisation. The consumerism-driven model of the economy under Edward Gierek undoubtedly had an impact on the gradual opening to Germany and German identity¹⁵ even though the official political doctrine remained unchanged and despite the eventual demise of the socio-economic policy of the time. This was fostered by the relative stabilisation of Polish-West German relations following the 1970 Treaty of Warsaw as well as increasingly frequent contacts of the former and present residents of the territories in question. The opened border traffic between Poland and East Germany resulted in frequent contacts, which gradually changed the Polish perception of Germans.¹⁶ It also needs to be highlighted that that time saw a rise in the number of the former German residents (from both East and West Germany) arriving in Poland.¹⁷ East Germans, who – compared to their western neighbours – had more limited overseas travel opportunities, were keen to come to Poland as tourists, which resulted in increasingly frequent visits to their hometowns. And even though the issue of resettlements was off the official agenda in East Germany, that country also saw an evolution of social attitudes to the 1945-1947 expulsions and resettlements, which had officially been erased from memory. Also West German citizens were keen to visit their birthplaces. Casual visits, for example, on the occasion of the Poznań International Fair, often turned into organised trips. This trend can well be seen in the magazines published at the time by the expellees’ associations in West Germany, which featured photo stories and short articles about the visits to the former German towns. This type of *Heimattouristik* continued on a large scale until the early 1990s with some interruptions, especially in the martial law period.

¹⁴ T. Zarycki, *Etosy regionalne a tożsamość narodowa – pole gry*, (in:) J. Szomburg, M. Wandolowski (eds.) *Polskie etosy regionalne i ich znaczenie z perspektywy ogólnonarodowej*, Warsaw 2018, pp. 13-21.

¹⁵ E. Cziomer, *Zarys historii powojennych Niemiec*, op. cit, pp. 210-243.

¹⁶ A. Kwilecki, *Z badań nad stereotypami Niemca w Polsce i Polaka w NRD i RFN*, “*Studia Prawnicze, Ekonomiczne i Socjologiczne*”, issue 4, 1978, pp. 201-219.

¹⁷ Cz. Osekowski, *Ziemie Odzyskane*, op. cit, pp. 94-100.

On the Polish side, the presence of Germans arriving especially in small towns, where they could not have been unnoticed, on the one hand aroused concerns about the property acquired after the war; on the other hand, however, it frequently (but probably not yet in the 1970s) caused a sense of shame (not always overtly expressed) for the state of cemeteries, parks and other monuments. And while the official propaganda in various album publications¹⁸ or in the Polish Film Chronicle (PKF, 44/52) painted a biased picture of the rebuilt Western Territories, it became increasingly obvious that the real image of the monuments was different. Contacts with Germans, often full of mistrust and mutual fears, albeit also friendly on a personal level, made it possible to go beyond the official line of the school education: at schools it was taught that the post-war territorial claims to the Western Territories were sanctioned by historical justice and the nation's and country's right to exercise control on the grounds of "self-affirmation" and denial of outsiders – by implication, of Germans.

In one of many numerous and interesting contributions written in a similar vein in the 1990s¹⁹, Adam S. Labuda outlined the evolution of attitudes to the German cultural heritage in Lower Silesia. He indicated that the rift between the official propaganda and the actual state of affairs had been at odds not only in terms of responsibility for preserving the European cultural heritage but also with the Polish national interest. The regime's policy of class (provenance-based) and ethnic segregation with regard to monuments was degrading both to these monuments and to the social awareness of publicly-owned heritage, which – under present-day views – is key to fostering positive attitudes to cultural heritage. While looking at a wide range of monuments (cemeteries, manor and urban complexes, etc.) and at broader determinants of the problem, it can easily be noticed that limitations on the protection of monuments are derived from the post-migration nature of the local communities as well as from a specific historical policy. That policy reinforced negative attitudes to cultural heritage that was labelled not only as alien (which meant it could somehow be brought under control, as in *Meinlichkeit* – "myiness") but also – to make matters worse – as hostile and, therefore, attributed to Germans. And even though already in the 1970s and 1980s there emerged a rift between the actual social attitudes and the regime's wishful thinking, the implications of that policy were in many cases irreversible. More importantly, they are still discernible in the cultural heritage of this area and in thinking about it, also at the level of decision-making groups.

While subscribing to the points made in Adam Labuda's paper, I find the issue of national interest debatable. With respect to cultural heritage, such a point can be valid if it is separated from the broader context of the problem. However, the scale of the degradation of cultural heritage in western Poland was unprecedented. The cultural heritage policy in this territory, just like other policies, was largely affected by international considerations, more specifically, by Polish-West German relations.

¹⁸ *Ziemia Lubuska*, album publication, Krakow 1970, pp. 15-30.

¹⁹ A. S. Labuda, *Niemieckie dziedzictwo historyczno-artystyczne w Polsce. Sądy, stereotypy i opinie po II wojnie światowej*, "Artium Quaestiones", issue VIII, 1997, pp. 22-24.

Naturally, no policy can be an excuse for ignoring or, even worse, destroying cultural property; however, in the social dimension, emphasising the Polish identity was part of the national interest at the time, especially in the light of West Germany's approach to the arrangements of the Potsdam Agreement and the legal status of the Polish territorial and material gains after 1945. It is thus necessary to view this as a process which had to take more time, regardless of the present assessments. It is also essential to be aware that that state of affairs did not change immediately after the 1970 Treaty of Warsaw. Poland was keen to sign it for two major reasons: to settle the border along the Oder-Neisse line and to engage in economic cooperation with West Germany. However, the treaty did not go beyond the temporariness of the border settlement, which was emphasised by the German side. Even Willy Brandt's leftist government had to reckon with German public opinion, which was explicitly reflected by the *Bundestag*'s vote on the ratification of the treaty.

Regardless of the historical, social and, most importantly, ethical determinants of the problem in question, the political context was paramount in raising any issues which could (as doubtless, many monuments could) show the German identity of this territory. And while all efforts aimed at the degradation of cultural heritage, irrespective of its social and ethnic origin, should always be considered ethically wrong, questions concerning the Polish national interest, given that the western border issue was not resolved until 1990, are not meaningless. Looking at the evolution of post-WW2 Polish-German relations at the social level, one can easily notice that the extent of negative narratives about Poland in West German expellees' groups was almost comparable to analogous phenomena in Poland.²⁰ These communities not only had an impact on the internal and foreign policies of subsequent German governments, including that of Konrad Adenauer, but they consciously influenced the attitudes of German society at the time. As early as the 1950s, Konrad Adenauer was aware that the territories lost to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union would probably never go back to Germany, yet the opposite interpretations could be found in German law, the statements of many intellectuals, and in the official doctrines of subsequent governments, including that of Helmut Kohl.²¹ It could even be argued that in that period both sides exerted a negative impact on the cultural heritage of the Polish Western Territories, viewed as a carrier of historical content. This was achieved by developing specific policies of historical memory, driven by different motives, albeit symmetrical in terms of the impact on the problem in question.

I am aware that the above view is not embraced by the publications that address the evolution of attitudes to the German cultural heritage. However, in my view, if the cultural heritage in western Poland is to be viewed as a supranational and European phenomenon, it is in this context that its status should be analysed in the period

²⁰ A. Sakson, *Obraz Polski i Polaków w działalności "Ziomkostwa Prusy Wschodnie" (Landmannschaft Ostpreussen)*, "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie" issues 2-3, 1983, pp. 267-277.

²¹ K. Wóycicki, *Niemiecki rachunek sumienia. Niemcy wobec przeszłości 1933-1945*, Wrocław 2004, pp. 149-174 ff.

in question as it exerted a negative impact on the current state of preservation. The Polish-German problem in this period is the problem of politicising the cultural heritage of these territories at the international level. Thus, I take issue with the views of Olgierd Czerner, which are summed up in the title of his publication: “Zabytki Śląska w Polsce dyktatury proletariatu” (“The monuments of Silesia under the Polish dictatorship of the proletariat”).²² Such an assumption naturally simplifies the problem, reducing it only to the socio-political system and the degradation of the post-migration local communities. A broader look, which goes beyond the status of this heritage in Poland as an identified problem, shows that these territories, their population and their cultural heritage, undoubtedly neither German nor Polish, had become a hostage of Europe’s division after WW2. It is true that extremely important German cemeteries were destroyed by the Polish hosts of these territories, primarily after 1970²³, which is a paradox in the light of the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty that regulated Polish-German relations. However, it is also true that the context of such behaviours in the social dimension is much more complex and goes far beyond senseless devastation. What is interesting in the case of cemeteries is their stories contained in memoirs. The analysis of such narrative sources, which are obviously subjective in nature, shows a sense of embarrassment and shame for acts of destruction committed in various towns.²⁴

On the other hand, while analysing the German situation in the 1970s, it is worth quoting documents from a conference of the German Episcopate and the German Evangelical Churches in connection with prospective Polish queries about the artefacts from the Western Territories in the context of the 1965 *Letter of Reconciliation of the Polish Bishops to the German Bishops* and the 1970 Treaty of Warsaw.²⁵ The historical and legal conclusions pertaining to the prospective Polish claims for the return of the artefacts were explicitly negative. What is interesting in this case is the fact that such a discussion was held in West Germany. The analysis of the documents, which the author has studied to determine the war losses of human property, clearly shows that the German side had questioned the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement due to the lack of a separate peace treaty which could have an impact on the change in negotiations with the Polish side. The issue was made worse by the lack of interna-

²² O. Czerner, *Zabytki Śląska w Polsce dyktatury proletariatu*, (in:) *Badania i ochrona zabytków w Polsce* op. cit., pp. 59-72.

²³ I. Skórzyńska, A. Wachowiak, *Cmentarze nieistniejących cmentarzy. Między obowiązkiem oddawania szacunku zmarłym i polityczną dyspozycją ich pamięci*, (in:) J. Kołacki, I. Skórzyńska (eds.), *Ziemia skrywa kości. Zapomniane krajobrazy pamięci – cmentarze protestanckie w Wielkopolsce po 1945 roku*, Poznań, pp. 61-79.

²⁴ J. Zięba, M. Tureczek, *Przywracanie pamięci czy pamięć wybiórcza? Kilka refleksji wokół akcji porządkowania zabytkowych nekropolii ewangelickich na przykładzie cmentarza w Brójcach, woj. lubuskie*, (in:) P. Zalewski, B. Bielinis-Kopeć (eds.), *Społeczeństwo obywatelskie a ochrona zabytków na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim*, Gubin 2014, pp. 243-258.

²⁵ Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin, *Ausschus für die Rückführung der Glocken e. V.*, File.: 52/158.

tional agreements as well as the regulations of the German law pertaining to private property.²⁶

At the same time, however, it is not possible to ignore the fact that these days numerous clean-up efforts, for example in the Evangelical cemeteries, also have various inspirations: from the intention of retrieving the situation of villages and towns or bringing them back to space and memory up to, what Joanna Zięba has termed, “the profitability of memory”.²⁷ This point begs the question not just about the present but about the future significance of such initiatives. It is only this future perspective that can provide answers to questions regarding the condition of memory and attitude to the German cultural heritage in Poland. The 1990s saw a crucial breakthrough in the treatment of the German legacy in western and northern Poland which resulted in many changes; however, today it makes sense to ask whether these changes will continue. In the author’s view, these initiatives are in marked decline as is the enthusiastic attitude of the post-1989 generations to the German heritage.

Is the above, rather critical picture of the evolution of social attitudes in western Poland a reason for concern or, rather, is it a natural phenomenon? It is true that old cemeteries are no longer being destroyed today, which is doubtless an achievement. However, are these cemeteries a noticeable constituent of local identities which could develop attitudes towards the cultural heritage? Probably, this state of affairs requires separate research, yet the issue is more complex and in the social dimension it cannot be contrasted with research on this heritage alone. In practice, there is a clear rift between the fact that some complexes of monuments are now the subject of interest on the part of researchers or authorities and the actual attitudes of the local communities. Another question can be asked here: does the fact that a palace complex has been renovated by a private investor always mean that the monument has become part of the local community? Too often it is still treated as adjacent space which is alien and closed to the community even though it is not deteriorating any further. The status of the facility has improved but does this mean that the status of the monument has also improved? This is a complex problem. Here I consciously touch upon the issue of the ownership title to historic sites.²⁸

A frequent criticism raised in the literature is that numerous complexes, notably manor and palace-park complexes, were nationalised and, as socialised property, were thus exposed to destruction or degradation. This is one of the problems that doubtless contributed to the demise of a great number of such historic sites precisely in the Communist period. It is hard to ignore the fact that those sites were most commonly owned by the State Agricultural Farms and were converted into offices, kindergartens, schools, community centres, as well as flats for farm workers. However, when in the early 1990s the State Agricultural Farms were liquidated, those facilities became deserted and were doomed to mass disappearance. Those which managed to survive

²⁶ Ibid., File: 52/167.

²⁷ J. Zięba, M. Tureczek, *Przywracanie pamięci czy pamięć wybiórca?*, op. cit. , pp. 243-258.

²⁸ B. Rymaszewski B., *Polska ochrona zabytków*, Warsaw 2005, pp. 174-175.

were to be privatised. It was assumed naturally that private owners would renovate them and take good care of them, which in many instances was the case. It turned out, however, that private ownership, which contributed to the improvement of some facilities, also made them less accessible to the public. Numerous monuments lost their immaterial value and became elements of the free market.

Unfortunately, this state of affairs has a negative impact on local communities, which in actuality are deprived of the opportunity to make use of monuments as integral constituents of cultural spaces. Why in the context of the 1970s and 1980s is it necessary to show the present-day state of affairs? The cultural heritage in western Poland, though not only in this area, was in the period in question deprived of a policy of protection in the social dimension. These decades were marked by a policy of hostility toward anything that was German and, by implication, alien. The contemporary period, markedly different in terms of social awareness, is characterised by economic interests, which even though they can contribute to the protection of monuments, pose other threats.

Coming back to the main theme, naturally, it would be wrong to ignore the economic context besides the aforementioned factors. Poland suffered enormous cultural property losses during World War II. This state of affairs, which does not require broader justification and which needs to be addressed as the background of the key problem, as one of numerous other factors, must have had an impact on determining priorities in the process of post-war reconstruction. As a result, in larger cities, such as Wrocław and Szczecin²⁹, reconstruction work was undertaken and attempts were made to develop compromise solutions; however even in such places there were numerous restrictions and ideas of changes which affected the entire urban spaces.³⁰ By contrast, smaller towns in western Poland served primarily as spaces for obtaining building materials.³¹ The scale of demolition works that were carried out there until the mid-1960s was such that not only districts but entire towns disappeared.

The implementation of the Government's Cabinet Presidium Resolution No. 666 of 20 August 1955 on the planned removal of war damaged remains in towns and housing estates and the analogous Government Resolution No. 417 of 8 December 1960 on the termination of works connected with the removal of war damaged remains in towns and housing estates led to the spatial degradation of entire urban solutions in western and northern Poland even though both resolutions in their content referred to the issues of the conservation of heritage. As a result, such towns as Krosno Odrzańskie, Kostrzyn nad Odrą, Dobiegniew and others lost their historical centres. And when

²⁹ A. Merta-Staszczak, *Niechciane dziedzictwo*, op. cit., pp. 168-183; J. Musekamp, *Między Stettinem a Szczecinem. Metamorfozy miasta od 1945 do 2005*, Poznań 2013, pp. 196-248.

³⁰ E. Małachowicz, *Architektura odbudowanych ośrodków miast historycznych*, (in:) *Badania i ochrona zabytków w Polsce*, op. cit., pp. 45-58.

³¹ B. Bielinis-Kopeć, *Zniszczenia miast Ziemi Lubuskiej w 1945 roku i ich konsekwencje dla współczesnych przestrzeni miejskich*, (in:) T. Nodzyński, M. Tureczek (eds.), *Ziemia Lubuska. Dziedzictwo kulturowe i tożsamość regionu*, op. cit., pp. 13-28.

in the 1970s and 1980s efforts were undertaken to develop urban parcels, stripped off their historic buildings, empty spaces were filled with “typical construction”, that is multi-family blocks of flats which had nothing in common with the previous urban landscape.

However, yet again the social context cannot be ignored. The 1970s was a time when the Polish baby-boomer generation was reaching the age of maturity and decision-making. As a result, there was a growing need for housing and social space for young people. Interestingly, it was those “typical” buildings as a “modern” phenomenon, in contrast to the old and degraded historic buildings, that provided provisional solutions, enhancing the economic and demographic potential of small urban centres.³² For it should not be forgotten, also in the context of the protection of monuments, that in western and northern Poland it was not until the late 1960s that the territory’s population reached the 1939 mark. The underpopulation of the Polish Western Territories (e.g. Lubusz Voivodeship) has always been a problem in at least some of the areas in the context of their economic condition. These factors must have had an impact on the socio-economic policy pursued at the time, which unfortunately also affected the problem of cultural heritage.³³ The effects of the 1970s construction policy followed in smaller towns of western Poland, some of which had not been rebuilt or developed earlier, remain visible to the present day, being a reason for the degradation of many urban centres and blocking the protection of the cultural heritage.

Another problem in the outlined socio-political context was the provisions of law. The Act of 15 February 1962 on the protection of cultural property and museums (Polish Journal of Laws 1962 No. 10, item 48),³⁴ although a highly modern legal act by the standards of the time, it created a number of loopholes in the interpretation of existing regulations, especially although not exclusively, those pertaining to the Western and Northern Territories. Regardless of the related premises, of relevance in the cited legislation was Article 4, Paragraphs 1-3. Under those provisions, legal protection was extended to the following cultural property, referred to in the act as “monuments”: 1) monuments entered in the register of monuments; 2) monuments that are parts of museums, libraries and public archives; 3) other monuments (if their status is obvious). In practice, the implementation of those provisions meant that conservators, who under the Communist regime could not act independently, had their hands tied when it came to undertaking any efforts that might run counter to the ideas

³² M. Tureczek, *Układ urbanistyczny Międzyrzecz w perspektywie powojennego siedemdziesięciolecia. Przemiany i problemy w zakresie ochrony historycznego miasta*, (in:) *Ziemia Lubuska. Dziedzictwo kulturowe i tożsamość regionu*, op. cit., pp. 29-48.

³³ J. Ziółkowski, *Socjologiczne aspekty przemian ludnościowych na Ziemiach Zachodnich*, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 24(3), 1962, pp. 255-284. For more cf. E. Frątczak, Z. Strzelecki (eds.), *Demografia i społeczeństwo Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych 1945–1995. Próba bilansu*, Warsaw 1996.

³⁴ Cf. B. Rymaszewski, *Polska ochrona zabytków*, op. cit., pp. 136-140.

of central and local authorities at various levels.³⁵ Another problem concerned the free interpretation of what is and what is not a monument, especially in the light of Article 16, Subparagraph 1 of the act, which stipulated that a monument could be removed from the register of monuments if its value was undermined by research. In practice, the freedom of interpretation was unlimited and the range of demolition works depended on the needs of local authorities and compliance with the Communist party line. Those phenomena are shown in the protocol dated 2 February 1970 on unused historic religious buildings on the territory of the then Zielona Góra Voivodeship.³⁶ According to the protocol:

“The registration of architectural monuments, carried out by the Ministry of Culture and Art in 1959-1961, also included unused and ruined monuments, such as religious buildings, for example. The follow-up guidelines of the Supreme Audit Office, issued after the analysis of the Voivodeship Conservator’s work in 1962, obliged the Department of Culture to enter into the register all registered facilities, including unused ones. This hampered demolition works since the decision to remove a monument from the register could only be made by the Minister of Culture and Art. Despite that, in the past eight years, approximately 40% of all unused religious buildings have been removed from the register and demolished. Among those that survived, there are a number of buildings which, due to the degree of deterioration, recurring architectural forms or little historical value can be demolished with no harm to the national culture. There is still a small number of monuments which should be saved because of their architectural and historical values and their high rank in the history of art and specialist literature. A great majority of them should be saved as permanent ruins, which is an increasingly common solution worldwide (...) The removal of such facilities from the register of monuments can be expedited following the submission of a request to that effect by local authorities. With regard to the Evangelical Church in Szprotawa, a decision has already been made to dismantle it. Only peripheral walls will be saved as they are remains of the mediaeval Piast castle. The tower will also be saved as a vantage point for tourists (...) Głogów – a parish church (13th-14th century) – a monument of culture of the Piast patronage. Romanesque relics were discovered, which Germans had uncovered but did not disclose during work to install central heating. How annoying this discovery is to Germans is reflected by the fact that a 1967 book published in West Germany on the state of monuments in Silesia questions the possibility of the presence of Romanesque architecture in that church. The building is planned to be saved as a permanent ruin, as a memorial to war damage (...) Gubin – a parish church. A proposal has been made to establish a museum of the struggle for the Middle Oder Region in the tower. The rooms surrounded by the walls of the naves (saved as a permanent ruin) would house an exhibition of heavy military equipment.”

However, a letter dated 10 April 1970 sent by the Presidium of the County National Council in Krosno Odrzańskie to the Department for Religious Affairs in Zielona Góra reads:

“The destroyed walls of Gubin Cathedral should also be dismantled because they disfigure the town and pose a threat to residents (no one has done any conservation work on these walls).”

³⁵ J. Muszyński, *Z doświadczeń w służbie konserwatorskiej*, (in:) Z. Mazur (ed.), *Wokół niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego*, op. cit., pp. 231-256.

³⁶ State Archives in Zielona Góra, Presidium of the Voivodeship National Council in Zielona Góra, Department for Religious Affairs, File: 3134.



Ruin of the Evangelical Church in Szprotawa (Lubusz Voivodeship), now the property of a Polish-Catholic parish, state as of November 2018. Photo by Marcei Tureczek

There were 113 churches which the Communist regime planned to dismantle in retaliation for the 1960 events in Zielona Góra (that list included the Gościkowo-Paradyż Abbey). Religious buildings, especially former Evangelical churches, as well as cemeteries and former manor complexes were among the most frequently degraded monuments.³⁷ It should also be noted that the status of religious architecture evolved over time. The 1970s saw the enfranchisement of church immovable properties in the Polish Western and Northern Territories pursuant to the Act of 23 June 1971

³⁷ M. Tureczek, *Niechciane zabytki na Ziemi Lubuskiej. Kościoły poewangelickie w świetle wybranych akt PWRN w Zielonej Górze*, "Studia Zachodnie", vol. 13, 2011, pp. 327-353.

on the transfer of immovable property situated in the Polish Western and Northern Territories to the Roman-Catholic Church and other churches and religious communities. (cf. the Polish Journal of Laws, No. 16, item 156).³⁸

* * *

The above overview of some of the barriers to the protection of the cultural heritage in western Poland in the 1970s and 1980s does not exhaust the subject in question. This issue is, doubtless, a broad research problem. It seems, however, that some of the points raised can lead to more general conclusions.

The 1970s and 1980s in the socio-political reality of communist Poland, despite a number of barriers, heralded the social transformations that provided grounds for developing new identities in the Western Territories. This was not a rapid phenomenon and it required political transformations to gain momentum as late as in the 1990s, when the local communities became truly empowered. The relative socio-economic stabilisation of the 1970s, the regime's consent to the restricted opening of the Polish-East German border, the gradual review of the "postwar" conservation doctrines – all of these factors provided opportunities to view the existing cultural heritage as not yet something personal or familiar but definitely more interesting. These views were shared not only by research circles, which were becoming increasingly responsible for the existing cultural heritage, but also, to a limited extent, by the local communities, which were rising to prominence, building new founding myths along with the generational change taking place in the territories settled by their parents after the war.³⁹

This, however, did not mean that the forthcoming transformations were radical. From the perspective of the central and local authorities, the cultural heritage of western Poland still posed a threat to the generally approved policy towards this area viewed as territorial gains after WW2. Under real socialism, it was impossible to empower the local communities; nor was it possible to empower the cultural landscape or heritage as carriers of specific content. According to historian of Warmia and Masuria Robert Traba, this was not a time for creating space for dialogue although, doubtless, this was a time for collecting experiences which emanated two decades later.⁴⁰

The above phenomena occurred in the context of a specific legal, economic and social reality. As can be inferred from the 1970 document cited above, the demolition works were not intended to reorganise the urban spaces in compliance with the principles of the preservation of monuments even though such provisions could be found in binding legal acts. The key objective, however, was to obtain raw materials. In such circumstances, efforts to protect the cultural heritage were doomed to failure.

³⁸ A. Małyszka, *Ewangelickie pozostałości w Poznańskim*, "Biuletyn IPN", issue 3, 2004, pp. 70-73; D. Mazurkiewicz, *Spór o prawo własności kościelnych majątków poniemieckich na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych w latach 1945-1973*, "Studia Paradyskie", issue 16, 2006, pp. 221-240.

³⁹ B. Halicka, *Polski Dzik Zachód. Przymusowe migracje i kulturowe osvajanie Nadodrza 1945-1948*, Krakow 2015, pp. 370-391.

⁴⁰ R. Traba, *Historia – przestrzeń dialogu*, Warsaw 2006, pp. 156-162.

As a result, entire urban and architectural complexes disappeared regardless of their value. The authorities' policy towards religious buildings whose proprietary and legal status was not resolved until the 1970s, regardless of their real historical value, served as a tool in the struggle against the Catholic Church. The former manor complexes, even though they were incorporated into state-owned farms, were associated with the hostile class of Prussian landowners.

Besides the aforementioned internal factors there were also external factors related to the legal status of these territories until the confirmation of the border by the reunified Germany in 1990. Much in contrast to the official propaganda, this created a sense of temporariness characteristic of post-migration communities. Regardless of cultural property losses, this aspect cannot be ignored in research.⁴¹

Finally, a few more questions should be asked: did the change in attitude to the foreign cultural heritage which occurred after 1990 result from the political transformations or from the social transformation that had been under way for some time? To what extent were these two aspects intertwined? How would the post-migration communities of the western and northern regions have behaved if after 1945 Poland had found itself in a different political reality? Would the processes of adaptation and embracement have progressed faster or would there have had to be more time for the changes to take place? I doubt that the political factors played the key and only role even though their impact was essential and their effects have been most frequently emphasised in the literature. This is probably a postulate for more extensive contrastive research.

Hence, the conclusion can be drawn that with regard to the broadly understood policy towards the cultural heritage in western Poland, the 1970s and 1980s should be delineated as a separate period. This conclusion runs counter to the findings of A. Merta-Staszczak's work, which views the issue of the cultural heritage in Lower Silesia in the 1945-1989 period with no internal subdivisions. How should then this issue be approached in the context of the 1962 act, which was effective until 2003? Is 1989 really the cut-off point for the issue of monuments or is it only a stage of the ongoing process? I argue that regardless of the objective changes that occurred, especially in the international dimension of Polish-German relations, after 1989, the cultural heritage viewed against the background of social phenomena is a more complex problem. Given the current treatment of monuments in western Poland, notably in the organisational, economic and social dimensions, these issues still remain complicated.

* * *

Appendix: An extract from the 1950 expert legal opinion on the ownership title to moveable property from the former German provinces (then the territory of Poland) which made its way to Germany. Source: EZA, ARG, File.: 52/167:

⁴¹ B. Zagórska, T. Polak, *Płyną lata, giną zabytki – z prof. Tadeuszem Polakiem rozmawia Bożena Zagórska* (in:) *Dylematy sąsiedztwa*, vol. 2, Warsaw 2002, pp. 49-58.

„Nach kanonischem Recht sind die Kirchenglocken Zubehör des Kirchengebäudes und stehen wie dieses regelmäßig im Eigentum der Kirchenstiftung (*fabrica ecclesiae*); sie können jedoch ausnahmsweise in nichtkirchlichem Eigentum, z. B. des Staates, einer bürgerlichen Gemeinde oder privater Personen stehen. Die Vermutung spricht aber für das Eigentum der Kirchenstiftung, sodaß Ausnahmen im Einzelfall beweispflichtig sind. Die Kirchenstiftung ist eine auf kirchlichem Organisationsakt beruhende juristische Person der Kirche, der die Aufgabe zugewiesen ist, Trägerin der Rechte und der Pflichten zu sein, die sich zufolge der Errichtung und Unterhaltung einer Kirche in vermögensrechtlicher Hinsicht ergeben. Dom-, Stifts- und Pfarrkirchen haben stets eine eigene Kirchenstiftung als Rechtsträger ihres Gotteshausvermögens. Für Nebenkirchen und öffentliche Kapellen kann eine eigene Kirchen- oder Kapellenstiftung bestehen. Nicht selten sind diese Gotteshäuser aber Eigentum einer anderen Kirchenstiftung, z. B. der jeweiligen Pfarrkirchenstiftung. Die Kirchenstiftung wird wie jede juristische Person der Kirche ihrer Natur nach auf immer errichtet, ist aber in ihrem rechtlichen Bestand abhängig von der zuständigen kirchlichen Behörde. Im staatlichen Bereich werden die kanonischen Vorschriften über den Eigentümer des Gotteshausvermögens nicht allenthalben anerkannt. Für das Gebiet jenseits der Oder-Neiße-Linie ist in der Frage des Eigentums an Kirchenglocken das Preußische Allgemeine Landrecht vom 5.2.1794 maßgeblich. Dieses bestimmt in § 191: „Das bei einer Kirche befindliche Geläute ist in der Regel als Eigentum der Kirchengesellschaft anzusehen“. Ob das ALR die „Kirchengesellschaft“ als Rechtssubjekt des örtlichen Kirchenvermögens betrachtet haben wollte, ist eine viel erörterte, aber wissenschaftlich nicht eindeutig geklärte Streitfrage. Ulrich Stutz (*Das Preuß. ALR und der Eigentümer des Kirchengutes*, in Festgabe für Bernhard Hübler, Berlin 1905) ist der Meinung, das ALR habe nichts über den Eigentümer des örtlichen Kirchenvermögens bestimmen, sondern allein das Verhältnis der verschiedenen Kirchengesellschaften (also der Religionsparteien) zueinander regeln wollen. Indessen erkennt die in der staatlichen Rechtsprechung und Verwaltungspraxis zur Herrschaft gelangte Auffassung für das Geltungsgebiet des ALR bloß die Kirchengemeinde als Rechtsträger des Kirchenvermögens an (vgl. Sebastian Schröcker, *Die Verwaltung des Ortskirchenvermögens nach kirchlichem und staatlichem Recht*, Paderborn 1935 S.76 und Johannes Schlüter, *Rechtsgeschäfte der katholischen Kirchengemeinden in Preußen*, München-Gladbach 1929 S.14). Die katholische Kirche hat sich diese Anschauung nicht zu eigen gemacht, mußte sich aber dem staatlichen Zwange fügen. So bestimmte die Geschäftsweisung über die Verwaltung des Vermögens in den Kirchengemeinden und Gemeindeverbänden der Diözese Breslau preußischen Anteils vom 27.11.1928 in Art.32 Z.2 für die Eintragung kirchlicher Grundstücke in das Grundbuch: „Falls nicht die Eintragung des kirchlichen Institutes, dem das Grundstück eigentlich gehört, als Eigentümerin erreicht werden kann, ist darauf zu halten, daß es wenigstens in Klammern dem Namen der formell als Eigentümerin eingetragenen Kirchengemeinde beigefügt wird“.

Die preußische „Kirchengemeinde“ ist eine Einrichtung des staatlichen Rechtes, das diese Rechtsfigur einheitlich auf die katholischen und protestantischen Kirchengemeinden anwendet. Die Kirchengemeinde beruht wenigstens für den Bereich der katholischen Kirche nicht auf einem staatlichen Organisationsakt, sondern auf einer staatlichen Anerkennung dessen, was die Kirche organisatorisch geschaffen hat. Das Gesetz über die Vermögensverwaltung in den katholischen Kirchengemeinden vom 20.6.1875 und das neuere Gesetz über die Verwaltung des katholischen Kirchenvermögens vom 24. Juli 1924 lassen die Frage, wer Eigentümer des örtlichen Kirchenvermögens ist unberührt. So sagt das Gesetz von 1924 in § 1: „Der Kirchenvorstand verwaltet das Vermögen in der Kirchengemeinde. Er vertritt die Gemeinde und das Vermögen. Das Vermögen umfaßt die kirchlichen Vermögensstücke und die unter die Verwaltung kirchlicher Organe gestellten örtlichen Stiftung. Beide Gesetze regeln nur die Frage der Vermögensverwaltung. Wenn sie auf die Frage des Eigentümers nicht eingehen, so ist dies darin begründet, daß diese Frage staatskirchenrechtlich für Preußen keine einheitliche Lösung gefunden hatte. Es unterliegt jedoch keinem Zweifel, daß in dem Geltungsgebiet des ALR die Kirchengemeinde als das staatlich allein anerkannte Rechtssubjekt

des örtlichen Kirchenvermögens betrachtet wurde. Kirchengemeinden in diesem Sinne sind alle Pfarrgemeinden, auch die sogen. Missionspfarrgemeinden, sowie Filial – und Kapellengemeinden, für welche besonders bestimmte Vermögensstücke vorhanden sind, nicht dagegen die Dom-, Militär- und Anstaltsgemeinden (vgl. Gesetz von 1875 § 2 und § 56). Unter „Kirchengemeinde“ versteht man herkömmlich die Gesamtheit der in einem Kirchspiel eingesessenen Bekenntnisangehörigen. In der Regel ist diese Gemeinschaft territorial bestimmt. Im Vordergrund steht jedoch nicht das Gebiet, sondern die Gemeinschaft; die gebietliche Abgrenzung dient dazu, den Personenkreis der Gemeinschaft festzulegen. Es handelt sich mithin um eine Gebietskörperschaft, wobei die im preußischen Staatskirchenrecht herrschende Auffassung dahingeht, daß die Kirchengemeinde von den durch die Mitglieder gewählten Organen(...) wird.

Die Vertreibung der in den verschiedenen Kirchengemeinden jenseits der Oder-Neiße-Linie eingesessenen Deutschen hat die bestehenden Kirchengemeinden nicht zum Erlöschen gebracht. Hierzu bedürfte es jedenfalls nach kanonischem Recht eigener Organisationsakte der Kirche. Soweit Kirchengemeinden mit einiger Geschlossenheit nach dem Westen ausgewandert sind, dürfte keine rechtliche Schwierigkeit bestehen, an der Identität mit der früheren Kirchengemeinde festzuhalten. Ob und inwieweit dies praktisch zutrifft, entzieht sich meiner Kenntnis. Die Kirchenvorstände der vertriebenen Gemeinden sind nach wie vor befugt, das Vermögen der Kirchengemeinde zu vertreten, und können ihre Eigentumsansprüche auf die in Hamburg gelagerten Kirchenglocken geltend machen. Um späteren Schwierigkeiten vorzubeugen, dürfte es sich jedoch empfehlen, die in Betracht kommenden katholischen Kirchenglocken dem Vorsitzenden der Fuldaer Bischofskonferenz als Treuhänder zur Verfügung zu stellen. Von hier aus könnten die Glocken jenen Gemeinden, die ihren Eigentumsanspruch rechtmäßig geltend machen, überlassen werden. Im übrigen könnte jene Glocken, die zur Zeit keinen legitimen Eigentümer finden, vorläufig in treuhänderischer Weise dem kirchlichen Gebrauch zugeführt werden, bis über die Frage des Eigentums endgültig entschieden werden kann“.

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Keywords: cultural heritage, Polish-German relations, post-migration communities

ABSTRACT

The issue of protecting the cultural heritage in northern and western Poland is still a research challenge despite the passage of time and extensive literature. This subject matter covers not only legal and economic issues, but also aspects of Polish-German relations in post-war Poland, the adaptation of an alien cultural heritage by Polish society, the issues of transformations in education, and finally the process of the formation of local communities.

The article aims to determine whether the 1945-1989 period can be further subdivided based on the evolving approaches to the issue of cultural heritage. This would make it possible to speak of an evolution of attitudes to an alien cultural heritage against the background of the socio-political changes taking place in Poland. Previous research has focused on more comprehensive approaches to the whole period of Polish Communism.

Such an attempt to capture internal divisions should, in the author's view, provide a more precise understanding of the processes in question, especially for the purpose of research on contemporary phenomena.

Hence, the main point of the paper is the assumption that with regard to the cultural heritage in western Poland, the 1970s and 1980s should be approached independently within the larger post-war period. It is also argued that the previous policies towards the cultural heritage have exerted an impact on contemporary phenomena.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF POLISH INTEREST IN THE EARLY MEDIEVAL PAST OF KOŁOBRZEG (UNTIL THE END OF THE 1950S)

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. KOŁOBRZEG AS A GERMAN AND POLISH PLACE OF MEMORY

Due to the heroic defence of the city-fortress against Napoleonic troops in 1807, Kołobrzeg (Ger. Kolberg), a large seaside resort in Pomerania, was an important place of memory for the Germans in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century as a symbol of persistent resistance and defence of the homeland against overwhelming enemy forces.¹ The town is also considered one of the most important Polish places of memory in Pomerania. Polish medieval descriptions referring to the place already tried to show it as a symbol of Polish power on the Baltic coast.² However, the true construction of the myth took place during World War II, when after the bloody capture of the German fortress town on 18 March 1945, Poland was symbolically wedded to the Baltic Sea. This event was commemorated already during the war in Jerzy Bossak's film *The Battle of Kołobrzeg* – a special edition of the Polish Film Chronicle (No. 9–10/45), and then in many publications.³ In the following years, in the spirit of the myth of the Recovered Territories, the town's connections with Poland were often mentioned, starting with the establishment of a bishopric subordinate to Gniezno in 1000,⁴ through Bolesław the Wrymouth's military expeditions,⁵ to the

¹ Cf. the film *Kolberg* by Veit Harlan (1945). U. Schröder, *Veit Harlans „Kolberg“*. *Der letzte „Großfilm“ der UFA*, in: *Konstelacja Szczecin. Aktorzy szczecińscy i kino okresu międzywojennego*, R. Skrycki (ed.), Szczecin 2011, pp. 109-107; M. Dondzik, *Sztuka i ideologia – kolorowe filmy Veita Harlana z okresu III Rzeszy*, in: *ibidem*, pp. 87-91. For the Kolberg myth see a comprehensive study by H.-J. Eitner, *Kolberg. Ein preußischer Mythos 1807/1945*, Berlin 1999.

² Cf. P. Migdalski, *Die Feldzüge des Bolesław Schiefmund nach Belgard und Kolberg und die Anfänge der symbolischen Inbesitznahme Pommerns durch Polen*, *Studia Maritima* 31, 2018, pp. 87-107.

³ Among them H. Kroczyński, *Zaślubiny Polski z morzem*, Kołobrzeg 1999.

⁴ An analysis of Thietmar's report on the bishopric in Kołobrzeg and the activities of its bishop Reinbern was made by S. Rosik, *Reinbern – Salse Cholbergiensis aecclesice episcopus*, in: *Salsa Cholbergiensis. Kołobrzeg w średniowieczu*, L. Leciejewicz, M. Rębkowski (eds.), Kołobrzeg 2000, pp. 85-93.

⁵ Cf. P. Migdalski, *op. cit.* These battles were described in the song of Wrymouth's warriors recorded by Gallus Anonymus and starting with the words *Pisces salos et fetentes apportabant*, which was sup-

Polish participation in the siege of the Prussian fortress in 1807.⁶ However, the most important narrative seems to be the one devoted to the capture of the town by the Polish First Army in 1945, which also became the leitmotif of monuments and memorial plaques in Kołobrzeg after 1945 (the Memorial of Poland's Wedding to the Sea, the military cemetery, the Statue of the Nurse).⁷ It became the basis for the conversion of the local museum to a military museum – the Museum of Polish Arms⁸ – and the holding of the Soldiers' Song Contest in the town between 1968 and 1989.⁹

While Kołobrzeg as both a German and Polish place of memory is gradually attracting the attention of researchers and enthusiasts, virtually no studies have been devoted to the beginnings of research on the town, which later became the basis for the shaping of further narratives referring to the town's past. It should be added that arguments supplied by archaeological and historical research were later used by the state authorities during the preparations for the celebrations of the Millennium of the Polish State. After all, as Benedict Anderson points out, it was archaeology that caused Asian countries to be considered the guardians of tradition, and legitimised the secular state.¹⁰ Hence the need to address the topic of the beginnings of Polish scientific

posed to be, as pointed out by the Cracow historian Józef Mitkowski, "a song of Poland's union with the Baltic" (J. Mitkowski, *Pomorze Zachodnie w stosunku do Polski*, Poznań 1946, p. 46). A part of this song, superbly arranged years later by Czesław Niemen in the 1977 *Polish Chronicle by Gallus Anonymus*, directed by Grzegorz Królikiewicz, was written on a commemorative plaque placed on a library in Kołobrzeg, deliberately named after the chronicler in 1966, "which was supposed to glorify the heroic deeds of Bolesław's warriors fighting to maintain the Slavic character of these lands". State Archive in Koszalin, the Board of the County People's Council and the County Office in Kołobrzeg, ref. no. 718, pp. 73-74.

⁶ See numerous publications by H. Kroczyński, in particular *Polacy w walce o Kołobrzeg 1807*, Warsaw 1969; *Wojsko Polskie na Pomorzu Zachodnim i Krajnie w 1807*, Warsaw 1990.

⁷ For Kołobrzeg as a Polish place of memory commemorating the events of 1945, see E. Krasucki, *Zaślubiny z morzem – powojenny mit założycielski Kołobrzegu. Kilka uwag wokół nieco wstydlivej historii*, in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki*, R. Ptaszyński (ed.), Szczecin 2010, pp. 297-319; M. Golonka-Czajkowska, „Gdzie moi żołnierze, tam i ja”. *Postać Emilii Gierczak w heroicznym micie o zdobyciu Kołobrzegu*, in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki*, R. Ptaszyński (ed.), Szczecin 2010, pp. 221-244; M. Prusak, *Obraz walk o Kołobrzeg w 1945 roku w audycjach Radia Koszalin w latach 1953-1989*, in: *Polifonia pamięci. Między niemiecką przeszłością a polską teraźniejszością. Kołobrzeg 1945-2015*, R. Ptaszyński, J. Suchy (eds.), Szczecin 2017, pp. 183-204; J. Watrak, A. Sawicka, Die polnische Lyriknach 1945 über Kołobrzeg (Kolberg). Eine Anmerkungen, *Pommersches Jahrbuch für Literatur* 2, 2007, pp. 274ff. For the Memorial of Poland's Wedding to the Sea and the anniversary celebrations of the 1945 fighting see: Z. Mazur, *Między ratuszem, kościołem i cmentarzem*, in: *Wokół niemieckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych*, Z. Mazur (ed.), Poznań 1997, p. 322; Z. Romanow, *Kreowanie „polityki pamięci” na Pomorzu Zachodnim w latach 1945-2000*, Poznań 2002 (IZ Policy Papers No. 24/2002), p. 22. Also a conference *Mity Kołobrzegu. Propaganda w służbie wojny i pokoju*, organised by the Museum of Polish Arms in Kołobrzeg, was held in 2011, but no proceedings have been published.

⁸ H. Kroczyński, *Organizacja i dzieje muzeum w Kołobrzegu*, *Koszalińskie Zeszyty Muzealne*, No. 1, 1971, p. 131f.

⁹ K. Bittner, *Piosenka w służbie propagandy. Festiwal Piosenki Żołnierskiej w Kołobrzegu 1968-1989*, Poznań 2015.

¹⁰ B. Anderson, *Wspólnoty wyobrażeniowe, Rozważania o źródłach i rozprzestrzenianiu się nacjonalizmu*, translated by S. Amsterdamski, Cracow 1997, p. 177.

ic interest, especially archaeological, in the early medieval past of Kołobrzeg, to show who first drew attention to this centre and when, and how the early fieldwork looked. Researchers did not consider the topic interesting enough, and it was mainly only archaeologists and museologists who dealt with it, superficially, on the margins of their own research.¹¹ The sources on which the present paper is based comprise documents held in state archives or scientific and cultural institutions. The final caesura is the end of the 1950s, when the first stage of archaeological works on a fortified settlement in Budzistowo was completed. The year 1960 abounded with initiatives related to the celebration of the Millennium of the Polish State, which already made use of the results of these first works. However, they – and the regional museum which opened its doors in 1963 – contributed little to our knowledge of the earliest history of the town.

PIONEERS IN POLISH RESEARCH ON EARLY MEDIEVAL KOŁOBRZEG

The beginnings of Polish researchers' interest in Kołobrzeg are related to what are known as the millennium studies. Although a few historians and archaeologists studying the beginnings of the Polish state had already suggested the need for research before the outbreak of World War II, it was not until 1946, with Poland in completely new borders and in a changing political reality, but above all in face of war damage which offered an opportunity to look deep inside many urban centres and individual buildings, and brought a need to protect and study the artefacts of material culture of the newly incorporated western lands, that the scientific community represented by archaeologist Witold Hensel, in 1944-1945 closely associated with the people's government,¹² came up with the idea of preparing an archaeological research programme related to the thousandth anniversary of the first mentions of these places.¹³ After long

¹¹ L. Leciejewicz, W. Łosiński, E. Tabaczyńska, *Kołobrzeg we wczesnym średniowieczu*, Wrocław 1961, pp. 28-30; L. Leciejewicz, *Dzieje badań archeologicznych*, in: *Kołobrzeg. Wczesne miasto nad Bałtykiem*, L. Leciejewicz, M. Rębkowski (eds.), Warsaw 2007 (Origines Polonorum, vol. II), pp. 15-22; M. Rębkowski, *Archeologia w kołobrzesckim muzeum*, in: *50 lat Muzeum Oręża Polskiego w służbie historii i kultury. Wydawnictwo jubileuszowe*, B. Polak et al.(eds.), Kołobrzeg 2013, p. 132; idem, *Badania milenijne na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Przebieg, znaczenie, skutki*, *Przegląd Archeologiczny*, vol. 65, 2017, pp. 121-124; idem, *O uwarunkowaniach i znaczeniu badań archeologicznych prowadzonych przy odbudowie kołobrzesckiej Starówki*, in: *Odbudowa miast Pomorza Zachodniego po II wojnie światowej. Wybrane problemy*, P. Migdałski (ed.), Wodzisław Śląski–Stargard 2018–2019 (in print); H. Kroczyński, *Organizacja i dzieje...*, p. 130.

¹² See, for example, J. Kośnik, Lubelski etap działalności Witolda Hensla, *Archeologia Polski*, vol. 52, No. 1-2, 2007, pp. 219-225.

¹³ W. Hensel, Z przygotowań do polskiego Tysiąclecia, *Z Otchłani Wieków* 24, 1958, No. 4, p. 226; W. Filipowiak, *Główna problematyka i wyniki badań archeologicznych na Pomorzu Zachodnim nad tysiącleciem państwa polskiego*, in: *Dwudziestolecie nauki polskiej na Pomorzu Szczecińskim 1946-1966*, L. Babiński, H. Lesiński (eds.), Szczecin 1968, p. 109; G. Labuda, *Poznańska Księga Tysiąclecia o początkach państwa polskiego po upływie półwiecza*, in: *Początki Państwa Polskiego. Księga Tysiąclecia*, K. Tymieniecki (ed.), Poznań 2002 (2nd edition; 1st edition: Poznań 1962), p. VIIIff.

preparations, on 1 March 1948, an interdisciplinary conference of archaeologists, historians and art historians, whose aim was to launch a systematic research programme on the beginnings of the Polish state, was organised in Warsaw.¹⁴ The conference, prepared by the General Directorate for Museums and Monument Protection at the Ministry of Culture and Art, was designed to enable the exchange of views on the most important issues and to develop a detailed research programme.¹⁵

The need to carry out excavations in Kołobrzeg was expressed by the doyen of Polish archaeologists, Professor Józef Kostrzewski, in the discussion after the introductory paper given by Aleksander Gieysztor. He pointed to the need for a quick start to excavations in Pomerania, on Rügen (sic – this island was not within the Polish borders), in Szczecin, Kołobrzeg and Toruń, and later, due to the lack of professional staff, also in Wolin.¹⁶ Roman Jakimowicz, since 1946 professor of archaeology at the newly founded university of Toruń, pointed out that preparations for research in Kołobrzeg were already far advanced.¹⁷ He also maintained that it should be carried out in the original Kołobrzeg, that is, in Budzistowo (Ger. Altstadt), because such research would be very promising due to the location of the complex, partly on a hill and partly in the Parsęta valley: “It will be possible there to find the remains of wooden structures, relics of wars waged by Bolesław the Wrymouth and other battles.” Jakimowicz claimed that traces of the Vikings’ presence there might be discovered, and these would require consultation with Scandinavian experts.¹⁸

A description of the organisational background of these projects can be found in archival materials in Pomerania. A letter sent in early August 1947 by the administrator of Kołobrzeg county, Leonard Zarębski, to the Department of Culture and Art at the Province Office in Szczecin states that there is no need for special protection of archaeological sites in the county as they do not attract the attention of the settlers and are not being damaged. The Kołobrzeg branch of the Polish Geographical and Historical Awareness Society (*Polskie Towarzystwo Krajoznawcze*, PTK), subsidised by the County Department, took an interest in the matter and asked Professor Jakimowicz to examine the finds and if possible begin excavations.¹⁹ The founder of the Kołobrzeg branch of the PTK was Jan Frankowski.²⁰ As he recalled years later, his active membership of various organisations including the PTK led him to work closely

¹⁴ Archive of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (henceforth AIAE PAS Warsaw), Management of Research on the Beginnings of the Polish State, ref. no. KB/13, item 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, items 5-8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, item 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, item 105.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, items 41, 43.

¹⁹ State Archive in Szczecin, Province Office in Szczecin, ref. no. 4973, p. 35; J. Frankowski, *Pierwsza siedziba biskupstwa pomorskiego (powiat kołobrzeczki)*, in: *Rocznik-Informator Pomorza Zachodniego 1945-1948*, W. Goszczyński (ed.), Szczecin 1948, p. 73.

²⁰ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia byłego aktywisty powiatu kołobrzeczkiego /1946-1961/*, typescript, pp. 14, 17.

with Roman Jakimowicz,²¹ who initiated research on the fortified settlement, and on 1 February 1948²² gave a lecture to social activists in Kołobrzeg on the Slavic past of the town. This event and its venue were funded by the County People's Council. The content of Jakimowicz's paper was published posthumously in the journal *Z Otchłani Wieków* ("Out of the Abyss of Ages") on the basis of a text submitted by Frankowski.²³

As Józef Kostrzewski wrote in his obituary of Roman Jakimowicz, the latter was working on a more comprehensive study of Kołobrzeg and its region.²⁴ A paper titled "The Kołobrzeg Castellany in the light of topographic and archaeological research" was presented by the author at a scholarly meeting of the First Department of the Scholarly Society in Toruń on 14 June 1949.²⁵ According to the published report, the purpose of the study was to discuss settlement in the Kołobrzeg castellany with regard to the natural conditions in the area. It was divided into eight chapters, covering the following topics: discussion of literature and sources, the topography of Kołobrzeg before the town's foundation, the nature of the place according to historical sources, the Kołobrzeg castellany, settlement in the light of historical sources, settlement in the light of archaeological sources, a description and analysis of the fortified settlements, and Slavic settlement in the light of onomastic data. The work ends with a glossary of the history and geography of the region.²⁶ The substantial content of the work can be partially inferred from the report and the above-mentioned paper. In both of them Jakimowicz highlighted the great economic importance of Kołobrzeg, similar to that of Wolin, where a bishopric was also established. He emphasised the role of the salt works in the early Middle Ages for the development of Kołobrzeg, which matched that of other chief strongholds in Poland. He did not agree with the interpretation of Gallus Anonymus' text stating that there used to be another stronghold by the sea protecting the salt pans. The original stronghold, described in sources dating back to the tenth and eleventh century, was not located in the town with the settlement priv-

²¹ It is interesting that in 1965, Elżbieta Piotrowska, the author of a part of a monograph on Kołobrzeg, wrote that the research had been initiated there by Dr Jan R. Jakimowicz (sic); E. Piotrowska, *Kultura współczesnego Kołobrzegu*, in: *Dzieje Kołobrzegu (X-XX wiek)*, H. Lesiński (ed.), Poznań 1965, p. 238. This claim was repeated by Hieronim Rybicki, another co-author of the monograph, who pointed out that the local museum provided patronage for the work of Jan Jakimowicz (sic); H. Kroczyński, *W Polsce Ludowej*, in: T. Gasztold, H. Kroczyński, H. Rybicki, *Kołobrzeg. Zarys dziejów*, Poznań 1979, p. 188.

²² According to footnote 1 on the first page of the aforementioned paper by R. Jakimowicz, the lecture was given in 1947.

²³ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia...*, p. 18. R. Jakimowicz, O położeniu słowiańskiego Kołobrzegu w świetle poszukiwań terenowych w r. 1947, *Z Otchłani Wieków* 20, 1951, Nos. 7-8, pp. 128-139.

²⁴ J. Kostrzewski, *Wspomnienia – Śp. prof. dr Roman Jakimowicz, Przegląd Zachodni*, 1951, vol. 3-4, pp. 685-690, here p. 690.

²⁵ In 1948 and 1949, R. Jakimowicz gave several lectures in Toruń on the history of Kołobrzeg; Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University, ref. no. R-102, Report on the operations of the Department of Prehistory of the Nicolaus Copernicus University for the academic year 1948-1949.

²⁶ R. Jakimowicz, *Kasztelania Kołobrzaska w świetle badań topograficznych i poszukiwań archeologicznych*, *Sprawozdania Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu*, No. 3, January-December 1949, pp. 56-64.

ilege, but in part of today's suburbs, the Old Town (Altstadt) or Budzistowo, which is confirmed by documents from the thirteenth century. The author also described the region's natural features and position on transport routes. He pointed to the possibility of travelling from Greater Poland to Kołobrzeg by water via the Parsęta River, Parseckie Lake and the Gwda River.²⁷ Jakimowicz also noted that he had first visited the place on 1 August 1947, and while prospecting he had found some earthen pots, although earlier also combs and spindle whorls, among others, had been discovered there.²⁸ Also later conservation documents show that the fieldwork conducted by Jakimowicz and Frankowski brought to light a certain number of ceramic broken pieces.²⁹

Due to the scarcity of the surviving source materials for Kołobrzeg, it is difficult now to ascertain why the studies did not finally begin, bearing in mind that on the one hand, they were supported by such local proponents as Frankowski and by the authorities, and on the other hand, they aroused the interest of eminent Polish scholars. However, knowing the situation in other localities of Western Pomerania, the following explanation seems plausible. It should be noted that during this period it was possible to undertake research only in the regional capital of Szczecin; it was not possible to do so even in Wolin, which for a number of years had taken an important place in the scholarly debate about the beginnings of the Polish state.³⁰ Jakimowicz himself became quickly involved in the millennium research in Kruszwica in 1948–1950, but in early 1951 he died a sudden death.³¹ During the Stalinist era the research was not supported by Frankowski, who took up a professional post in Koszalin in 1952. One should also mention the lack of people with relevant education in the region and in the western territories in general, who would have been aware of the importance of undertaking research and, by virtue of their positions, would have taken up the challenge in the face of the problems of the time (with provisions, supplies, security, rebuilding, lack of staff, etc.), especially in the completely destroyed Kołobrzeg.³² Even with regard to

²⁷ R. Jakimowicz, *Kasztelania Kołobrzaska*; idem, *O położeniu...*

²⁸ R. Jakimowicz, *O położeniu...*, pp. 133, 135. R. Jakimowicz's personal files contain a certificate dated 29 July 1947, on the conduct of fieldwork in the area of Szczecin Province using maps, measuring instruments and a camera, in which it is stated that the Governor's Office in Szczecin and the Governor's Office of Public Security were notified of the research; Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University, ref. no. K-1/268, p. 83.

²⁹ Archive of West Pomeranian Monument Protection Office, Branch in Koszalin, File: Budzistowo, Kołobrzeg county, site 1, Report, unpaginated.

³⁰ Cf. P. Migdalski, Wizyta polskich naukowców w Szczecinie i w Wolinie w 1935 roku, *Roczniki Historyczne* 84, 2018, pp. 329-348; idem, *Słowiańszczyzna północno-zachodnia w historiografii polskiej, niemieckiej i duńskiej*, Wodzisław Śląski 2019; idem, *Między nauką, mitem, a propagandą. Przeszłość Wolina w polskich badaniach oraz w życiu małego miasta na ziemiach zachodnich w okresie Polski Ludowej*, in preparation.

³¹ J. Kostrzewski, Śp. Roman Jakimowicz, *Z Otchłani Wieków* 20, 1951, vol. 3-4, pp. 37, 39-40.

³² Cf. my comments in: P. Migdalski, *Fragmety dziejów muzeum drawskiego po 1945 roku. Przyczynek do losów muzealnictwa i dziedzictwa pomorskiego po II wojnie światowej*, in: *Drawsko Pomorskie i okolice poprzez wieki. Studia i szkice. Odłona druga*, E. Krasucki (ed.), Drawsko Pomorskie 2017, pp. 267-284.

the creation of a museum in this coastal town in 1951, advocated by the General Directorate for Museums and Monument Protection at the Ministry of Culture and Art,³³ Zygmunt Knothe, Provincial Monument Conservator, noted that the town was underpopulated and heavily damaged, and faced many housing problems. He stated that its residents could easily visit museums in nearby Białogard, Koszalin and Darłowo.³⁴ The last argument that should be mentioned is the dropping of issues relating to the Recovered Territories and the removal of Gomułka's government in the late 1940s.³⁵

One comes across the name of Jan Frankowski in the documents referring to the first archaeological explorations of Kołobrzeg. Therefore, we should take a closer look at him and the role he played. He was born in July 1886 in Siedlce, and took part in school strikes in the early twentieth century in that town. In 1908–1918 he lived in Switzerland, where he received a bachelor's degree in social sciences from the University of Lausanne. During the First World War he spent time in Russia, and later in the Second Republic of Poland he worked as a teacher and a clerk. He was an active member of the PTK, and from 1925 was chairman of its Warsaw branch.³⁶

In 1926 Jan Frankowski had an opportunity to see German Kolberg for the first time during his return trip from Sweden to Poland.³⁷ As he recalled, after the Second World War he wanted to settle in the Recovered Territories, which were said to need people to work. In July 1946 he arrived in Szczecin, from where he was sent to the Kołobrzeg County Office, located until October 1947 in Karlino, which was less damaged.³⁸ In Kołobrzeg, he initiated a search for mementoes of the past³⁹ and collected German books: "I chose those that could provide a basis for research on the past of the Kołobrzeg region and the whole of Western Pomerania."⁴⁰ They

³³ State Archive in Szczecin, Province Office in Szczecin, ref. no. 5058, item 3.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, item 1. It is perhaps noteworthy that in reply Witold Kieszkowski from the General Directorate wrote that "there were enough historical reasons to tip the scales in favour of Kołobrzeg because the town and the surrounding lands played a significant role in the period of Bolesław the Wrymouth's Poland and above all in the external relations (with the papacy and the empire in the first place) [...]"; *ibid.*, item 5.

³⁵ Cf. for example, G. Strauchold, *Mysł zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945-1957*, Toruń 2003.

³⁶ B. Konarski, Jan Ignacy Frankowski, *Jantarowe Szlaki* 25, No. 2, April–June 1982, pp. 26-28; D. Kabciniński, „Głos Podlasia” – nieznaną epizod z życia Jana Frankowskiego, *Bibliotekarz Zachodniopomorski*, Nos. 3-4, 2009, pp. 18–24; H. Filip, *Frankowski Jan*, in: *Słownik pracowników książki polskiej. Suplement III*, H. Tadeusiewicz, Warsaw 2010, pp. 75-76. There is still no monograph devoted to Frankowski.

³⁷ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia byłego aktywisty powiatu kołobrzieskiego/1946-1961/*, typescript, p. 10.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 17. The early situation in the county was discussed by R. Ptaszyński, *Między strachem a nadzieją. Kołobrzeg i okolice w latach 1945-1948*, in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki, Studia i materiały*, R. Ptaszyński (ed.), Szczecin 2010, pp. 257-295.

³⁹ It should be mentioned that in 1946, a treasury was discovered in the town hall building; State Archive in Szczecin, Province Office in Szczecin, ref. no. 4974; R. Ptaszyński, *Między strachem a nadzieją. Kołobrzeg i okolice w latach 1945-1948*, in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki, Studia i materiały*, R. Ptaszyński (ed.), Szczecin 2010, pp. 270–271.

⁴⁰ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia byłego aktywisty powiatu kołobrzieskiego /1946-1961/*, typescript, pp. 13-14, elsewhere in his diary he wrote

were supposed to mark the beginnings of a library on Pomeranian studies at the local PTK branch, which he had founded.⁴¹ The first exhibits of the future Regional Museum⁴² collected by the members of the Society⁴³ were displayed in a secondary school, which had been moved from Goścín to Kołobrzeg. He recalled that he and Bogacki, the bank's manager, tried to get loans, and work even began to renovate the old museum in the former Schlieffen House,⁴⁴ but due to official disfavour the whole venture ended in failure.⁴⁵

As Frankowski recalled, to commemorate the second anniversary of the "liberation" on 18 March 1947, on his initiative, a one-off leaflet was published in Kołobrzeg, in which he stressed that Kołobrzeg must have been a very important location since a bishopric was established there in 1000. Until the thirteenth century, the people and the local nobility were purely Polish-Kashubian. Then German colonisation began, the town was founded, and while expanding to the east, Poland turned away from the

that "all German scholarly publications should be collected in order to use them for rebuilding Pomerania and deepening the knowledge on cultural and economic links with Poland"; *ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴¹ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia...*, pp. 14, 17.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴³ At the same time the archaeological monuments in Kołobrzeg were left in the care of Aleksander Stafiński, who tried to save them from oblivion and looting in consultation with Professor Józef Kostrzewski from Poznań. He sent a letter to the County Office asking about the museum collection. In a reply dated 23 April 1946 he was informed that the regional museum had been burnt down, some collections had earlier been taken to Szczecin by the Germans, however, the Nettelbek house had survived but the collection had been taken by the Russians and a few items could be found at the Municipal Board. Archive of the Poznań Archaeological Museum, ref. no. MAP – A – dz – 80, unpaginated, Letter of the Kołobrzeg County Office dated 23 April 1946.

Aleksander Stafiński (1899–1968), soldier in World Wars I and II, would-be veterinary surgeon, history teacher, amateur archaeologist working with Roman Jakimowicz and Konrad Jażdżewski in the 1930s, author of a monograph on Suraż, after World War II he settled down in Szczecinek, worked for the Polish Red Cross. He insisted that the archaeological heritage of Pomerania be saved, and therefore he established cooperation with Józef Kostrzewski, the author of many works devoted to the Szczecin region. There is still no monograph devoted to Adam Stafiński and his work. Here see: B. Konarski, *Ich pasją była turystyka*, Koszalin 1983; Z. Romaniuk, *Aleksander Józef Stafiński*, in: *Słownik biograficzny białostocko-lomżyńsko-suwalski*, vol. 3, A. Dobroński (ed.), Białystok 2005, pp. 149-152; I. Skrzypek, Przedchrześcijański posąg kamienny, tzw. „Belbuk”, *Szczecineckie Zapiski Historyczne* 2011, No. 5, pp. 37-59; J. Dudź, Muzeum w Szczecinku – jego historia i perspektywy, *Koszalińskie Zeszyty Muzealne* 1984, No. 14, p. 118, 121-123; idem, 85 lat Muzeum Regionalnego w Szczecinku, *Szczecineckie Zapiski Historyczne* 2000, No. 4, pp. 6–14; I. Skrzypek, Z historii muzealnictwa środkowopomorskiego, *Koszalińskie Zeszyty Muzealne* 1997, vol. 21, pp. 98-99; cf. also P. Migdalski, Elżbieta Kazimierzówna w Szczecinku. Przyczynek do dziejów pamięci stosunków polsko-pomorskich w średniowieczu i ich znaczenia w Polsce Ludowej, *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski*, 32, 2017, vol. 2, pp. 5-29.

⁴⁴ Archive of the West Pomeranian Monument Protection Office, Koszalin branch, file: Kołobrzeg, the so-called "Schlieffen house" Gierczak 28 – the building was renovated much later in the late 1950s to house the museum.

⁴⁵ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia...*, p. 44.

sea.⁴⁶ In the following years he published more articles on Kołobrzeg.⁴⁷ One of them,⁴⁸ written at the request of Professor Stanisław Leszczycki,⁴⁹ chairman of the PTK, was later published in the Travel and Nature Library series as a stand-alone guide.⁵⁰

On 2 April 1947 at a conference on the rebuilding of Kołobrzeg, attended by Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, Frankowski pointed out that for reasons of communication the town had to be rebuilt further away from the sea, as the Slavs had done when they built their stronghold at Budzistowo.⁵¹ Frankowski recalled that in early 1948 a Cultural Education Society had been established in Kołobrzeg, and organised a lecture on the past of the Kołobrzeg lands, delivered by Dr Kazimierz Ślaski.⁵² On 1-8 May 1949, Frankowski organised the First Polish Book Exhibition in Kołobrzeg, in the City Council Hall. As he wrote, it was supposed to “show to visitors the past of Pomerania and of Kołobrzeg in particular”; exhibits included Polish works mentioning the town and selected German works with “appropriate comments”.⁵³ Having a passion for history, in 1948 he also attended the 7th General Congress of Polish Historians in Wrocław, which was dedicated to the past of the Western Territories.⁵⁴

In 1952, for professional reasons he started working as a librarian in the Regional Library in Koszalin, while still living in Kołobrzeg.⁵⁵ Unfortunately, this caused him to limit his activities in the latter. It was not until he returned to work in the library in Kołobrzeg in March 1957, in a new political situation after the Polish October, that he revived his old passion for searching for exhibits for the future museum. He headed the Organising Committee of the Regional Museum in Kołobrzeg. The inaugural meeting of this body took place on 5 October 1957. This time, organisational support was provided by the Board of the County People’s Council in Kołobrzeg. Frankowski called for care to be taken of surviving monuments, and for the discovery and collection of exhibits that had been saved from former museums. These were to be handed over to the museum’s temporary headquarters in the library, or else its founders

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 15; *Jednodniówka „Kołobrzeg” 1945 18.III. 1947 Miasto – Port – Uzdrowisko – Powiat*, Kołobrzeg 1947, p. 16.

⁴⁷ J. Frankowski, *Pierwsza siedziba biskupstwa pomorskiego...*, p. 73.

⁴⁸ J. Frankowski, Kołobrzeg, *Ziemia* 23, 1949, No. 2, pp. 33-39.

⁴⁹ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia...*, p. 24.

⁵⁰ J. Frankowski, *Kołobrzeg i okolice*, Warsaw 1949. An extended version of the guide was published in 1952.

⁵¹ H. Kroczyński, *Powojenny Kołobrzeg 1945-1950. Wybór źródeł*, Kołobrzeg 2004, p. 55.

⁵² Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia...*, pp. 21-22.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁵ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Dziesięć lat pracy niefachowego bibliotekarza na Pomorzu Zachodnim 1949-1959*, typescript, p. 2 (supplement attached to the typescript). This diary was published as an independent article: J. Frankowski, *Dziesięć lat pracy niefachowego bibliotekarza na Pomorzu Zachodnim (1949-1959)*, *Bibliotekarz*, vol. 23, No. 6, 1966, pp. 179-182.

were to be informed where to look for them. He suggested creating an institution of a historical, natural and geological nature which would “show the deep roots of the Lechitic prehistory of the Pomeranian tribes by making available archaeological research on Slavic Kołobrzeg”. The initiative was supported by Feliks Ptaszyński, the Provincial Monument Conservator, and by Marian Sikora from the museum in Koszalin. Frankowski mentioned that the temporary headquarters of the museum in the library had been visited by crowds of tourists.⁵⁶ Eventually, as a result of the Committee’s actions the Regional Museum was created in 1963, and the first archaeological exhibition *Archaeological Research in the Kołobrzeg Region* was opened in 1965.⁵⁷

Another scholar who focused on the history of Kołobrzeg and the Kołobrzeg region was Kazimierz Ślaski, a graduate of the University of Poznań (having completed a master’s degree under the supervision of Zygmunt Wojciechowski). From October 1945 he was a junior research assistant in the Department of History of the Pomeranian Lands and the Baltic States, headed by Karol Górski.⁵⁸ In his doctoral dissertation the scholar focused on the early medieval history of the Kołobrzeg region. While working on it, not only did he complete postgraduate studies in historical geography under the supervision of Professor Władysław Semkowicz in Cracow in 1947, but he also took part in research expeditions to Pomerania, during which he visited Kołobrzeg in the summer of 1946.⁵⁹ His visit to the town on the Parsęta River resulted in a report and several scholarly articles, which have survived as his research legacy. He wrote that by the courtesy of Mayor Stanisław Brożek and Secretary Graczyński he had been able to visit the archives and the city museum, from which there survived, among others, a manuscript copy of the law code dating back to 1297. His other texts refer to the Slavic element in the Kołobrzeg populace, which was estimated to account for 25% of the town’s population, mainly in the poorer classes; the history of the Kołobrzeg and Białogard lands; and Christianisation and religion in those areas.⁶⁰ On 25 February 1947 in Toruń, Ślaski defended the dissertation *Dzieje ziemi kołobrzesckiej do czasów jej germanizacji* [History of the Kołobrzeg Lands until Germanisation], written under the supervision of Karol Górski, and reviewed by Maria

⁵⁶ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Wspomnienia...*, pp. 45, 47; Archive of the Museum of Polish Arms in Kołobrzeg: An appeal to the residents of the town and Kołobrzeg county.

⁵⁷ Archive of the Museum of Polish Arms, file: Reports on the operations of the Museum of Polish Arms 1963-1973, Report on the operations of Museum in Kołobrzeg in 1963; M. Rębkowski, *Archeologia w kołobrzesckim muzeum*, p. 133.

⁵⁸ *Powstanie i pierwsze dziesięć lat Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika 1945-1955. Wybór źródeł*, published by H. Duczowska-Moraczewska, Toruń 1995, No. 28, pp. 44-45; Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University, ref. no. H-3/85, item 27.

⁵⁹ Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University, ref. no. H-3/83-93, item 24; *ibid.*, ref. no. K-1/185, item 42.

⁶⁰ K. Ślaski, *Kołobrzeg w sierpniu*, in: The Polish Academy of Sciences, Archive in Warsaw, Poznań Branch, Kazimierz Ślaski’s files (PIII-89), ref. no. 39, items 43-45; other texts – *ibid.*, items 93-103, 117-122, 123-126.

Kielczewska-Zalewska and Bronisław Włodarski.⁶¹ The main aim of the dissertation was to prove that the Germanisation of the Slavic inhabitants of the Kołobrzeg region (and thus Western Pomerania) had taken place much later than German studies reported. The study, published by the Society of Arts and Sciences in Toruń, was, as Górski noted, awarded a prize by the Polish Historical Society.⁶² Fifteen copies of Ślaski's book were purchased by the District Department of the Kołobrzeg County Office.⁶³

In the early 1950s Władysław Kowalenko took an interest in Kołobrzeg. In 1951 he published an article on the town's earliest history. It was part of his studies on harbour fortified settlements of the Western Slavs, which were published in the early 1950s when he became head of the Department of History of Pomerania in the Institute for Western Affairs.⁶⁴ According to the researcher, this stronghold, as the sources maintain, was among "the oldest and greatest Polish strongholds in Pomerania". He claimed that the privilege related to the salt pans could date back to the time of the introduction of Christianity by Bolesław the Brave. He stated that "the Slavic Kołobrzeg had perfect conditions for developing its system further and transforming into a larger harbour town on its own", but its development was interrupted by the German foundation of the town. The colonists settled on the Slavic foundations. From an economic point of view, therefore, colonisation was a continuation of the economy developed by the Slavs. Based on it, the Hanseatic League was easily able to become the ruler of the Baltic Sea in the fourteenth century, and Kołobrzeg played a major role in the process.⁶⁵

ARCHAEOLOGICAL MILLENNIUM RESEARCH IN KOŁOBRZEG

The next stage of the archaeological research in Kołobrzeg is associated with the so-called millennium research, and with Lech Leciejewicz. A result of the conference of 1948 was the creation, on 3 May 1949, by order of the Ministry of Culture and Art, of the Management Board of Research on the Beginnings of the Polish State at the General Directorate for Museums and the Monument Protection. Its aim was to "prepare the millennial anniversary of the appearance of the Polish State in the world

⁶¹ (J. Zajac), Wykaz prac doktorskich i habilitacyjnych z zakresu historii obronionych przed Radą Wydziału Humanistycznego UMK (II 1947-III 1976), *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Historia*, 12, 1978, p. 104.

⁶² K. Ślaski, *Dzieje ziemi kołobrzesckiej do czasów jej germanizacji*, Toruń 1948 (Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, 51, vol. 1, 1946); Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University, ref. no. K-1/185, item 14. The role of Kazimierz Ślaski as a pioneer of Polish research on Pomerania after World War II requires an in-depth study.

⁶³ State Archive in Toruń, The Society of Arts and Sciences in Toruń, ref. no. 139, item 168.

⁶⁴ K. Ślaski, *Władysław Kowalenko (1884-1966)*, in: The Polish Academy of Sciences, Archive in Warsaw, Poznań Branch, Kazimierz Ślaski's files (PIII-89), ref. no. 51, item 70. The text was published in *Kwartalnik Historyczny*.

⁶⁵ W. Kowalenko, Najdawniejszy Kołobrzeg (VIII-XIII w.), *Przegląd Zachodni*, 1951, No. 7/8, pp. 538-576, quotations pp. 541, 567, 575-576.

arena” by managing and conducting archaeological and source studies.⁶⁶ The board initiated studies at the places in Poland that were the most important from a historical point of view, often taking advantage of war damage, without which it would not have been possible to gain access beneath many buildings. In the course of this research, carried out increasingly by the generation of young archaeologists⁶⁷ who had been educated after the war, mainly in Poznań, Lech Leciejewicz became involved in work in Kołobrzeg. As he recalled, in 1952 Witold Hensel told him that it would be valuable to begin excavation work in that town. Thus, on 16 February 1953 Leciejewicz arrived in Kołobrzeg for the first time, and began his stay by seeking out Jan Frankowski and paying his first visit to the suburban settlement of Budzistowo.⁶⁸

After this initial inspection, Leciejewicz began his research proper in July 1954, under the auspices of the newly established Institute of the History of Material Culture of the Polish Academy of Sciences, which took over the millennium research programme from the Management Board. An Archaeological Station was established in Kołobrzeg, with the task of investigating the development of early medieval settlement in Kołobrzeg with regard to its regional base, the basis for the development of feudalism in Western Pomerania, the creation of economic and social foundations for the formation of the Pomeranian state, and the formation of an urban centre. For this purpose, it was planned to carry out a study of sources, excavations in Budzistowo, verification of the thesis presupposing the existence of another settlement located closer to the sea, and an examination of the salt mine. Another important goal was the discovery and investigation of the cemetery adjacent to the settlement.⁶⁹ The excavations in Kołobrzeg itself were to be a prelude to further research on the early medieval settlement region covering the entire Parsęta and Rega river basins.⁷⁰

In 1954, the first layers dating back to the eleventh and twelfth centuries were examined. In the following year the research was expanded and a wooden structure of a rampart was found. It was concluded that the beginnings of settlement in this area dated back to the ninth century, and at that time it was already a fortified settlement. These findings were confirmed by the excavations carried out in the next year, 1956, when it was found that the stronghold had been built in the ninth century and that artisan production had become increasingly common then. The explorations of 1957 revealed that the rampart had been strengthened from the inside in the second half of the tenth century and destroyed at the end of the eleventh century, when the area oc-

⁶⁶ AIAE PAS Warsaw, Management of Research on the Beginnings of the Polish State, ref. no. KB/7, item 7: Order of the Minister of Culture and Art of 3 May 1949; *ibid.*, item 9: Official Journal of the Ministry of Culture and Art, No. 2/23/19 June 1949.

⁶⁷ Cf. M. Rębkowski, *Badania milenijne*, pp. 120-125.

⁶⁸ L. Leciejewicz, *W Kołobrzegu i nie tylko. Fragmenty wspomnień z lat 1953-1960*, in: *Kołobrzeg i okolice poprzez wieki, Studia i materiały*, R. Ptasiński (ed.), Szczecin 2010, pp. 15-37.

⁶⁹ Archive of the Poznań Archaeological Museum, ref. no. MAP – A – dz – 89/7, unpaginated, A research plan of the archaeological station I.H.K.M. in Kołobrzeg for 1954.

⁷⁰ Regional Museum in Szczecinek, ref. no. 8/4, unpaginated – Lech Leciejewicz’s letter to Aleksander Stafiński dated 12 June 1956.

cupied by the stronghold had been significantly expanded. In 1956 Lech Leciejewicz wrote to Aleksander Stafiński, a passionate amateur archaeologist from Szczecinek, saying that something of an unusual nature had been found – a finely wrought hook – a tenth-century construction element typical of Greater Poland, which was considered to indicate that the above-mentioned renovation of the rampart had been commissioned by Mieszko I or Bolesław the Brave. The examination of the northern part located outside the rampart, where the settlement is thought to have developed in the tenth or eleventh century at the latest, began in the same year. Remains pointing to artisan production, especially metallurgy and smithery, were also discovered. In 1958, research continued in the fortified settlement itself and the Parsęta valley adjacent to it, where the exploration of the riverbed (organised in partnership with the Warsaw Diving Club of the PTTK) revealed traces of fishing harbours. A trial dig was carried out also on Salt Island, and surface surveys in the area revealed traces of hillfort settlement in Kędrzyno and Gołańcz. This was the last year of research on the Kołobrzeg settlement. In the following years, the research supervised by Władysław Łosiński was conducted away from the main settlement – in Kędrzyno, Gołańcz and then Bardy and Świelubie, where in 1964 a richly equipped grave including, among others, Scandinavian imports was unearthed in the barrow cemetery (burial mound no. 5).⁷¹

One of the team members was Stanisław Tabaczyński. Later, in 1956 Władysław Łosiński also joined the team. As in Wolin,⁷² staff shortages were a major problem. The year 1959 was the last in which Lech Leciejewicz participated in the Kołobrzeg research.⁷³ In 1962, the Kołobrzeg station was transformed into an Archaeological Expedition.⁷⁴ Institutionally, the Kołobrzeg unit was subordinate to the Department of Archaeology of Poland in the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute for History of Material Culture.⁷⁵ Professor Witold Hensel was appointed its first head, and after he left for Warsaw in the fourth quarter of 1955, the position was offered to Assis-

⁷¹ Archive of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Poznań, ref. no. 8/65 (2.5), unpaginated, A summary of the field research conducted by the institutions subordinate to the Department of Archaeology of Greater Poland and Pomerania in the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Poznań in 1954–1965; Regional Museum in Szczecinek, ref. no. 8/4, unpaginated – Lech Leciejewicz’s letter dated 5 September 1956; Archive of the Poznań Archaeological Museum, ref. no. MAP – A – dz – 89/7, unpaginated, Archaeological research in Kołobrzeg in 1958. The exploration of the settlement hinterland continued until 1974; L. Leciejewicz, *Dzieje badań archeologicznych*, p. 20.

⁷² Cf. P. Migdalski, *Między...*

⁷³ L. Leciejewicz, *W Kołobrzegu i nie tylko...*, pp. 15–37.

⁷⁴ M. Rębkowski, *Archeologia w kołobrzeskim muzeum*, p. 133; J. Patan, *Moje lata sześćdziesiąte. Kołobrzeg 1960-1969, Część pierwsza*, Kołobrzeg 2009, p. 39.

⁷⁵ Archive of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Poznań (henceforth AIAE PAS Poznań), ref. no. 27/68: Summary report on the operations of the Department of Archaeology of Greater Poland and Pomerania IHMC PAS in 1954–1968, unpaginated. Summary report on the operations of the Department of Archaeology of Greater Poland and Pomerania IHMC PAS in 1954–1968.

tant Professor Wojciech Kóčka. In 1958, the Department of Pomeranian Archaeology was established, with its headquarters in Poznań, and the Pomeranian institutions, including the one in Kołobrzeg, became part of it. Hensel was appointed its head and Leciejewicz his deputy. In the last quarter of 1961, both departments merged under the name of the Department of Archaeology of Great Poland and Pomerania, with its seat in Poznań. It included eight stations, among them the one in Kołobrzeg.⁷⁶

From the very beginning, Kołobrzeg research was covered by the press – mainly the local party newspaper *Głos Koszaliński*, a fact also mentioned by Lech Leciejewicz,⁷⁷ but also other titles.⁷⁸ The head of the expedition cooperated closely with the library in Kołobrzeg, which held archaeological artefacts collected by Frankowski. These would be loaned to the Archaeological Station for examination; for example, axes in September 1958.⁷⁹ Frankowski organised the first temporary exhibitions in the library, which showed the results of archaeological research,⁸⁰ and promoted the research, for example at a meeting of social activists at the Board of the County People's Council on 24-25 October 1957, during the so-called cultural assembly.⁸¹ In 1960, Jan Frankowski published an article in *Z Otchłani Wieków* about the location of the Kołobrzeg stronghold and settlements beyond the walls in the times of Bolesław the Brave and Bolesław the Wrymouth, in which, on the basis of Lech Leciejewicz's research reports, he claimed that already in the eleventh and twelfth centuries the life of the stronghold and castellany was not concentrated in Budzistowo, but closer to the sea in the place where the German chartered town was later founded.⁸² As Leciejewicz recalled, he had to engage in polemics, though reluctantly.⁸³ In his reply, he pointed out that Frankowski's conclusions were somewhat too far-reaching, as no traces of early medieval settlement had been found in the chartered town. However, this did not settle the dispute once and for all, and even if there had been a settlement there, it would have been quite small and of little importance. In conclusion, Leciejewicz emphasised that Frankowski had been right

⁷⁶ AIAE PAS Poznań, ref. no. 27/68: Summary report on the operations of the Department of Archaeology of Greater Poland and Pomerania IHMC PAS in 1954–1968, unpaginated. Summary report on the operations of the Department of Archaeology of Greater Poland and Pomerania IHMC PAS in 1954–1968.

⁷⁷ AIAE PAS Warsaw, Management of Research on the Beginnings of the Polish State, ref. no. KB/20, unpaginated, *Głos Koszaliński*, 23–24 October 1954; L. Leciejewicz, *W Kołobrzegu i nie tylko*, p. 20; idem, *Wykopaliska w Kołobrzegu i ich historyczna wymowa*, *Głos Koszaliński*, vol. 5, 1956, No. 47, p. 2; No. 48, p. 2.

⁷⁸ L. Leciejewicz, *Piastowski Kołobrzeg*, *Żołnierz Polski*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁹ Archive of the Museum of Polish Arms in Kołobrzeg, book inventory of 14 September 1957, IOU dated 9 September 1958.

⁸⁰ Archive of the Gallus Anonymus Public Library in Kołobrzeg: J. Frankowski, *Dziesięć lat pracy...*, p. 25.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

⁸² J. Frankowski, *Lokalizacja grodu i podgrodzi z czasów Chrobrego i Krzywoustego w Kołobrzegu*, *Z Otchłani Wieków*, vol. 26, No. 3, 1960, pp. 302-304.

⁸³ L. Leciejewicz, *W Kołobrzegu i nie tylko...*, p. 33.

to start discussion over the matter, but that his hypothesis could only be verified by further studies.⁸⁴

Animal remains discovered in the fortified settlement between 1954 and 1958 were studied by Marian Kubasiewicz and Jerzy Gawlikowski, and the findings of their research were published by Szczecin Scientific Society in 1965.⁸⁵ Similarly, in 1959 the Poznań Society for the Advancement of Arts and Sciences published a study by Władysław Łosiński and Eleonora Tabaczyńska entitled “From research on craft in early medieval Kołobrzeg”.⁸⁶ Many articles presenting research reports were also published in professional journals.⁸⁷ A booklet “Kołobrzeg in the Early Middle Ages” by Lech Leciejewicz, Władysław Łosiński and Eleonora Tabaczyńska was a popular science summary of this stage of the research. The authors concluded that in the case of Kołobrzeg there was no question of the centre having declined; it continued its development and the establishment of the town under the Lübeck law did not bring anything new. As to the economic development, what could be inferred from the written sources was confirmed by the archaeological research. However, the foundation of the town brought about changes in political and ethnic spheres.⁸⁸ This work thus became a polemic against the conclusions drawn by older German researchers, mainly Hermann Bollnow.⁸⁹

The last issue I would like to address is the impact of the research conducted by Leciejewicz’s team on the recognition of the fortified settlement in Budzistowo as a historic object by the Provincial Monument Conservator in Koszalin, Feliks Ptaszyński, in April 1960 and its entry at number 276 in the Register of Historic Buildings.⁹⁰ Leciejewicz asked the management of the State Collective Farm in Budzistowo to exclude the area adjacent to the fortified settlement and the surviving

⁸⁴ L. Leciejewicz, W sprawie lokalizacji grodu i podgrodzia w Kołobrzegu, *Z Otchłani Wieków*, vol. 26, No. 3, 1960, p. 304.

⁸⁵ M. Kubasiewicz, J. Gawlikowski, *Szczątki zwierzęce z wczesnośredniowiecznego grodu w Kołobrzegu*, Szczecin 1965.

⁸⁶ W. Łosiński, E. Tabaczyńska, *Z badań nad rzemiosłem we wczesnośredniowiecznym Kołobrzegu*, Poznań 1959.

⁸⁷ L. Leciejewicz, Sprawozdanie z badań archeologicznych w Kołobrzegu w 1954 r., *Sprawozdania Archeologiczne*, vol. 1, pp. 165-178; idem, Wczesnopolski Kołobrzeg w świetle ostatnich badań archeologicznych, *Dawna Kultura*, vol. 3, pp. 40-46; idem, Badania archeologiczne w Kołobrzegu w 1955 r., *Sprawozdania Archeologiczne*, vol. 3, pp. 119-130; idem, Badania archeologiczne w Kołobrzegu w 1958 r., *Sprawozdania Archeologiczne*, vol. 11, pp. 43-57; idem, Początki Kołobrzegu w świetle ostatnich badań, *Szczecin*, 1960, Nos. 1-2, pp. 7-20 (the entire issue of the journal was devoted to Kołobrzeg); idem, Wczesnośredniowieczny Kołobrzeg, *Slavia Antiqua*, vol. 7, 1960, pp. 307-392; idem, Z. Solek, Z badań nad krajobrazem naturalnym wczesnośredniowiecznego Kołobrzegu, *Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej*, vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 387-394; L. Leciejewicz, *O położeniu grodu „najbliższego morzu” w Kołobrzegu*, in: *Munera Archaeologica Iosepho Kostrzewski... oblata*, Poznań 1963, pp. 369-374.

⁸⁸ L. Leciejewicz, W. Łosiński, E. Tabaczyńska, *Kołobrzeg we wczesnym średniowieczu*, Wrocław 1961, here p. 111.

⁸⁹ Cf. P. Migdański, *Słowiańszczyzna północno-zachodnia...*, p. 250.

⁹⁰ Archive of the Monument Protection Office, Koszalin Branch, File: Budzistowo, Kołobrzeg County, site 1: Ruling.

chapel from further cultivation and development.⁹¹ Unfortunately, like in Wolin, this protection was not sufficiently effective, and in 1963 the site suffered destruction. During digging of a large, deep septic tank, the remains of buildings were discovered, but the authorities were not notified of their existence and they were destroyed.⁹² As Leciejewicz recalled, Frankowski lodged a vehement protest in this matter, which led to a court case.⁹³

CONCLUSIONS

The beginnings of Polish interest in the past of Kołobrzeg, which was almost completely destroyed during the battles in March 1945, date back to early post-war times. It stemmed from the initiatives undertaken by both scholars and enthusiasts trying to save the remains of the heritage that could be found there. Among those who contributed greatly to the revealing of these pages of the town's history, one should mention, first of all, the local social activist Jan Frankowski, the archaeologists Roman Jakimowicz and Lech Leciejewicz, and the historians Kazimierz Ślaski and Władysław Kowalenko. It was their media awareness and their presence in the then dominant world of the printed media that, apart from the narrative of the events of 1945, the early mediaeval history of Kołobrzeg gained an important presence in this place of memory. Two of the aforementioned, Jan Frankowski and Lech Leciejewicz, were remembered by the people of Kołobrzeg to such an extent that commemorative plaques have been dedicated to them in recent years. Although at the beginning of the 1960s Leciejewicz's research interests extended far beyond the borders of Pomerania, he was present in Kołobrzeg, not only through his visits and participation in various ceremonies, but mainly due to the fact that his work was continued by his collaborators and students, such as Władysław Łosiński and Marian Rębkowski, who introduced research on the settlement and its hinterland into the new millennium. The complicated history of the town in the later post-location period, very much neglected so far, for which the source base is huge and scattered among many archives in Europe, and the lack of interest on the part of the local authorities, have led to a situation where the settlement has still not been the subject of a modern scholarly monograph.

From the very beginning, the early medieval research in Kołobrzeg was considered one of the flagship study areas during the preparations for the millennium celebrations, as evidenced by Józef Kostrzewski's suggestions. Unfortunately, despite the first explorations carried out by – and I would like to emphasise this here – the newly established academic centre in Toruń⁹⁴, it was not possible to start a systematic exam-

⁹¹ Ibid., F. Ptasiński's letter dated 4 April 1960.

⁹² W PGR Budzistowo zniszczono bezcenne wykopaliska, *Głos Koszaliński*, No. 165, 11 July 1963.

⁹³ L. Leciejewicz, *W Kołobrzegu i nie tylko...*, p. 33.

⁹⁴ The role of the Toruń centre in the research on the history of Western Pomerania after the Second World War is discussed in my separate article, which is in preparation.

ination in the difficult post-war conditions. The exploration of the site was resumed in the mid-1950s, when the generation of archaeologists educated after the war began their own independent research. That Kołobrzeg was important for the celebration of the Millennium of the Polish State is also indicated in the programme documents of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (KC PZPR) – “Note on the celebration of the Millennium of the Polish State” (1958)⁹⁵ and “Resolution of the Preparatory Committee for the celebration of the Millennium of the Polish State approved at the meeting of the Council of State on 12 February 1960”.⁹⁶ However, the narrative of the early medieval history of this centre was used not only for political purposes – to fight the Church – but sometimes also to fight for the Church, because the arguments relating to the Polish bishopric founded by Bolesław the Brave in 1000 contributed after 1945 to the saving of the late medieval collegiate church in Kołobrzeg, which was not raised to cathedral status until the establishment of permanent church structures in the Recovered Territories in 1972.⁹⁷

To a large extent, the pioneering post-war exploration of such centres as Szczecin, Wolin and Kołobrzeg and their hinterlands (this remark refers particularly to the Kołobrzeg region and the later studies by Władysław Łosiński, which, according to Marian Rębkowski, still represent, in our country, a unique model of research on regional settlement changes in the period between the seventh and tenth centuries⁹⁸) revealed some specific features in the development of those settlements, in which an important part was played by their location at the intersection of sea and land routes, by which long-distance trade took place. The millennium studies in Greater Poland, Pomerania and Silesia – it was claimed at the time – pointed to “the perfect unity of the early Polish culture, with some local regional differences, of course”.⁹⁹ Today, such claims are often rejected, but without undermining the achievements of the millennium research, which will continue to represent a milestone in Polish archaeological studies.¹⁰⁰

Archaeological research, such as that carried out in Kołobrzeg, revealing traces left by the former Slavic inhabitants of those lands, was intended to create a sense of familiarity in what Tadeusz Konwicki described as a “regained home with a foreign

⁹⁵ Central Archives of Modern Records, The Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, ref. no. V/60, items 20, 59.

⁹⁶ Polskie Tysiąclecie, Uchwała Komitetu Przygotowawczego Obchodów Tysiąclecia Państwa Polskiego akceptowana na posiedzeniu Rady Państwa w dn. 12 lutego 1960 r., *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 67, 1960, book 1, p. 6.

⁹⁷ State Archive in Szczecin, Province Office in Szczecin, ref. no. 5087, item 129; K. Bastowska, *Polityka władz wobec zabytkowych obiektów sakralnych Pomorza Środkowego w latach 1945-1966 – mity, niedomówienia, półprawdy*, in: *Kościół katolicki w realiach władzy komunistycznej na Pomorzu Środkowym w latach 1945-1989*, P. Knap, T. Ceynowa (eds.), Szczecin 2011, pp. 84, 94, 96.

⁹⁸ M. Rębkowski, *Badania milenijne...*, p. 127.

⁹⁹ AIAE PAS Poznań, ref. no. 35/69: 1966, unpaginated: A short outline of the achievements of the Department of Archaeology of Greater Poland and Pomerania in research on the Millennium.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Archeologia i prahistoria polska w ostatnim półwieczu*, M. Kobusiewicz, S. Kurnatowski (eds.), Poznań 2000 and the studies published recently in *Przegląd Archeologiczny*, vol. 65, 2017; for Pomerania, the study by M. Rębkowski mentioned above in footnote 11.

smell”.¹⁰¹ Years later, Gerard Labuda, one of the founders and animators of Polish research in Pomerania, recalled that “after 1945, when the Western Territories were given to Poland, the task of historians was to help people who arrived there. To make them feel rooted, at home. To make them see a certain heritage of the past.”¹⁰² In this way, on the basis of the pre-war achievements of Polish Western thought and the Piast-centred concept of Poland’s history that it created, the myth of the Recovered Territories,¹⁰³ in which stories about the centuries-long battles fought by Polish forces over Kołobrzeg occupied a special place, was built. Such stories were promoted by politicians on all sides, social and cultural activists, and first of all by country experts, scholars and clergy, because the Western idea proved to be more important than the political system, and national and state goals dominated over class and party goals.¹⁰⁴

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Keywords: Kołobrzeg, history of archaeological research, millennium studies, Recovered Territories

ABSTRACT

The aim of the paper is to present the beginnings of the Polish interest in the early medieval past of Kołobrzeg (Kolberg) mainly on the basis of archival sources. For 200 years the town was an important German location, and since 1945 it has been a significant Polish place of memory. However, so far there are no studies dealing with the history of research on the town of Kołobrzeg, although such enquiry subsequently became a canvas of political narratives about the past.

The limit of the time-scope covered in the paper is the end of the 1950s, when the first stage of archaeological works on the Kołobrzeg settlement in Budzistowo (Altstadt) were completed. In 1960 a number of enterprises were undertaken in connection with the celebration of the Millennium of the Polish State. The article attempts to answer the question why studies on Kołobrzeg were launched so late, whether it was a top-down or bottom-up initiative and what was the meaning of the research.

The source base of the paper consists mainly of archival materials collected in state archives and scientific and cultural institutions.

¹⁰¹ T. Konwicki, *Wschody i zachody księżycy*, Warsaw 1990, pp. 90, 340, 342.

¹⁰² G. Labuda, *Jestem Kaszubą w Poznaniu* in: idem, *Zapiski kaszubskie, pomorskie i morskie. Wybór pism*, Gdańsk 2000, p. 488.

¹⁰³ For more on the term Recovered Territories see: J. Jasiński, *Kwestia pojęcia Ziemi Odzyskane*, in: *Ziemi Odzyskane / Ziemi Zachodnie i Północne 1945-2005. 60 lat w granicach państwa polskiego*, A. Sakson (ed.), Poznań 2006, pp. 15-25; Z. Mazur, *O legitymizowaniu przynależności Ziemi Zachodnich i Północnych do Polski*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 27-44; J. Wawrzyniak, *Die Westgebiete in der Ideologie des polnischen Kommunismus. Symbolik und Alltag am Beispiel der Soldatensiedler*, in: *Wiedergewonnene Geschichte. Zur Aneignung von Vergangenheit in den Zwischenräumen Mitteleuropas*, P.O. Loew, C. Pletzing, T. Serrier (eds.), Wiesbaden 2006, pp. 300-309.

¹⁰⁴ P. Madajczyk, *Polska myśl zachodnia w polityce komunistów polskich*, *Przegląd Zachodni* 1997, vol. 3, pp. 15-36.

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THE GREATER POLAND UPRISING OF 1918-1919 IN THE FRENCH AND BRITISH DAILY PRESS

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to present and analyse the picture of the Greater Poland Uprising which was created by the French and British daily press. It will discuss the nature, form, content and sources of press reports on the events in Greater Poland in the newspapers of both countries. The research question addressed is whether and to what extent the press reports on the Polish–German fighting reflect the positions of France and Great Britain on the Polish question.

For the purposes of this study, an analysis was made of selected large-circulation French and British press titles representing different political leanings. The selected French titles are: *La Croix*,¹ a conservative and anti-Semitic Catholic daily; the oldest and moderate *Le Figaro*,² popular among monarchists and the bourgeoisie; the conservative *Le Gaulois*; the widely read *Le Petit Parisien*,³ one of the “big four” of the “golden age” of the press;⁴ the conservative and republican *Le Temps*,⁵ being

¹ *La Croix*, a monthly magazine founded in 1880 by the Assumptionists, became a daily in 1883, adopting the language and style of the popular press; *Les principaux quotidiens*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr> (accessed: 12 March 2018).

² *Le Figaro* was the oldest of the French dailies, published since 1826, originally with a royalist editorial stance, recognised as an organ of the upper and middle classes. It became very popular owing to widely read reports about France and from abroad. Many outstanding writers have published on its pages; *Les principaux quotidiens*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr> (accessed: 12 March 2018).

³ *Le Petit Parisien* (1876 to 1944), a republican daily with a balanced editorial line, owed its success to the thematic diversity of its articles; *Les principaux quotidiens*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr> (accessed: 12 March 2018).

⁴ The term “golden age” of the French press refers to the period of the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century until the end of World War I. At that time, 95% of the French population was literate, which resulted in the emergence of a huge press market. Just before the outbreak of the Great War, four Parisian dailies – *Le Matin*, *Le Petit Journal*, *Le Journal* and *Le Petit Parisien* – had (or exceeded) a circulation of 1 million copies, and are hence referred to as the “big four” of that age; S. Donin, *La lecture au jour le jour: les quotidiens à l'âge d'or de la presse*, <http://classes.bnf.fr/rendezvous/pdf/Fiche-presse1.pdf> (accessed: 12 March 2018); C. Delporte, *1901-1944. Un parfum d'âge d'or...*, <http://expositions.bnf.fr/presse/arret/04.htm> (accessed: 12 March 2018).

⁵ *Le Temps* was a daily founded in 1861 and distinguished by its significant network of correspondents. Its quality and standard were widely recognised, making this republican and conservative

a semi-official organ of French diplomacy; and *L'Humanité*,⁶ a socialist paper with communist leanings.

As to the British press, the following newspapers were analysed: *The Times*,⁷ *The Globe*,⁸ *The Pall Mall Gazette*⁹ and *The Daily Mirror*.¹⁰ All of these published reports about the causes, outbreak, course and consequences of the Greater Poland Uprising at the turn of 1918 and 1919.

The study was based primarily on source analysis using the philological method, consisting in this case in translating French and British press articles, with particular emphasis on the terms used in both languages, describing the events of the Greater Poland Uprising in the specific context and time conditions. However, the key research method used here is the comparative method, consisting in comparing information referring to the same events in Greater Poland at the turn of 1918 and 1919 in the French and British daily press, and identifying similarities and differences in the terminology used and the assessment offered.

FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN AND THE POLISH–GERMAN BORDER QUESTION

With the end of World War I and the fall of the three partitioning monarchies, the Poles, apart from engaging in military actions, began organisational activity to restore the Polish state. On 11 November 1918, the day when Germany signed the

daily the official organ of French diplomacy. It was published until 1942; *Les principaux quotidiens*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr> (accessed: 12 March 2018).

⁶ *L'Humanité*, founded in 1904 by the socialist Jean Jaurès, represented workers' interests; originally an organ of the French section of the Workers' International, since 1920 it has been an organ of the French Communist Party; *Les principaux quotidiens*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr> (accessed: 12 March 2018).

⁷ *The Times* is a daily published in London since 1785, initially as *The Daily Universal Register*, and under its present title since 1788. It was the first daily to set up a network of foreign correspondents; it was also a leader in introducing technological innovations in printing. It is considered to have a centre right editorial stance. It has traditionally supported the Conservative Party; *About us*, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

⁸ *The Globe* is a London evening newspaper founded in 1803 as a commercial journal of book-sellers. It offered more eye-catching advertisements than other newspapers and included ministerial announcements. Initially it supported the liberals, but in 1866 it adopted a conservative stance and came to be regarded as a journal of the London intelligentsia. In 1921 it merged with *The Pall Mall Gazette*; *Globe*, <https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

⁹ *The Pall Mall Gazette* is a London daily that has been published since 1865. Under various owners, it alternately supported the Liberal Party or conservative policies. Several well-known writers contributed to *The Pall Mall Gazette*: George Bernard Shaw, Oscar Wilde and Robert Louis Stevenson. The paper also had a huge impact on the development of investigative journalism in Britain. In 1921 it merged with *The Globe* as *The Pall Mall Gazette and Globe*; *Pall Mall Gazette*, <https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

¹⁰ *The Daily Mirror* is a British tabloid daily, published since 1903 in London, originally as a newspaper for women written by women. Since 1904 an illustrated magazine, later an innovative right-wing newspaper intended for middle-class readers. In 1919 its circulation reached one million copies; *Daily Mirror*, <https://en.wikipedia.org> (accessed: 15 June 2019).

capitulation, the Regency Council placed Józef Piłsudski in command of the Polish army. Three days later the Commander took all authority over Polish administration and issued a decree sanctioning the Government of Ignacy Daszyński, which on 17 November was replaced by the cabinet of Jędrzej Moraczewski, which in turn, with a decree “on the highest representative power of the Polish Republic” of 22 November, handed over supreme power in the state to Piłsudski as the Provisional Chief of State.¹¹ The Republic of Poland became a fact, but its construction – in not only political, territorial, economic and social, but also international terms – was a long process, full of difficulties and conflicts.

International recognition of the Polish government in Warsaw, which Piłsudski sought, starting with the sending of the famous telegram on 16 November notifying the leaders of the powers of the creation of an independent Polish state, was not immediate. During the first post-war months, until January 1919, the victorious Entente states considered the Polish National Committee in Paris, established in 1917, to be the only Polish representation. Being aware of how this would restrict his actions, at the beginning of 1919 Piłsudski decided to conclude an agreement with the Polish National Committee and appoint a new cabinet with Ignacy Paderewski as its head, which satisfied the Western leaders.¹²

The Entente states’ acceptance of the creation of an independent Poland was indisputable,¹³ but there were significant differences between those countries as to the form – and especially the borders – of the new state. There was a particularly large difference in the positions of France and Great Britain regarding the location of the Polish–German border. Although from the perspective of both countries, Poland was to play the role of a barrier between Russia and Germany, where the revolutionary movement was gaining strength, Britain saw Germany as the main anti-Soviet power. Besides, having taken away Germany’s colonies and fleet, Britain did not intend to significantly weaken that country’s position in Europe, as that would result in a strengthening of France’s position on the Continent.¹⁴

¹¹ A. Ajnenkiel, *Ustrój polityczny II Rzeczypospolitej*, [in:] *Z dziejów Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, A. Garlicki (ed.), Warsaw 1986, p. 114.

¹² M. M. Drozdowski, *Ignacy Jan Paderewski. Zarys biografii politycznej*, Warsaw 1986, p. 137; for more see: Z. Wroniak, *Rola delegacji polskiej na Konferencję Paryską w ustaleniu polskiej granicy zachodniej*, [in:] *Problem polsko-niemiecki w traktacie wersalskim*, J. Pajewski (ed.), in collaboration with: J. Krasuski, G. Labuda, K. Piwarski, Poznań 1963, pp. 220-235.

¹³ The final agreement of the Western powers on the need for an independent Polish state was reached after Russia had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers. On 3 June 1918, on the initiative of France, a joint declaration of the Allies was formulated and adopted, which stated that one of the conditions for a just and lasting peace and the rule of law in Europe was the creation of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea. J. Krasuski, *Zagadnienie polskie w polityce Wielkiej Brytanii, Francji i Stanów Zjednoczonych w czasie I wojny światowej*, [in:] *Problem polsko-niemiecki w traktacie wersalskim*, J. Pajewski (ed.), in collaboration with: J. Krasuski, G. Labuda, K. Piwarski, Poznań 1963, pp. 176-177.

¹⁴ Z. Wroniak, *Rola delegacji polskiej na Konferencję Paryską w ustaleniu polskiej granicy zachodniej*, [in:] *Problem polsko-niemiecki...*, p. 239; R. Bierzanek, *Państwo polskie w politycznych koncepcjach*

France, on the other hand, was interested chiefly in weakening Germany as much as possible, and Poland was to take the place of the former ally, tsarist Russia, which had been lost as a result of the Bolshevik revolution and the Brest Treaty.¹⁵ Therefore, the different positions of the two powers concerning Germany's role in the post-war world had an impact on the positions adopted on Polish issues.

Both powers competed for the adoption of their vision of Poland's western border (Germany's eastern one), and a settlement was to be achieved at the Paris Peace Conference, during which Polish issues were discussed by the Commission on Polish Affairs.¹⁶ However, the position of the Polish authorities, presented by Roman Dmowski on 29 January 1919 to a session of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference, indicated that the pre-partition borders of the Republic of Poland should serve as a starting point for the arrangements that were to be made. From January to June 1919, at the forum and behind the scenes of the Paris Peace Conference, France and Great Britain were engaged in a dispute over the drawing of the border between Germany and Poland – a dispute which was eventually resolved for the most part in accordance with the proposals of the British side, and especially of Prime Minister David Lloyd George.¹⁷

The disagreement between the great powers of Western Europe about the course of the eastern German border was mostly related to whether Pomerania – Danzig in particular – and Upper Silesia should go to Poland or Germany. However, even on the question of the affiliation of Greater Poland, there was no clear agreement within the Entente. Therefore, the way in which public opinion was shaped through press reports about the events in Greater Poland was different in the two countries, reflecting the positions of the respective governments.

THE GREATER POLAND UPRISING IN THE FRENCH AND BRITISH PRESS

Analysis of daily newspaper reports in France and Great Britain at the turn of 1918 and 1919 shows that the start of the fighting in Greater Poland attracted similar attention in both countries. What was different was the way the action was described, and the naming of the territory itself. French dailies, focusing on the German question at the end of the war, referred to Greater Poland as *la Pologne Prussienne* (Prussian Poland). In London, the events were usually described as taking place simply in *Posen*

mocarstw zachodnich 1917–1919, Warsaw 1964, pp. 86–87; M. Rezler, *Powstanie wielkopolskie 1918–1919. Po stu latach*, Poznań 2018, pp. 86–92.

¹⁵ *Polska – Francja. Dziesięć wieków związków politycznych, kulturalnych i gospodarczych*, A. Tomczak (ed.), Warsaw 1983, pp. 345–353.

¹⁶ W. Petsch, *Narodowościowe problemy granicy polsko-niemieckiej*, [in:] *Problemy polsko-niemiecki...*, pp. 287–288.

¹⁷ For more see: W. Petsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–288. The perception of the Greater Poland Uprising on the international stage was described by Stanisław Sierpowski; S. Sierpowski, *Aspekty międzynarodowe Powstania Wielkopolskiego 1918–1919*, *Przegląd Zachodni* 2008, No. 4, pp. 73–102.

(the German name for Poznań) or in the *province of Posen*. Greater Poland was also referred to as *German Poland*, although this term was most often used more broadly, referring to the entire Prussian partition including Pomerania and Silesia.

Differences in reporting on the Greater Poland Uprising are noticeable in the very terms used to describe the events. In the Paris newspapers, the fighting was mainly referred to as *les incidents* or *les troubles*; French journalists did not use the terms *insurrection* or *soulèvement* (uprising), although *reveil* (with similar meaning) occasionally appears. In the British press, despite the appearance of terms that might seem to undermine the importance of the events, such as “street fight, riot” or “conflicts”, one also encounters such terms as “rising” and “insurgent Poles”.

There are also differences in the sources of information about the Uprising. In the French press, the first reports from Greater Poland relied on German news bulletins or the German press. However, in the early days of January 1919, other sources were used by French journalists: the Polish press, telegrams from Warsaw sent to the offices of newspapers (including Swiss ones), or information obtained from Poles associated with the Polish National Committee. In Britain, except for *The Times*, which already had a correspondent in Warsaw at the end of 1918, journalists used almost exclusively two sources of information: the German daily press, such as *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Posener Neueste Nachrichten* or *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and the offices of British diplomatic missions in Copenhagen or Amsterdam, although press releases and telegrams also sometimes served as sources. Very rarely, and not until the time of the Paris conference, did British journalists rely on the French press.

The differences in the French and British perceptions and descriptions of the events in Greater Poland can be seen even in the first press reports published in the West. The French made no secret of their support for the Polish side, and the outbreak of the Uprising was considered a sign of the resilience of the young Polish state; while the British papers, at the early stages of the fighting, portrayed the Poles mainly as aggressors. Differences can also be seen in the focus placed on various aspects of the events.

The first mention of the outbreak of fighting on 27 December 1918 was made on both sides of the English Channel on 30 December 1918, and came from the same sources – mainly the German press – hence their content was quite similar.

On 30 December 1918, *Le Gaulois* described the start of fighting in the streets of Poznań¹⁸ as having been caused by the “provocative” entry of Ignacy Paderewski into the city (this was how German propaganda, also reproaching him for a ride in a four-horse carriage, described him).¹⁹ *Le Temps* also published a report on the fighting sparked by “Paderewski’s provocative entry” (*l’entrée provocante de Paderewski*). In both newspapers, however, journalists interpreted this information as a product

¹⁸ Two names for Poznań are used by the French press at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919. It is called either *Posen* as in German, or by the French name *Posnanie*, depending on the sources of information used.

¹⁹ “Troubles à Posen”, *Le Gaulois* 30 December 1918.

of German propaganda, suggesting that it was rather the Germans who had used the general welcome given to the “great patriot” (*au grand patriote*) as a reason for aggression.²⁰

In Britain, *The Globe* published a similar report on 30 December 1918, citing the Poznań-based German newspaper *Neueste Nachrichten*. It was reported that German soldiers alongside the German civilian population had organised a counter-demonstration in response to a Polish demonstration held on the occasion of Paderewski’s visit to the city. During the German march, there was an incident in which soldiers tore down several flags, mainly French and American. In response to this, the first shots were fired.²¹

At this point, it is worth noting that the press reports in Western Europe, following German sources, made it clear that the street fights had been provoked by German soldiers, who insulted the Allied flags by removing them and throwing them to the ground. The British titles, however, also published an explanation of such behaviour that had been offered to representatives of the British military mission by General Schimmelfening, Chief of Staff of the V Corps, which covered, among others, the city of Poznań:²² the display of flags of the Entente states was prohibited on the territory of the German state during the war, which explained the behaviour of the German soldiers.²³ This account is quite different from the one that has taken root in Polish historiography. For years it has been said that the fighting started as a result of the Germans’ removing and insulting Polish flags (along with Allied ones), which triggered the outbreak of the uprising.²⁴

The Pall Mall Gazette reported further on the events of 27 December, just as the French newspapers did. It published a description of fighting with machine guns and hand grenades spreading rapidly around the city.²⁵ What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that the British emphasise the importance of Paderewski himself, not as the initiator of the Polish actions, but as leader of the entire Polish nation. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, citing reports from Copenhagen, explains to its readers that the famous pianist was to be “proclaimed first President of a new Polish Republic”.²⁶ Similarly, *The Daily Mirror*, writing about the start of the fighting in Poznań, referred to the upcoming presidency of Paderewski in one of its headlines (*Paderewski to Be First*

²⁰ Ibid.; “Troubles à Posen”, *Le Gaulois* 30 December 1918.

²¹ “Paderewski in Posen”, *The Globe* 30 December 1918.

²² A. Czubiński, Z. Grot, B. Miśkiewicz, *Powstanie Wielkopolskie 1918–1919. Zarys dziejów*, Warsaw–Poznań 1983, pp. 101–102; A. Czubiński, *Powstanie wielkopolskie 1918–1919. Geneza – charakter – znaczenie*, Poznań 2002, p. 149.

²³ “Shots in Posen”, *The Pall Mall Gazette* 30 December 1918.

²⁴ Cf. A. Czubiński, Z. Grot, B. Miśkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 162 (Polish flags only). Modern Polish historiography provides information on the removal of Allied flags; R. Kaczmarek, *Historia Polski 1914–1989*, Warsaw 2010, p. 95 (Polish and Allied flags); A. Czubiński, *op. cit.*, p. 149 (Allied flags); B. Polak, *1919. Powstanie Wielkopolskie*, Warsaw 2015, p. 19 (Allied flags).

²⁵ “Shots in Posen”, *The Pall Mall Gazette* 30 December 1918. *The Globe* of 30 December 1918 reports the events almost in the same way; “Paderewski in Posen”, *The Globe* 30 December 1918.

²⁶ “Shots in Posen”, *The Pall Mall Gazette* 30 December 1918.

President of Poland).²⁷ The shift of focus in the British press from the events of 27 December to the person of the future Polish prime minister provides evidence that among the members of the Polish National Committee, the British were consistently promoting the pianist as the head of the Polish state or government, in some opposition to the strictly Parisian circles of the Committee, which were particularly favoured by France and from which the French government wanted to see the Polish government appointed.²⁸

The Daily Mirror of 30 December 1918, referring to a telegram received from Germany, described one of the incidents that had taken place in the capital of Greater Poland on the day of the outbreak of the Uprising – an Allied car with an American flag on its way to Warsaw was stopped by German officers. The car was then fired on, and the American flag was taken and thrown to the ground. Then the Polish People's Guard was summoned and dispersed the Germans.²⁹ Also on 30 December, *The Times*, relying on the same telegram, referred to the same incident as the cause of the riots in Poznań. The newspaper also reported that a British delegation had visited General Schimmelfening.³⁰ A day later, the French press also reported on the German attack on an Allied car carrying the American flag. For example, *Le Gaulois* described the above-mentioned visit of a delegation from the British Mission to the German Commander-in-Chief and their protest against the incident and the riots in Poznań.³¹

More details about the events in Poznań on 27 December could be found in the French and British press on 31 December 1918. The Parisian newspaper *Le Figaro* reported under the headline *Les incidents de Posen* that there had been serious riots in Poznań, which were the result of several circumstances. The paper described the return of the grenadier regiment from the front to the barracks, and the enthusiastic welcome of Paderewski by schoolchildren and the counter-demonstration organised by the Germans, during which German soldiers tore down French and American flags.³² The daily reported a kind of street “voice dispute”, when the Germans sang *Deutschland über alles*, and the Poles responded with shouts of “Long live Poland”. The article also includes topographic information about the events – a gathering of protesters at Wilhelmstrasse (now Aleja Marcinkowskiego), fighting in Wilhelmsplatz (now Plac Wolności) or the square in front of the Imperial Castle. There is also a description of the fighting methods – initially, tumult and hand-to-hand combat of soldiers of both nationalities using the butt ends of their rifles, and after the arrival of reinforcements – regular battles with firearms in various parts of the town, also with

²⁷ “Paderewski to Be First President of Poland”, *Daily Mirror* 30 December 1918.

²⁸ R. Wapiński, *Ignacy Paderewski*, Wrocław 1999, pp. 94-95; M.M. Drozdowski, *Ignacy Jan Paderewski. Zarys biografii politycznej*, Warsaw 1986, pp. 136-137; M. Rezler, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

²⁹ “Paderewski to Be First President of Poland”, *Daily Mirror* 30 December 1918.

³⁰ “Street Fighting in Posen. Germans and Poles in Conflict”, *The Times* 30 December 1918.

³¹ “Un grave incident”, *Le Gaulois* 31 December 1918.

³² Interestingly, according to the British press, German soldiers tore down British and Allied flags. See, for example, “Sharp Fighting in Posen”, *The Times* 31 December 1918.

hand grenades, resulting in people being wounded or killed.³³ *Le Temps* published an almost identical account, noting that it was based on information provided by *Posener Neueste Nachrichten*.³⁴ Another article in the same issue gives information about the number of dead – 38 women and children and 100 soldiers on both sides – and states that the entire city is in the hands of the Poles.³⁵ A day later, *Le Temps*, in its first issue of 1919, citing news from Berlin, revealed that the Poznań telegraph and telephone lines and railways were in Polish hands, and the German authorities of Poznań had called on Berlin to send reinforcements.³⁶

The socialist *L'Humanité*, repeating the information about the fighting in Poznań and its causes, drew attention to its mass scale. An article of 31 December 1918 contained such expressions as *de nombreux manifestants* (“numerous demonstrators”) and *un tumulte effroyable* (“terrible chaos”).³⁷

While the French press on the last day of 1918 and the first day of 1919 mainly reported on the fighting in the streets of Poznań, supplementing the first reports of 30 December with more information, the daily London press in those days tried to present the actions of the Polish insurgents in as much detail as possible. As has been mentioned, *The Times* had a correspondent in Warsaw, and it was on his reports (information obtained from the Polish government) that the daily based its account of the events that had taken place on 27 December 1918 in Poznań. The article *Sharp Fighting in Posen* precisely described the moment of Paderewski’s arrival in Poznań on 26 December, his greeting, and even the fact that Wojciech Korfanty (called in the text “the leader of the Poles of Posnania”) welcomed the British Colonel Wade, who was accompanying the pianist, in English. The daily also quoted Paderewski’s speech and reported that the German military command had demanded that the future Polish Prime Minister and his British companions should leave the town immediately and continue their journey to Warsaw, which was refused point blank. In that article one can also find an interesting definition of who the fighting Poles were. While those fighting on the German side were referred to as German troops and civilians, the author of the article described those on the Polish side as “ex-German troops of Polish nationality”.³⁸ Two days later on 2 January 1919, *The Times* gave yet another reason for the fighting in Poznań – the words “Posen is a German town” chanted by the Germans, which were considered a provocation. However, the paper wrote that Korfanty, which it regarded as the Polish leader, had tried to persuade the Poles to disperse to prevent the Germans from using the argument of a Polish provocation.³⁹

On 31 December 1918, *The Globe* cited a joint proclamation announced by the “German and Polish authorities” on 29 December – the imposition of martial law,

³³ “Les incidents de Posen”, *Le Figaro* 31 December 1918.

³⁴ *Le Temps* 31 December 1918.

³⁵ “Les incidents sanglants de Posen”, *Le Temps* 31 December 1918.

³⁶ “Les incidents sanglants de Posen”, *Le Temps* 1 January 1919.

³⁷ “Troubles à Posen”, *L'Humanité* 31 December 1918.

³⁸ “Sharp Fighting in Posen”, *The Times* 31 December 1918.

³⁹ “German provocation”, *The Times* 2 January 1919.

a five p.m. curfew, and suspension of the right of assembly. As the news was described in vague terms (“the following proclamation, signed by the German and Polish authorities, was posted up on December 29”), an English reader might have mistakenly assumed it referred to a mutual agreement. In fact, the proclamation came from the Polish–German Poznań City Command established on 28 December by those who desired a cessation of the fighting, which the Polish insurgents did not recognise.⁴⁰ For the first time a Polish name is mentioned in the article, that of Jan Maciaszek⁴¹ (the name, however, as was often the case in the Western press, was misspelled – Macazek), elected as the new city commander, who had signed an order that public buildings in the city would remain occupied by the Polish [People’s] Guard until further notice.⁴² It should be noted that neither the French nor the British papers analysed here named any other Polish commanders, such as Major Stanisław Taczak.

On the last day of the memorable year 1918, the British press described the actions of the Poles in Poznań. *The Daily Mirror*, in a short article headlined *Street Fight in Posen*, apart from repeating the news about the tearing down of flags and the beginning of the fighting, reported that the Poles had made themselves masters of the city and disarmed German officers and soldiers, some of whom had been executed, and that telephone and telegraph communication between Poznań and Berlin had been cut off.⁴³

In their editions of 1 January 1919, *The Globe* and *The Pall Mall Gazette* published much more extensive reports from Poznań, relying exclusively on the news given in the German press. *The Globe*, in a subtitle of its article *Siege of Posen*, posed the question: *Is Paderewski Leading the Troops Himself?*, pointing out that such a suggestion was being made by German newspapers. The message conveyed in this article is clearly different from that of the previous day. The newspaper quoted *Berliner Tageblatt*, which had reported that the fighting had begun with mutual demonstrations, during which Poles encroached upon the Germans; the latter resisted, which gave the Poles a signal for a major attack, resulting in 50 deaths. According to the daily, the Poles seized public buildings, cut off the German population from the districts where they lived, on the evening of 28 December allowed armed youths to rob and ill-treat all Germans encountered in the streets.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ A. Czubiński, Z. Grot, B. Miśkiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-192.

⁴¹ Jan Maciaszek was a lawyer, Poznań city commander, and member of the Military Department of the Commissariat of the Supreme People’s Council; A. Czubiński, Z. Grot, B. Miśkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 501.

⁴² “Iron Law in Posen”, *The Globe* 31 December 1918.

⁴³ “Street Fight in Posen”, *Daily Mirror* 31 December 1918. It is also worth noting the subtitle of this article: “Hun-Made Riot About Paderewski Ends in Failure”. During World War I in Britain, the German enemy were commonly referred to as “Huns”, comparing them to barbaric peoples who had invaded late ancient Europe. The French, on the other hand, commonly used the term “les Boches”, an abbreviation of the French slang word *alboche*, which is a blending of *Allemand* (German) and *caboch* (numskull). For more see: J. Walker, *Words and the First World War: Language, Memory, Vocabulary*, London–New York 2017.

⁴⁴ “Siege of Posen”, *The Globe* 1 January 1919.

While *The Globe* debated the suggestion that Paderewski was in command of the Polish troops, *The Pall Mall Gazette* took it for granted, as reflected in the headline of its report from Greater Poland, *Paderewski Leads an Army*. The introduction to the article says: "Posen, the capital of Prussian Poland, is apparently in the hands of the insurgent Poles, led by M. Paderewski, the famous pianist, who has devoted himself to the interests of his beloved country since the outbreak of the war."⁴⁵ Another headline in the same article is *Drumfire Against a Synagogue*, and one of the first facts given about the uprising is that on Saturday, 28 December 1918, the Jews had fired on Poles from their synagogue, which provoked the Poles to fire on the building, where the Jewish community was assembled for the Sabbath. Then, citing the Berlin paper *Acht Uhr Abendblatt*, the article states that with the start of the uprising there had been pogroms in Poznań, in which Jewish houses and shops were plundered, and several Jews killed or wounded. By 31 December 1918, thirty Jews were reported to have been killed by Poles.⁴⁶ The discussion of anti-Semitic actions in press reports in Britain is not surprising, as information about pogroms was deliberately and widely disseminated by German news agencies and the German press in the Western media at the turn of 1918 and 1919, also with regard to pogroms in Galicia and the former Kingdom of Poland. They aimed to discredit the newly restored Polish state and its authorities, especially in view of the pending peace conference.⁴⁷ The British government treated the reports on the pogroms seriously, as evidenced by, for example, the mission of Stuart Montagu Samuel investigating the situation of the Jewish population in Poland between September and December 1919.⁴⁸

As noted above, the first mentions of the Uprising referred to the spontaneous removal of Allied flags by German soldiers. On 1 January 1919, *The Pall Mall Gazette* wrote that during the march of German soldiers and civilians on 27 December, some expressed the view that it would be a just and friendly act for the American flags flying over the city to be removed. When their request was not met, they began to remove the flags themselves, which sparked street fights.⁴⁹ It is worth noting the change that was clearly noticeable in the German press sources reaching the Entente concerning the causes of the outbreak of fighting in Poznań, where the Germans were coming to be portrayed as victims of Polish aggression.

The first analyses of the situation in Greater Poland seen from a broader perspective appeared in the French press at the beginning of January 1919. In the 1 January

⁴⁵ "Paderewski Leads an Army", *The Pall Mall Gazette* 1 January 1919.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Cf. A. Misiurska, *Pierwsze dni niepodległości Polski na łamach francuskiej prasy codziennej*, [in:] *Pierwsze dni niepodległości. Materiały z konferencji, Białystok 14–16 March 2018*, N. Filinowicz, P. Niziołek, Ł. Radulski, T. Wesołowski (eds.), Białystok 2018, pp. 206–207; D. Jeziorny, *Zszargana reputacja? Wizerunek odradzającej się Polski i kwestia żydowska na łamach amerykańskiej prasy, Przegląd Zachodni 2018*, No. 3 (368), pp. 15–37.

⁴⁸ Ł. Jastrząb, *Raporty o antysemickich wystąpieniach w Polsce po I wojnie światowej, Pamiętnik Biblioteki Kórnickiej*, vol. 32, Kórnik 2015, p. 201.

⁴⁹ "Paderewski Leads an Army", *The Pall Mall Gazette* 1 January 1919.

edition, the very popular daily *Le Petit Parisien*, citing German articles, reported not only on the situation in Poznań, but also on the seizure of Gniezno by the Poles, and the announcement by local workers' and soldiers' councils in Września, Mirosław and Środa of the annexation of that area to Poland.⁵⁰ The following day, the same newspaper described the actions taken by the people of Greater Poland as part of the ongoing process of restoring an independent Polish state. In the article *La Pologne libre se constitue*, the daily noted that the inhabitants of Greater Poland had been somewhat sidelined with regard to the Polish issue, trying to resist German pressure until the surrender of Germany, which pushed them to take Poznań, Gniezno and other cities by force. The author of the article stated that the people of Greater Poland had refused to become German at the moment when they declared their wish to participate in the elections to the Polish parliament, and the Uprising was proof of this.⁵¹

Le Petit Parisien continues its analysis of the situation in Greater Poland in its edition of 4 January 1919, in the article *Le conflit de Posnanie* by Colonel Rousset, a well-known politician and military historian. The author explained the important part played by the Greater Poland region in the history of Poland, mentioning that Gniezno was the seat of the Primate of Poland, who had presided over the royal elections. Thus: "Its conquest has a moral significance." Rousset also stressed another important aspect of the fighting in the former Prussian partition – the involvement of both the German troops of General Hoffmann, commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, and the Polish army, made it impossible to send help to Vilnius, which had been occupied by the Bolsheviks. The author noted that the Poles did not intend to withdraw; on the contrary, the insurgent commanders had decided to call the Polish-speaking inhabitants of Prussia, Silesia and Galicia to arms, which in turn would force the Germans to mobilise additional troops. What was the Allies' role in resolving the Polish–German conflict, according to Rousset? In his opinion, direct intervention seemed to have been accidental and delayed, but the question of involvement was important because the Polish question was linked to the expansion of the Bolsheviks to the West. All the Allies could do, according to the author of the article, was send provisions or instructors to Greater Poland.⁵² As can be seen, French commentators discussed the Greater Poland Uprising with regard to the threat posed by the Bolsheviks, and saw the need to assist the Poles.

In the following days of January 1919, newspapers on both sides of the English Channel reported on the fighting in Greater Poland, although somewhat briefly. On 3 January, the Catholic *La Croix* announced that Poznań was already in the hands of the Poles.⁵³ *Le Petit Parisien* of 5 January 1919, citing a German press source, wrote that the German–Polish negotiations taking place in Poznań, Gniezno, Inowrocław and Bydgoszcz had been successful and both parties had announced that they would

⁵⁰ "Le soulèvement polonais s'étend en Posnanie", *Le Petit Parisien* 1 January 1919.

⁵¹ "La Pologne libre se constitue", *Le Petit Parisien* 2 January 1919.

⁵² L. Rousset, "Le conflit de Posnanie", *Le Petit Parisien* 4 January 1919.

⁵³ "En Pologne. La Posnanie aux mains des Polonais", *La Croix* 3 January 1919.

lay down their arms. The Poles were to keep those parts of Greater Poland that were already in their hands, and undertook not to attempt further conquests. However, the author of the text remarked that this information was not confirmed by any other source.⁵⁴ Further down the page is a short article about the progress of the fighting in Greater Poland: the siege of Piła and renewed arms fire in Poznań.⁵⁵ The next day, the same newspaper reported on a Polish breach of the ceasefire that it had mentioned the day before, and further fighting: the occupation of Kruszwica and battles for Strzelno and Gniezno.⁵⁶ In turn, on 7 January 1919, the socialist daily *L'Humanité*, citing a German source, wrote that German protests could not stop the march of the Poles into German lands. On the contrary, that march seemed to be gaining momentum. An article headlined *Allemands et Polonais* described Polish actions reaching further and further to the north-east and west: the cutting of communication routes, the recruitment of Poles in Gniezno, a march on Toruń by Polish troops, the desertion of some parts of Bydgoszcz by their inhabitants, and a Polish advance towards the border between Greater Poland and Brandenburg. This article clearly reflects the German point of view, as evidenced by such statements as: "The Poles do not hide the fact that they are forming an army in order to 'liberate' the west of Greater Poland".⁵⁷

In early January, London newspapers reported on the fighting in Greater Poland using eye-catching headlines: *Poles Advancing* or even *Poles Marching on Berlin*. On 2 January, *The Pall Mall Gazette* wrote that, according to the Berlin soldiers' council, an army of at least 30,000 Poles was advancing towards the German capital and the Polish government had commenced a general mobilisation (this probably referred, however, to the first Polish volunteer recruitment, as the first general conscription into the Polish Army was approved by parliament on 7 March 1919). The paper also stated that the Polish side made no secret of its desire to make a *fait accompli* of the incorporation of East Prussia, meaning Greater Poland, into Poland.⁵⁸ *The Globe*, in turn, reported that a telegram from Berlin said that events in Poznań were assuming a grave, not to say disastrous character.⁵⁹ The next day, on 3 January, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, in an article under the portentous headline *Bolshevik March Must Stop*, cited another report from Berlin, according to which the events in Greater Poland were assuming a more and more threatening character. Further places of conflict were mentioned: Leszno and Nakło nad Notecią, where the Poles were defeated. The paper described the situation as "extremely critical", and judged that the German government had

⁵⁴ "Le conflit germano-polonais serait réglé", *Le Petit Parisien* 5 January 1919.

⁵⁵ "Cependant de Berlin on signale encore quelques incidents", *Le Petit Parisien* 5 January 1919.

⁵⁶ "La trêve germano-polonaise serait déjà rompue", *Le Petit Parisien* 6 January 1919.

⁵⁷ "Les Polonais ne dissimulent pas qu'une armée est actuellement en formation dans le but d'être destinée à la «libération» de la Posnanie occidentale"; "Allemands et Polonais", *L'Humanité* 7 January 1919.

⁵⁸ "Poles Advancing", *The Pall Mall Gazette* 2 January 1919.

⁵⁹ "Poles Marching on Berlin: A German Report", *The Globe* 2 January 1919.

acted too late and that the negotiations in Poznań with German ministers had yielded no results.⁶⁰

In the following days, both French and British newspapers reported on the fighting in Greater Poland. On 8 January, the French daily *Le Figaro* announced that three-quarters of Greater Poland was in Polish hands, including the towns of Gniezno, Rogowo and Września,⁶¹ and in another article in the same edition, it referred to the rumours being spread by the Germans about a Polish army marching towards Berlin (as readily reported in the British press). The author of a short article *Faux bruits* ("False rumours") referred to a Reuters' statement saying that Polish circles in London had not confirmed the information about a Polish march on Berlin. The author suggested that the story might be a deliberate German action aimed at discrediting the Poles, while allegations of anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland were greatly exaggerated and also had their origin in Germany.⁶²

Nevertheless, news about the progress of Poles fighting against the Germans in Greater Poland and occupying further areas appeared on the following days. On 6 January 1919, the article *Poles Pushing On* in *The Globe* said that the Poles had made further progress along the railway line from Poznań, and the day before they were four miles away from Zbąszyń (Bentschen), where the Germans had decided to defend the railway station. The author explained that Zbąszyń was of the greatest importance to Berlin and the whole of Germany, as it was a great railway centre connecting Silesia with Frankfurt an der Oder, the Oder River and Berlin. If that railway hub were taken by the Poles, then Germany would lose its richest grain- and sugar-producing area.⁶³ *The Globe* was quite meticulous in documenting the progress of the Poles, listing the actions and conquests of the Polish insurgents in January: the capture of the railway station in Chrośnica, the fighting for the railway hub in Zbąszyń, the fighting for Piła, and the occupation of Chodzież and Białośliwie by the Germans.⁶⁴ A day later it wrote that the Poles had reached Kostrzyn and Śrem.⁶⁵ This is quite detailed information, bearing in mind that few British people, even among the upper classes, knew where the above-mentioned places were or how important they were for Poland and Germany. Thus, it is clear that the British reports on the events in Greater Poland are mainly reprinted from the German press with no added commentary.

On 9 January, a short analysis of the events in Greater Poland was published in *Le Temps*, valuable in that it was obtained from a Polish bureau, stating that the occupation of Poznań by Poles was mainly the result of the action of a local military organisation which had operated for several months and which was in touch with

⁶⁰ "Bolshevik March Must Stop", *The Pall Mall Gazette* 3 January 1919.

⁶¹ "Inquiétude allemande", *Le Figaro* 8 January 1919.

⁶² "Faux bruits", *Le Figaro* 8 January 1919.

⁶³ "Poles Pushing on", *The Globe* 6 January 1919. Significantly, the Germans are called "Huns" in the British papers, and particularly in *The Globe*.

⁶⁴ "Poles Pushing on", *The Globe* 6 January 1919; "Poles and Huns Fight", *The Globe* 9 January 1919.

⁶⁵ "3 Hun Corps to Take Posen", *The Globe* 10 January 1919.

a similar one in the former Russian partition. The Uprising was triggered mainly by working-class youth, despite the fact that Polish political circles maintained the position that the Greater Poland question should be settled at the peace conference.⁶⁶

Although the newspapers mention numerous places as Polish–German battlefields, the absence of names of leaders of the Uprising is particularly noticeable. Among the analysed dailies, the name of General Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki was mentioned by *Le Temps* (misspelled as Doubor-Musnitzki) and the Catholic *La Croix* (again misspelled, as Dombor Musnicki), and only on the occasion of his becoming commander-in-chief and his arrival with a staff in Poznań. However, there was no mention of Major Stanisław Taczak, the former commander, or of the role of the Polish government and Józef Piłsudski in appointing the commander-in-chief of the Polish fighting forces in Greater Poland.⁶⁷ The only mention of the commanders of the uprising found in the British press is the information published on 16 January 1919 in *The Times* on the appointment of General Dowbor-Muśnicki as the commander-in-chief,⁶⁸ although he had already been known as the Commander of the Polish I Corps in Russia and his name had appeared in French and British newspapers at the turn of 1917 and 1918. The same article quotes a statement of the German Council of People’s Deputies⁶⁹ that the German state needed protection against “Polish annexationism”, placing it on a par with Russian military despotism – Bolshevism, which for Germany meant “the death of peace, of freedom, and of Socialism”.⁷⁰ As can be seen, the German side tried to use its propaganda to create in the British press an image of Poles as a threat to the peace and functioning of the German state.

The Greater Poland question was not referred to in the newspapers in the context of the internal situation of the fledgling Polish state. An exception might be an article on Polish affairs in *Le Temps*, which described a meeting between Józef Piłsudski and a delegation of workers from Poznań and Gniezno, citing a telegram sent from Warsaw to one of the Swiss newspapers. The author of the article quoted Piłsudski’s speech, in which he declared that he would like Poznań and Gniezno to become part of Poland, but would leave the question of whether Greater Poland should belong to Poland or Germany to be decided at the peace conference. In his view, the only task of the Polish government in the face of the still-existent German power was to appeal to the Allied states and point out the importance of modifying the terms of the current armistice. Poland’s relations with the Entente were excellent, as evidenced by the

⁶⁶ “Pologne. La prise de Posen”, *Le Temps* 9 January 1919.

⁶⁷ “Combats en Posnanie”, *Le Temps* 16 January 1919; “En Pologne”, *La Croix* 16 January 1919. For more on General Dowbor-Muśnicki’s appointment see A. Czubiński, *op. cit.*, pp. 193, 231–235.

⁶⁸ “Protection for Prussia”, *The Times* 16 January 1919.

⁶⁹ This was the central authority in Berlin during the revolution from 10 November 1918 until the formation of the government of Philipp Scheidemann on 13 February 1919 and the election of Friedrich Ebert as President. It consisted of three representatives each of the radical Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). For more see: J. Krasuski, *Historia Rzeszy Niemieckiej 1871-1945*, Wrocław 2008.

⁷⁰ “Protection for Prussia”, *The Times* 16 January 1919.

arrival of the Polish mission in Paris and the Allied mission in Warsaw. The delegates were said to have assured Piłsudski that Greater Poland was fully at his disposal.⁷¹

From mid-January 1919, there was a significant decrease in the number of reports in the French press on the fighting in Greater Poland. During this period, the French public was interested in the Polish issue mainly in connection with the beginning of the peace conference and, somewhat peripherally, with the situation in Russia and the Bolshevik threat that the Poles had to face. The question of which nation should receive Greater Poland was discussed in commentaries, for example, in *Bulletin du jour*, a daily column in *Le Temps*. In an article published in that column on 30 January 1919, the author explained that the hostility surrounding Poland was incurable because it did not result, as others did, from the rivalry between two nations, but from the struggle between the Polish nation and the Prussian state. Nations can come to an agreement, but there can be no compromise between a nation that wants to be free and the mechanism of conquest built by the Hohenzollerns. The author also explained how important Greater Poland was for Germany as an agricultural base.⁷²

In the final stage of the Greater Poland Uprising, the British papers tended to avoid commenting on the events, preferring to report the continued fighting on the basis of German sources, which often portrayed the Germans as victims of Polish aggression. For example, on 22 January 1919, *The Globe* quoted a German response to a British government note requesting the Germans to refrain from any provocation of the Polish population in the entire former Prussian partition and Upper Silesia, and pointing out that a final decision on the eastern German frontiers would be made at the peace conference. The German government's note stated that it had done everything possible to redress Polish grievances, and accused the Poles of continually provoking the Germans.⁷³ Moreover, in London, the rhetoric of the German press about the threat posed by the Poles was sustained. On 28 January 1919, *The Globe* announced in a headline that the Poles had occupied Babimost without fighting and were only three miles from the frontier with Brandenburg.⁷⁴

Almost from the beginning of February 1919, the French and British press focused on the question of another extension of the armistice with Germany. For the French, calming the situation in eastern Germany was essential because of the looming Bolshevik threat, the more so that at the beginning of February, a strengthened Germany had launched a significant counter-offensive.

The convention signed in Trier on 16 February 1919 between Germany and the Entente states, represented by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, prolonged and supplemented the armistice convention of 11 November 1918, which fact was reported in the French and British press the following day. On 17 February, *Le Temps* presented the demar-

⁷¹ "Les affaires polonaises. Piłsudski et les Posnaniens", *Le Temps* 18 January 1919.

⁷² "Bulletin du jour. Les puissances et la Pologne", *Le Temps* 30 January 1919.

⁷³ "Huns Allege Polish Provocation", *The Globe* 22 January 1919.

⁷⁴ The headline states: "Poles Advance in Germany. Only Three Miles from Frontiers of Brandenburg", *The Globe* 28 January 1919.

cation line in Greater Poland as defined in Trier. It also included General de Lacroix's commentary on the aforementioned convention, in which he noted Germany's position that until the conference settled the border issue, it would defend those borders. He also wrote that so far the German–Polish conflicts had been exaggerated and the right proportions had to be restored, but on the other hand, the Poles had suffered so much during the German partition that a reaction was inevitable. Moreover, the Poles never posed a real threat to the Germans, who, on the pretext of defending the integrity of their lands, opposed them with considerable forces. The general also defended the French government, explaining that the Western allies had not failed to fulfil their commitment to protect Poland.⁷⁵

On the same day, *The Globe* in London cited the terms of the armistice, saying that despite it, Germany was continuing its offensive in south-western Greater Poland using modern weapons: flamethrowers, artillery and even gas (it is noteworthy that the information on the conditions of the ceasefire and the progress of the fighting during this period were for the first time reported quoting Paris sources, and not, as was formerly the case, the German press). The text also cites arguments presented by the Germans, and more specifically by Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defence, justifying the continuation of fighting. He argued that there were in Greater Poland large quantities of food products intended for Germany, and it would likely be impossible to get through the difficult period if those supplies were controlled by Polish landowners, who would most certainly not release them to Germany. This argument indicates that in order to improve their image and justify their actions, the Germans cited social and economic motives to portray themselves as victims instead of aggressors.⁷⁶

In the later part of February, the British press continued to report on further fighting in Greater Poland, adopting a critical stance towards German violations of the provisions of the armistice. At the same time, the Greater Polish question disappeared from the French newspapers, which were by then focused on the peace conference, and – as regards Polish issues – on the situation in Galicia and the Polish–Czech conflict.

CONCLUSION

The Greater Poland Uprising at the turn of 1918 and 1919 received considerable attention in the daily press in the European Entente states. Almost every day there were reports, analyses or at least brief mentions of the situation in Greater Poland. However, the way the events were described and assessed differed between France and Great Britain. The French press made no secret of its support for the fighting insurgents, pointing to the aggressive behaviour of German soldiers. In the Paris papers,

⁷⁵ H. de Lacroix, "Prolongation de l'armistice", *Le Temps* 17 February 1919.

⁷⁶ "New Armistice Signed", *The Globe* 17 February 1919.

commentary and analysis of the events from the perspective of the post-war situation in Europe were much more common than accounts of the fighting itself.

At the beginning of the Uprising, the British papers strongly emphasised the role of Paderewski as a national leader for Poland and for the people of the Greater Poland region also. But as time went by, the reports of the fighting, based mainly on German press sources, were limited to a scrupulous listing of towns or railway lines that had changed hands. Not until the end of the Uprising, at the time of the signing of the Convention at Trier, did the British perception of the Germans change – from that of victims of Polish aggression to that of aggressors.

Despite the differences in the presentation of the events of the Greater Poland Uprising in the French and British press, there was no clear disagreement between the two countries, like the one that emerged later with regard to the future of Danzig and Upper Silesia, which led to a significant rise in the temperature of international discourse.

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Keywords: Greater Poland Uprising, French press, British press, Ignacy Jan Paderewski, struggle for the borders of the Second Republic of Poland

ABSTRACT

This paper describes the reporting of the Greater Poland Uprising (1918–1919) in the French and British daily press, and compares the two perspectives.

The main hypothesis is that the manner of presentation of events in France and Great Britain was different, as a result of the different sources of information used and the differing positions of the two governments regarding the Polish question, which was understood as an element of policy towards the defeated Germany.

An analysis of selected French press titles was made (Le Gaulois, Le Temps, Le Figaro, Le Petit Parisien, La Croix), along with British newspapers (The Globe, The Pall Mall Gazette, The Daily Mirror), from the end of 1918 and the first months of 1919. These daily newspapers had different political leanings and readerships, but they were extremely popular and enjoyed high circulation. Selected articles were analysed in terms of the information given about the causes, outbreaks, course and consequences of the Greater Poland Uprising, using appropriate historiographic methods: analysis of press sources, the linguistic method and, above all, the comparative method.

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ROSA LUXEMBURG AGAINST WAR ON THE CENTENARY OF HER DEATH

The date of 11 November 1918 is special in both Polish and German history even though it was marked by different circumstances. Poland was reborn after 123 years of partition whereas the Armistice of Compiègne, signed on the morning of that day, sealed the fall of the German Empire and the rise of the republic. Such anniversaries are linked with people whose stories tend to be forgotten. A good case in point is the story of Rozalia Luxenburg, more commonly known as Rosa Luxemburg (Polish: Róża Luksemburg). While she is sometimes described as “the best known Polish woman in the world, besides Marie Skłodowska Curie”,¹ very few people now associate this un-Polish sounding name. She is still more recognisable outside Poland, “in remote corners of Europe and the world”² than in her country of origin. The centenary of her tragic death, which fell in January 1919, is an opportunity to look back at the life of Rosa Luxemburg, which is an example of complex and diverse Polish-German relations at the turn of the 20th century. She began her career in the rising labour movement in the Russian partition and from 1898 continued it in the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), gaining international recognition in subsequent years.

Luxemburg was engaged in many fields of political activity. Her involvement in the movement against the militaristic policy of the Wilhelmine Reich and the impending war was noteworthy, which is a research theme rarely addressed in the Polish literature of the subject. Due to the nature of the topic, the present paper draws primarily upon German sources (documents, minutes of the *Reichstag* sessions, press articles, epistolary and biographical literature, etc.). As a leading *SPD* member, Luxemburg took part in political debates, published and delivered speeches in German, which at the time was a *lingua franca* of the world labour movement. Also, the vast majority of the publications on this topic are available in German.³

¹ R. Luksemburg, *O rewolucji 1905, 1917*, selected and edited by P. Wielgosz, Warsaw 2018, p. 13.

² A. Kowalczyk, *Brakująca połowa dziejów. Krótka historia kobiet na ziemiach polskich*, Warsaw 2018, p. 335.

³ The publications by foreign researchers predominantly refer to the German sources, which is why they are secondary in nature.

In the face of the rising international tension at the turn of the 20th century, which eventually led to the outbreak of an armed global conflict, Rosa Luxemburg delivered her pacifist message with courage and tenacity, much in opposition to the prevailing moods within German political circles and society. Despite a time lapse of 100 years, this message is still valid: today, just like in the past, wars, which serve the interests of a minority, result only in destruction and victims. What is also important in this context is Luxemburg's sharp criticism of the German *SDP*'s conservative stance. The party's support of the imperial government's oppressive plans not only led to the split within the labour movement in Germany but it also affected its growth after the end of WW1. The unity and cohesion of the left coupled with inconsistency in action paved the way for the Nazis' rise to power.

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (that name was adopted at the Halle convention held 12-18 October 1890) was founded over 150 years ago and is one of the oldest and longest operating groups of the labour movement both in Germany and worldwide. At the turn of the 20th century, it evolved from a small and insignificant political group into a mass party, which thanks to election successes became a leading political force. The party controlled the so-called free trade unions (*freie Gewerkschaften*), which also experienced dynamic growth at the time.

One of the ideological foundations of the German Social Democracy was pacifism. In the *Reichstag*, it consistently opposed military expenditures, following the message of its founders and eminent leaders, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht: "For this system, not one man, not one penny!" as "social democracy cannot be reconciled with militarism, which is an inevitable excess of the existing state and social system, or with the system itself"⁴. The Social Democrats expressed solidarity with the international labour movement and condemned militarism as a manifestation of national interests.⁵ However, they could see that while peace fostered the growth of international relations, the economic competition among countries intensified the arms race, which brought with itself the risk of war. Hence, the turn of the 20th century was often called the age of military peace. This applied also, or maybe most of all, to Germany, one of the most developed and wealthiest countries of the world at the time. Its ruler, Emperor Wilhelm II, in his search for "a place in the sun" pursued a confrontational policy (*Weltpolitik*). Already at the time of Frederick the Great, it was said that the Prussian monarchy was not a country which had an army, but an army which had a country. Prussia's dominance in the empire resulted in the militari-

⁴ *Dokument 11. Aufruf der sozialdemokratischen Reichstagsfraktion von 14. Januar 1887 zur Reichstagswahl*, [in:] Ch. Butterwegge, H.-G. Hofschien, *Sozialdemokratie, Krieg und Frieden: Die Stellung der SPD zur Friedensfrage von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Eine kommentierte Dokumentation*, Heilbronn 1984, pp. 36-37 (author's translation).

⁵ F. Walter, *SPD. Z historii niemieckiej socjaldemokracji*, translated from German by M. Sutowski, Warsaw 2013, p. 43.

sation of social life in the entire country.⁶ Therefore, in the Erfurt Programme of 1891, the Social Democrats demanded, among other things, “education of all to bear arms. Militia in the place of the standing army (...) Settlement of all international disputes by arbitration”⁷.

In the face of the growing international tension, the German representatives kept demonstrating their solidarity with the Second International⁸ and expressed their desire to maintain peace during numerous meetings and debates. However, it became noticeable that the party leaders were gradually shifting away from antimilitarism. In doing so, they quoted their authority figure, August Bebel, who in a 1904 *Reichstag* speech vowed “to shoulder a rifle”, if the country was in need (i.e. if it faced a war of aggression).⁹ He reaffirmed this view at the Eisenach convention of 1907, saying that the *SPD* would defend the Reich. Hence, the party emphasised the distinction between a (still condemned) war waged by Germany (*Angriffskrieg*) and a defensive war (*Verteidigungskrieg*), which puts an obligation upon all citizens to resist an attack. The German Social Democrats wanted to avoid being stigmatised as “bad patriots” and strove to prove their political maturity and loyalty to the mother country. Thus, they chose to operate within the parliamentary system as, in their view, that could prevent their isolation and repression against the party. Consequently, political pragmatism prevailed, which resulted in the increased role of the *SPD*’s faction in the *Reichstag* (besides its leadership).¹⁰ At the 1913 congress in Jena, the last one before the war, the party overwhelmingly voted in favour of raising inheritance, wealth and income taxes.¹¹ While this primarily affected the wealthy sectors of society, there was no doubt that the money raised would be channelled into arms funding: only in 1913-1914 arms spending rose twofold.¹² Such was the price of “hunting for seats and parliamentary calculations”.¹³

⁶ In the *Wilhelmine Reich*, which was established in 1871 largely due to Prussia’s military successes, the army enjoyed a privileged position and huge respect among citizens. The army was associated with punctuality, order and discipline, which were deemed by Germans as desired civic virtues (*bürgerliche Tugenden*).

⁷ K. Kautsky, *Program Erfurcki (Zasady socializmu)*, corrected and supplemented according to the last German edition, Warsaw 1907, pp. 172, 176, 180 (The English quotation from <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1891/erfurt-program.htm>, accessed 20 July 2020). The programme was adopted just after the lifting of the anti-socialist laws, which were in effect from 1878 to 1890 and banned the activity of the socialist parties.

⁸ An international association of socialist parties and organisations, which lasted from 1889 to 1923.

⁹ *Reichstag* – 51. Sitzung, Montag den 7. März 1904, p. 1588, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k11_bsb00002808_00737.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

¹⁰ J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, London-Oxford-New York 1969, p. 307.

¹¹ Cf. *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten in Jena vom 14. bis 20. September 1913*, Berlin 1913, p. 515.

¹² Precisely from 1,479,461,000 to 2,245,633,000 German marks, according to: *Deutschlands Rüstungsausgaben*, “Lübecker Volksbote” 7 July 1914.

¹³ P. Frölich, *Rosa Luxemburg. Gedanke und Tat*, Frankfurt am Main 1967, p. 211.

The above attitude was, doubtless, strongly influenced by the events of 1905 in Russia. They showed that, in contrast to previous predictions, a revolution was more likely to break out in eastern Europe, rather than in more economically developed western countries. For the *SPD*, those events were like shock therapy and seemed to prove the views of Eduard Bernstein. It should be reminded that he undertook the task of combining the party's revolutionary rhetoric with its parliamentary practice when, in the late 19th century, it became clear that the capitalist system was not only bound to fail, as predicted by Karl Marx, but had entered a new stage of development. On the other hand, the *SPD* began to achieve considerable election successes and grow in strength. From then on, it strove not to topple the capitalist system but to make it democratic through reforms aimed at providing equal rights to workers and improving their living conditions. Bernstein revised Marxist concepts of the decomposition of the middle class, the impoverishment of the proletariat and a growing tendency toward crises, finding them inadequate to reality. He pointed to the evolutionary growth of the labour movement, and called for its representatives to be involved in Germany's political life, including parliamentary engagement. This way, he pioneered a new ideological direction, called revisionism.

Initially, this approach did not meet with approval among the party ranks because for the *SPD* it meant a dramatic move away from its original ideals; that, however, changed over time. The social revolution in Germany, promised by the Social Democrats, "had always been for them an issue of the following day, never a task for the present day".¹⁴ Satisfied with waiting for a revolution, which was to occur in some distant future, the *SPD* was ceasing to be a revolutionary party. Moreover, at the turn of the 20th century, a generational change in the German labour movement was taking place. The generation of the party's founding fathers, whose lives had been shaped by persecution and underground activity, such as A. Bebel and W. Liebknecht, were gradually leaving the political stage being superseded by activists, such as Friedrich Ebert. In other words, charismatic leaders were replaced by professional politicians and the period of the socialist movement was coming to an end, giving way to the period of the party apparatus, which in the first place aimed to struggle for parliamentary seats. Of equal significance was the fact that German workers had also become the beneficiaries of capitalism, which was becoming increasingly tolerable. If they had been called to revolutionary action, they would have had much more to lose than, for example, Russian proletarians. As a result, according to the *SPD*'s historian Fritz Walter, its Marxism came down to "the radicalism of the rhetoric, the radicalism of Sunday speeches and emotional ecstasy, not of warlike action".¹⁵

Not all party members approved these changes, arguing that they resulted from a wrong assessment of the situation. They also criticised parliamentary engagement as being illusive and mistaken. Among the few politicians calling for vehement oppo-

¹⁴ S. Haffner, *Niemiecka rewolucja 1918/1919*, translated from German by A. Marcinek, Lublin 1996, p. 15.

¹⁵ F. Walter, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

sition to the governmental policies of their countries, which were increasing the risk of war, was Rosa Luxemburg. From 1898 onwards, when she arrived in Berlin and joined the *SPD*, she became a stern critic of the party's particularism and consistently spoke out against the emperor's belligerent policy and his armaments programme.¹⁶ This was one of the most important issues she raised at international and domestic congresses of the labour movement. She regarded militarism as "a deadly enemy of any culture".¹⁷ With an excellent knowledge of economic issues, she predicted that the capitalist system would collapse most likely for political, rather than economic, reasons.¹⁸ Thus, she did not rule out that a war would break out and that the proletariat should be ready to seize power also in such circumstances.¹⁹ "Our task in Germany is to prepare for a revolution and a revolution needs men who can handle arms"²⁰: this is what she said to a conscripted party comrade who was faced with the dilemma whether, as a social democrat, he should serve the Wilhelmine Reich.

Luxemburg's pacifist approach resulted from her views: as a dedicated follower of classical Marxism with its anti-war agenda, she rejected all manifestations of nationalism. Also, as she had grown up in a multicultural background and, since childhood, had experienced discrimination not least due to her Jewish origin, she had a strong social conscience. Luxemburg believed that Social Democracy should not just "have 'connections' but identify with the working class", and that it should develop freely rather than be controlled by "professional revolutionaries".²¹ In her case, the fact that she was not German, or she did not feel German, made it easier for her to criticise the *SPD*'s passivity. She warned the Social Democrats against opportunism, which inadvertently results in "sacrificing the ultimate goals of the movement, the interests of the liberation of the working class, for short-term and imaginary interests".²² She wrote disapprovingly, using the word "swamp", in reference those party members who had supported German militarism for the sake of choosing "a lesser evil".²³ In that period, real power in Germany was concentrated in the hands of the military, which strengthened its position during the war. In Rosa Luxemburg's view, it was necessary "to fight

¹⁶ She first criticised the Baden Social Democrats, including Anton Fendrich. Cf.: R. Luxemburg, *Die badische Budgetabstimmung*, "Die Neue Zeit. Wochenschrift der deutschen Sozialdemokratie" 1900-1901, issue 27, 2, pp. 14-20.

¹⁷ *Über den Völkerfrieden, den Militarismus und die stehenden Heere*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke* [henceforth: *GW*], 6: 1896 bis 1906, Berlin 2014, pp. 304-308.

¹⁸ F. Oelßner, *Rosa Luxemburg. Eine kritische biographische Skizze*, Berlin 1952, p. 91.

¹⁹ *Dokument 32. Rede Rosa Luxemburgs über den Massenstreik im Kriegsfall in der Kommission „Militarismus und internationale Konflikte“ des Stuttgarter Kongresses der II. Internationale 1907*, [in:] Ch. Butterwegge, H.-G. Hofschien, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁰ E. Thape, *Von Rot zu Schwarz-Rot-Gold. Lebensweg eines Sozialdemokraten*, Hannover 1969, p. 19.

²¹ W. Brandt, *Rosa Luxemburg*, "Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte" 1989, 4, p. 352.

²² Quoted from: *Milicija i militarizm*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *Wybór pism*, 1, Warsaw 1959, pp. 120-121.

²³ *Nach dem Jenaer Parteitag*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *GW*, 3, Berlin 1973, pp. 343-353. The term "swamp" or "mud" originally referred to the rather inactive and wavering political centre, which constituted the majority in the National Convention during the French Revolution 1789-1799.

against the institution of a regular army, in whose service the proletariat was bleeding out, which should be replaced with a militia system, governed by democratic rules established by the people, (...) the struggle against the existing system of military organisation was an indispensable part of the struggle against the existing socio-economic system”²⁴.

Luxemburg was increasingly distancing herself ideologically from her previous comrades. Yet she won a supporter in Franz Mehring, a prominent representative of the left wing of Social Democracy. She saw her task in raising social awareness and believed that if the majority of people realised how barbaric, deeply immoral and antihuman wars were, then such conflicts would become impossible.²⁵ She had an unwavering faith in the will and the driving force of the masses,²⁶ which is why she went on numerous agitation trips and attended meetings in the most remote corners of the country. It should be added that she revelled in making public speeches, during which she “enchanted her listeners with her fiery temper”²⁷. Rather short and full of energy, she delivered (with a slight Polish accent) rousing speeches to crowds of people. As the risk of war intensified, her words were falling on increasingly fertile ground.²⁸

In the autumn of 1913, Luxemburg spoke to thousands of people at rallies in three towns of the Frankfurt region: Fechenheim (24 September), Hanau (25 September) and Bockenheim (26 September). At the time, Frankfurt was experiencing rapid industrial growth. Newly established factories drew large numbers of job-seeking workers, who succumbed to socialist agitation. The rooms where the meetings were held were full to the brim. In an almost two-hour talk, Luxemburg spoke, among other things, about colonial policy and the threat of German militarism. Among the listeners were also journalists, including Eduard Heinrici, the editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper “Frankfurter Warte”, who after the Fechenheim meeting deliberately went to another one to take notes, which would later serve as evidence in court. More precisely, the following quotation from a Bockenheim inn was used against Luxemburg: “If they expect us to murder the French or our other brothers, we can only answer them: ‘No, not under any condition’”²⁹. These words were found to be “an attack on the living foundations”³⁰ of the German state, which could carry a long-term prison sentence or even the death penalty. In October 1913, Luxemburg

²⁴ Quoted from: D. Winczewski, *Problematyka wojny i wojskowości w klasycznym marksizmie*, “Studia Krytyczne” 2016, 2, p. 245.

²⁵ G. Schmidt, *Rosa Luxemburg. Sozialistin zwischen Ost und West*, Göttingen-Zürich 1988, p. 79.

²⁶ [Brief an] Franz Mehring, 19 April 1912, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Briefe* [henceforth: *GB*], 4, Berlin 1987, p. 201.

²⁷ Quoted from: H. Kühn, *Auf den Barrikaden des mutigen Wortes: Politische Redekunst*, Bonn 1986, p. 116.

²⁸ J. Lampe, *Rosa Luxemburg im Kampf gegen Militarismus, Kriegsvorbereitung und Krieg*, Berlin [Ost] 1984, p. 26.

²⁹ Quoted from: [Brief an] Franz Mehring, 18 February 1914, *GB*, 4, p. 336.

³⁰ *Gerichtszeitung. Ein Prozeß gegen Rosa Luxemburg*, „Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt” (Abendblatt) 20.02.1914.

faced criminal charges and on 20 February 1914 she stood trial in the Second Criminal Chamber of the National Court in Frankfurt am Main.

The key role in what could be called a show trial was played by the press. It was due to the accounts of conservative newspapers that the charges were brought. However, the transcripts of Luxemburg's speeches on which the case was built were not preserved; thus, the charges were based on a denunciation. Finally, in accordance with paragraphs 110 and 111 of the Criminal Code³¹, Luxemburg was charged with incitement to disobedience. She was defended by social democratic attorneys: Paul Levi from Frankfurt and Kurt Rosenfeld from Berlin.³²

In his closing speech, the prosecutor argued that there were several extenuating circumstances, i.e. "she was not German by birth, she did not speak with evil intent, and she was convinced that she was in the right". Another factor that was considered was that she had had a clear criminal record for many years and that she had been struggling with health problems. However, according to the prosecutor, her activity was intentional and "she carefully considers what she is saying and is known as 'the Red Rose'"³³. He accused her of inciting to disobedience, which made her "a deadly enemy of society", and argued that when faced with the enemy, even the slightest rebellion in the German army could have disastrous effects. "The defendant planned an attack on the living force of the state and should be firmly punished"³⁴. The prosecutor requested a 14-month prison sentence and immediate arrest.³⁵

Rosa Luxemburg delivered a brilliant 45-minute defence speech, one of the most important in her life,³⁶ which was the quintessence of her pacifist beliefs.³⁷ While referring to that speech, eminent intellectual Hannah Arendt wrote that "her 'bravery' was unparalleled in the history of German socialism"³⁸. She protested against taking

³¹ Cf.: *Rozdział szósty. Opór władzy państwowej*, [in:] *Kodeks karny Rzeszy Niemieckiej z dnia 15 maja 1871 r. z późniejszymi zmianami i uzupełnieniami po rok 1918 wraz z ustawą wprowadzącą do kodeksu karnego dla Związku Północno-Niemieckiego (Rzeszy Niemieckiej) z dnia 31 maja 1870 r.*, official translation of the Department of Justice of the Former Prussian Partition, The Laws of the Former Prussian Partition, 1, Poznań 1920, p. 53.

³² [Brief an] Königliches Landgericht Frankfurt (Main). Strafkammer 3, 10 December.1913, *GB*, 6, Berlin 1993, pp. 238-239. Cf. S. Quack, *Geistig frei und niemandes Knecht. Paul Levi – Rosa Luxemburg. Politische Arbeit und persönliche Beziehung*, Köln 1983, pp. 80-91.

³³ *Gerichtszeitung. Ein Prozeß gegen Rosa Luxemburg*, "Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt" (Abendblatt) 20 February 1914.

³⁴ Quoted from: *ibid.*

³⁵ *Der Prozeß Rosa Luxemburg*, "Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt" (Erstes Morgenblatt) 21 February 1914.

³⁶ J. P. Nettl, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

³⁷ The transcript of the defence speech was reprinted by the SPD's organ "Vorwärts": *Verteidigungsrede der Genossin Dr. Rosa Luxemburg*, "Vorwärts" 22 February 1914. For the Polish version, cf. R. Luksemburg, *Militaryzm, wojna i klasa robotnicza* [Mowa obrończa przed sądem we Frankfurcie], [in:] R. Luksemburg, *Wybór pism*, 2, Warsaw 1959, pp. 233-246.

³⁸ H. Arendt, *Rosa Luxemburg 1871(?)–1919*, [in:] *Men in Dark Times*, San Diego, New York, London [Polish translation: *Róża Luksemburg 1871(?)–1919*, [in:] *Ludzie w mrocznych czasach*, translated and edited by E. Rzana, Gdańsk 2013, p. 52].

the sentences from her speeches out of context and distorting their meanings and added that “a formal education is not sufficient to grasp the social democratic method of thinking”.³⁹ She was sentenced to one year in prison.⁴⁰ That ruling was discussed in the *Reichstag*, where on 21 February, the conservative groups took the opportunity to criticise the *SPD* while the leftist deputies still defended their comrade.⁴¹ The Social Democrats were appalled by the punishment as such a harsh sentence for an agitation statement had not been passed since the lifting of the anti-socialist laws.⁴² The party press, which had by then been distancing itself from Rosa Luxemburg, expressed solidarity with her, writing that that verdict “came out of fear among those in power of antimilitarist agitation by the Social Democrats”⁴³.

As Luxemburg was not immediately arrested, she continued her activity, engaging in anti-war demonstrations. Soon, the authorities found another pretext in one of her speeches for pressing charges and in June she stood trial once again, this time for offending the German army. At the time, extensive coverage was given to an affair involving German officers, which had occurred in late 1913 in the Alsatian town of Zabern (*Zabern-Affäre*).⁴⁴ In Freiburg im Breisgau, on 7 March 1914, in the fully packed Festhalle, Rosa Luxemburg spoke about excesses in the army and the abuse of soldiers.⁴⁵ “Whatever happened there one thing is beyond doubt: this is definitely one

³⁹ Quoted from: R. Luksemburg, *Militaryzm, wojna i klasa robotnicza...*, p. 234.

⁴⁰ [Brief an] C. Zetkin, 20 February 1914, *GB*, 4, p. 337. On 20 February 1914, the National Court in Frankfurt sentenced Rosa Luxemburg to one year in prison. She requested a sentence review. A special hearing on her case was scheduled for 27 June 1914 at the First Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Reich (*Reichsgericht*) in Leipzig. However, the hearing was cancelled and rescheduled to 22 October 1914. The request was rejected making the Frankfurt Court sentence final and binding. Cf. *Das Frankfurter Urteil gegen die Genossin Luxemburg bestätigt*, “Leipziger Volkszeitung” 23 October 1914.

⁴¹ Reichstag – 220. Sitzung, Sonnabend den 21. Februar 1914, pp. 7550-7554, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003389_00318.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

⁴² P. Frölich, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

⁴³ Quoted from: *Die Sorge um den Lebensnerv*, „Leipziger Zeitung” 21 February 1914. Cf also: *Zur Verurteilung der Genossin Luxemburg*, “Vorwärts” 22 February 1914; *Ein Jahr Gefängnis*, “Volkswacht für Schlesien, Posen und die Nachbargebiete” [henceforth: “Volkswacht”] 21 February 1914; *Ein Protest gegen das Frankfurter Urteil*, “Leipziger Zeitung” 28 February 1914; *Das Urteil gegen Rosa Luxemburg*, “Volkswacht” 23 February 1914.

⁴⁴ Cf. P. Szlanta, *Porządek po prusku. Afera Zabern 1913*, “Mówią wieki. Magazyn historyczny” 2007, issue 7, pp. 12-17. After the victorious war against France in 1871, Alsace was annexed to Germany under the peace treaty. In 1913 in Zabern (French: Saverne) a young and inexperienced Prussian lieutenant from the local military school, Günter von Forstner, while training Alsatian recruits offended them by calling them “Wackes” (yahoos) even though since 1903 this word had been banned by order. The relations between the soldiers and the residents of Zabern were becoming tense as the lieutenant was inciting their hatred by encouraging his subordinates to use weapons in case of a rebellion. He even set a reward for killing the provocateur. Not only did the Zabern affair worsen the relations with Alsations but it also led to a serious political crisis. On 5 December, the *Reichstag* overwhelmingly passed a vote of no confidence (by 293:54) in Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. However, the final decision rested with the emperor who did not dismiss the head of the government and supported the military groups.

⁴⁵ *Rosa Luxemburg in Freiburg*, “Freiburger Zeitung” 9 March 1914. The story depicted her as a representative of radical socialism (*Vertreterin des radikalen Sozialismus*) and a Russian (*eine Russin*).

of the numerous dramas taking place in the German army barracks day by day and hardly ever do the moans of the tormented reach our ears"⁴⁶. Taking this statement as a slander and an insult against the army, notably its officers and non-commissioned officers, General Erich von Falkenhayn, the minister of war with the mentality of a typical Junker and militarist⁴⁷, pressed charges against Luxemburg to the Fourth Criminal Chamber of the Second National Court in Berlin. This was a blow dealt to the *SPD*'s anti-war propaganda and to Luxemburg herself.⁴⁸ She knew well that the military authorities would press for the maximum punishment.⁴⁹ "They want to harass me with trials and I won't let them destroy my good mood. By the party board and the parliamentary group I am being treated like a criminal"⁵⁰. Finally, in response to the call published in the party newspapers, over a thousand people declared their willingness to confirm the defendant's words. At least a hundred of them were called to the Berlin court.⁵¹

The trial began on 29 June. Luxemburg was defended again by P. Levi and K. Rosenfeld, who declared that they would disclose 30 thousand cases of the aforementioned abuse. For fear of demonstrations, the police secured the court building while the courtroom was fully packed. The social democratic papers emphasised a months-long hate campaign instigated against Luxemburg, which was reminiscent of a mediaeval witch-hunt. Since there was no hard evidence against her, besides several out-of-context statements, it was expected that she would prove her innocence.⁵² Detailed accounts of the hearing of the witnesses, published by the newspapers, did not serve the interests of the military authorities. It became clear that a mistake had been made because the dock became a podium from which Rosa Luxemburg could spread her pacifist views to the whole of Germany.⁵³ Thus, Minister von Falkenhayn changed his mind and tried to prevent further proceedings.⁵⁴ The trial was labelled

⁴⁶ Quoted from: *Diskussionsbeitrag und Schlußwort am 7. März 1914 in der Protesversammlung gegen die Verurteilung Rosa Luxemburgs in Freiburg in. Br.*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *GW*, 3, pp. 414-425.

⁴⁷ P. Szlanta, "Godzina Marsa" w Alzacji. *Afera Zabern 1913/1914*, "Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego" 2018, 4, pp. 823-840. At the *Reichstag* session in December 1913 r. Chancellor Th. von Bethmann Hollweg emphasised that the German uniform must always be respected. *Reichstag – 181. Sitzung Mittwoch, den 3. Dezember 1913*, pp. 6157, https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003387_00223.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

⁴⁸ H. Afflerbach, *Falkenhayn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich*, Munich 1996, p. 142.

⁴⁹ If the Frankfurt court sentence had become final and binding before the Berlin trial, this would have increased the sentence in the latter case. For that reason, Luxemburg did not want the Berlin trial to be adjourned.

⁵⁰ Quoted from: [Brief an] C. Zetkin, zweite Hälfte Mai 1914, *GB*, 4, p. 348.

⁵¹ *Gegen die Militärmißhandlungen. Zeugen heraus!*, "Vorwärts" 25 June 1914; *Wer Soldatenmißhandlungen erlebt hat...*, "Volkswacht" 9 June 1914; *Zeugen gesucht! Meldet euch!*, "Volkswacht. Organ für die Werktätige Bevölkerung der Provinz Westpreußen" 9 June 1914.

⁵² *Soldatenmißhandlungen vor einem Zivilgericht*, 3. Beilage des "Vorwärts" Berliner Volksblatt 30 June 1914; *Soldatenmißhandlungen vor der Strafammer*, "Vorwärts" 30 June 1914.

⁵³ *Der Prozess gegen Frau Rosa Luxemburg*, "Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt" (Abendblatt) 3 July 1914. Cf. H. Afflerbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-143.

⁵⁴ *Die Flucht in die Dunkelheit*, "Vorwärts" 4 July 1914

by the Breslau “Volkswacht” newspaper “a tragicomedy of the Prussian judiciary”⁵⁵. Due to the escalation of war tension, triggered by the Sarajevo assassination, and for fear of disgrace in the light of the defendant’s evidence, after a few days the case was adjourned for an indefinite period⁵⁶ and was never resumed.

It is worth recalling here a caricature published in the “Der Wahre Jacob” satirical magazine of 25 July. The drawing depicted Rosa Luxemburg who had swapped places with the prosecutor: she was shown as the judge of the general who embodied Prussian militarism. The first rows of the witnesses’ seats were occupied by skeletons in uniforms, the victims of the German army.⁵⁷

At the time, the Social Democrats were still officially opposed to war. Only in the last month before its outbreak, they organised nearly 300 anti-war demonstrations that took place in 163 German cities and were attended by hundreds of thousands people. In Berlin alone, there were a hundred thousand protesters.⁵⁸ When the conflict seemed inevitable, the emperor expressed his disapproval of, as he put it, those “stateless journeymen” (*vaterlandslose Gesellen*⁵⁹), who “are engaged in antimilitary activity in the streets”. He was not going to tolerate “socialist propaganda” and was ready, if necessary, to proclaim the stage of siege (*Belagerungszustand*) and arrest all of their leaders.⁶⁰

On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, starting the Great War. On 31 July, the Austrian-Hungarian monarch’s ally Wilhelm II called on his subjects to defend the country against the attack.⁶¹ The following day he declared war on Russia, and on 3 August – on France. The outbreak of the war was greeted with enthusiasm by societies and politicians. Soldiers leaving for the front were assured by the emperor that they would be back home by the time the leaves had fallen off the trees. For Germany, this was meant to be a quick and victorious military confrontation, the top priority being the defence of the motherland, which was an obligation for the entire German nation. In secret talks, the *SPD* leaders fully supported the cabinet’s meas-

⁵⁵ *Drama*, „Volkswacht” 30.06.1914; *Moabiter Dramaturgie*, “Volkswacht” 2 July 1914.

⁵⁶ *Klägliche Ausreden*, “Leipziger Zeitung” 6 July 1914.


⁵⁷ *Der Militarismus auf der Anklagebank. Aus dem Prozeß Rosa Luxemburg, »Der Wahre Jacob« vom 25. Juli 1914*, p. 8417, <http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/wj1914/0245/image> (accessed 29 June 2018).

⁵⁸ B. Beuys, *Die neuen Frauen. Revolution im Kaiserreich: 1900-1914*, Berlin 2015, p. 314.

⁵⁹ An offensive term for leftist activists (communists, socialists and social democrats).

⁶⁰ Nr. 332. *Der Zar an den Kaiser*, [in:] *Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, vollständige Sammlung der Karl Kautsky zusammengestellten amtlichen Aktenstücke mit einigen Ergänzungen. Im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes nach gemeinsamer Durchsicht mit Karl Kautsky*, hrsg. von Max Montgelas u. Walter Schücking, 2, Berlin 1919, p. 49.

⁶¹ Because the German authorities did not know what position the Social Democrats would take, everything had to look as if it was Germany that had been attacked and forced to take defensive action. Russian general mobilisation was an argument for taking more serious steps on the way to war. I. Kershaw, *To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914-1949*. London 2015 [Polish translation: *Do piekła i z powrotem: Europa 1914–1949*, translated by. A. Romanek, Kraków 2016, p. 61].



Militarism in the dock. From the trial of Rosa Luxemburg

Source: akg-images.

ures.⁶² The parties' withdrawal from the previous class activity and a truce for the sake of embracing a superior national interest at the time of war was dubbed *Burgfrieden*. This change was welcomed by the emperor, when on 4 August 1914, as he opened the *Reichstag* session, he delivered a speech from the throne and made a memorable statement that from that point on he would not recognise any political parties but only

⁶² Dokument 49. Brief des sozialdemokratischen Reichstagsabgeordneten Albert Südekum an den Reichskanzler von Bethmann Hollweg vom 29. Juli 1914 (Auszüge), [in:] Ch. Butterwegge, H.-G. Hofschien, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

citizens of Germany.⁶³ The *SPD* leaders feared that they might encounter repression from the authorities and that the results of their meticulous work might be forfeited. For those reasons, in the *Vorwärts* daily of 1 August they called on workers to stay calm and recommended full support of the German government.⁶⁴ Paul Löbe, a Breslau activist, and the future president of the *Reichstag* in the interwar period wrote about the dilemma the party had faced at the time:

What could Social Democracy have done? Could it have persuaded soldiers to give up arms and leave their barracks? Could it have demanded that the reservists and the *Landwehr* people not heed the call for struggle? Could it have urged workers from arms factories to go on a general strike? In the face of the unflagging monarchical power in Germany, such attempts would have had to lead to a civil war, and a violent conflict would have arisen between the defenders of peace and the followers of a defensive war. [...] If active resistance was not possible, if the soldiers, including hundreds of thousands of comrades, left for the front, would anyone have taken responsibility for sending those people against the enemy without sufficient arms and with shortages of uniforms and food supplies? Whoever denied that, they had to approve the resources, i.e. war bonds.⁶⁵

This general approach caused all deputies (110) of the social democratic parliamentary group (the largest in the *Reichstag*) to vote in favour of awarding the cabinet five million marks' worth of war bonds.⁶⁶ The emperor responded approvingly to this by saying that "red paint came off" the Social Democrats and that "good Germans saw the light of day"⁶⁷. In accordance with the party discipline, a yes vote was also cast by Karl Liebknecht, known for his pacifist views.⁶⁸ By the end of the month he appealed to the party board to convene rallies against Germany's imperialist policy but he did not succeed.⁶⁹ At the time, he established contact with Rosa Luxemburg, whom he had previously not known very well. This resulted in close collaboration.

"I am in deep shock"⁷⁰, she wrote when the war broke out. A friend of hers Louise Kautsky recalled that Luxemburg had even had suicidal thoughts at the time. She had it out with her former comrades, the *SPD* deputies who had now allied with the empire, in the article *Party Discipline*:

⁶³ Reichstag – Eröffnungssitzung, Dienstag den 4. August 1914, p. 2, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003402_00013.html (accessed 12 October 2019). The emperor used the same words on 1 August 1914 in a speech delivered from the balcony of the Berlin Castle to citizens gathered in Lustgarten Park.

⁶⁴ The *Parteigenossen!* was published on the front page of the "Vorwärts" of 1 August 1914.

⁶⁵ Quoted from: P. Löbe, *Erinnerungen eines Reichstagspräsidenten*, Berlin 1949, p. 42.

⁶⁶ *Die Sozialdemokratie und der Krieg!*, "Vorwärts" 4 August 1914.

⁶⁷ Quoted from: O. K. Flechtheim, *Rosa Luxemburg zur Einführung*, Hamburg 1985, p. 18.

⁶⁸ A heated debate ensued during the session of the *SPD*'s parliamentary group on 3 August 1914. As a result, 78 of its members (18 against) voted in favour of granting war credits to defend, as was emphasised, the endangered motherland. They believed that that approach would strengthen the position of Social Democrats as German patriots. Cf. R. Traub, *Die große Irreführung*, „Spiegel GESCHICHTE" 2013, issue 5, pp. 110-113.

⁶⁹ A. Laschitzka, *Liebknechts. Karl und Sophie – Politik und Familie*, Berlin 2007, p. 241.

⁷⁰ [Brief an] Kostja Zetkin, 2 August 1914, *GB*, 5, p. 7

The fact is then that since the outbreak of the war, under cover of the state of siege, the most serious crimes of breaking party discipline have been consistently committed. These can deprive Social Democracy of its existing course of action, its character and its objectives. Due to such infringements of the discipline, the party organs do not serve the collective will, i.e. the party platform, but rather they compromise that collective will for their own purposes.⁷¹

Luxemburg soon became engaged in illegal activity with several other people who shared her views.

For the *SPD*, the break with anti-war tradition proved to be a seminal decision. While it seemed a logical consequence of the party's political growth in the past 25 years, it plunged it into a deep crisis, which led to a split within the German labour movement.⁷² A month later, on 10 September, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin sent a statement to the party organs in Switzerland, Sweden and Italy (it was not published in the Swiss press until late October 1914). In it, they took issue with the position of the party's majority regarding the ongoing war, its reasons and nature.⁷³

In the *Reichstag*, on 2 December, another vote was held on further war bonds. As Luxemburg predicted, "the 4th August scenario repeated itself"⁷⁴. It was not until that day that Karl Liebknecht as the only one expressed his objection. According to the minutes of the session, the bill was passed "unanimously with one deputy voting 'no'".⁷⁵

The discrepancies within the *SPD* became apparent at that time and the pacifists were definitely isolated. The opponents of Germany's "imperialist war" centred around "The Internationale" journal⁷⁶, adopting The *Internationale* Group as their name. Soon afterwards, the need arose to publish their own newsletter so in January 1916 "The Letters" started coming out, under the conspiratorial pseudonym "Spartacus".⁷⁷ The group was renamed the Spartacus Group, which in the course of the November Revolution, on 11 November 1918, changed its name again, to the Spartacus League (*Spartakusbund*), the forerunner of the Communist Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD*).

⁷¹ Quoted from: R. Luksemburg, *Dyscyplina partyjna*, [in:] R. Luksemburg, *Wybór pism*, 2, p. 254.

⁷² The crisis resulted in the decrease in *SPD* members from 1,085,905 (1914) to 395,216 (1916), as well as a decrease in workers belonging to the free trade unions from 2.5 million (1914) to 1.1. million in the first half of 1915. During the war, there was also a significant drop in the number of subscribers of the *SPD*'s central press organ "Vorwärts" (*Forward*): in July 1914 that number totalled 160.7 thousand, in 1915 – 120 thousand, and in March 1917 – 72 thousand. Cf. A. Czubiński, *Rewolucja 1918-1919 w Niemczech*, Poznań 1967, p. 22.

⁷³ H. Eberlein, *Erinnerungen an Rosa Luxemburg bei Kriegsausbruch 1914*, UTOPIE kreativ, H. 174 (April 2005), p. 357.

⁷⁴ [Brief an] Kostja Zetkin, 17 November 1914, *GB*, 5, p. 25.

⁷⁵ Cf. Reichstag. 3. Sitzung Mittwoch den. 4 Dezember 1914, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003402_00033.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

⁷⁶ The first and last issue came out on 14 April 1915 and the journal was immediately banned.

⁷⁷ The name was a reference to Spartacus, the famous leader of the largest slave rebellion in ancient Rome. From 20 September 1916 to October 1918, a total of 12 issues of "The Letters of Spartacus" came out, which were distributed in the whole of Germany.

The split within the German Social Democracy seemed inevitable as the previous conflicts and division lines were aggravated by the war-related debatable issues. Back in 1914, the *SPD* deputies had supported Germany's military action. However, as the war dragged on with no successes on the front and as the situation in Germany deteriorated dramatically, the alliance between the party's right wing and the government declined. "Finally, the public rejection of the policy of nationalist deception. Finally, at least 20 people in the parliament who appreciate socialism!"⁷⁸, wrote Luxemburg in response to the news that in December 1915 some of the *SPD* deputies for the first time voted against further war bonds for the army (another 22 had left the session before the vote).⁷⁹ The hardship and famine were taking a toll on society, providing fertile ground for social democratic activists promoting their anti-war agenda. The tactic to isolate and thus to hold back the critics of German militarism that time proved ineffective. When Karl Liebknecht was removed from the parliamentary faction on 12 January 1916, Otto Rühle followed suit in solidarity. During the 24 March session, regarded as the beginning of "the great schism"⁸⁰ in the history of German Social Democracy, Hugo Haase, an *SPD* leader and the head of its parliamentary faction, openly spoke out against the government's imperialist policy and further spending for this purpose.⁸¹ On the same day, he and 17 other deputies sharing his view were removed from the parliamentary group for breaking party discipline. Together they established the Social Democratic Working Group (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, SAG*)⁸², which in April the following year, was transformed into the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD*). The party was joined by representatives of all political groups, including Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, Karl Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg, who were all opposed to the imperialist war fought by the Wilhelmine Reich, and were critical of the pro-war attitudes of the *SPD* parliamentarians.

In December 1914, Rosa Luxemburg was ordered to serve the sentence passed by the Frankfurt court.⁸³ The sentence was adjourned to the end of March 1915⁸⁴ due to health reasons; however, from 18 February that year she had to serve it in the women's prison on Barnimstrasse in Berlin (until 18 February 1916). The premature arrest

⁷⁸ R. Luxemburg, *Die Politik der sozialdemokratischen Minderheit*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Dachau 2017 [electronic publication].

⁷⁹ H. Krause, *Rosa Luxemburg, Paul Levi und die USPD*, Münster 2019, p. 33.

⁸⁰ Cf. C. E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: The Development of the Great Schism*, ed. 4, Cambridge 1990.

⁸¹ Cf. Reichstag, 37. Sitzung, Freitag, den. 24. März 1916, https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003403_00071.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

⁸² *Eine eigene Fraktion der Sozialdemokratischen Minderheit*, "Vorwärts" 25 March 1916. The ideological split was followed by a structural one, when on 18 January 1917, the *SPD* leaders, by a 29-10 majority removed the party's opposition, the members of the Spartacus Group (Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and Clara Zetkin) and *SAG*, including Eduard Bernstein, Karl Kautsky and Georg Ledebour.

⁸³ [Brief an] Kostja Zetkin, 27 December 1914, *GB*, 5, p. 30.

⁸⁴ [Brief an] Mathilde Jacob, 24 January 1915, *GB*, 5, p. 35.

was made following “the order from above”⁸⁵ with the reason being illegal meetings convened by Luxemburg.⁸⁶ Against the prevailing moods, she had kept promoting her pacifist views. The German military elites could not let it pass: for them she was “a thorn in their side”. She was contemptuously called “Lübeck”⁸⁷ and her academic degree was ignored.⁸⁸ It was also ensured that her speeches, regarded as calls for rebellion and viewed as “misleading”, would not reach the soldiers and damage their morale.⁸⁹

Even though the imprisoned Rosa Luxemburg could not participate in the inter-party disputes, discussions or meetings in person, she continued her writing by commenting on current events based on available materials (press articles or talks with her visiting friends). In was in prison cell 219 that she wrote her famous work on the crisis of Social Democracy, which analysed its involvement in the Reich’s policies, so different from the original foundations of the labour movement: anti-imperialism, anti-militarism and anti-capitalism. In it, she wrote, for example, that

The world war, which officially began on 4 August, was the same war which for decades German and international imperialist policies had consistently been aiming for, the same war which for 10 years had consistently been predicted every year by the German Social Democracy, the same war which had been condemned thousands of times by the social democratic parliamentarians, the press and brochures as a reckless imperialist crime, the war which had nothing to do with culture or the interests of the people, being their exact opposite. In essence, this war is not about ‘the existence and libertarian development of Germany’, as the declaration by the social democratic faction says, this war is not about German culture, as the social democratic press writes, but it is about current gains [...]. Dividends are up, proletarians are dying.⁹⁰

The brochure smuggled from behind the prison bars was published the following year, on her friends’ advice, under the pseudonym “Junius”.⁹¹ Luxemburg’s contacts began to be severely restricted: only once a month she could have a visitor and exchange letters.⁹²

⁸⁵ *Die Genossin Luxemburg*, “Leipziger Volkszeitung” 20 February 1915.

⁸⁶ *Genossin Rosa Luxemburg verhaftet*, “Vorwärts” 20 February 1915.

⁸⁷ In 1898 Luxemburg entered into a marriage of convenience with Gustaw Lübeck to become a Prussian citizen and to legally reside and work in Germany. She divorced him after five years. She hardly ever used the name “Lübeck”.

⁸⁸ At the University of Zurich in 1897 Luxemburg earned a PhD with distinction based on a dissertation on the growth of industry in Poland (*Die industrielle Entwicklung Polens*, Leipzig 1898). She was one of the first Polish women in history to receive a PhD.

⁸⁹ B. Sommer, *Rosa Luxemburg vor dem Frankfurter Landgericht*, http://www.hr-online.de/website/specials/wissen/index.jsp?rubrik=68527&key=standard_document_51527897 (accessed 27 July 2017).

⁹⁰ Quoted from: R. Luxemburg, *Kryzys socjaldemokracji (Broszura Juniusa)*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *Wybór pism*, 2, pp. 255-397, here: pp. 322, 390.

⁹¹ *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie*, von Junius, Berlin 1916. Polish text cf. *ibid*.

⁹² *Rosa Luxemburg im Gefängnis. Briefe und Dokumente aus den Jahren 1915-1918*. Hrsg. von Ch. Beradt, Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 35.

Exactly 12 months later, on 18 February 1916, she was released from prison and became politically involved. On every occasion, she promoted pacifist views and denounced the war, as a result of which yet again she became a person of interest for the secret police. As Luxemburg was an opponent of the German governing circles, she was arrested on 10 July. That time, she was accused, among other things, of authoring illegal leaflets, which called on workers to go on a general strike and express public sympathy for Karl Liebknecht. As her flat was searched, the police found a draft leaflet which was distributed among workers and soldiers on the front.⁹³ However, that evidence was not sufficient to bring another case against Luxemburg. Thus, following the 17 July decision of the Prussian supreme command, “the well-known radical socialist agitator” was placed in preventive detention in the interest of public security. Such a possibility, either imprisonment or the official restriction of movement (within a specified place), if it was to protect the Reich, was stipulated in the *Reichstag’s* legislation of 4 December 1916.⁹⁴ It gave the military authorities the practically unrestricted right to eliminate political opponents from public life without a trial. When placed in preventive detention, unlike the remaining prisoners, they were allowed to receive food, flowers, books and personal belongings. They were also permitted, albeit to a limited extent, to maintain contacts through correspondence and visits.⁹⁵

In October, Rosa Luxemburg was transferred to the Wronke (now Wronki) prison near Poznań, from where on 22 July 1917 she was moved to the Breslau prison on Kleczkowska Street. Isolated from the world, without a court verdict, she was to stay there until the end of the war. That issue was, unsuccessfully, raised by the social democratic deputies at the *Reichstag*. Wilhelm Dittmann emphasised that even though Luxemburg did not face any specific charges, “she had been held in protective detention for months” because of “dislike for her political views” and “out of fear of her spiritual influence on the working masses in the spirit of distinct socialist opposition. In order to eliminate it, she was put under arrest”⁹⁶. Hugo Hasse argued that without any court proceedings, “that woman had been deprived of freedom for over a year”.⁹⁷

The government’s official position on that issue was set out by the chancellor on 11 October 1917 in response to a parliamentary question from Otto Rühle: “Rosa

⁹³ R. Luxemburg, *Ich umarme Sie in großer Sehnsucht. Briefe aus dem Gefängnis 1915 – 1918*, Bonn 1984, pp. 31-32. This was a leaflet designed for the anti-war rally, called by Karl Liebknecht, which took place in Berlin on 1 May (under the slogan *Nieder mit dem Krieg! Nieder mit der Regierung!*) and was attended by 10 thousand people. The social democratic politician was arrested on that day and sentenced for treason to 4 years’ severe imprisonment.

⁹⁴ *Gesetz Nr. 275 betreffend die Verhaftung und Aufenthaltsbeschränkung auf Grund des Kriegszustandes und des Belagerungszustandes*, Reichsgesetzblatt 1916, p. 1329. That regulation supplemented the Law on the State of Siege, in force from 1851 (*Gesetz über den Belagerungszustand*).

⁹⁵ Those terms were very precisely described in her memoirs by M. Jacob, who befriended Luxemburg, *Rosa Luxemburg. An Intimate Portrait*, translated by H. Fernbach, London 2000.

⁹⁶ Reichstag – 69. Sitzung, Sonnabend den. 28. Oktober 1916, pp. 1876-1877, https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt_k13_bsb00003404_00307.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

⁹⁷ Reichstag – 116. Sitzung, Donnerstag den 19. Juli 1917, p. 3594, https://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_Blatt_k13_bsb00003406_00503.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

Luxemburg was placed under preventive detention because of her seditious actions and extreme involvement in the radical-socialist movement, which posed a threat to the Reich's security". Preventive detention does not require criminal proceedings."⁹⁸

Luxemburg's prison term in Breslau was initially harsher than her previous times in prison. The German authorities were keen to keep the well-known activist isolated from her comrades for as long as possible out of fear of her "spiritual impact on the working class",⁹⁹ especially that the situation on the front had taken a negative toll on Germany. The developments in Russia culminated in October 1917 with the Bolshevik upheaval, which in turn entailed the risk of spreading the revolution across Europe. Long isolation and harassment were meant to lead to her mental breakdown. She was not eligible for the October 1918 amnesty for political prisoners. She was informed about her release from prison in the late evening of 8 November and two days later she arrived in Berlin, which was swept up in revolutionary turmoil.¹⁰⁰

The revolution, which broke out in the first days of November 1918, began with the sailors' revolt in the northern city of Kiel. Political power was contested primarily between the leftist groups: the SPD, the USPD, and the proponents of revolutionary socialism from the Spartacus League. Due to the pressure of the events of 9 November 1918, Chancellor Max von Baden declared the abdication of Emperor Wilhelm II and handed over the chancellorship to the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert. Shortly after 2 PM, Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed the democratic republic (*deutsche Republik*), two hours before the leftist radicals who strove to proclaim a Soviet-style republic of councils (*freie sozialistische Republik Deutschland*).¹⁰¹ Two days later, Germany signed the armistice agreement. The First World War came to an end.

Willy Brandt, one of the most eminent SPD leaders, emphasised that the Social Democrats could be proud that they had never sided with those who started wars and brought enslavement to the German people.¹⁰² As shown above, it is hard to fully agree with this opinion. The date 4 August 1914 marked a pronounced and also symbolic change in the history of the German labour movement. The perception of that change became a source of controversy in subsequent years. A number of Social Democrats and politicians from other parties believed that that the *Burgfrieden* was the only

⁹⁸ Quoted from: *Aktenstück Nr. 1137, Berlin den. 11. Oktober 1917*, [in:] Reichstag. Aktenstück No. 1132-1142, p. 1922, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_Blatt_k13_bsb00003427_00326.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

⁹⁹ Reichstag – 126. Sitzung, Donnerstag den 11. Oktober 1917, p. 3910, http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_Blatt_k13_bsb00003407_00048.html (accessed 12 October 2019).

¹⁰⁰ R. Luxemburg, *Ich umarme Sie...*, pp. 53-54; *Rosa Luxemburg entlassen*, "Volkswacht" 9 November 1918.

¹⁰¹ A. Krzemiński, *Żagiew światowej republiki rad*, "Polityka" 6 February 2019.

¹⁰² *Abschiedsrede des Parteivorstehenden Willy Brandt beim außerordentlichen Parteitag der SPD in der Bonner Beethovenhalle am 14. Juni 1987*, https://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Abschiedsrede_Willy_Brandt_Parteitag_1987.pdf, p. 2 (accessed 18 October 2019).

right decision to make in order to prove loyalty and responsibility for their country. According to well-known historian Heinrich August Winkler, “the *SPD* should be credited for its departure in the first half of the 20th century from the dogmatic position adopted by the Socialist International in 1900 that socialist parties should not make coalitions with bourgeois parties”¹⁰³. A small number of leading activists, including Rosa Luxemburg, thought that that was the moment of “the political surrender” of the German Social Democracy.¹⁰⁴ The departure from the underlying principles of the socialist movement at the start of the Great War deepened and strengthened its divisions into competing groups that differed in their ideological views and strategies for future action.

For her beliefs and uncompromising approach Rosa Luxemburg paid with many years of isolation and, finally, her life. Her perception was linked with many contradictions: she was killed and condemned as a communist (which she formally was for barely two weeks), who posed a threat to the republican order in Germany, for which she had earlier been campaigning. Earlier on, however, for most of the Social Democrats this was an unacceptable solution. Just after her death in January 1919, and later in the Eastern Bloc countries, she was viewed with detachment due to the so-called mistakes of “Luxemburgism”, which were not forgotten.¹⁰⁵ She was wrong in her approach to some issues (notably, the possibility of Poland regaining independence) and some views proved to be at odds with reality. However, there is no doubt that Luxemburg’s anti-war approach and her ensuing commitment are universal in nature and still relevant.

The German reception of her life’s work varied due the ideological discrepancies between the two states established in 1949. In East Germany, Luxemburg earned a cult status, which was reflected in annual demonstrations. Her grisly death at the hands of the rightist military groups was used for propaganda purposes against the capitalist West; her legacy, however, was subjected to censorship. The Social Democrats in West Germany emphasised her pacifist approach. She was cherished by Chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt; the former even admitted that he had grown up on her works.¹⁰⁶

In Poland, after the transition to democracy, as part of widespread decommunization, there were hardly any research publications on her life and work. The few authors who did write about her depicted her uncritically as an opponent of Poland regaining

¹⁰³ An interview with Heinrich A. Winkler: *150 Jahre SPD: “Erst kommt das Land”*, “Der Tagesspiegel” 21 May 2013.

¹⁰⁴ R. Luxemburg, *Der Wiederaufbau der Internationale (1915)*, [in:] R. Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Dachau 2017 [electronic publication].

¹⁰⁵ In her interpretation of Marxist ideas, Rosa Luxemburg opted for a revolution as a revolt of the working class, not as a party-inspired coup d’état. These views had made a strong impact on the platform of the radical socialist and (later) communist movements. In later years, however, they met with criticism as the so-called mistakes of “Luxemburgism”. The idea is credited to the Bolshevik Grigory Zinoviev.

¹⁰⁶ W. Brandt, *Links und frei. Mein Weg 1930-1950*, Hamburg 1982, pp. 185-190; G. Hofmann, *Willy Brandt und Helmut Schmidt: Geschichte einer schwierigen Freundschaft*, Munich 2012, p. 53.

independence as well as a communist, “bloody Rosa” (as she had been dubbed by political opponents), who strove to foment revolution. As a result, she earned a highly negative reputation in Polish writings.¹⁰⁷ However, this view is simplistic as well as unfair. Her worldview and writings were closely linked with the socio-political circumstances at the turn of the 20th century and should be viewed against that particular context; on the other hand, they bear witness to the events that were key to understanding that period. It is worth quoting here historian and biographer Feliks Tych,¹⁰⁸ who argues that in Poland it is time to look at Rosa Luxemburg, her engagement and literary works “not only from the perspective of her views on Poland’s independence, which have been proven wrong by history and are now impossible to accept”. As he posits, these views should be analysed in terms of their refined moral sense, which Luxemburg contributed to the theory of social development.¹⁰⁹

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Keywords: Rosa Luxemburg, Social Democratic Party of Germany, First World War, labour movement, antimilitarism.

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to present a profile of Rosa Luxemburg, who embodies complex and diverse Polish-German relations at the turn of the 20th century. She began her career in the Polish labour movement in the Russian Partition and later continued it in the Social Democratic Party of Germany. She was engaged in all forms of political activity gaining international recognition. The centenary of her tragic death is a good opportunity to look back at the life of a woman who evades simple categorisation and came to be known as an intellectual and leader in a world at that time dominated by men.

The focus is on Rosa Luxemburg’s involvement in actions against the impending world war. Contrary to the militaristic mood prevailing in the German political circles and German society, she courageously and tenaciously carried her pacifist message, which remains valid to the present day, that a war waged in the interest of a minority brings only destruction and victims. For her peaceful beliefs and uncompromising approach she paid with years of imprisonment as she spent almost the entire war period in prisons: in Berlin, Wronke (now Wronki) near Poznań and Breslau (now Wrocław). The authorities were keen to keep her away from soldiers and workers who were becoming increasingly susceptible to her message. She was not released from prison until 9th November 1918, when the German revolution broke out.

¹⁰⁷ Recently, though, some political commentators have mentioned her name in more positive contexts, e.g., R. Woś, *Tajemnica Róży L.*, “Polityka” 3 April 2018; A. Machcewicz, *Zszargane imię Róży*, “*Ale Historia*” [supplement to “*Gazeta Wyborcza*”] 2018, issue 13, M. Czyż, *Kwiatki Róży Luksemburg*, “*Wysokie Obcasy*” 15 December 2018 or the note in *Polacy i Niemcy. Tysiąc lat sąsiedztwa*, “*Pomocnik Historyczny POLITYKI!*” 2018, issue 8.

¹⁰⁸ The author of the biographical note on Luxemburg in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, XVIII, Wrocław 1973, pp. 119-129.

¹⁰⁹ F. Tych, *Preface* to the Polish edition of *Listy z więzienia* [Letters from prison] by R. Luxemburg, translated by M. Bilewicz, Warsaw 1982, p. 15.

It is important to highlight her insightful criticism of the then attitude of the SDP, whose decision to support the imperialist plans of the government ultimately resulted in a split within the labour movement in Germany. The inconsistency and irrecoverable loss of unity of the left as well as its incoherent actions paved the way to power for the Nazis.

The paper draws upon Rosa Luxemburg's rich epistolary and journalistic writings and the literature of the subject (which are mostly German sources).

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**LITERARY FICTION AND POVERTY.
THE IMPACT OF LITERARY VALUE CONSTRUCTIONS
IN THE LIGHT OF MOTIVATION PSYCHOLOGY:
THE EXAMPLE OF GUSTAV FREYTAG'S NOVEL *SOLL UND HABEN***

I

The question of possible relations between fiction and poverty is a vast area for exploration by literary scholars. Charles Dickens, Hans Christian Andersen, Georg Büchner, Gerhart Hauptmann, Maria Konopnicka, Bolesław Prus and Stefan Żeromski undoubtedly made us aware that poverty, its various causes, manifestations and outcomes are frequently presented in literary fiction with much insight and empathy, and have been an inspiration to scholars in other disciplines. In literary studies, the most interesting approaches to poverty seem to be its analysis in terms of literary motifs or the discourse on poverty and social exclusion, or the changing place of poverty in literary-historical narratives.¹ Each of these is surely basic to the humanities in the matter of “critical self-awareness and the sensitivity and creative agency of individuals and communities”,² which is a sufficiently valid justification in itself. Recently, however, the humanities have been claimed to be in crisis, with demands being made that research in such fields as literary studies should be capable of being put to use. In this context, it is worthwhile to recall Ryszard Nycz’s opinion that “seemingly redundant research contributes to ontological and social understanding and sometimes has formative outcomes, and it often inspires new directions of reflection”.³

This paper, however, offers a new approach to the topic of poverty in literary fiction, referring to the ever valid question of whether and to what extent fiction – one of the-so-called ‘poor means’ of fighting poverty – may have a real impact on

¹ Cf. for example M. Hellström, E. Platen (eds.), *Armut. Zur Darstellung von Zeitgeschichte in deutschsprachiger Gegenwartsliteratur*, München 2012; B. Korte, G. Zipp, *Poverty in Contemporary Literature. Themes and Figurations on the British Book Market*, Basingstoke 2014; P. Butale, *Discourses of Poverty in Literature: Assessing representations of indigence in post-colonial texts from Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe* (PhD thesis), Stellenbosch 2015.

² R. Nycz, Nowa humanistyka w Polsce: kilka bardzo subiektywnych obserwacji, koniektur, refutacji, *Teksty drugie*, No. 1, 2017, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

reducing it. The research question concerns the actual impact of value constructions in literary fiction, which may be a relevant element of a wider strategy of fighting poverty inheritance. This approach has not only theoretical value, but also helps demonstrate the social usefulness of the literary analysis of texts. The arguments presented above justifying research in the humanities do not require further legitimisation of literary studies, but on the other hand, the possibility that literary works may contribute to the socially important fight against poverty should not be ignored. Consequently, this paper aims to present arguments for the social relevance of literary value constructions, by referencing findings in motivation psychology and supporting them with analysis of the text and reception of Gustav Freytag's 1855 novel *Soll und Haben* ('Debit and Credit'). This analysis hopefully also demonstrates what values this novel promoted and why *Soll und Haben* is believed to be formative for the German work ethic of the nineteenth century.

My research goal requires giving a definition of poverty and identifying an aspect of the phenomenon where literary value constructions may have a real positive influence (II). Next, findings of American psychologist David McClelland are referenced. His forty years of research into achievement motivation has led to the finding that the content of children's literature and school reading material is correlated with the level of achievement motivation present in a given society and, consequently, with that society's economic growth (III). To demonstrate that the content of literary works not only reflects the axiological orientation predominant in a given society but also actively shapes it, which means that literary value constructions have an impact on the behaviour of readers, the corpus of texts examined by McClelland's team around 1925 and 1950 is extended here to include the perspective of nineteenth-century Germany. The book selected is Gustav Freytag's best-selling novel *Soll und Haben*, which remained popular for over one hundred years, also featuring on school reading lists. The status of this novel as the book most widely read in Germany after the Bible⁴ in the nineteenth century, in the period preceding Germany's spectacular economic growth, suggests that its content and value constructions might be informative in the light of McClelland's research and findings on the formative role of literary works. The text is analysed – in somewhat *à rebours* fashion – to determine whether, in accordance with McClelland's research conclusions, elements of achievement motivation can be identified in such a work (IV). The outcomes of this analysis, which indicate a far-reaching identification between elements of achievement motivation and specific values, are later contextualised in the German discourse on the so-called bourgeois values propagated in the nineteenth century as 'German virtues'. These considerations also include the reception of *Soll und Haben*, and strongly suggest that literary value constructions can have a real impact on readers (V). The paper ends with conclusions relating to the possible relevance and applicability of such analyses to fighting poverty (VI).

⁴ E. de Morsier, *Romanciers Allemands Contemporains*, Paris 1890, p. 261. After I. Surynt, *Gustav Freytag & Henryk Sienkiewicz. (Nie)moc literackiego kanonu*, in: R. Traba, H. H. Hahn (eds.), *Polsko-niemieckie miejsca pamięci*. Volume 3, *Paralele*, Warsaw 2012, p. 306.

II

Questions relating to values link literary works with certain aspects of the phenomenon of poverty. It is a fact that today this phenomenon is highly diversified in terms of its causes, manifestations and outcomes and the extent to which the poverty-stricken contribute to their own situation. When academics try to debate poverty, there is a danger that the poor will become objects and not subjects. Words like “the poor” and “poverty” are perceived by the impoverished as stigmas. However, we need a precise definition of the phenomenon to develop effective strategies to prevent and fight poverty.⁵

Ruth Lister proposes a definition of poverty suited to the context of the modern consumer society, going beyond the dichotomy of absolute and relative poverty encountered in scholarly discourse. She believes that both the non-material and the material manifestations of poverty need to be considered. The material aspects relate to income being insufficient to meet basic needs. The non-material aspects of poverty refer to capabilities, well-being, human development, quality of life and social quality. Social quality is important as it refers to both well-being and individual potential in a society.⁶ It follows that people who experience relative deprivation may also be called “poor”. According to Peter Townsend:

Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and the amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average family that they are in effect excluded from the ordinary living patterns, customs, and activities.⁷

Referring back to the main research question here, of whether literary value constructions may have an impact on fighting poverty, what is essential is the multidimensional issue of **poverty inheritance** (intergenerational transmission or reproduction of poverty). Poverty inheritance refers to a social process where poverty is carried over or transmitted from one generation to another, and the likelihood that the next generations will replicate patterns resulting in poverty. Poverty inheritance is largely a metaphor. The process involves some biological components (genes, the health of a child – conditioned by, for example, the health of a pregnant woman, including her nutrition and behaviour), but importantly also economic standing (financial capital), cultural resources (education of parents, transmission of aspirations, motivations and

⁵ Ruth Lister’s book *Poverty* (Cambridge 2004) referred to associations with “poverty” and “poor”. This book was translated into Polish in 2007. In its Polish translation remarks about Polish associations are added (*Bieda*, translated by A. Stanaszek, Warsaw 2007, p. 14 and pp. 140-144). It is pointed out that in Polish *bieda* is associated with a deplorable, unfortunate condition. Also the word *bidula* or *biedula* used to refer to a pitied woman wronged by fate; <https://sjp.pl/bidul> (accessed 31 July 2019).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-36.

⁷ P. Townsend, *Poverty in the United Kingdom*, London 1979, p. 31ff.

model conducts) and social components (contacts, networks).⁸ If these components are absent or impoverished in the case of parents, they will contribute to the reproduction of poverty by their children.

The phenomenon of poverty inheritance is also present in Poland, in both urban and rural areas.⁹ Intergenerational transmission is often attributed to living in impoverished areas or enclaves of poverty, which are geographical spaces inhabited by people with low income, but primarily to the social environment, which may influence “the potential growth of individuals due to the available social resources, options and risks, which might limit chances to change the inhabitants’ life experiences”.¹⁰ This non-material psychological and social aspect of poverty inheritance is of concern to researchers, who refer to theories of poverty culture.¹¹ The term “poverty culture” may sound pejorative, but the theory behind it is of value because it precisely indicates the role played by “the lack of key competencies for effective functioning in the economic, social and public spheres”.¹² In this light, the poverty culture is absorbed by children in their early socialisation process (family, neighbourhood) as certain thought patterns and norms and values, which later block their growth.

A [social] environment of this kind teaches children that it does not pay to advance their education since it is enough to earn their living from sporadic employment and social benefits. They are taught to be passive and isolated from a dominant culture.¹³

Children’s deficiencies in terms of model conduct, norms and values are a huge obstacle already in primary school. Karolina Kowalewska writes that public institutions (educational institutions included) follow norms created by the middle class.

⁸ Cf. M. Chustecka, *Dziedziczenie biedy*, <https://rownosc.info/dictionary/dziedziczenie-biedy/> (accessed 31 July 2019).

⁹ Cf. research on the city of Łódź and former state farms: W. Warzywoda-Kruszyńska, K. Kruszyński, *Dziedziczenie biedy i wykluczenia społecznego – w perspektywie lokalnej polityki społecznej*, in: *Ubóstwo i wykluczenie społeczne w Polsce. Raport krajowy Polskiej Koalicji Social Watch i Polskiego Komitetu European Anti-Poverty Network*, Warsaw 2011, pp. 49–55; E. Tarnowska, *Młode pokolenie z byłych PGR-ów: Dziedziczenie biedy czy wychodzenie z biedy?*, *Polityka Społeczna*, no. 11-12, 2006, pp. 13-16.

¹⁰ W. Warzywoda-Kruszyńska, K. Kruszyński, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹¹ The theory of a “culture of poverty” was created by the American anthropologist Oscar Lewis, who studied Puerto Rican families in New York and poor families in Latin America. In short, this culture is remarkably stable and persistent, passed down from generation to generation along family lines. “The culture of poverty has its own modalities and distinctive social and psychological consequences for its members. It is a dynamic factor which affects participation in the larger national culture and becomes a subculture of its own.” O. Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez: The Autobiography of a Mexican Family*, New York 1961, p. xxiv. K. Kowalewska, *Underclass i kultura ubóstwa w badaniach nad rozwojem kompetencji moralnych i społecznych w środowiskach ludzi ubogich*, *Ethics in Progress* vol. 9, no. 1, 2018, p. 80.

¹² K. Kowalewska, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹³ J. M. Zabielska, *Ubóstwo a procesy marginalizacji społecznej*, Lublin 2007, p. 73.

The norms of the middle class are unofficially binding. But they are not taught to those who are not middle class. Consequently, pupils from impoverished families have difficulties adapting and behavioural and educational problems because they lack the expected social and moral competencies. This is especially obvious when the work ethos is concerned. This ethos in poverty enclaves strongly differs from the ethos valued by the middle class.¹⁴

The key role of norms and values was emphasised by Oscar Lewis, who observed that the subculture of the poor is selective and does not apply to every impoverished individual. "For example, middle class people who become impoverished do not automatically become members of the culture of poverty, even though they may have to live in the slums for a while."¹⁵ Also Susan Meyer underlines that the difficult economic situation of parents does not automatically mean the poverty of their children if the parents are able to instil a particular system of values during the upbringing process:

[...] parental income is not as important to children's outcomes as many social scientists have thought. This is because parental characteristics that employers value and are willing to pay for, such as skills, diligence, honesty, good health, and reliability, also improve children's life chances independent of their effect on parents' income. Children of parents with these attributes do well even when their parents do not have much income.¹⁶

It follows that agendas preventing poverty inheritance should include educational measures equipping children and adolescents with values, norms and models of conduct which will help them to break the vicious circle of poverty. Researchers stress, however, that the influence of external interventions (e.g. school education) is limited and correlates with the child's stage of development. "The younger a child, the more effective this intervention may be if provided by specialists. Some good results may be achieved in adolescence, but interventions at the later stages are almost totally ineffective."¹⁷

Considering the limited time available for effective intervention, it seems that all targeted strategies should be employed during the compulsory education of children and adolescents, when they may be most efficiently introduced. Can school set books, and in particular the literary value constructions contained in them, have a real impact? The American psychologist David McClelland wrote about this sixty years ago. In the years since, his research has been mostly referred to in the context of employees' motivation to succeed. The aspect of achievement motivation in literary works has been marginalised, and for this reason McClelland's major findings will be recalled below.

¹⁴ K. Kowalewska, *op. cit.* p. 88.

¹⁵ O. Lewis, *The culture of poverty*, in: Jeanne Guillemin (ed.) *Anthropological Realities: Readings in the Science of Culture*, New Brunswick, N.J. 1981, p. 316.

¹⁶ S. Mayer, *What Money Can't Buy. Family Income and Children's Life Chances*, Cambridge, Mass. 1997, pp. 2-3.

¹⁷ W. Warzywoda-Kruszyńska, K. Kruszyński, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

III

David McClelland taught at Wesleyan University before joining the faculty at Harvard University in 1956 and devoting himself to research on **achievement motivation**. He compared countries with strong and weak economies and came to the conclusion that the main difference was the achievement motivation of their inhabitants. His first focus was on the relationship between levels of need for achievement (N-Ach) and subsequent economic development. He did wide-ranging research on modern societies and historical sources including ancient Greece, mediaeval Spain, England from Tudor times to the Industrial Revolution, the US until the 1950s, and even prehistoric Peru. The conclusion was that rapid economic growth is preceded by the setting of high motivation standards for and in a given society.¹⁸

Among McClelland's findings, of key importance here is his recognition of the role literary works, and especially required school readers, play in the development of achievement motivation. McClelland was interested in the role of such books because of Max Weber's classic *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (*Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*). McClelland was interested in whether the growth of capitalist economies was related to the Protestant ethic, which teaches that God helps those who work hard and can delay immediate gratification for greater future profits. Elliot Aronson, a renowned American social psychologist,¹⁹ recalled in his autobiography his wife Vera Aronson's collaboration with McClelland:

McClelland reasoned that if Weber were right, then Protestant countries should be trying to infuse their youngsters with achievement motivation to a greater extent than Catholic countries. To test this hypothesis, he asked Vera to gather a random sample of elementary school readers that were currently popular in several countries. She found several bilingual students and oversaw them as they translated these books into English. Vera then scored these stories for achievement imagery [...] The data confirmed Weber's speculation: Children's readers in Protestant countries were loaded with achievement imagery, while such imagery was scarce in Catholic countries.²⁰

Extending his research with more contemporary printed and orally transmitted narratives collected in both democratic, free-market countries (including the UK and US) and communist countries (such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary) and also in some preliterate communities in North America, Africa, Asia and the South Pacific, David McClelland concluded that "Weber's observation of the connection between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism may be a special instance of a much more general phenomenon."²¹ His generalisation was that "A concern for achievement as

¹⁸ D. McClelland, *The Achieving Society*, New York, London 1967 (1961), pp. 107-158.

¹⁹ Cf. for example E. Aronson, *The Social Animal*, New York 1972.

²⁰ E. Aronson, *Not by Chance Alone: My Life as a Social Psychologist*, Hachette UK, 24 August 2010, Chapter Four, n.pag.

²¹ D. McClelland, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

expressed in imaginative literature – folk tales and stories for children – is associated in modern times with a more rapid rate of economic development.”²²

When analysing the texts collected, McClelland and his associates first checked whether a story contained any **achievement imagery** (“concern with a standard of excellence”).²³ If it did, it was analysed further for whether it contained other ideas connected with the achievement sequence. These included:

- a stated wish to succeed;
- obstacles to achievement (“either objectively present in the world or subjectively in the thoughts or activities of some person in the story”);
- means of gaining the achievement goal.

The analysis of more particular subcategories (anticipation of success or failure, positive or negative emotions, help of another person, etc.) revealed that stories from more dynamically developing countries (whether or not the story was centrally concerned with achievement) were more apt to specify:

- (i) the means that were successful in gaining achievement goals;
- (ii) obstacles to be overcome.²⁴

In the case of these stories the identification of the goal, the desire to gain the goal and emotions involved (success or failure) were less important than the means and obstacles to be overcome. “[...] the ‘means’-oriented stories come from countries which have managed to overcome the obstacles to economic achievement more successfully than other countries.”²⁵

McClelland’s methodology was not experimental and the research outcomes were not of the cause-and-effect kind; however, they pointed to a correlation between economic growth and achievement motivation in children’s readings. Maciej Dymkowski has noted that “one can soundly assume that the propagation of stronger achievement needs among producers has an impact on the always consequent economic growth”, and “achievement motivation training brings about the growth of economic activities of the trainees”.²⁶ McClelland’s research on literature was part of many factors conditioning achievement motivation; however, his conclusions suggest that under some circumstances (e.g. school readers), literature may influence the intergenerational transmission of some axiological ideas about specific values.

This thesis may be supported by Gustav Freytag’s novel *Soll und Haben*, published in Prussia in 1855. The story of its reception speaks for the genuinely strong influence of literary value constructions. This novel was indeed propagated widely before the rapid growth of the German economy, and it included the most important components of David McClelland’s achievement motivation.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 105.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

²⁶ M. Dymkowski, O uniwersalności teorii psychologii społecznej, *Psychologia społeczna* vol. 2, 2007, p. 260.

IV

It is highly probable that if David McClelland had chosen to compare literary works popular in the nineteenth century, Freytag's *Soll und Haben* would have drawn his attention for two reasons at least. Firstly, *Soll und Haben* was most popular shortly before the spectacular economic growth of the Prussian-dominated German Empire (1871–1918), as well as during the time of the Empire's prosperity. When the Empire was founded in 1871, its economic potential was already strong;²⁷ however, in the years which followed, its growth was impressively high until 1913, in spite of regularly occurring crises. This was manifested primarily in "the expanding material base, growing employment, industrial production, the wide range of services provided, and the increasing diversity and growing quality of investment and consumption goods."²⁸ The dynamics of this economic growth can be illustrated in figures: the average net value of investments grew from 408 million marks in 1870–1874 to 1.95 billion in 1900–1913. Investment expenditure grew from 10.3% to 15.5% in the same period. The latter figure was Germany's highest in its entire history up to 1945, Czesław Łuczak underlines. The value of fixed assets in the German economy grew from an annual average of 75.36 billion in 1870–1874 to 50,215 billion (!) in 1910–1913.²⁹ Obviously, the war indemnity of 5 billion gold francs paid to Germany by France after the Franco-Prussian War (the last instalment was paid in 1873)³⁰ and the expansion of Germany's territory to cover most of Alsace and the Moselle department of Lorraine had an impact on this economic growth. However, even today there are many examples proving that money transfers are not enough to initiate steady and significant economic growth.³¹ What seems to be essential is an entrepreneurial spirit, or as McClelland put it: the socially approved level of achievement motivation. In the German Empire, the level of achievement motivation was reflected in technological advancements. The number of patents grew from 4,416 in 1878–1879 to 12,835 in 1910–1913. Discoveries and innovations by German scientists and practising engineers revolutionised many branches of industry and transport.³² German scholars were regularly awarded Nobel Prizes starting from their inauguration in 1901.

²⁷ Germany accounted for 13.2% of global industrial production, compared with 23.3% for the United States and 31.8% for the United Kingdom. Cf. C. Łuczak, *Dzieje gospodarcze Niemiec 1871-1945*, Poznań 1984, p. 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

³⁰ W. Dobrzycki, *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych 1815-1945*, Warsaw 2003, p. 65.

³¹ An example often referred to in the last decade was the rapid growth of the Polish economy, significantly higher than that of eastern Germany. Eastern Germany received much more funding from western Germany than Poland from the EU at that time. David McClelland in his analysis of programmes supporting entrepreneurs in developing countries in the 1960s noted that from a long-term perspective material aid is not enough for economically underdeveloped countries. Self-driven and steady economic growth can be expected only if individual success is appreciated and people's satisfaction with their own effectiveness increases. Cf. F. Rheinberg, *Motivation*, Stuttgart 2004, p. 68.

³² Cf. C. Łuczak, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

It was at that time that *Soll und Haben*, the first novel of Gustav Freytag, was extraordinarily popular. It was published in 1855 and was soon judged to be “the exemplary German novel”.³³ It was translated into English as *Debit and Credit* by Georgiana Malcolm née Harcourt in 1857. According to historian Thomas Nipperdey, its German readers appreciated it for being “a book of agreement, of belief in the harmony of human individual development and society, in the liberal-national rise of the bourgeoisie, progress, the victory of the good.”³⁴ Izabela Surynt, an expert on Freytag’s works, writes that readers – in spite of initially mixed opinions of reviewers – “fell in love with Freytag unconditionally” and “every new edition was sold instantly”.³⁵ Four years after the first edition, the wide-circulation German newspaper *Die Gartenlaube* reported that for decades no other work of fiction had been so successful in Germany.³⁶ In the first five years 22 thousand copies of *Soll und Haben* were sold. In total, in 1855–1965 over 1.2 million copies were sold.³⁷ By 1899 the novel had had fifty-two editions.³⁸ Its influence on opinions and values was huge. It suffices to say that the novel was a typical gift for young people on their Confirmation and a prize for school achievements.³⁹ The admiration for Freytag and his works had some traits of a growing cult. From 1892 his works were included in German language and history curricula at Gymnasium level.⁴⁰ In the Weimar Republic, *Soll und Haben* was an obligatory reader.⁴¹

Gustav Freytag (1816-1895), born in Kreuzburg in Silesia (now Polish Kluczbork), was a writer, cultural historian and journalist who sensed the *Zeitgeist* and, like no other writer of his epoch, combined his descriptive style and evocative language with the substance much needed by German society in the process of unification. This need was to give shape to a shared German identity based on cherished values. He designed his *Soll und Haben* as a coming-of-age or educational novel (*Entwicklungsroman* or *Bildungsroman*, well-known genres in German culture), spiced with some features of the adventure novel (*Abenteuerroman*). In the Polish context, one cannot

³³ H. Mielke, *Der deutsche Roman des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Braunschweig 1890, p. 184.

³⁴ “[...] ein Buch des Einverständnisses, des Glaubens an die Übereinstimmung von human individueller Entfaltung und Gesellschaft, an den liberalnationalen Aufstieg des Bürgertums, den Fortschritt, den Sieg des Guten.” T. Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800-1866. Bürgerwelt und starker Staat*, München 1998, p. 582.

³⁵ I. Surynt, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

³⁶ “[...] seit Jahrzehnten [...] kein belletristisches Werk einen solchen Erfolg gehabt”, *Die Gartenlaube*, no. 11, 1859, p. 10. After: H. Steinecke, *Gustav Freytag: Soll und Haben (1855). Weltbild und Wirkung eines deutschen Bestsellers*, in: H. Denkler (ed.), *Romane und Interpretationen*, Stuttgart 1980, p. 138.

³⁷ Cf. F. Krobb, *Einleitung: Soll und Haben nach 150 Jahren*, in: *idem* (ed.), *150 Jahre Soll und Haben. Studien zu Gustav Freytags kontroverser Roman*, Würzburg 2005, p. 9.

³⁸ Cf. I. Surynt, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

³⁹ Cf. T. Nipperdey, *op. cit.*, p. 582; H. Steinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁴⁰ Cf. I. Surynt, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

⁴¹ Cf. A. Hopp, *Gustav Freytag und die Juden*, in: H.-W. Hahn, W. Oschmann (eds.), *Gustav Freytag (1816-1895). Literat – Publizist – Historiker*, Köln, Weimar, Wien 2016, p. 233.

avoid the sensitive issue that the novel was strongly anti-Polish. In fact, Freytag is regarded as an author who through his popular novel greatly contributed to the spread of the *polnische Wirtschaft* stereotype of chaos, mess, no plan or logistics, which became a synonym of disorderly and inefficient economic conduct.⁴² Historian Szymon Askenazy analysed one scene in *Soll und Haben* in his 1902 publication and judged it to be “a purposeful, open provocation to deadly tribal war”, an expression of venom seeping “from calculated exterminatory logic”.⁴³ This theme has been widely researched already⁴⁴ and need not be addressed in this paper, which concentrates on those elements that are relevant to considerations of achievement motivation. Such elements in *Soll und Haben* are interesting because Freytag identified what was needed to achieve success with specific values. Freytag’s bestseller has never been translated into Polish (as his earlier theatrical plays were⁴⁵), which is not surprising as Polish reviewers contemporary with Freytag⁴⁶ found his depiction of Poles offensive, deceitful and ill-meant.⁴⁷ (*Soll und Haben* was rendered into English in 1857 by three translators who worked independently and produced different versions. Of these three translations, the first – titled *Debit and Credit. A Novel* – was by Georgiana Malcolm née Harcourt. Her translation is the most complete and will be quoted here.⁴⁸) For

⁴² Cf. H. Orłowski, „*Polnische Wirtschaft*“. *Zum deutschen Polandiskurs der Neuzeit*, Wiesbaden 1996.

⁴³ S. Askenazy, „*Epik*” nienawiści, in: *idem: Wczasy historyczne*, Warsaw, Kraków 1902, p. 249.

⁴⁴ Cf. H. Orłowski, *op. cit.*; I. Surynt, *Das „ferne”, „unheimliche” Land. Gustav Freytags Polen*, Dresden 2004; A. Kochanowska-Nieborak, *Die Rezeption des Werkes von Gustav Freytag in Polen*, in: R. Biskup (ed.), *Gustav Freytag (1816-1895). Leben – Werk – Grenze*, Leipzig 2015, pp. 137–190.

⁴⁵ Only Freytag’s theatrical plays written before his works became political were translated into Polish: *Walentyna (Die Valentine)*, trans. D. C. Chodźko, Wilno 1860; *Fabiusze (Die Fabier)*, trans. S. T. Krzesiński, published in *Bluszcz*, no. 1-22, 1871; and two theatrical scripts: *Księżna Udaszkin / Hrabia Waldemar (Graf Waldemar)*, trans. M. Glücksberg (fragments published in *Kłosy*, no. 79-86, 1867) and *Nasi dziennikarze / Dziennikarze / Nasi poczciwi dziennikarze (Die Journalisten)*, trans. M. Chrzanowski, J. K. Zajączkowski. Cf. K. Estreicher, *Bibliografia polska XIX. stolecia*, vol. 1, Kraków 1872, pp. 377, 411, 517; E. Połczyńska, C. Załubka, *Bibliografia przekładów z literatury niemieckiej na język polski 1800-1990*, vol. 1, Poznań 1995, p. 38; J. S. Buras, *Bibliographie deutscher Literatur in polnischer Übersetzung. Vom 16. Jahrhundert bis 1994*, Wiesbaden 1996, p. 184; S. Hałabuda (ed.), *Dramat obcy w Polsce 1765-1965. Premiery – druki – egzemplarze. Informator. Praca zespołowa pod kierunkiem Jana Michalika*, vol. 1, Kraków 2001, p. 254.

⁴⁶ Especially reviewers who had an insight into Prussian politics, for example Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, who lived in Dresden, and Paulina Wilkońska, brought up in Prussian Poland, who was a writer and journalist and ran her own literary salon. It may be assumed that many Polish readers living in Prussian Poland could read *Soll und Haben* in German.

⁴⁷ Cf. P. W[ilkońska], O beletryście niemieckiej, *Tygodnik Mód i Powieści*, no. 25, 1874, p. 4: “Apparently twenty years ago Gustaw Freitag [sic], one of the most brilliant, renowned and widely read writers in Germany, released several editions of his romantic novel *Sool und haben* [sic]. His name has long been recalled also in correspondence and reviews in our various journals, because what he wrote was hideous, totally ignorant about relations, traditions, customs in Poland, imbued with such ill will that he even wrote about our land as barren.”

⁴⁸ Cf. S. Stark, *Dickens in German Guise? Anglo-German Cross-Currents in the Nineteenth-Century Reception of Gustav Freytag’s Soll und Haben*, in: *The Novel in Anglo-German Context: Cultural*

the purpose of this paper a short summary of *Soll und Haben* is in place (despite the reviewers who have argued that there is not much action in the thousand-page-long novel⁴⁹).

The protagonist in *Soll und Haben* is Anton Wohlfart. (His surname alludes to the German word *Wohlfahrt*, meaning 'welfare',⁵⁰ which already gives a picture of the questionable finesse of Freytag's prose). Anton is introduced to readers as a "remarkable" boy, the only child of a royal auditor and his wife, and at school "a pattern for all others, and the pride of his family".⁵¹ After his parents die, he leaves his fictional small hometown of Ostrau in Silesia for an unnamed 'capital', which researchers agree is Breslau (Wrocław). There he gets a job with Traugott Schröter's export-import firm.⁵² As an apprentice, Anton better gets to know Schröter's family and numerous employees in the firm. Anton is a very diligent apprentice and wins the appreciation and trust of his boss, who decides to appoint Anton to the position of a provincial correspondent one year earlier than would normally be expected.

Then Anton's linear career takes an unexpected turn. Baron von Rothsattel, whose park Anton crossed on his way to Breslau, is in debt and faces the loss of his estate because of his risky investments (advised by Hirsch Ehrenthal, his Jewish agent). Anton is in love with Lenore, the young daughter of von Rothsattel, and decides to help her family. Together with Fritz von Fink, his befriended colleague at Schröter's firm, he moves to the district of Rosmin in the Prussian partition of Poland, where a former Polish property, bought by von Rothsattel, is situated. Anton recovers the property from ruin and endangers his life safeguarding it against Polish insurgents. Finally, however, he clashes with von Rothsattel and returns to Breslau, while Lenore marries von Fink. The villain in *Soll und Haben* is Veitel Itzig, Anton's Jewish schoolmate. Itzig played a part in von Rothsattel's fall. When his wrongdoings are discovered, he tries to escape and drowns in a river. The novel ends with the triumph of good embodied in the bourgeois virtues of the protagonist. Anton Wohlfart on his life path has been tempted by the refined lifestyle of the aristocracy, but recognises the high value of the bourgeois work ethic, becomes a partner in Schröter's firm and marries Sabine, Schröter's sister.

Cross-currents and Affinities, *idem* (ed.), Leiden 2000, pp. 157-172. Quotations are after *Debit and Credit. A Novel*, translation by Georgiana Malcolm née Harcourt.

⁴⁹ Jeske-Choiński did not mean this as an accusation, nevertheless he wrote about Freytag: "[...] his protagonist, trader Anton mopes about the whole novel as though he is not a right protagonist of a novel. There is no action, intrigue, spectacular events, dramatic great moves, because the author did not want to depict strong emotions of the soul, but only peaceful, everyday life." T. Jeske-Choiński, *Powieść niemiecka od roku 1850, czyli od czasu politycznego odrodzenia. Studium literackie*, part II, *Kłosy*, no. 685, 1878, p. 111.

⁵⁰ Szymon Askenazy translates this name as 'Fortunat' (fortunate). Cf. S. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, p. 248 ff.

⁵¹ *Debit and Credit*, p. 2. G. Freytag, *Soll und Haben. Roman*, Köln 2009, p. 8: "Kurz, er war ein so ungewöhnlicher Knabe, wie nur je das einzige Kind warmherziger Eltern gewesen ist. Auch in der Bürgerschule und später im Gymnasium wurde er ein Muster für andere und ein Stolz seiner Familie [...]"

⁵² *Debit and Credit*, p. 20ff. Traugott is another positive character and an ideal bourgeois. His name means 'trust God'.

Analysing the structure of *Soll und Haben*, it becomes clear that Freytag implements in an exemplary fashion McClelland's premises of achievement motivation, identified a hundred years later. Early in the novel, Freytag's protagonist sets his goal, which for him involves striving for the position of master in his field (McClelland's criterion of a "standard of excellence"⁵³). Alluding to the traditions of educational and coming-of-age novels, Freytag describes his protagonist's career path and the lurking temptations which can impede his career. In the novel, both the narrator and characters present their evaluations of events and afterthoughts guiding the reader to learn the norms, values and patterns of conduct which best serve Anton in reaching his goal. Following the presented patterns of conduct is shown to give a deep feeling of satisfaction and fulfilment. Freytag leaves no doubt: the individual success of his protagonist is to be admired.

Theodor Fontane, a now classic master of modern realistic fiction in Germany, knew *Soll und Haben* well. In his review, several pages long, published in 1855, he complimented the novel, emphasising its ideological message, which in his opinion favourably distinguished *Soll und Haben* from English novels.⁵⁴ One may wonder if Freytag's novel inspired Fontane to write famously about the importance of the first chapter in the structure of a whole novel: "The first chapter is always the main thing, and in the first chapter the first page, almost the first line. [...] If the structure is correct, the germ of the whole must be on the first page."⁵⁵ Both Fontane and Thomas Mann, the best known of his declared readers, translated this theoretical observation into practice in masterly fashion. In Freytag's case, aesthetic qualities come second to the central 'tendency' (*Tendenzroman*).⁵⁶ However, on the first page of *Soll und Haben* there are unambiguous hints as to what values will play the lead role. Describing Anton Wohlfart's parents, Freytag underlines two distinguishing traits: diligence and order. About his father we read on the first page of the first chapter that this royal auditor "took a secret pleasure and humble pride in the active performance of his troublesome official duties".⁵⁷ This trait is revealed in its pro-social context next to his admiration for the king and love for his fellows. In the sentence which follows we learn about his little garden. This is done on purpose to emphasise that the owner is "cultivating his little garden with his own hands".⁵⁸ This important detail makes An-

⁵³ Cf. D. McClelland, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁵⁴ Cf. H. Steinecke, *Theorie und Technik des Romans im 19. Jahrhundert*, Tübingen 1970, pp. 57-62.

⁵⁵ After: E. Szabó, "Vergessen Sie das Geschehene, vergessen Sie mich". *Die Unlösbarkeit der Zeichen in Fontanes Effi Briest*, in: H. Delf von Wolzogen (ed.), *Theodor Fontane. Am Ende des Jahrhunderts*, Würzburg 2000, p. 63: "Das erste ist immer die Hauptsache und in dem ersten Kapitel die erste Seite, beinahe die erste Zeile. [...] Bei richtigem Aufbau muß in der ersten Seite der Keim des Ganzen stecken."

⁵⁶ Cf. I. Surynt, M. Zybura (eds.), *Mein theurer Theodor. Gustav Freytags Briefe an Theodor Molinari 1847-1867*, Dresden 2006, p. 32.

⁵⁷ *Debit and Credit*, p. 1. *Soll und Haben*, p. 7: "[...] in seiner sauren Amtstätigkeit viele Veranlassung zu heimlicher Freude und zu demütigem Stolze fand."

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* "Er hatte spät geheiratet, bewohnte mit seiner Frau ein kleines Haus und hielt den kleinen Garten eigenhändig in Ordnung." The word *Ordnung* is used 62 times. In the English translation the word 'order' is also used frequently in the same meaning. Here it would be 'keeping his garden tidy'.

ton's father different from noblemen who, in the novel, are increasingly degenerate. In this first paragraph of the first chapter, the third person narrator conveys some information about Anton's mother, who is a very orderly woman and gives birth to Anton only after she "had smoothed the last folds" on the curtains and made sure "that the curtains were of impeccable cleanliness".⁵⁹ The fact that Anton was born behind this impeccably clean, perfectly folded white curtain is almost symbolic in the context of what happens to him later.

It is worthwhile to have a closer look at McClelland's drivers in achievement motivation, to realise what Freytag judged to be good and what won him his wide readership. The drivers are, in turn:

1. A stated wish to succeed, a clearly set goal

The goal of Anton Wohlfart takes shape under the influence of his imagination of success in the first chapter. Every Christmas a box with sugar and coffee was delivered to his parents' house. This was T. O. Schröter's appreciation for the auditor's discovery of a missing important bond. The Wohlfarts' attitude to Schröter's firm grew and almost become a cult. This delicate tie between the quiet life of the auditor's family and the worldly business "became a guide" to Anton and "gave the direction to his whole life".⁶⁰ His father was charmed by Schröter's personal standards and became interested in news about sugar and coffee prices. One day he jokingly asks Anton if he would like to become a merchant:

Visions bright as the coloured images of the kaleidoscope flitted before the mind of the child. Sugar-loaves, raisins, almonds, and golden oranges, together with the tender smiles of his parents, and the mysterious delight which the arrival of the box had always occasioned, so worked on his imagination, that he exclaimed, "Yes, father, I will!"⁶¹

Anton's father takes up his son's wish eagerly, and from now on all undertakings serve Anton's goal, including his college education. It is worth noting that the nineteenth-century readership already valued this trait. In 1912 philologist Eduard Engel wrote: when Freytag published his first novel in 1855 "The world of readers

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* "Endlich begab es sich, daß die Frau Kalkulatorin ihre weißbaumwollene Bettgardine mit einer breiten Krause und zwei großen Quasten verzierte und unter der höchsten Billigung aller Freundinnen auf einige Wochen dahinter verschwand, gerade nachdem sie die letzte Falte zurechtgestrichen und sich überzeugt hatte, daß die Gardine von untadelhafter Wäsche war."

⁶⁰ *Debit and Credit*, p. 3. *Soll und Haben*, p. 10. "Das war ein unscheinbares, leichtes Band, welches den Haushalt des Kalkulators mit dem geschäftlichen Treiben der großen Welt verknüpfte; und doch wurde es für Anton ein Leitseil, wodurch sein ganzes Leben Richtung erhielt."

⁶¹ *Debit and Credit*, p. 3. *Soll und Haben*, p. 10ff. "Und in der Seele des Kleinen schoß augenblicklich ein hübsches Bild zusammen, wie die Strahlen bunter Glasperlen im Kaleidoskop, zusammengesetzt aus großen Zuckerhüten, Rosinen und Mandeln und goldenen Apfelsinen, aus dem freundlichen Lächeln seiner Eltern und all dem geheimnisvollen Entzücken, welches ihm selbst die ankommende Kiste je bereitet; bis er begeistert ausrief: »Ja, Vater, ich will!«"

breathed a sigh of joy: instead of the idle, talkative, world-improving ‘heroes’ of the Young Germans, in Freytag’s *Soll und Haben* they finally got to see people who had a purpose in life.”⁶²

2. Means needed to achieve success

Gustav Freytag identifies a great majority of the means needed to gain success with the so-called bourgeois virtues. However, a careful reader will notice that chronologically, the first effective means to guide Anton to his future bright career are **social contacts** or connections. Leaving the moral evaluation of this aside, the fact is that Anton’s professional career begins when his father decides personally to ask Schröter to accept Anton as an apprentice.

[...] one Saturday, when his father had again asked him whether he would like to be a merchant, and Anthony [Anton] had for the hundredth time assured him that it was precisely the vocation he wished for, the old gentleman rose resolutely from his chair, called the maid-servant and ordered a conveyance to the capital for the next morning.⁶³

It seems that Freytag had some doubts about the readers’ reaction to the strong suggestion to use “social capital” as a means to reach the goal. This is probably the reason why the narrator emphasises that the father did not disclose the objective of his trip to Anton.

[...] poor man, he had good grounds for his silence! For though he had during twenty years prided himself on his friendship with the great merchant, yet his heart failed him, when it became a question of presenting himself before him, and asking a place in his office for his son. [...] Often he had resolved upon it, and as often deferred it, till at last his anxiety about his son became greater than his fears.⁶⁴

This – if only this – seems to confirm the opinions of later interpreters⁶⁵ that Freytag knew and valued the classic *Grundsätze der Realpolitik* by Ludwig von Ro-

⁶² E. Engel, *Geschichte der Deutschen Literatur von den Anfängen bis in die Gegenwart*, vol. 2, Wien, Leipzig 1912, p. 228: “Die Leserwelt atmete freudig auf: statt der nichtstuerischen, geschwätzig, weltverbessernden ‚Helden‘ der Jungdeutschen bekam sie in Freytags *Soll und Haben* endlich Menschen zu sehen, die einen Zweck im Leben hatten.”

⁶³ *Debit and Credit*, p. 4. *Soll und Haben*, p. 12: “Als der Vater aber an einem Sonnabend den Sohn wieder gefragt hatte, ob er noch Kaufmann werden wollte, und Anton zum hundertsten Male versichert hatte, daß er gerade dies gern wolle und nichts anderes, da stand der alte Herr entschlossen auf, rief das Dienstmädchen und bestellte zum nächsten Morgen eine Fuhre nach der Hauptstadt.”

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* “Und er hatte wohl Grund zum Schweigen, der arme alte Herr! Denn wenn er auch seit zwanzig Jahren stolz gewesen war auf seinen großen Handelsfreund, so hatte ihm doch immer der Mut gefehlt, selbst vor den Kaufmann zu treten und für seinen Sohn einen Platz im Kontor zu erbitten. [...] Oft hatte er sich’s vorgenommen, und stets hatte er’s wieder aufgeschoben, bis die Sorge um seinen Sohn größer wurde als seine Scheu.”

⁶⁵ Cf. B. Wagner, Verklärte Normalität. Gustav Freytags *Soll und Haben* und der Ursprung des ‚Deutschen Sonderwegs‘, *Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur (IASL)*, no. 30, 2005, pp. 14-37.

chau (1853), according to which moral and ethical premises may be put aside if they disturb pursuing a pragmatic approach to a set goal.

However, in the novel the key to success is primarily presented as a catalogue of bourgeois virtues, of which **diligence** is the most important. This quality is not isolated from others, however. It is a component of a carefully designed strategy, in which **planning** is also very important. Prior to any activity the characters meticulously search for information about which path will be the best for Anton to reach his goal and what steps to take. Anton's father talks with Schröter and receives "some hints concerning some preparation which would be desirable"⁶⁶ in terms of Anton's being taken into employment the following year. Having learned these, the seventeen-year-old Anton begins to study accounting and learns English. His enthusiasm speaks for his strong inner motivation.

The very next day Anthony was sitting with a large accounting book before him, disposing with unlimited power of thousands of pound sterling, which he changed to Rhenish florins, or Hamburgh marks, or sent about the world as Brazilian milresis, and at the last placed them quietly as Mexican bonds, which gave him, with the greatest certainty, interest at the rate of ten per cent. Having thus accumulated a colossal fortune, he went into the garden with a small book in his hand, the title of which promised to make him within a month a finished English scholar. There, to the horror of all the German sparrows and finches, he endeavoured to pronounce the *a*, and other respectable letters in every way that is possible, when a person pronounces them otherwise than is compatible with their nature and character.⁶⁷

Anton's tireless diligence and integrity become the leading motif in the novel. Of course, in accordance with the rules of an educational novel, these qualities must be rooted in the protagonist to become: "[...] an habitual and firm disposition to do the good".⁶⁸ This disposition is called a virtue (here a derived one). On his path, Anton struggles. He experiences boredom and is tempted to give up, but his **persistence**, which is an outcome of his parents' guidance, comes to his rescue when he confronts the monotony of work at Schröter's firm.

After some time, however, our hero did feel, even in the midst of all the bustle of this business life, the perpetual monotony of the days and hours, and it wearied him, but it did not make him un-

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.* "[...] einige Wünsche über die Vorbildung, die dafür wünschenswert sei."

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, *Soll und Haben*, p. 12ff. "Schon am nächsten Tage saß Anton vor einem großen Rechenbuch und disponierte mit unbeschränkter Vollmacht über Hunderttausende von Pfunden Sterling, welche er bald in rheinische Gulden verwandelte, bald in Hamburger Mark Banco umsetzte, als brasilianische Milresis in die Welt flattern ließ und zuletzt ruhig in mexikanischen Staatspapieren anlegte, an denen er mit größter Sicherheit alle möglichen Interessen bis zu zehn vom Hundert abzog. Hatte er auf diese Weise ein kolossales Vermögen zusammengeschart, so ging er in den Garten, ein kleines dünnleibiges Buch in der Hand, welches auf dem Titel versprach, ihn in vier Wochen zu einem fertigen Engländer zu machen. Dort bemühte er sich zum Entsetzen der deutschen Sperlinge und Finken, das A und andere ehrliche Buchstaben auf jede Weise auszusprechen, welche dem Menschen möglich ist, wenn er einen Buchstaben anders ausspricht, als sich mit der Natur und dessen Charakter verträgt."

⁶⁸ *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Part three, Chapter 1, Article 7 (The virtues). 1803.

happy, for he had been accustomed to order and regularity with his parents, and this helped him over many a tedious hour.⁶⁹

These virtues also arm Anton against another obstacle, namely against the jeering about his exemplary work attitude from his aristocratic colleague Fink. However, Anton's diligence is never presented in the novel as a means to achieve an egoistic goal of some personal pleasure or profit. Work is a source of satisfaction and happiness, because Anton believes that it is a path to self-improvement. This is how Freytag refers to the German concept of 'formation' or 'shaping' (*Bildung*).⁷⁰ Anton's belief makes this young man voluntarily devote his free time to reading books and learning more about fields related to his professional activities. At the same time, in *Soll und Haben* the effort of an individual is an effort for the greater good of all. An individual is presented as a "social animal",⁷¹ given "the bliss of the holy circles, formed around each individual by thousands of his fellow-creatures – his family, his fellow-workers, his race, and his commonwealth".⁷² Freytag, glorifying the apparently typically German attitude to work, pictures an individual deeply rooted in his team, deriving joy and self-satisfaction from shared successes. "We, all here assembled, are workmen in a business which is not ours, and every one of us does his work in the German way [...] What is gained by the work in which we help gives us pleasure, and is a source of pride to us."⁷³ And Fritz von Fink raises a toast and says: "Drink with me to the prosperity of a German house where work is a pleasure and honour has a home."⁷⁴ The specific image of the value of the individual's work relates to *Der Staat als Maschine* (The State as Machine)⁷⁵, referring to the Prussian *Polizeiwissenschaft* (the main background to cameralist doctrines) born in the eighteenth century. When Anton begins to work for Schröter, Fritz von Fink explains this to Anton as follows: "You are now placed as a wheel in the machine, and you will be expected to turn round regularly the whole year."⁷⁶ Fink is a man of leisure and his ironic stance is explained by

⁶⁹ *Debit and Credit*, p. 35. *Soll und Haben*, p. 64: "Wohl empfand unser Held nach einiger Zeit mitten in dem Rauschen des Geschäftslebens die ewige Gleichförmigkeit der Stunden und Tage; wohl ermüdete ihn das zuweilen, aber es machte ihn nicht unglücklich; denn durch seine Eltern war er an Ordnung und regelmäßigen Fleiß gewöhnt, und diese beiden Tugenden halfen ihm über manche langweilige Stunde hinweg."

⁷⁰ Cf. C. Karolak, W. Kunicki, H. Orłowski, *Dzieje kultury niemieckiej*, Warsaw 2006, pp. 217-221.

⁷¹ Cf. E. Aronson, *op. cit.*

⁷² *Debit and Credit*, p. 309. *Soll und Haben*, p. 542: "[...] der heiligen Kreise, welche um jeden einzelnen Menschen Tausende der Mitlebenden bilden, die Familie, seine Arbeitsgenossen, sein Volksstamm, sein Staat."

⁷³ *Debit and Credit*, p. 159. *Soll und Haben*, p. 284f.: "Wir alle, die wir hier sitzen und stehen, sind Arbeiter aus einem Geschäft, das nicht uns gehört. [...] Was etwa gewonnen wird durch die Arbeit, bei der wir geholfen, das freut auch uns und erfüllt uns mit Stolz."

⁷⁴ *Debit and Credit*, p. 162, *Soll und Haben*, p. 290.

⁷⁵ Cf. B. Stollberg-Rilinger, *Der Staat als Maschine. Zur politischen Metaphorik des absoluten Fürstentums*, Berlin 1986. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2F9781137364906_7.pdf

⁷⁶ *Debit and Credit*, p. 35. *Soll und Haben*, p. 63: "Sie sind jetzt als Rad eingefügt in die Maschine, und es wird von Ihnen erwartet, daß Sie das ganze Jahr regelmäßig abschnurren."

his noble social habitus; nevertheless, the machine image to which he refers is valid. This image does not discourage Anton, who creates his own image of “the poetry of mercantile life”.⁷⁷

In *Soll und Haben*, the main means to achieve one’s goal is diligence, which is placed amidst other supporting qualities. Of these, respect for **order** is emphasised exceptionally often. As a child, Anton is properly brought up by his parents. It suffices to mention the immaculately white and smoothed curtains behind which he was born. Referring to Anton’s father, the narrator strongly emphasises that after the father died, “his housekeeping was a model of arrangement”, his little property

was carefully written down to the last penny [and] the memorandum placed in the secret drawer of his writing-table. All that the maid had broken and spoilt during the last twelvemonth was marked down and in its fitting place and reckoned up. Suitable dispositions were made of everything [...].⁷⁸

Also at Schröter’s, order turns out to be highly valued both in relationships (for example, the appropriate hierarchy and conversational turn-taking at the dining table in Schröter’s house) and in business. The description of Purzel is highly representative: “Every morning, when the cashier entered the closet, he began his official activity, seizing the chalk, and making a white point on the table, to fix the place where it had to pass that day.”⁷⁹ In the novel, descriptions of order are clearly positive, as a practice which makes activities more efficient and the work more effective, even in the case of simple activities such as cleaning shoes. After Anton joins Schröter’s household, young Karl Sturm carefully writes No. 14 on the soles of Anton’s boots,⁸⁰ before putting them aside. Sabine, the young sister of Schröter, is presented as the ideal of a German woman, who loves counting and sorting tablecloths and napkins, tying them up with pink tape, and putting numbered tickets on the parcels.⁸¹ When Sabine, upset about her apparently misguided affection for Fritz von Fink, talks about it with her brother, Schröter comments on what she is doing and interprets her putting things in order as a sign of her restored emotional balance.

⁷⁷ *Debit and Credit*, p. 149. *Soll und Haben*, p. 345: “die Poesie des Geschäfts”.

⁷⁸ *Debit and Credit*, p. 5. *Soll und Haben*, p. 13: “Der alte Herr war nicht umsonst Kalkulator gewesen: sein Haushalt war in musterhafter Ordnung, seine sehr geringe Hinterlassenschaft in der geheimen Schublade des Schreibtisches war auf dem gehörigen Blatt Papier zu Heller und Pfennig aufgezeichnet; alles, was im letzten Jahre durch das Dienstmädchen zerschlagen oder verwüstet worden war, fand sich an der betreffenden Stelle bemerkt und abgerechnet, über jedes war Disposition getroffen.”

⁷⁹ *Debit and Credit*, p. 44-45. *Soll und Haben*, p. 80: “Jeden Morgen, wenn der Kassierer in seinen Verschlag getreten war, begann er seine Amtstätigkeit damit, daß er die Kreide ergriff und einen weißen Punkt auf den Tisch malte, um der Kreide selbst die Stelle zu bezeichnen, wo sie sich den Tag über aufzuhalten hatte.”

⁸⁰ *Debit and Credit*, p. 49, *Soll und Haben*, p. 89.

⁸¹ *Debit and Credit*, p. 54, *Soll und Haben*, p. 97.

[...] she laughed heartily at the idea of the aunt's note, [aligned the tea napkin and adjusted the cups until all three were in a row]. "Good," replied the merchant; "now you are yourself again. [The line is flawless and the symmetry of the napkin tips is extraordinary.]"⁸²

Of particular interest in Freytag's model of orderly life and efficient activities is his emphasis on the ability of **self-control**. One of the most interesting scenes – from the point of view of motivation psychology – is the situation where the old, giant and goodhearted head packer Sturm introduces his teenage son Karl to Schröter's firm and shows him the warehouse and its contents. Sturm, the father, makes Karl participate in an experiment, which may well be called the prototype of the Stanford marshmallow experiment carried out by Walter Mischel in the 1970s.⁸³ Freytag is ahead of the state of art of psychology in his times. He predicts what will be demonstrated one hundred years later: the level of self-control and the ability to delay gratification may predict children's success in life. The point is that delayed consequences of activities are often more beneficial than instant gains. Freytag educates his readers via the kind-hearted Sturm, who tells his son to taste the raisins and almonds stocked in the warehouse:

"Look, thou mayst eat out of all these barrels as much as thou likest, nobody will prevent thee; Herr Schroeter allows this, Herr Pix allows it, and so do I. But now listen, my little man. The longer thou canst stand before these barrels without touching them, the better for thee, and when thou canst not stand it any longer, come out and tell me. This is no command, it is only for thine own, and honour's sake." So saying, the old man, after having taken his big watch, with three cases to it, out of his pocket and laid it on a chest near him, left the boy alone. "Try it first for one hour", he said, as he was going away, "if it won't do, there is no harm; it will soon be learnt." The boy put his hands defiantly into his pockets, and paced to and fro amongst the barrels. After more than two hours had passed, he came back to his father, with the watch in his hand, and exclaimed, "It is enough."

"Two hours and a half," said old Sturm, nodding contentedly to Herr Pix. [...]

[...] Thus was Karl introduced [to Schröter's firm].⁸⁴

⁸² *Debit and Credit*, p. 78 (the parts in square brackets are missing in the quoted translation). *Soll und Haben*, p. 141. "Sie lachte herzlich bei dem Gedanken an den Brief der Tante, zog an der Teeserviette und rückte die Tassen zurecht, bis alle drei in einer Reihe standen. »So ist's recht«, rief der Kaufmann, »jetzt bist du wieder du selbst. Die Linie ist untadelhaft, und die Symmetrie der Serviettenzipfel ist außerordentlich.«"

⁸³ American psychologist Walter Mischel carried out experiments on self-control with pre-schoolers. He and his students gave the children a choice between one reward (for example, a marshmallow) that they could have immediately, and a larger reward (two marshmallows) for which they would have to wait, alone, for up to 20 minutes. Of course there were differences between children. Some resisted the temptation and waited for the experimenter to return, while others quickly consumed the available sweets. Those who were able to delay the reward were found to be more successful later in life. For example, their school results were better than the results of more impulsive children. Cf. T. Zaleśkiewicz, *Psychologia ekonomiczna*, Warsaw 2012, p. 235; W. Mischel, Y. Shoda, M. L. Rodriguez, Delay of Gratification in Children, *Science*, no. 244, 1989, pp. 933-938.

⁸⁴ *Debit and Credit*, pp. 39-40. *Soll und Haben*, p. 87: "»Sieh, aus allen diesen Fässern kannst du essen, soviel du willst, kein Mensch wird dir's wehren; Herr Schröter erlaubt dir's, Herr Pix erlaubt dir's, ich erlaube dir's. Jetzt merke auf, mein Kleiner. Jetzt sollst du probieren, wie lange du vor diesen Tonnen stehen kannst, ohne hineinzugreifen. Je länger du's aushältst, desto besser für dich; wenn du's nicht mehr aushalten kannst, kommst du zu mir und sagst: Es ist genug. Das ist gar kein Befehl für dich, es ist nur

The canon of virtues or qualities serving the attainment of success is extended to include thrift, honesty and honour, which in the eyes of Anton's principal and colleagues make him a person worthy of respect. Anton's courage is also valued. His courage saves Anton's principal from Polish insurgents, and Anton becomes part of the Schröters' family. Other qualities which today are considered to be valuable in emotional intelligence or simply socially are also included in the canon: politeness, tact, and empathy. Both the narrator and some of the characters offer comments assuring the reader that these qualities enable Anton to achieve his professional and social success (Anton gets promoted and becomes a partner in Schröter's firm) and his very personal success (the love and hand in marriage of a woman who very much shares Wohlfart's values).

3. Obstacles to achievement

As has already been mentioned, *Soll und Haben* takes many inspirations from the traditions of educational and coming-of-age novels. Consequently, obstacles are among its natural themes. The protagonist has to overcome them on his path to achieving success, which is both to become a respected merchant and to acquire the habitus of an exemplary German bourgeois. In *Soll und Haben*, the means needed to achieve the goal are identified with certain qualities, while obstacles Freytag identifies with what is not a virtue, but its opposite, an 'anti-quality'. In the novel, the most significant obstacles on the path to success are prodigality and a lack of respect for work and order. The obstacles are thus the opposites of the values of thrift, diligence and order. The obstacles are the distorted 'circus mirror' reflections of the desired qualities. The way these 'anti-qualities' are presented has much in common with the popular – in Freytag's time – ideal of the German novel where values are strongly polarised. This ideal "does not put up any resistance to its intellectual acceptance by the reader and does not cause the reader any axiological problems".⁸⁵ In other words, Freytag employs unsophisticated, black-and-white schemata by attributing the 'anti'-values to certain social groups (the nobility) or ethnic groups and nations (Poles, Jews, Americans). They are to serve as a contrasting background for the image of an ideal German bourgeois.

wegen dir selber und wegen der Ehre.« So ließ der Alte den Knaben allein, nachdem er seine große dreischalige Uhr herausgezogen und auf eine Kiste neben sich gelegt hatte. »Versuch's zuerst mit einer Stunde«, sagte er im Weggehen, »geht's nicht, schadet's auch nicht. Es wird schon werden.« Der Junge streckte trotzig die Hände in die Hosentaschen und ging zwischen den Fässern auf und ab. Nach Verlauf von mehr als zwei Stunden kam er, die Uhr in der Hand, zum Vater heraus und rief: »Es ist genug.« »Zwei und eine halbe Stunde«, sagte der alte Sturm und winkte vergnügt Herrn Pix zu. [...] So wurde Karl eingeführt."

⁸⁵ Cf. H. Markiewicz, *Teorie powieści za granicą. Od początków do schyłku XX wieku*, Warsaw 1995, p. 154.

For reasons of space, I will concentrate only on the question of **prodigality**. This is an ‘anti-quality’ which proves to be the main obstacle on Anton’s path. The charm of the world of aristocracy fascinates him. At one point Anton decides to spend much money on clothes just in order to be accepted by people of aristocratic background. The narrator and some characters comment on Anton’s flirting with the aristocracy, judging it to be a step towards his oblivion.

[...] all the colleagues were unanimous that this [his] participation in the dancing-lessons was a most audacious and portentous step for Wohlfart, which would occasion inexpressible mischief, and disturb the entire order of mankind.⁸⁶

Tangling with members of aristocracy is unambiguously presented as a threat to Anton, because its members are overly attached to excessive luxury and appearances, which in the end result in a fall. In the novel, Baron von Rothsattel is the embodiment of the ‘anti-qualities’. Facing financial problems, he makes some small attempts at cutting down his expenditure, but they turn out to be insufficient. “In fact these [his] fits of parsimony were not lasting, and proved to be nothing but innocent whims, for in all essential things the baron continued his usually handsome style of living, which was quite up to his rank and fortune.”⁸⁷ Furthermore, when the Baron gets a significant return on a risky speculation, which could improve his financial standing, he is not able to save this return for long. Due to compulsive and unnecessary purchases, he shortly finds with consternation that in his desk drawer “only a small portion of it [the money] is left”.⁸⁸ Freytag takes a didactic approach to illustrate the detrimental effect of von Rothsattel’s prodigality, born of his excessive attachment to vain forms of presentation. Rothsattel’s fall is multifaceted. He loses his family estate and social position, and he tries to commit suicide. Prodigality combined with the inability to save money is clearly presented as a serious obstacle on the path to success. Anton Wohlfart’s firmly anchored virtues or traits, especially his common sense, integrity, and frugality, prove to be the final antidote. Prodigality is described by Freytag in detail as an attribute of both German and Polish aristocracy. This is a background against which the thrift of members of the bourgeoisie, one of their most pivotal virtues, shines.

⁸⁶ *Debit and Credit*, p. 92. *Soll und Haben*, p. 165: “Aber alle Kollegen waren darin einig, daß dieser Besuch der Tanzstunde für Wohlfart ein äußerst gewagter und verhängnisvoller Schritt sei, der unaussprechliches Unheil bereite und die gesamte menschliche Ordnung störe.”

⁸⁷ *Debit and Credit*, p. 40. *Soll und Haben*, p. 72: “In der Tat waren die kleinen Anfälle von Sparsamkeit nicht konsequent und nichts anderes als eine unschuldige Laune, denn in allen größeren Dingen hielt der Freiherr in gewohnter Weise auf anständige Repräsentation, und sein Auftreten war durchaus seiner Familie und seinem Wohlstande entsprechend.”

⁸⁸ *Debit and Credit*, p. 43. *Soll und Haben*, p. 77: “Mit Bestürzung sah er, daß nur noch ein kleiner Teil des Gewinnes vorhanden war.”

V

The examples given above prove that Gustav Freytag, in his best-selling novel, successfully linked the ways to attain success with defined qualities. Among the qualities which the protagonist Anton Wohlfart learns or develops further, Freytag particularly emphasises those which in the nineteenth century became known as first bourgeois virtues and then Prussian or German virtues: order, diligence and thrift (*Ordnung, Fleiß, Sparsamkeit*). At this point, it is justified to pose the question of whether conclusions drawn from the above analysis of *Soll und Haben*, referencing the components of the Achievement Theory of Motivation, may be of any value to a Polish reader in the twenty-first century. Is it worthwhile to consider the issue of the propagation of qualities which some authors consider to be explicitly “inborn” qualities of Germans and almost innately related to Germany’s Protestant culture? An interesting answer to this question is offered in Paul Münch’s anthology *Ordnung, Fleiß und Sparsamkeit* (‘Order, diligence and thrift’) published in 1984. In the preface, Münch writes that, in contrast to opinions close to Wojciech Wrzesiński’s statement that the Germans’ industriousness, hard-work, thrift, and organisational skills are their innate attributes,⁸⁹ in the early seventeenth century the stereotype of Germans was completely different. “Around the year 1600 the then generalised and simplified comparisons of nations noted excessive drunkenness, extravagant behaviour and general immoderation to be prominent traits of the German lifestyle.”⁹⁰ Canons of virtues which were considered to be both German and bourgeois (and to a large extent these overlapped) emerged, according to Münch, only in the early Modern Era, in a long process which began in the fifteenth and continued to the eighteenth century. As late as 1782, Johann Wilhelm Petersen in his *Geschichte der deutschen National-Neigung zum Trunke* (‘History of the German National Inclination to Drink’) still identified drunkenness, roughness, impetuosity and primitivism as the most typical traits of Germans.⁹¹ The chief flaw of Germans in the popular eighteenth-century oil paintings of the so-called Tables of Nations (*Völkertafel*) was... profligacy (!).⁹² The German virtues which would shortly be embraced in the *Ordnung, Fleiß und Sparsamkeit* (order, diligence and thrift) formula had not been parts of the German genome. Instead, they were propagated in a long, mundane educational process abundant in unexpected turns. This process was dominated by “*das kameralistisch-utilitaristische Effizienzdenken*” (‘cameralistic-utilitarian thinking about efficiency’) and the popular

⁸⁹ Cf. W. Wrzesiński, *Niemiec w stereotypach polskich XIX i XX wieku*, in: T. Walas (ed.), *Narody i stereotypy*, Kraków 1995, p. 185.

⁹⁰ P. Münch, *Einleitung*, in: *idem* (ed.), *Ordnung, Fleiß und Sparsamkeit. Texte und Dokumente zur Entstehung der „bürgerlichen Tugenden“*, München 1984, p. 14: “Der zeitgenössische, holzschnittartig verkürzte Moralvergleich der Nationen notierte noch um 1600 exzessive Trunkenheit, überbordende Lebensfreude und eine generelle Maßlosigkeit als hervorstechende Merkmale des deutschen Lebensstils.”

⁹¹ Cf. H. Orłowski, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

⁹² E.g. *Völkertafel* from Augsburg (ca. 1725) and Vienna (ca. 1750). Cf. F. K. Stanzel, *Europäer. Ein imagologischer Essay*, Heidelberg 1997.

(in Enlightenment times) “*Verfleißigungsprogramm*” (‘programme for increased industriousness’),⁹³ in which intellectual elites in German-speaking countries played a major role:

Literary works of all genres served education for diligence and joy in work and condemnation of idleness and laziness: learned treatises, edifying sermons, encouraging proverbs, instructive fables, moral storytelling, fictional stories and novels, descriptions of examples from mythology and history worth following, poems and songs.⁹⁴

This massed effort of many authors was highly effective. In the late eighteenth century “Immanuel Kant could already say about his countrymen that reliability, cleanliness and thrift distinguished them from other nations and that they loved order and rule.”⁹⁵

Paul Münch has no doubt that this was an effect of the literary works mentioned above. Indeed, Freytag’s novel was part of a more comprehensive process, which began in the sixteenth century and which historians have called a process of civilising, disciplining and imposing power (*Zivilisations-, Disziplinierungs- und Übermächtigungsprozeß*),⁹⁶ linked to society’s confessionalisation. However, the impetus and meticulousness of Freytag in his portrayal of a German as a model of order, diligence and thrift (almost resembling an instruction manual) suggests that the process of civilising and disciplining had not yet reached its objective by the 1850s, and that Freytag’s vision served as a zealous appeal and an attempt to cast a spell over reality.

Did Freytag achieve his goal? Did *Soll und Haben* not only educate German society in the spirit of Prussian-German patriotism, but also make it love the ‘bourgeois virtues’, which for Freytag were typically German values (but Prussian in spirit)? Izabela Surynt gives much evidence that Freytag’s contemporaries had no doubt about this. In his lifetime they perceived and admired him as “the teacher of everyday life”,⁹⁷ and after his death in 1895, “in many municipalities in the Reich, his name was eagerly given to streets, squares and schools”, because for numerous “eulogisers of Freytag’s genius, it was unquestionable that Freytag had earned his place in the German national pantheon since doubtlessly he was the teacher of Germania – *Praeceptor Germaniae*”.⁹⁸

⁹³ P. Münch, *Lebensformen in der frühen Neuzeit*, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, p. 392.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* “Der Erziehung zu Fleiß und Arbeitsfreude, der Verteufelung von Müßiggang und Faulheit widmeten sich literarische Genres aller Art: gelehrte Traktate, erbauliche Predigten, aufmunternde Sprichwörter, lehreiche Fabeln, moralische Beispielerzählungen, fiktive Erzählungen und Romane, Beschreibungen nachahmenswerter Exempel aus Mythologie und Geschichte, Gedichte und Lieder.”

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 401. “Am Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts konnte Immanuel Kant seinen Landsleuten bescheinigen, sie zeichneten sich vor anderen Völkern durch ‘Fleiß, Reinlichkeit und Sparsamkeit’ aus und besäßen einen Hang ‘zur Ordnung und Regel’.”

⁹⁶ R. von Dülmen, *Kultur und Alltag in der Frühen Neuzeit*, vol. 2, München 1992, p. 274.

⁹⁷ I. Surynt, *Gustav Freytag & Henryk Sienkiewicz*, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

The impact of *Soll und Haben* has been analysed further especially after 1968,⁹⁹ by scholars representing different research approaches. They have analysed various aspects of the novel which are thought to have made it a phenomenal publishing success: its ideological content (apotheosis of the bourgeois, national liberalism, and the socio-political system of the Prussian state),¹⁰⁰ the construction of a German identity and assurance of German readers of their rightful good opinion of their own social and national (ethnic) group at the expense of Poles and Jews,¹⁰¹ and the legitimation of the Polish partitions and the policy to Germanise the Poles, in line with Freytag's colonialist narrative on Germans' cultural superiority.¹⁰² A common element of many analyses was the conviction that "a book so often reprinted and devoured by successive generations of Germans must have influenced their consciousness".¹⁰³

Such arguments are not to be underestimated; however, the aesthetic and structural characteristics of the novel – which today are usually criticised and marginalised, as *Soll und Haben* is primarily viewed as a document of its times – also played an important role in captivating its readers. Especially in the 1850s, its readers must have read it with joy and relief, because they were offered clear values and guidelines at a time of troubles and uncertainty after the failure of the March Revolution in 1848, massive social changes related to industrialisation, mass migration of villagers to towns, and the emergence of an urban proletariat. The huge impact of the literary value constructions in *Soll und Haben* was surely strengthened by the vision of a world where good was clearly differentiated from evil and was finally victorious. Last but not least, the main characters were created in a way that made them an attractive model of conduct. Hartmut Steinecke writes (in 1980!):

Wohlfart's virtues, his love of order and hard work, his modesty and his eagerness to serve, his admiration for his parents and his employer, were and still are seen by many as valuable educational goals for their growing sons [...] ¹⁰⁴

This fact contributed to the popularity of *Soll und Haben* measured by the number of copies sold, but it was primarily its opinion-forming and value-creating power that elevated its status to that of a "Bible" of achieving citizens („*Bibel*“ *des deutschen*

⁹⁹ Cf. B. Wagner, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁰ Cf. for example H. Steinecke, *Gustav Freytag: Soll und Haben (1855), op. cit.*; A. Warakomska, *Państwo pruskie w latach 1850-1870 i jego pisarze od „Realpolitik” do realizmu mieszczańskiego*, Warsaw 2005.

¹⁰¹ Cf. for example H. Orłowski, *op. cit.*; M. Gubser, *Literarischer Antisemitismus. Untersuchungen zu Gustav Freytag und anderen bürgerlichen Schriftstellern des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Göttingen 1998.

¹⁰² Cf. I. Surynt, *Das „ferne“, „unheimliche“ Land, op. cit.*

¹⁰³ A. Warakomska, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

¹⁰⁴ H. Steinecke, *Gustav Freytag: Soll und Haben (1855), op. cit.*, p. 147. "Wohlfahrts Tugenden, seine Ordnungsliebe und Arbeitsamkeit, seine Bescheidenheit und sein Dienstfeifer, seine Verehrung der Eltern und des Arbeitgebers betrachteten und betrachten viele als erstrebenswerte Bildungsziele für die heranwachsenden Söhne [...]"

Leistungsbürgers)¹⁰⁵ and a guidebook to the world of values for both sons and daughters. It should be noted that philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, the father of epistemological hermeneutics, recommended it to his newly engaged female cousin as “the first truly German novel” and a useful reader, and encouraged her to follow the example of one of the characters (Sabine Schröter):

In it you meet a German girl who is a perfect image of everything that is in your nature to strive for: quiet confinement to the house, but the highest sense of order and organisation of domestic life [...].¹⁰⁶

The history of the reception of *Soll und Haben* and the importance of achievement show that many shared the view of Freytag’s biographer Conrad Albertie that “No German man or woman can claim [to be called an achiever] without reading this novel not once, but two or three times.”¹⁰⁷

VI

In conclusion, the analysis and references presented in this paper confirm the thesis that literary works can play a significant role in the transmission of values and in creating high achievement motivation in readers. My analysis, inspired by findings in motivation psychology, of Gustav Freytag’s novel *Soll und Haben* has first of all confirmed the hypothesis that a book widely read in Germany directly before that country’s spectacular economic growth indeed contains the most important components of achievement motivation: a clear goal of the main character which requires him to set high standards for himself, the path to succeed explicated in a detailed way as well as possible obstacles of which the reader should be aware so as to avoid them, meticulous instructions on how to gain self-control, and appraisal of the main character’s individual achievement. At the same time, the ways to succeed were identified with a number of values (or qualities), which in the German public space in the nineteenth century were called ‘bourgeois virtues’, and later increasingly often ‘German virtues’, partly thanks to Freytag’s novel. Primary of these were order, diligence and thrift, supported by many ‘auxiliary’ virtues, which increased the chance of individual success. The history of the reception of *Soll und Haben* points to another conclusion: this novel not only mirrored the existing axiological system, it actively co-shaped it. The literary construction of the value system in the novel effectively impacted the wider

¹⁰⁵ H. Orłowski, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

¹⁰⁶ Dilthey an seine Cousine Karoline Rückert, *Berlin Frühjahr 1856*, in: G. Kühne-Bertram, H.-U. Lessing (eds.), *Wilhelm Dilthey. Briefwechsel 1852-1911*, vol. 1, Göttingen 2011, p. 44: “Du begegnest darin einem deutschen Mädchen, das ein vollkommenes Bild all dessen ist, dem nachzustreben in Deiner Natur liegt: stille Beschränkung auf das Haus, aber der höchste Sinn für Ordnung und Gestaltung des Häuslichen [...].”

¹⁰⁷ C. Alberti, *Gustav Freytag, sein Leben und Schaffen*, Leipzig 1885, p. 151: “Es giebt keinen Deutschen und keine Deutsche, die nur irgendwie auf das Beiwort gebildet Anspruch erheben und den Roman nicht ein-, nein zwei- oder gar dreimal gelesen haben.”

German readership and – in accord with Freytag’s intention – it had an educational or disciplining effect on society.¹⁰⁸

It follows that my analysis may be an argument for the real impact of literary constructions of values. This may be a reason for approaching particular literary texts as strategic components of the fight against generational poverty, especially if children’s parents or guardians from impoverished environments are not able to transmit the values essential to the children’s successful functioning at school, and later in a wider economic, social and public context. It follows that the idea of creating teams of social workers, psychologists, and teachers of literature is one that is worthy of consideration. This might make it possible to choose texts containing the values desired, and prepare class scenarios to assist teachers at different stages of education, possibly including the pre-school stage. This idea is close to the concept of applied literature proposed by Stefania Skwarczyńska in the 1930s.¹⁰⁹ The idea that the transfer of values by applied literary works is not outdated today has been confirmed by the relatively numerous, current and value-oriented publications for children and adolescents in Poland. One of the most acknowledged examples is the *Gorzka czekolada* (‘Bitter Sweet’) anthology of “short stories about important matters”, whose authors were joint winners of the Astrid Lindgren Memorial Award run by the Polish ABC XXI Foundation *Cała Polska czyta dzieciom* [All of Poland reads to their children]. This anthology (15 short stories) makes young readers familiar with such values as respect, sympathy, honesty, responsibility, courage, self-discipline, amicability, justice, freedom, integrity, optimism, friendship, solidarity, beauty and wisdom.¹¹⁰

Is it right to extend this value spectrum to include the ‘German virtues’ which Gustav Freytag propagated 160 years ago: order, diligence and thrift? This question has an emotional dimension, being entangled with the difficult Prussian–Polish and German–Polish past. *Soll und Haben* reflects the system of values and standards of conduct in the nineteenth century, when the antagonism between Poland and Prussia was growing, and Prussia and Poland became cultural enemies.

[...] the conviction was then born that Germans made their inborn attributes of thriftiness, diligence, frugality and organisational skills part of their policy dangerous for others (primarily Poles) and also for themselves.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ See also: J. Schönert: „*Arbeit in der deutschen Weise*“ als nationales Erziehungsprogramm. Zur Wirkungsweise literarischer Wertkonstitution, in: *idem*, H. Segeberg (ed.), *Polyperspektivik in der literarischen Moderne. Studien zur Theorie, Geschichte und Wirkung der Literatur: Karl Robert Mandelkow gewidmet*, Frankfurt a.M. 1988, pp. 338–352.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. S. Skwarczyńska, O pojęcie literatury stosowanej, *Pamiętnik Literacki*, vol. 28, 1931, pp. 1–24; S. Skwarczyńska, O metodzie badania literatury stosowanej, *Ruch Literacki*, vol. 8, no. 7, 1933, pp. 129–134.

¹¹⁰ Cf. P. Beręsewicz, W. Cesarz, B. Kosmowska, A. Maleszka, K. Ryrych, K. Terechowicz, *Gorzka czekolada i inne opowiadania o ważnych sprawach*, Warsaw 2016.

¹¹¹ W. Wrzesiński, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

Provided that there is an appropriate balance between the cardinal and secondary virtues glorified in nineteenth-century Prussia, today we may view the situation from a more detached perspective, like that proposed by Leszek Żyliński:

It is worth considering whether from our current perspective some of the Prussian attributes ought to be appreciated and the image of Prussia relativised in the Polish public perception. Some people say that in the twenty-first century this foreign tradition of Prussian virtues may be very useful when building one's own country and free-market economy [...].¹¹²

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Keywords: literary constructions of values, achievement motivation, combating poverty, bourgeois virtues, Prussian/German virtues.

ABSTRACT

*The aim of this article is to examine the meaning of literary constructions of values in the context of the fight against poverty. The significance of the transmission of values is emphasised especially by scholars who study the phenomenon of the inheritance of poverty. The hypothesis is that literature can take on the role of a transmitter of values. To confirm this hypothesis, findings of the American psychologist David McClelland in the field of motivation psychology are discussed and then developed in the analysis of the text of a 19th-century German novel, Gustav Freytag's *Soll und Haben*. This is followed by an examination of the history of the novel's reception. The two threads of analysis serve as evidence of the possible real impact of literary constructions of values, and reveal what values were propagated in this extremely popular novel from the period preceding Germany's spectacular economic growth. The results of the analysis are assessed with regard to their applicability to strategies for fighting poverty.*

¹¹² L. Żyliński, *Od Prus do Europy. Szkice o tożsamości narodowej Niemców*, Toruń 2014, p. 12.

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COMING TO TERMS WITH THE WEST GERMAN 68ERS IN THE WRITINGS OF THE 85ERS

In 2018, the fiftieth anniversary of the student revolts, the role the West German 68ers¹ played in history, politics and culture was widely debated, disputed and analysed. This is not surprising, because no other post-war generation has been equally controversial and criticised. Evaluations of the events and legacy of 1968 which have appeared in journalistic, literary, scholarly, and political discourse have been varied and often contradictory.² Discussion and evaluation of the 68ers have a long history. The role of that generation has been debated not only on the occasion of major anniversaries, but whenever journalists and historians have found something new and when politicians have been in disagreement.

In the late 1960s, Europe was swept by a wave of student protests against the existing hierarchy, culture, and traditional values. The common characteristics of student revolts in western Europe were their anti-authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and opposition to the establishment. Students demanded full freedom of conduct and a real right to co-decide on policymaking. They referred to utopian revolutionary ideas, demanding the creation of a new society and “new man”. The result of their fight was not a political revolution, but a revolt which resulted in changes in traditional models of the family and of social and cultural life. The year 1968 has become a symbol of the generation that challenged the older generations and radically rejected traditions. The 68ers have had a strong generational identity, which reveals itself in emotional debates on that generation’s history and actors. The multitude of evaluations and interpretations clearly speaks for the complexity and ambiguity of the 68ers as a generation.

Undoubtedly, the voice of the 68ers’ children is important in German discourse. The younger generation tries to reckon with the 68ers’ legacy, work through their experiences and express mostly critical evaluations of them in literary, (auto)biographical, essayistic or journalistic texts. The main areas which the 85ers have addressed are the new concepts of family and upbringing, ideology, the past and history, and

¹ In East Germany there were no student protests, and hence no “generation of ‘68”.

² Examples are discussed below.

politics. The 1968 generation, which once negated the traditions and culture of their parents, has become a target of criticism by the next generation.

To outline the complexity of the evaluation of the 1968 generation and its legacy, in the first part of this paper I will refer to the main topics raised in the debate relating to that generation's history and impact. Later I will present a profile of the 1985 generation and proceed to the issue of that generation's reckoning with the 68ers, referring to selected publications of the 85ers. In analysing their texts I will point to the 85ers' strategies of constructing their own generational identity, in contrast to that of their parents.

In this paper, which refers to generation research (*Generationenforschung*),³ I will apply the complementary **close** and **wide reading** methods⁴ of literary research. Close reading focuses on analysis of what is inherent in the text, while wide reading focuses on historical and cultural aspects. Most of the texts I will analyse have not been translated into English, and quoted passages will be therefore translated especially for this paper, and additionally quoted in German in footnotes. To avoid being extensively repetitive, in writing about the German *68er-Generation* and *85er-Generation*, I will refer to the 68ers and the 85ers for short. My research questions, perspective and conclusions will largely refer back to my monograph published in 2013.⁵

THE 68ERS AND THEIR LEGACY: CONTROVERSIES

The first area of controversy is the West German 68ers' reckoning with the Nazi past of their parents and grandparents.⁶ Historians and commentators debate whether the 1968ers truly sought to reckon with the Nazi past of former generations, or whether this was a myth. Some, like Edgar Wolfrum⁷ and Norbert Frei,⁸ believe the effort was genuine and a significant part of the student protests. Others think that the 68ers did not contribute to the working through of the Nazi past. Götz Aly, himself

³ In German socio-historical thought, the tradition of generational research is particularly strong and goes back to Karl Mannheim's essay on the problem of generations. K. Mannheim, *Das Problem der Generationen* (1928), in: *Wissenssoziologie. Auswahl aus dem Werk Karl Mannheims*, ed. K. H. Wolff, Neuwied am Rhein 1970 (1964), pp. 509–565.

⁴ Cf. W. Hallet, *Methoden kulturwissenschaftlicher Ansätze: Close Reading und Wide Reading*, in: A. Nünning, V. Nünning (eds.), *Methoden der literatur- und kulturwissenschaftlichen Textanalyse*, Stuttgart 2010, pp. 293–315.

⁵ M. Stefański, *Die 68er-Generation vor Gericht. Untersuchungen zu den Konfliktkonstruktionen in den Texten der 85er-Generation*, Frankfurt am Main 2013.

⁶ Heinz Bude defines the generation of 1968 as those born in 1938–1948, while for Aleida Assmann it is those born in 1940–1950. Cf. H. Bude, *Das Altern einer Generation. Jahrgänge 1938 bis 1948*, Frankfurt am Main 1995, p. 18; A. Assmann, *Geschichte im Gedächtnis. Von der individuellen Erfahrung zur öffentlichen Inszenierung*, München 2007, p. 62.

⁷ Cf. E. Wolfrum, *Die geglückte Demokratie. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Stuttgart 2006, p. 267.

⁸ Cf. N. Frei, *1968. Jugendrevolte und globaler Protest*, München 2008, pp. 79–88.

a 68er, in his book *Unser Kampf. 1968 – ein irritierter Blick zurück*, even compares the 68ers to their parents' generation of 1933. His thesis is that the 1968 young rebels were themselves epigones of totalitarianism.⁹ They rebelled to escape from the burden of the Nazi past.¹⁰ Wolfgang Kraushaar – another expert in the student revolt and the events of 1968 – disagrees with Aly, asserting that the latter's far-reaching simplifications lead to erroneous interpretations and inadequate evaluation of the 68ers and the revolt's main actors.¹¹

The second area of controversy in the debate on the history and legacy of the 68ers concerns their criticism of authoritarian society and the ideas of anti-authoritarian upbringing which the 68ers propagated and put into practice, having been inspired by the psychoanalytical school,¹² publications by leftist philosophers (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse) and the experimental pedagogy of Alexander Neil, Celestin Freinet and Lorenzo Milani, who ran schools implementing the tenets of emancipation pedagogy.

The main premise of anti-authoritarian upbringing was the enrooting of critical thinking, creativity, and independency. The objective was not to question authority as such, but to shape an emancipated, self-aware individual who would be capable of resisting the influence of an authoritarian society and manipulation by the authorities. In the second half of the 1960s the first communes emerged, where the postulates of emancipated communal life were put into practice. The best-known were *Kommune 1* and *Kommune 2* in Berlin.

This was a time not only of experimentation with new forms of social life, but also of exploration of the sexual spheres of both adults and children. These areas were highly ideologised. The aims were to abolish ownership and intimacy, which were perceived as products of an oppressive society and culture. The 68ers founded *Kinderläden*, where children's pre-school upbringing was anti-authoritarian, where they could play freely, learn to think critically, and discover their sexuality.¹³

The pedagogy practised and developed by the 68ers had its positive sides: it increased adults' involvement in children's upbringing, it was open to new ideas, and contributed to making education more dynamic. It had its negative sides too. These include a tendency to eliminate differences between adults and children, strong ideologisation of

⁹ Cf. G. Aly, *Unser Kampf. 1968 – ein irritierter Blick zurück*, Frankfurt am Main 2008, p. 8.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 148ff.

¹¹ Cf. W. Kraushaar, *Die blinden Flecken der 68er Bewegung*, Stuttgart 2018, pp. 123–134.

¹² Along with Freud and Fromm, Wilhelm Reich's work should be mentioned, as it was an important reference point for the 68ers. Reich combined the tenets of psychoanalysis with Marxism, and wrote extensively on child sexuality. Cf. W. Reich, *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*, Leipzig, Wien, Zürich 1927; idem, *Der Einbruch der Sexualmoral*, Berlin, Leipzig, Wien 1932; idem, *Die Sexualität im Kulturkampf*, Kopenhagen 1936.

¹³ More on *Kinderläden* in M. S. Baader, *An der großen Schaufensterscheibe sollen sich die Kinder von innen und die Passanten von außen die Nasen platt drücken. Kinderläden, Kinderkultur und Kinder als Akteure im öffentlich-städtischen Raum seit 1968*, in: idem, U. Hermann (eds.), *Engagierte Jugend und kritische Pädagogik: Impulse und Folgen eines kulturellen Umbruchs in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik*, Weinheim 2011, pp. 232–251.

the upbringing process, excessive experimentation in the early introduction of sexuality (for example, showing parents' intercourse to children, encouraging children to touch the genitals of their peers and adults), and the lack of a regular care-taker, be it mother or father, that function being performed by different people in turns.¹⁴

Recently, the issue of the possible affirmation and propagation of paedophilia in the late 1960s by extreme leftists and later by the Greens (now *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*) has been raised frequently.¹⁵ In the 1990s there was a heated debate on the alleged impact of the propagated permissive upbringing on the aggressive behaviours of nationalist youth.¹⁶ This allegation has not been confirmed. Studies carried out in North Rhine-Westphalia have demonstrated that the perpetrators of xenophobically motivated violence were mostly brought up in an authoritarian way.¹⁷

Another area of criticism of the 68ers is their fascination with communism and the totalitarian regimes in China, Vietnam and Cuba, and also their inclination to idealise the German Democratic Republic.

After the disintegration of the student movement and the APO (*Außerparlamentarische Opposition*, extra-parliamentary opposition) many extremist groups surfaced. They followed communist ideology, and some became underground organisations conducting an armed struggle against imperialism, capitalism, and what they saw as the fascist Federal Republic of Germany. The best-known terrorist organisation was the Red Army Faction (RAF; *Rote Armee Fraktion*) established in 1970. The RAF was responsible for numerous attacks on public institutions and state officials.

Unquestionably, acts of terrorism were one of many consequences of the 1968 revolt.¹⁸ It should be recalled however, that attitudes towards the use of violence were not uniform. In fact, this was one of the most disputed issues which led to the disin-

¹⁴ Cf. M. S. Baader, *Vorwort*, in: idem (ed.): »Seid realistisch, verlangt das Unmögliche!«. *Wie 1968 die Pädagogik bewegte*, Weinheim 2008, pp. 7–13, in particular p.11ff.

¹⁵ Such accusations were strongly voiced ahead of the 2013 federal elections, and the *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen* leadership commissioned the Göttingen Institute for Democracy Research to conduct an academic review of discourse, views and practices with regard to paedophilia in the 1968 movement and later among the Greens (1968–1989). It was concluded that the allegations were oversimplified and superficial. Cf. F. Walter, S. Klecha, A. Hensel (eds.), *Die Grünen und die Pädosexualität: Eine bundesdeutsche Geschichte*, Göttingen 2014. Sexual abuse of children in the 1968 movement and later among the Greens was also criticised by Christian Füller. Cf. C. Füller, *Die Revolution missbraucht ihre Kinder: sexuelle Gewalt in deutschen Protestbewegungen*, München 2015, pp. 131–199.

¹⁶ Cf. D. Sinhart-Pallin, *Endstation einer pädagogischen Sehnsucht: Rückmarsch zur Autorität? Bemerkungen zu einer pädagogischen Debatte*, in: Idem (ed.), *Aufgabe der Erziehung. Essays und Biographisches zur 68er-Pädagogik und zur Jugendgewalt der 90er Jahre*, Weinheim 1994, pp. 10–20, p. 11 in particular.

¹⁷ Cf. W. Kraushaar, *1968. Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat*, München 1998, p. 313.

¹⁸ Gerd Koenen asserts that the RAF and other militant groups active in the 1970s cannot be set apart from the 68ers' history. Cf. G. Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution. 1967-1977*, Köln 2001, p. 365. Hans-Jürgen Wirth accords that the 68ers share moral and political responsibility for RAF violence. Cf. H.-J. Wirth, *Versuch, den Umbruch von 68 und das Problem der Gewalt zu verstehen*, in: idem (ed.), *Hitlers Enkel – oder Kinder der Demokratie? Die 68er-Generation, die RAF und die Fischer-Debatte* (2001), Gießen 2004, p. 41.

tegration of the 68ers' movement. It needs to be underlined that few members of the movement supported or carried out armed actions.

In 1998 the RAF was officially dissolved. Nevertheless, terrorism and its history in West Germany continued to be disputed on anniversaries of the 1968 protests and when former RAF members were released from prison; for instance, Birgit Mohnhaupt in 2007, Christian Klar in 2008 and Birgit Hogefeld in 2011.

What were the life paths of the majority of active members of the 1968 student movement who did not join terrorist groups? Many became involved in civic initiatives and social projects on ecology, or campaigns for peace. Many became writers, artists, journalists, or scholars who co-created the intellectual elite of West Germany. In their so-called long march through the institutions, they increasingly departed from their dissenting identity and have gradually become members of the establishment which they once fought. A civic movement led to the creation of the Green party in 1980 (*Die Grünen*, later *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*), where former rebels Joschka Fischer and Daniel Cohn-Bendit became the leading figures.

In 1985 Fischer became Minister for the Environment in the state of Hesse. In 1998, when the SPD–Green government took power, he became a prominent politician at national level, as leader of the Greens and Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is a telling photograph of him together with Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Oskar Lafontaine (then leader of the SPD) holding glasses of champagne and celebrating the sealing of the coalition, which for many years was interpreted as documenting Fischer's symbolic breach with the ideals of his youth. In 2001 photographs of him attacking a policeman were published, and Fischer had to distance himself from his rebellious past. He apologised at the Bundestag for his conduct, and declared that he adamantly supported the state's monopoly on the use of legitimate physical force.¹⁹

The student rebellion and the legacy of the 68ers continue to arouse strong emotions and ideological debate. We may mention the criticism coming from members of the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD, *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) and Alternative for Germany (AfD, *Alternative für Deutschland*). The NPD website has published a radical critique of the leftists' policy titled *Das Erbe der 68er – ein kaputtes Deutschland* ("The legacy of the 68ers – a broken Germany") by leading party activist Ronny Zasowk.²⁰ This policy has been mainstream policy since representatives of the 68ers came to power. Similar criticism is voiced by the AfD, whose politicians blame the 68ers for "infecting Germany with the left-red-green ideology".²¹ In contrast, there are also sympathetic views expressed by

¹⁹ Cf. J. Fischer, „*Ich habe damals Unrecht getan*“, 17 January 2001, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fischer-ich-habe-damals-unrecht-gegan-113767.html> (accessed 7 November 2018).

²⁰ R. Zasowk, *Das Erbe der 68er – ein kaputtes Deutschland*, 4 April 2018, <https://npd.de/das-erbe-der-68er-ein-kaputtes-deutschland/> (accessed 2 November 2018).

²¹ “[...] weg vom links-rot-grün verseuchten 68er-Deutschland”, AfD deputy chairman Jörg Meuthen said at the AfD convention in 2016. Quoted after M. Hägler, „*Weg vom links-rot-grün verseuchten 68er-Deutschland*“, 30 April 2016, <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/proteste-gegen-afd-aufmarsch-der-wut-1.2974815-2> (accessed 2 November 2018).

those who miss the counter-culture and rebellious spirit of the 68ers.²² Hopes that the grandchildren of the 68ers will be inspired by their grandparents' stories and initiate a new rebellion have been expressed by psychologist Claus Koch in his book *1968: Drei Generationen – eine Geschichte* ("Three generations: one story").²³

Contradictory evaluations of the 1968 generation and its legacy also appear in scholarly discourse. Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, for example, believes that the 68ers contributed to the abolition of authoritarianism and to profound changes in mentality which have resulted in the transformation of political, social and cultural structures.²⁴ Ulrike Jureit goes further, writing that the 1968 generation was the last 'heroic generation' of the 20th century.²⁵ Others, like Axel Schildt²⁶ and Hans-Ulrich Wehler,²⁷ are of the opinion that the 68ers did not initiate shifts in values, because the student protests were only a part of the modernisation process which had already begun in West German society in the early 1960s.

In the most recent publications, there is a tendency to revise the previously standard interpretations and evaluations of the student revolt and the generation of the 68ers. Christina von Hodenberg questions the generally accepted interpretation that the cause of the rebellion was a generational conflict, instead seeing it primarily in terms of gender conflict.²⁸ Sociologist Armin Nassehi, on the other hand, identifies the concept of the year 1968 as a vehicle of communication which helps to talk about the Federal Republic of Germany and its history, and also about the stories of individuals.²⁹

THE 85ERS

In contrast to the 68ers, the picture of the 1985 generation is blurred, and this generation is not a topic of heated disputes. One reason is that the 85ers are not politically and socially engaged to the same extent as their parents. The term '1985 generation'

²² Cf. M. Tholl, *Wo bleiben die Erben der 68er?*, 31 May 2017, <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/jugendbewegung-wo-bleiben-die-erben-der-68er/19871612.html> (accessed 2 November 2018).

²³ Cf. C. Koch, *1968: Drei Generationen – eine Geschichte*, Gütersloh 2018, pp. 252–254.

²⁴ Cf. I. Gilcher-Holtey, *Die 68er Bewegung: Deutschland – Westeuropa – USA* (2001), München 2005, p. 127.

²⁵ According to Jureit no other later generational formation has been equally strongly involved in politics and reckoning with the past and in working out its own identity without creating a myth around itself or reinterpreting history. Cf. U. Jureit, *Generationenforschung*, Göttingen 2006, p. 96.

²⁶ Cf. A. Schildt, *Vor der Revolte: Die sechziger Jahre*, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 22-23/2001, p. 13. <http://www.bpb.de/files/G99WID.pdf> (accessed 7 November 2018).

²⁷ Cf. H. U. Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 5: *Bundesrepublik und DDR: 1949-1990*, München 2008, p. 311.

²⁸ Christina von Hodenberg underlines the role of emancipatory women's movements, which had a substantial impact on social transformations. Cf. C. von Hodenberg, *Das andere Achtundsechzig*, München 2018, e.g. p. 190.

²⁹ Cf. A. Nassehi, *Gab es 1968? Eine Spurensuche*, Hamburg 2018, p. 54ff.

was coined by Aleida Assmann,³⁰ who – referring to an essay by Christian Schüle³¹ – recognised the year 1985 as the reference point for the cohort born in West Germany in 1965–1980. The key experiences relevant to the shaping of the ‘post-heroic’ generation³² included growing up in the post-modernist era, in a world of prosperity, media and advertising, subject to a variety of ideas and values. This generation has also experienced globalisation, acceleration and mobility on an unprecedented scale. In contrast to the 68ers, the attitudes of most of the 85ers have been typically consumerist, with little accompanying interest in politics. It is important to note that the 85ers did not grow up in the shadow of the Nazi past as the 68ers did.

The 85ers are also referred to as the Golf generation. This name goes back to Florian Illies’ essay *Generation Golf*, referring to the Volkswagen Golf, which Illies thought to be the embodiment of the ambitions and desires of many of his generation. The term “Golf generation” undoubtedly has a resounding quality; however, it reduces the generation’s definition to a single artifact. I have therefore decided to use the broader and less labelling term ‘the 1985 generation’.

EVALUATIONS OF THE 1968 GENERATION BY THE 85ERS

The first publications by 85ers taking on the generation of 1968 appeared in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This was the time when authors in their thirties began to work through their experiences in literary form, and tried to describe their own generational identity in opposition to the 1968 generation.

In what follows I will focus on analysing the early publications by the 85ers which are representative of the array of main tendencies and typical attitudes towards the 68ers.³³ These publications set the tone for the disputes carried on today. I will refer to Sophie Dannenberg’s novel *Das bleiche Herz der Revolution* (2004), Bettina Röhl’s (auto)biography titled *So macht Kommunismus Spaß!* (2006), and a number

³⁰ Cf. A. Assmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–67.

³¹ According to Schüle, in West Germany in 1985 there was a paradigm change due to a slackening of the critical activity of the 68ers. Cf. C. Schüle, *Deutschlandvermessung. Abrechnung eines Mittdreißigers* (2006), München 2007, p. 22.

³² Cf. U. Jureit, *op. cit.*, p. 96ff.

³³ The publications I have chosen are only a fraction of the literature evaluating the 68ers. Other interesting publications include: D. Bielenstein, *Das richtige Leben*, Frankfurt am Main 2007; J. von Düffel, *Houwelandt*, Köln 2004; W. Frömberg, *Etwas Besseres als die Freiheit*, Lohmar 2013; A. Henning von Lange, *Peace*, Köln 2009; Z. Jenny, *Das Blütenstaubzimmer*, Frankfurt am Main 1997; J. Jochimsen, *Das Dosenmilch-Trauma. Bekenntnisse eines 68er-Kindes*, München 2000; J. Jochimsen, *Flaschendrehen oder: Der Tag an dem ich Nena zersägte*, München 2002; R. Merkel, *Das Gefühl am Morgen*, Frankfurt am Main 2005; R. D. Precht, *Lenin kam nur bis Lüdenscheid*, Berlin 2005; B. Röhl, *Die RAF hat euch lieb: Die Bundesrepublik im Rausch von 68 – Eine Familie im Zentrum der Bewegung*, München 2018; M. Schwerdtfeger, *Mein erster Achttausender*, in: Idem, *Leichte Mädchen*, Köln 2001; Idem, *Wir Nutella-kinder, Kursbuch 154* (2003), pp. 42–48; A. Stelling, *Horchen*, Frankfurt am Main 2010; D. Wagner, *Meine nachtblaue Hose*, Berlin 2000.

of essays: Florian Illies' *Generation Golf* (2000) and *Generation Golf zwei* (2003), Joachim Bessing's *Rettet die Familie!* (2004), Adriano Sack's *Elternabend* (2004), Adriano Sack's *Deutschlandvermessung* (2006) and Christian Schüle's *Deutschlandvermessung* (2006).

The authors of the publications I have selected include people raised in environments ranging from extreme leftist (Dannenberg, Röhl) and moderate leftist-liberal (Sack) to moderate liberal or even conservative (Schüle, Illies). Thus, not all of them are offspring of 'typical' representatives of the 1968 generation. Nonetheless, in a wider sense all 85ers are children of the 68ers, because they have been culturally and socially immersed in the 1968 generation's legacy. The 85ers try to face up to this and create their own generational identity.

FAMILY, ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN UPBRINGING, IDEOLOGY

As far as the concepts of the family and upbringing are concerned, the 85ers have strongly criticised the rejection of traditional values by the 68ers. Joachim Bessing in his emotional essay *Rettet die Familie! Eine Provokation* ("Save the family! A provocation") writes of the "destruction of the family sense" in 1968 when the old traditions of family culture were discarded.³⁴

In *Rettet die Familie!* Bessing analyses the phenomenon of the step family (*Patchworkfamilie*). In Bessing's view this family format is a threat to the future of society as a whole. Using aggressive rhetoric and numerous stereotypes, he emotionally blames the 1968 generation for questioning all kinds of authority. For him the emergence of step families is a generational experiment which was initiated by the destruction of the "family sense" by the 68ers. The anti-authoritarian rebellion "broke up families", and the consequences have been more profound than those of "the disaster of 1945" because in 1968 "no attempt was made to uphold the continuity of transmission of family culture", and instead a "totally new format" was propagated.³⁵

Ideas propagated and practised by the 68ers, including their anti-authoritarian model of upbringing, are said to have led to a situation where their children are not able to form lasting relationships. The key factor which led to their children's loneliness and inability to make serious commitments was the 68ers' egoism and unconditional pursuit of self-realisation, which supplanted the feeling of community and human solidarity. For Bessing his generation is a victim of the family experiment conducted by the 68ers. He constructs the identity of the 85ers in opposition to the 1968 generation, which ironically in his narrative becomes the scapegoat responsible for every evil.

³⁴ "Zerstörung des Familiensinns". J. Bessing, *Rettet die Familie! Eine Provokation*, München 2004, e.g. p. 40.

³⁵ "Denn nun gab es nicht einmal den Versuch, die tradierte Familienkultur weiterzuführen, man wollte eine vollkommene Neukonstruktion." *Ibidem*. In Bessing's opinion the decisive factor destructive to the sense of family has been "the anti-enlightenment shift of society after 1968" – "der antiaufklärerische Zug in der Gesellschaft nach 1968". *Ibidem*, p. 43.

Another example of radical criticism of anti-authoritarian upbringing is Sophie Dannenberg's (real name: Annegret Kunkel) novel *Das bleiche Herz der Revolution* ("The pale heart of the revolution"). Like Bessing, she presents the children of the 68ers as victims of parental experiments. Criticism of the anti-authoritarian pedagogy strongly bonded with the sexual revolution is present in the childhood memories of Kitty Caspari, the protagonist, an art gallery owner. There are many references to the 17th issue of the journal *Kursbuch*, where excerpts from reports from the radical *Kommune 2* were published. The reports contained the commune members' own descriptions of their parenting styles, with particular emphasis on the question of children's sexuality.³⁶

In *Das bleiche Herz der Revolution*, one of the most drastic descriptions is that of the sexual education forced on Kitty and Benno, her younger brother, by their parents. Kitty and Benno were told to touch each other's genitals³⁷ and watch their parents' intercourse.³⁸ Kitty pictures her parents as slugs and describes her trauma as follows:

I no longer understood why there were wallpapers, parents, houses, and trees. When the sense was gone, [slugs] slithered through my eye sockets leaving me only with slimy pictures. Then they reached my heart and made it sticky and cold. And finally, my heart was gone too [...].³⁹

There is also a shocking description of Kitty's molestation by her father and Benno. They force her to show them her breasts to free her from bourgeois inhibitions.

Benno got me first. He put his arms around my waist, he hopped, laughed, and shyly put his cheek on my breast; then looked at me; his eyes had a loving and childish look. However, when my father grabbed me from behind and grasped my breasts with his both hands, Benno's eyes became flashy as of an insect which spreads out its wings in warning. My body's shell became hard, and everything, all my insides melted into bitter, viscous pap.⁴⁰

³⁶ Cf. Kommune 2 (C. Bookhagen et al.), *Kindererziehung in der Kommune*, *Kursbuch* 17 (1969), pp. 147–178.

³⁷ In anti-authoritarian groups it happened that child minders let children touch their intimate areas. Daniel Cohn-Bendit's confession that while working at an anti-authoritarian kindergarten he let the children touch his genitals reverberated widely. The aim was to allow the children to meet their sexual needs. Cf. D. Cohn-Bendit, *Der große Basar. Gespräche mit Michel Lévy, Jean-Marc Salmon, Maren Sell*, München 1975, p. 143.

³⁸ Some collectives discussed whether a child should be allowed to watch its parents' intercourse. In most cases it was agreed that this should not be forbidden, so that the child would not feel excluded. The premise was that the private sphere and intimacy should be part of the sphere of politics and should not be hidden. Cf. C. Sager, *Das Ende der kindlichen Unschuld. Die Sexualerziehung der 68er-Bewegung*, in: M. S. Baader (ed.), „*Seid realistisch, verlangt das Unmögliche!*“, Weinheim 2008, pp. 56–68, in particular p. 64ff; M. S. Baader, *Zwischen Politisierung, Pädosexualität und Befreiung*, in: Idem (ed.), *Tabubruch und Entgrenzung: Kindheit und Sexualität nach 1968*, Köln 2017, pp. 55–84, in particular pp. 75–76.

³⁹ "Ich verstand nicht mehr, warum es überhaupt Tapeten gab und Eltern, Häuser und Bäume. Als der Sinn verschwunden war, krochen sie durch meine Augenhöhlen und ließen nur schleimige Bilder übrig. Dann kamen sie in mein Herz und machten es schmierig und kalt. Und schließlich war auch mein Herz verschwunden [...]." S. Dannenberg, *Das bleiche Herz der Revolution* (2004), Berlin 2006, p. 170.

⁴⁰ "Benno erwischte mich zuerst, er umschlang meine Taille, hüpfte, lachte und legte schüchtern die Wange an meine Brust, dann sah er auf, sein Blick war zart und kindlich. Doch als Vater von hinten

Kitty also has to confront her mother's aggression as she forces Kitty to attend psychoanalytic sessions. The mother does not want Kitty to disturb her own self-realisation efforts, and wants Kitty to let go the "Oedipal tension"⁴¹ which she allegedly brings to the family.

Dannenbergl depicts anti-authoritarian upbringing as oppressive and violent both psychologically and physically. This picturing may be shocking, but in reality it is true to an extent. Some people raised in radical communes recall that seemingly they were free to do anything, but the system was "the dictatorship of forced liberation".⁴² Others blame their parents for having excessive expectations of their children and treating them as "a new generation brought up in freedom"⁴³ which served to make their parents' dreams come true.

One of the most serious allegations in Dannenberg's novel is the attribution to the 68ers of the expulsion of God and transcendence. In her gallery, Kitty exhibits iconoclastic works by 68ers who question Christian tradition and desecrate religious symbols. These artists want to leave transcendence behind, but it is not possible, because whenever they are ahead of it, it begins to catch up with them.⁴⁴

In *Das bleiche Herz der Revolution*, the rebellious and atheist generation of 1968 strips the world of its metaphysical dimension not only through the art that it creates, but also through its ideologised methods of upbringing. The 68ers torment their children, neglect and abandon them, not giving them love, support or hope. In this novel the world after the 1968 revolt is a place of loneliness and suffering, as religion is replaced with the idea of revolution.⁴⁵ Kitty's parents, blinded by ideology, represent all of the 68ers, who become degenerate and drag their children in their footsteps. Dannenberg constructs the identity of her protagonist, and more widely of her whole generation, on a victim myth. This victim, in the course of the 68ers' pedagogical and ideological experiments, has been robbed of innocence and the meaning of life.

In this fictional novel, which contains some autobiographical elements,⁴⁶ Dannenberg's world is exaggerated and overwrought. Sometimes she refers to actual radical

zupackte und mit beiden Händen meine Brüste nahm, wurden Bennos Augen grell, wie ein Insekt, das zur Warnung die Flügel spreizt. Meine Körperhülle wurde hart, und alles, was in mir war, zerfloß zu einem bitteren, zähen Brei." S. Dannenberg, *Das bleiche Herz...*, *op. cit.*, p. 242ff.

⁴¹ "Ödipale Spannung". S. Dannenberg, *Das bleiche Herz...*, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

⁴² "Diktatur des Befreiungszwangs". T. Spielhofer, *Ansichten eines Versuchskaninchens*, in: B. Danneberg (ed.), *Die '68er. Eine Generation und ihr Erbe*, Wien 1998, pp. 356–365, in particular p. 356.

⁴³ "neuen frei erzogenen Generation". J. Pelikan, *Kindsein im ersten Wiener Kinderkollektiv*, in: B. Danneberg et al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 334–341, in particular p. 340.

⁴⁴ Cf. S. Dannenberg, *Das bleiche Herz...*, *op. cit.*, Berlin 2006, p. 133ff.

⁴⁵ "The revolution became our religion and our worldviews derived from its dogmas had little chance to grow independently." – "Die Revolution wurde zu unserer Religion, und unsere von ihren Dogmen geleiteten Weltbilder hatten schlechte Chancen, sich eigenständig zu entwickeln." T. Spielhofer, *Ansichten eines Versuchskaninchens*, *op. cit.*, p. 357.

⁴⁶ Dannenberg said in an interview that her novel contains some traces of her own experiences, but underlined that her book was not autobiographical. Cf. S. Dannenberg, „*Ich habe nie geglaubt, dass 68er*

pedagogical practices, but she multiplies generalisations and stunning descriptions of violence, and reinforces various stereotypes concerning the 68ers. It is easy to understand why this controversial novel has widely resonated with the 1968 generation, who have criticised Dannenberg's extremely one-sided perspective.⁴⁷

CRITICISM OF POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL CULTURE

In most publications by 85ers, evaluation of the politicians of the 1968 generation and their political culture does not have so prominent place as the evaluation of their ideology or ideas on the family and upbringing. This confirms Florian Illies' diagnosis that the majority of the 85ers (his Golf generation) have been "politically indifferent".⁴⁸

In this context it is relevant to give some examples from Illies' and Schüle's essays, as they both challenge two actors representing the generation of 1968. One is former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, and the other is Gerhard Schröder. Schröder does not himself identify with the 68ers and is not associated with them as strongly as Fischer is, but as the first leftist Chancellor of Germany after Helmut Kohl (who served as Chancellor for 16 years) Schröder has sometimes been described as a politician from the 1968 generation.

Interestingly, the criticism of these two politicians is not of their particular views or decisions; instead it concentrates on their outward personas and lifestyles. Politically uninterested 85ers judge politicians of the 1968 generation primarily on the basis of their appearance, and accuse them of a lack of substance, criticising their narcissistic appearances on talk shows. In *Generation Golf* Illies openly ridicules the path of the 68ers from rebels to members of the establishment: "The march through the institutions has finally led even the Fischers and Schröders to exclusive menswear boutiques."⁴⁹ Schüle in his essay *Deutschlandvermessung* ("Measurement of Germany") states that: "Schröder, Fischer and Trittin, who were considered symbolic figures of the cultural revolution of the end of the 1960s, have ironically created a Berlin Republic with a culture stripped of revolution."⁵⁰

Antifaschisten waren“, Anna Reiman's interview, 18 November 2004, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/literatur/0,1518,327028,00.html> (accessed 7 November 2018).

⁴⁷ One of Sophie Dannenberg's meetings with readers was described by Jörg Lau. Cf. J. Lau, *Kalte Pose begegnet dem Mythos*, *Die Zeit* 46/2004, https://www.zeit.de/2004/46/KA-Lit_Leb_46 (accessed 7 November 2018).

⁴⁸ "Politisch indifferent". F. Illies, *Generation Golf. Eine Inspektion* (2000), Frankfurt am Main 2001, p. 121.

⁴⁹ "Der Marsch durch die Institutionen hat endlich auch die Fischers und Schröders zum Herrenausstatter geführt." *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ "Schröder, Fischer und Trittin galten als Symbolfiguren der Kulturrevolution in den endsechziger Jahren und schufen, verkehrte Welt, die revolutionslose Kultur der Berliner Republik." C. Schüle, *op. cit.*, p. 71ff.

Schüle in his essay points to contradictions in the biographies of actors from the 1968 generation, but also presents the thesis of a paradigm change to which they have contributed. In his view, when 68ers who questioned traditions, conventions and existing social norms came to power, politics entered its postmodernist stage. Individualism and one's own style became "more important than membership of a particular group".⁵¹ Schüle believes that the new style in politics was embodied by Schröder:

He put public opinion, appearance, and emotions first. He represented de-theorised and ultimately de-politicised politics, and this is why he was a post-modernistic chancellor par excellence. He was the *prima poeta* of politainment and of the open "society of experiences" (*Erlebnisgesellschaft*).⁵²

According to the aforementioned authors, one reason why the 85ers are not interested in political life is the lack of relevant content in politicians' pronouncements. In contrast to the generation of the 68ers, the disillusioned 85ers do not construct their identity referring to political concepts or theories, and this points to an erosion of ideas. The 85ers' lack of faith in the possibility of changing the world contrasts with the 68ers, who believed – following their leader Rudi Dutschke – that history could be created.⁵³ The optimism of the late 1960s vanished when the 68ers came to power. Having betrayed their former ideals, the 68ers deprived the 85ers of any illusions and discouraged most of them from being interested in politics.

POLITICS, HISTORY, COMMUNISM, TERRORISM

In contrast to the majority of authors from the 1985 generation, Bettina Röhl is interested in the role of the 68ers in politics. Röhl in her (auto)biographical publications tries to face up to her parents' involvement in propagating communism, her mother's activities in the RAF (Red Army Faction), and also, in a wider context, the generation of 1968 as a whole. Because of the year of her birth (1962) and her involvement in political and historical polemics, Röhl cannot be regarded as a typical representative of the 1985 generation. Nevertheless, her voice in the debate on the legacy of the 68ers is of special importance. As a daughter of some of the forerunners and main actors in the 1968 generation, she grew up in an environment permeated with ideology and the atmosphere of the late 1960s and the 1970s. Her father Klaus Rainer Röhl was editor-in-chief of the *Konkret* monthly, which was influential in leftist circles.

⁵¹ "[...] wichtiger als die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Milieu". *Ibidem*, p. 72.

⁵² "Er setzte auf Öffentlichkeit, Erscheinung und Emotionalisierung. Er repräsentierte die enttheoretisierte, letztlich entpolitisierte Politik und war deshalb der postmoderne Kanzler schlechthin. Er war der *prima poeta* des Politainments und der offenen Erlebnisgesellschaft." *Ibidem*, p. 73.

⁵³ Cf. R. Dutschke, *Geschichte ist machbar. Texte über das herrschende Falsche und die Radikalität des Friedens*, Berlin 2018.

Her mother, Ulrike Meinhof, was a well-known journalist who engaged in terrorist activity and became one of the leading figures in the RAF.⁵⁴

Bettina Röhl wrote the extensive biography *So macht Kommunismus Spaß! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte KONKRET* ("Making Communism Fun! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl and the Konkret Files"), in which she tries both to work through her family history and to review the history of communism in West Germany. Referring to her parents' life stories, she also pursues the relations between the histories of West Germany and East Germany.⁵⁵ She criticises her mother in relation to, among other things, her journalistic work. Firstly, she criticises her mother's instrumentalisation of the Nazi past for use in the ideological battle against imperialism and capitalism. She accuses her mother of using Eichmann's trial as an instrument for a political attack on the CDU: "Ulrike Meinhof macabrely exploited the Holocaust in her everyday politics, and instrumentalised the genocide to serve her communist class warfare."⁵⁶

Another criticism, addressed not only to her mother, but to all activists of the 1968 generation, concerns their attitude to the Vietnam War, which – in Röhl's view – they did not evaluate correctly. For Bettina Röhl the entire generation of the West German Left is to be blamed for the denial and ignoring of the genocide for which communist militants were responsible. She takes a similar view of the extreme leftists' fascination with Mao Zedong and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. She points to the 68ers' mistaken identification of Maoism with a pop culture revolution, and blames them for their lack of understanding of the essence of criminal ideology.⁵⁷

In both her books and her journalistic publications, Bettina Röhl also addresses the violence and terrorism in which her mother and a part of the 1968 generation were involved. Röhl opposes the mythologisation of the RAF, and objects to the falsification of history, ignoring of victims, and the giving of visibility to terrorists, or even their glorification. She constructs her identity in opposition to her parents and the 68ers. She is very critical of their activities, but at the same time she calls for more objective judgement on history and its actors. Writing about her mother, whom some circles idealised and others unconditionally condemned and demonised, she postu-

⁵⁴ Meinhof was arrested in 1972 and sentenced to prison (Stammheim, Stuttgart) where she committed suicide in 1976. Extreme leftists believed that she was murdered, and this was why she was often referred to as a victim of the authoritarian and criminal state.

⁵⁵ Referring to documented sources (Stasi files, press articles, excerpts from letters) and many eyewitness reports and interviews, she argues that many initiatives directed against the West German government were inspired by the secret services of East Germany, which supported them financially and logistically. In this context mention should be made of the *Kampf dem Atomtod* movement, Röhl's parents' magazine *Konkret*, and the inspiring of attacks on West German politicians.

⁵⁶ "Makaberweise macht Ulrike Meinhof mit dem Holocaust ihre Tagespolitik und instrumentalisiert den Völkermord für ihren kommunistischen Klassenkampf." B. Röhl, *So macht Kommunismus Spaß! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte KONKRET* (2006), Hamburg 2007, p. 350.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 533.

lates the following: “It seems that thirty years after her death, it should be possible to see Ulrike Meinhof appropriately – both as a journalist and as a terrorist.”⁵⁸

COEXISTENCE AND COMPETITION

Not in all publications by authors from the 1985 generation is their criticism unconditional and radical. Florian Illies and Adriano Sack remain ambivalent. In their essays, the 1968 generation is both criticised and admired, if not envied⁵⁹ for its rebellious life stories and material status.⁶⁰ Although they criticise the 68ers, their presentation of intergenerational relations is less brutal than Bessing’s and Dannenberg’s. They highlight the gap between the generations, but also emphasise the similarities between them.

The search for the 85ers’ generational identity is accompanied by problems in making a definite separation from the 1968 generation. In the end a rebellion against the 68ers is found to be impossible, because the parents of the 85ers have already tried all kinds of rebellion⁶¹ and all the old authorities and limitations have been overthrown. Consequently, one does not know against what or whom one should rebel. The only area of conflict and rivalry is one of values and lifestyles, and there the 85ers can at least partly free themselves from the domination of the 68ers. Illies contrasts his generation with that of the 68ers, underlining his generation’s obsession with consumption and brand products. His diagnosis is that the 85ers have (re)turned to conservatism.⁶² However the difference in lifestyles does not result in serious conflicts, because parents are now partners of their children:

How harmonious this relationship [between the generations] is, one can see watching afternoon soap operas. There is an irritating concord between parents and their children. At breakfast, the talk is about taking an anticontraceptive pill and about where the father and son will ride their motorcycles at the weekend.⁶³

Adriano Sack has similar observations. In his satirical essay *Elternabend. Über unsere schwer erziehbaren Mütter und Väter* (“A parents’ evening. About our problem mothers and fathers”) he describes the difficulty his generation has when confronting

⁵⁸ “30 Jahre nach ihrem Tod müßte eigentlich ein angemessener Umgang mit Ulrike Meinhof sowohl als Journalistin als auch Terroristin möglich sein.” *Ibidem*, p. 623.

⁵⁹ Cf. F. Illies, *Generation Golfzwei* (2003), München 2005, p. 205.

⁶⁰ Cf. A. Sack, *Elternabend. Über unsere schwer erziehbaren Mütter und Väter*, München 2004, p. 159.

⁶¹ Cf. F. Illies, *Generation Golfzwei*, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 20.

⁶³ “Wie harmonisch dieses Verhältnis [der Generationen] ist, läßt sich in den täglichen Vorabendserien nachvollziehen. Zwischen Eltern und Kindern herrscht hier irritierende Eintracht, am Frühstückstisch wird über die künftige Einnahme der Pille geredet und darüber, wohin Vater und Sohn am Wochenende mit den Motorrädern fahren.” *Ibidem*, p. 59ff.

his parents' generation as follows: "In short, we have had no enemy."⁶⁴ Sack, like Illies, believes that the outbreak of generational conflict has been impeded by the disappearance of political disputes. He writes that the children of the leftists have no opportunity to rebel on important issues such as "nuclear energy, the arms race, the population census" because their parents would stand by them.⁶⁵ The only sphere of conflict is competition between generations, where the ego of the parents clashes with the ego of their children.⁶⁶

Our parents still feel obliged to be up to date. [...] We secretly compete about who first saw the spectacular settling of scores with the 1968 generation in Denys Arcand's *The Barbarian Invasions*, who has a profound opinion about Michel Houellebecq, and who first chose snowboarding over skiing.⁶⁷

CONCLUSIONS

In most of the publications examined, a negative opinion about the 1968 generation and its legacy prevails. The 68ers are blamed for their egoism, their unconditional drive for self-realisation, and their rejection of the traditional family model. The so-called anti-authoritarian model of upbringing is attacked for being quite the opposite. The generation is also criticised for stripping the world of its metaphysical dimension and depriving its children of a meaning of existence.

The politicians of the 1968 generation are also criticised. The majority of the 85ers are not interested in politics, judge politicians by their outward personas, and accuse them of a lack of substance in their pronouncements. Bettina Röhl is an exception. She explores in depth the involvement of the 68ers in politics, their propagation of communist ideology and their attitude to the Nazi past. Röhl criticises misinterpretations of current and historical events and their exploitation as instruments in political struggle, which cumulated in the formation of terrorist groups and a wave of violence in West Germany in the 1970s.

Illies and Sack offer a different perspective in their essays. Their attitude to the 68ers is ambivalent. In their publications the 68ers are an object of criticism, but also of admiration and sometimes jealousy. The negative assessment concentrates on the values cherished by the 68ers and their lifestyles. At the same time, intergenerational relations are not seen as so clear-cut as they are in other publications. Both authors underline similarities as well as differences.

⁶⁴ "Wir hatten, schlicht gesagt, keinen Gegner." A. Sack, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁶⁵ "Atomkraft, Nachrüstung, Volkszählung". *Ibidem*, p. 107.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 17ff.

⁶⁷ "Unsere Eltern fühlen sich permanent dazu verpflichtet, am Puls der Zeit zu sein. [...] Latent konkurrieren wir darum, wer zuerst die grandiose 68er-Abrechnung Die Invasion der Barbaren von Denys Arcand gesehen, wer eine profunde Meinung über die Qualitäten von Michel Houellebecq hat und wer zuerst von Skiern auf Snowboard umgestiegen ist." *Ibidem*, p. 156.

My analysis of the discussed publications leads to the conclusion that the 85ers criticise the 68ers in an attempt to define their own values and create their own generational identity. The clearly profiled generation of the 68ers provides a opportunity for the 85ers to define themselves by way of contrast. At the same time, most authors strongly overstate the reality and perpetuate stereotypes of the 68ers, which impedes the objectivity of discourse.

The children of the 68ers are almost in their fifties now. Their own children are entering adulthood. What can be said about the grandchildren of the 68ers? What will be the attitude of the youngest generation to the legacy of the rebellious generation of 1968? Will they question the consumerism of the 85ers? How will they refer to the history of the 68ers? Will this third generation get involved in politics and rebel against the present establishment? Will they be able to confront the realities of the digitalised, globalised world? Commentators underline that the problems of today's youth are more complex than those of their grandparents 50 years ago. The reality is less transparent and less univocal, and this makes questioning it more difficult. Is a revolt like that of 1968 still possible? Is the generation of today's students ready to challenge and disobey the authorities on a wide scale?⁶⁸ The question is how the millennials (Generation Y) will relate to the legacy of the 68ers. This question has not yet been answered, but surely there will soon appear new publications and commentaries to stimulate further research on intergenerational interactions.

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Keywords: 1968, generation of '68, generation of '85, generational conflict, Federal Republic of Germany, generational identity

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evaluations of the West German generation of 1968 made by their children, the so-called generation of 1985, in selected literary, (auto)biographical and essayistic texts. It also considers the way in which the 85ers construct their own generational identity.

The main subjects of evaluation are new concepts of the family, anti-authoritarian education, the sexual revolution, ideology, the past, and politics. Most assessments of the 68ers are negative, but there are also some ambiguous and ambivalent evaluations in which the generation of 1968 is not only criticised, but also admired and envied.

The analysis of the texts reveals the multidimensional nature of the problem, and leads to the conclusion that the 85ers, through confrontation with the generation of their parents, are trying to determine their own value system and to create their own generational identity. With its strong identity, the generation of 1968 provides an opportunity for the 85ers to define themselves by way of contrast.

The research perspective presented in this paper refers to the field of generational research (Generationenforschung), and is based on the methods of close reading – focusing on analysis of what is inherent in the text – and wide reading, oriented towards analysis of the historical and cultural aspects represented in the text.

⁶⁸ *Rebellisch oder unpolitisch?*, WDR report by Sabine Jainski and Ilona Kalmbach, 2018.

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THE MANUSCRIPT OF THE LETTER OF THE POLISH BISHOPS TO THE GERMAN BISHOPS COMPOSED BY ARCHBISHOP BOLESŁAW KOMINEK

The history of the *Letter of the Polish Bishops to the German Bishops*, the circumstances of its inception, and its significance for the process of Polish–German reconciliation have been subjects of research for close to 30 years.¹ Scholarly discussion on the subject was initiated in 1990 by Piotr Madajczyk² and Edith Heller.³ Significant later works include a paper by Karl-Joseph Hummel⁴ based largely on the German Church archives; a publication by Robert Żurek, Bazyl Kerski and Tomasz Kycia⁵ placing the *Letter* in the context of actions towards Polish–German reconciliation; works by the present author,⁶ who was the first to give a critical publication of the text, basing it on the typescript signed by the Polish bishops and held at Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln;⁷ the anniversary collection *Pojednanie i polityka* (“Rec-

¹ Works published before 1990 were primarily journalistic analysis and memoirs. See especially: W. Dirks, Die Kirche greift ein. Drei 1965 er Modelle politischer Mahnungen, *Frankfurter Hefie* 1965, no. 12, pp. 819–82; H. Stehle, Der Vatikan und die Oder-Neiße-Grenze, *Europa-Archiv* 1972, no. 16, pp. 559–566; Idem, *Seit 1960: Der mühsame katholische Dialog über die Grenze*, [in:] *Ungewöhnliche Normalisierung. Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Polen*, W. Plum (ed.), Bonn 1984, pp. 155–178.

² P. Madajczyk, Przebaczymy i prosimy o przebaczenie..., *Więź* 1990, no. 9, pp. 112–124; Idem, Annäherung durch Vergebung. Die Botschaft der polnischen Bischöfe an ihre deutschen Brüder im Hirtenamt vom 18. November 1965, *Vierteljahreshfte für Zeitgeschichte* 1992, no. 40, pp. 223–240; Idem, *Na drodze do pojednania. Wokół orędzia biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich z 1965 roku*, Warsaw 1994.

³ E. Heller, Dokument świętej naiwności, *Res Publica* 1990, no. 4, pp. 52–65; Eadem, *Macht Kirche Politik. Der Briefwechsel zwischen den polnischen und deutschen Bischöfen im Jahre 1965*, Mainz 1992.

⁴ K.-J. Hummel, Der Heilige Stuhl, deutsche und polnische Katholiken 1945–1978, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 2005, vol. 45, pp. 165–214 (particularly pp. 195–206).

⁵ B. Kerski, T. Kycia, R. Żurek, „Przebaczymy i prosimy o przebaczenie”. *Orędzie biskupów polskich i odpowiedź niemieckiego episkopatu z 1965 roku. Geneza – kontekst – spuścizna*, Olsztyn 2006.

⁶ W. Kucharski, *Najważniejsze źródła archiwalne w badaniach kulis powstania Orędzia biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich*, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia. Kardynał Bolesław Kominek, prekursor pojednania polsko-niemieckiego*, W. Kucharski, G. Strauchold (eds.), Wrocław 2009, pp. 165–179; *Orędzie biskupów polskich do ich niemieckich braci w chrystusowym urzędzie pasterskim*, by W. Kucharski, linguistic consultation J. Giel, P. Przybylska-Moskwa, [in:] *Ibidem*, pp. 383–430.

⁷ Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln, ref. no. R 32048/65.

conciliation and Politics”)⁸ which described Polish–German conciliatory initiatives in the context of political détente; and a recent work by Severin Gawlitta⁹ based on material held at several German church archives. None of the aforementioned researchers, however, made use of the most important source, namely the original manuscript of the Letter, which until now has remained unknown.

THE FORM, DATE AND ORIGIN OF THE MANUSCRIPT

The manuscript is contained in an unclassified archive of the Polish Papal Church Institute in Rome.¹⁰ This is not the Institute’s official archive as such, but a collection of materials which can be considered as forming a historical archive of the Institute, currently held in its library. These materials are stored in suitable conditions, but are not ordered or classified. It is not clear whether documents were assigned to specific folders by the archive’s founder or at a later date by staff of the Institute. However, the manner of description and the folders used suggest that the documentation was kept by the founder in the same manner as at present, from the 1960s onwards. Years later, no doubt, the folders with historical documentation were placed additionally within ring files and archive boxes. A significant part of the material consists of the correspondence of the long-time rector of the Institute, the prelate Fr. Franciszek Mączyński. At least seven folders contain papers of cardinal Bolesław Kominek. The reason for this is that when visiting Rome, archbishop Kominek always lodged at the Institute, where he had the use of a suitable apartment. It may be presumed that there were certain materials that he did not wish to bring to Poland, particularly after the authorities began a campaign against the bishops in Poland in relation to the letter to the German bishops.¹¹

The manuscript that interests us is stored in a folder marked only with the date “1965” and placed in a ring file labelled “Correspondence”.¹² The folder contains many materials from the fourth period of the Second Vatican Council, authored by archbishop Kominek. These are not paginated. The Letter is found on twenty A4 sheets, written on one side only. (The author manually numbered the sheets at the top from 2 to 20; there is no number on the first sheet.) The author used an ink pen, and

⁸ *Pojednanie i polityka. Polsko-niemieckie inicjatywy pojednania w latach sześćdziesiątych XX wieku a polityka odprężenia*, F. Boll et al. (eds.), Warsaw 2010.

⁹ S. Gawlitta, „*Aus dem Geist des Konzils! Aus der Sorge der Nachbarn!*“. *Der Briefwechsel der polnischen und deutschen Bischöfe von 1965 und seine Kontexte*, Marburg 2016.

¹⁰ The discovery of this previously unknown manuscript was made jointly by myself and Dr Andrzej Jerie, during research at the Polish Papal Church Institute in Rome (hereafter PPIK) on 23 May 2019. The text of the manuscript will be further cited as: B. Kominek, *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, ms.

¹¹ R. Żurek, *Bolesław Kominek – autor orędzia pojednania biskupów polskich*, [in:] *Pojednanie i Polityka...*, p. 62.

¹² PPIK, *Korespondencja*. In 2019 classification work was planned in the PPIK archive, which will undoubtedly lead to changes in the way in which particular items are labelled.

wrote in German using *Kurrent* script, with distinct influences of humanist script. The letters slant uniformly at an angle of approximately 60°. The writing is quite careful and legible.

It is clearly visible that the manuscript was created at a single time, and was later altered on several occasions for style, spelling and content. The main changes of content consisted of the marginal insertion of three substantial passages:

– Darin besteht auch wohl der allertiefste Unterschied zwischen echter christlicher Kulturmission und dem sogenannten, zu Recht verpönten Kolonialismus.¹³

– In den schwersten politischen und geistigen Nöten des Volkes, in seiner jahrhundertelanger Zerissenheit sind die katholische Kirche und die Heilige Jungfrau immer der Rettungsanker und das Symbol der nationalen Einheit des Volkes geblieben, zusammen mit der polnischen Familie. In allen Freiheitskämpfen während der Unterdrückungszeit gingen die Polen mit diesen Symbolen auf die Barrikaden, die weissen Adler auf der einen Seite – die Mutter Gottes auf der anderen. Die Devise war immer: „für Eure und unsere Freiheit“.¹⁴

– Wir sollten einander öfters besuchen um unsere beiderseitige Verhältnisse besser kennen zu lernen. Das alles sind wohl christliche Werke der geistigen Barmherzigkeit, die wir einander schuldig sind – und zwar in aller moderster, ganz aktueller Fassung.¹⁵

It would appear that all of the changes were made not much later than the text was written, possibly within a few hours. They are written with the same pen. Only the first sheet contains small additions and underlinings made in red ballpoint. The text carries the date “Dezember 1965” – this is when the author expects the letter to be sent to the German bishops. This date appears on two newly discovered versions of the text (the handwritten “first draft”, and the typed “second draft” with notes added by hand by Kominek).¹⁶ The date “November” was certainly introduced before 27 October 1965. The manuscript must therefore be dated to before the end of October.¹⁷ Furthermore, comparing the surviving manuscript with the remarks of bishop Kowalski, it should be assumed that it preceded those comments, and is therefore to be dated to before 24 October 1965.¹⁸ The date of composition of the *Letter* may be established more precisely based on two additional sources: an account by Fr. Zdzisław Seremak, and a postcard sent by Kominek to Fr. Franciszek Mączyński. According to Seremak, who served as Kominek’s secretary in Rome, the Wrocław archbishop composed the *Letter* at the house of the Sisters of St. Elizabeth in Fiuggi near Rome.¹⁹ In turn, among

¹³ Cited without marking of deletions and corrections in the manuscript. PPIK, *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, ms., sheet 10.

¹⁴ Ibidem, sheet 17.

¹⁵ Ibidem, sheet 20.

¹⁶ Both versions are contained in the folder marked “1965” kept at PPIK.

¹⁷ *Orędzie biskupów polskich do ich niemieckich braci w chrystusowym urzędzie pasterskim*, by W. Kucharski, linguistic consultation J. Giel, P. Przybylska-Moskwa, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia...*, pp. 385, 386, note 1.

¹⁸ W. Kucharski, *Najważniejsze źródła...*, pp. 172–173, 177.

¹⁹ Enclosure no. 2 “Letter to the episcopate of Germany” to a letter of 14 September 1966 from Maria Winowska to Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, [in:] J. Nowak-Jeziorański, M. Winowska, *Korespondencja 1955-*

the papers of Fr. Mączyński kept at the Diocesan Archive in Włocławek, there is a postcard sent by Kominek from Fiuggi, dated 8 October 1965, in which the sender records that apart from resting he is working a great deal, and requests a car to return him to Rome on 13 October.²⁰ From the account in *Pro memoria* by primate Stefan Wyszyński, we know that Kominek was still in Rome on 5 October;²¹ we also know that he did not attend the meeting of the Polish Council Fathers in Rome on 7 October.²² This evidence implies that the manuscript was composed on some date between 7 October and 13 October 1965.

THE AUTHOR

The author did not sign his name on the manuscript. There is no doubt, however, that it was written by the hand of Bolesław Kominek. We have many samples of the Wrocław archbishop's handwriting, and graphological analysis leaves no doubt in this matter. It should further be noted that the document was located in a folder among other materials belonging to or written by Kominek, some of which carry his signature.

COMPARISON WITH THE FINAL VERSION OF THE LETTER

An analysis was made based on the manuscript, the second draft with handwritten notes added by archbishop Kominek, and the typescript with the signatures of the bishops, kept in Cologne.²³ The text of the manuscript represents 83% of the final text of the Letter. The differences between the two versions are of three kinds: passages in the manuscript which were removed during editing and did not appear in the final version of the document; passages absent from the manuscript which were added in the course of work on the final text; and editorial and language corrections and minor adjustments of content, relating in particular to proper names.

The Letter initially bore the title *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*.²⁴ Already in the second draft

1989, edited and prefaced by A. Nowak, Wrocław 2016, p. 173. On the author of the account contained in Enclosure no. 2 see W. Kucharski, *Oroędzie biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich, podsumowanie badań, nowe ustalenia i perspektywy badawcze* [in print].

²⁰ Diocesan Archive in Włocławek, Papers of Fr. Franciszek Mączyński, ref. no. KsFm 11, Postcard from archbishop Bolesław Kominek to Fr. Franciszek Mączyński, 8 October 1965, sheet 142.

²¹ Warsaw Archdiocesan Archive (AAW), S. Wyszyński, *Pro memoria*, 1965, sheet 174.

²² Document no. 33, [in:] M. Białkowski, *Protokoły konferencji Polskich Ojców Soborowych. Zbiór dokumentów 1962-1965*, Lublin 2009, p. 579.

²³ Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln, ref. no. R 32048/65.

²⁴ PPIK, *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, ms., sheet 1.

the words *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief* (“joint pastoral letter”) were changed to *Botschaft* (“address”).

In the course of editing work, six fairly extensive passages which appeared in the manuscript were removed:

1) Vier Jahre hindurch haben wir mit Euch zusammen im ökumenischen Konzil in Vollsitzungen, in Konzils-Kommissionen und andererseits mit Euch Seite an Seite zusammen gewirkt. Diese vier Jahre gemeinsamer Arbeit, persönlicher Begegnungen und freier Aussprache haben uns Bischöfe beider Länder nähergebracht, vielleicht sogar näher als je zuvor. Gott sei dafür demütig gedankt.²⁵

2) Nach Ansicht eines polnischen Geschichtswissenschaftlers erhielt Mieszko I das Taufsakrament am Karsamstag 966 in Mainz vom damaligen Mainzer Bischof. Diese letztere Tatsache kann jedoch nicht ganz genau bestätigt werden und wird von uns nur mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit angenommen.²⁶

3) Dieses imponierende Staatsgebilde, das von der Lausitz bis zum Bug und von der Ostseeküste bis nach Mähren gereicht hat, kann in erster Linie nur als bewusste Fortführung Karolingisch-ottonischer Überlieferungen im Osten verstanden und gewürdigt werden.²⁷

4) (Die alte römische Handelstrasse [sic] von Rom zum Baltikum reichend führte über Böhmen hunderte von Kilometern über polnische, slawische Westgebiete schon in vorchristlichen Zeiten).²⁸

5) In den obenerwähnten Zeitschrift wird die Teilung Polens folgendermassen beurteilt: „Die entscheidende Belastung im deutsch-polnischen Verhältnis rührt zweifellos aus der massgeblichen Beteiligung Preussens an den polnischen Teilungen her... Diese Aufteilung Polens bildet ein einmaliges Ereignis, ein Unglück und ein Verhängnis für Europa. Sie bedeutet eine tiefe Zäsur in der Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems und für ihre Rechtfertigung von preussischer Seite hat das Argument einer drohenden Annektierung ganz Polens durch Russland vor dem polnischen Urteil niemals Gnade gefunden. Wie sehr dann die preussische Polenpolitik des 19 Jahrhunderts zur Verfestigung dieser antipreussischen und antideutschen Haltung beigetragen hat, braucht nicht mehr wiederholt zu werden“ (Europ. Begegnung, 1965 – 7/8 – s. 419).²⁹

6) Wir sollten einander öfters besuchen um unsere beiderseitige Verhältnisse besser kennen zu lernen. Das alles sind wohl christliche Werke der geistigen Barmherzigkeit, die wir einander schuldig sind – und zwar in aller moderster, ganz aktueller Fassung. Wir müssen wohl Christi allergrösstes Gebot von der Nächstenliebe – und auch seine allerschwierigste Ausgabe, die Feindesliebe – ganz ernst nehmen und es über derzeitig bestehenden politischen Grenzen hinweg einfach versuchen zu vorzuleben. Wer soll es denn sonst tun, wenn nicht wir, Hirten des christlichen *Populus Dei*? Es scheint uns, dass wir es dem Evangelium Christi und eben unserem Volke Gottes als seine Hirten schuldig sind; nennt uns doch der große Völkerapostel einfach *forma gregis*.³⁰

The passages numbered 3, 4, 5 and 6 were deleted by Kominek himself in the second draft of the text.³¹ In addition, in the course of language correction a fairly large number of single words and expressions were removed, although these did not

²⁵ Ibidem, sheet 1

²⁶ Ibidem, sheets 2–3.

²⁷ Ibidem, sheet 5.

²⁸ Ibidem, sheet 7.

²⁹ Ibidem, sheet 15.

³⁰ Ibidem, sheet 20.

³¹ PPIK, *Botschaft der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt, Dezember 1965* [Draft no. 2], typescript, sheets 4, 5, 10, 14. Ibidem, sheet 1.

substantially affect the content of the *Letter*. Passages 1 and 2 were deleted in the third or fourth draft, but before the text was sent to bishop Kowalski for review.

The author of the manuscript made use of two extensive quotations from an article by the German mediaevalist Herbert Ludat (see passages 3 and 5).³² Although this was more a journalistic than a scholarly text, Kominek took a certain inspiration from it. Most of the quotations were nevertheless removed from the final version. It is not currently possible to establish whether the decision to delete these passages was influenced by the critical views expressed by Polish historians concerning some of Ludat's work,³³ or whether it may have been suggested by those whom Kominek consulted regarding the *Letter*.

It should also be noted that in the passage on the German anti-Nazi opposition, among the German hierarchs who had behaved honourably, Kominek initially listed the archbishop of Breslau (Wrocław), cardinal Adolf Bertram.³⁴ His name did not ultimately appear in the *Letter*, although we know that bishop Kazimierz Kowalski proposed that he be included in this passage.³⁵ This passage was deleted by Kominek's hand in the second draft of the text. In turn, also in the second draft, Kominek added by hand the following passage, which would remain part of the document:

Wir haben versucht, uns mit dem gesamten polnischen Gottesvolk auf die Tausendjahrfeier durch die sogenannte große Novenne unter dem hohen Patronat der allerseligsten Jungfrau Maria vorzubereiten. Neun Jahre hindurch (1957-1965) haben wir im Sinne des „per Mariam ad Jesum“ die Kanzel in ganz Polen aber auch die gesamte Seelsorge auf wichtige moderne Seelsorgeprobleme und soziale Aufgaben eingesetzt: Jugendseelsorge, sozialer Aufbau in Gerechtigkeit und Liebe, soziale Gefahren, nationale Gewissensforschung, Ehe und Familienleben, katechetische Aufgaben und ähnliche.

Das ganze gläubige Volk nahm auch geistig regsamsten Anteil am ökumenischen Konzil durch Gebet, Opfer und Bußwerke. Während der Konzilssitzungen fanden jeweils in allen Pfarrgemeinden Bittandachten statt und das heilige Bild der Muttergottes sowie die Beichtstühle und Kommunionbänke in Częstochowa waren wochenlang belagert von Pfarrdelegationen aus ganz Polen, die durch persönliches Opfer und Gebet dem Konzil helfen wollten.

Schließlich haben wir uns in diesem Jahr, dem letzten der großen Novenne, alle der Mutter Gottes geweiht, Bischöfe, Priester, Ordensleute sowie alle Stände unseres gläubigen Volkes. Vor den ungeheuren Gefahren moralischer und sozialer Art, welche die Seele unseres Volkes, aber auch seine biologische Existenz bedrohen, kann uns nur die Hilfe und Gnade unseres Erlösers retten, die wir durch die Vermittlung seiner Mutter, der Allerseligsten Jungfrau, herabflehen wollen. Voll kindlichen

³² H. Ludat, *Deutsch-polnische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, Europäische Begegnung* 1965, no. 7/8, pp. 412–419 (the passages appear on pages 417 and 419).

³³ See e.g. A. Gieysztor, [rev.] Ludat Herbert, *Studien zur Gründungsfrage und zur Entstehung und Wirtschaftsgeschichte seiner schlesisch-polnischen Besitzungen*. Weimar, Böhlau 1942, *Przegląd Historyczny*, vol. 36 (1946), pp. 169–174.

³⁴ PPIK, *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, ms., sheet 19.

³⁵ Letter of 24 October 1965 from Kazimierz Kowalski, bishop of Chełm, to archbishop Bolesław Kominek with remarks on the text of the *Letter* and of a letter to the episcopate of Austria, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia...*, no. 1, p. 217.

Vertrauens werfen wir uns in ihre Arme. Nur so können wir innerlich frei werden als dienende und zugleich freie Kinder - ja sogar als „Sklaven Gottes“ – wie es der h[ei]l[ige] Paulus nennt.

Wir bitten Sie, katholische Hirten des deutschen Volkes, versucht auf Ihre eigene Art und Weise unser christliches Millenium mitzufeiern, sei es durch Gebet, sei es durch einen besonderen Gedenktag. Für jede Geste dieser Art werden wir Ihnen dankbar sein.³⁶

Unfortunately we do not have precise information as to when this passage was inserted. The second draft is unquestionably to be dated to before 24 October 1965, since it still lacks the changes introduced at the suggestion of bishop Kowalski. At the same time, analysing the Chełm bishop's remarks, it can be concluded that it was not the second draft that he reviewed, but a subsequent – third – draft.³⁷ This means that the second draft was written closer to mid-October. The added passage relates chiefly to the “Great Novena”. This implies that its insertion into the *Letter* may have been suggested by primate Stefan Wyszyński. It is known from the primate's diary (*Pro memoria*) that on 15 October, two days after Kominek's return to Rome from Fiuggi, the primate spoke to Maria Winowska concerning remarks on the draft *Letter* to the German bishops “prepared by archbishop Kominek”.³⁸ This is the first mention in the primate's diaries of an individualised millennial letter to the German bishops composed by Kominek. The preliminary assumption may thus be made that the analysis concerned the first version of the text. This would mean that the second draft was produced later than 15 October. This would also be the time at which the aforementioned passage was inserted.

In the manuscript of the *Letter*, toponyms are usually written in German. In the final version, however, proper names are given in Polish, with the German equivalent in parentheses.

Finally, it should be noted that the following, the most famous, passage was already present in the manuscript, and thus formed part of the text from the very start:

In diesem allerchristlichsten und zugleich sehr menschlichen Geist strecken wir unsere Hände zu Euch hin in den Bänken des zu Ende gehenden Konzils, **gewähren Vergebung und bitten um Vergebung** [emphasis added]. Und wenn Ihr Deutsche Bischöfe und Konzilsväter, unsere ausgestreckten Hände brüderlich erfasst, dann erst können wir wohl mit ruhigem Gewissen in Polen auf ganz christliche Art unser Millennium feiern.³⁹

Apart from three minor changes (indicated here by underlining), the above passage remained intact in the final version of the *Letter*.

³⁶ PPIK, *Botschaft der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt, Dezember 1965*, typescript/ms., sheet [13b].

³⁷ The manner of identification of the place in the typescript reviewed by bishop Kowalski indicates that he read a typescript that no longer contained the paragraph from the second page (*Nach Ansicht einer polnischen...*).

³⁸ AAW, S. Wyszyński, *Pro memoria*, 15 October 1965, sheet 182, typescript.

³⁹ PPIK, *Gemeinsamer Hirtenbrief der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, ms., sheet 20.

NEW, OLD HYPOTHESES

The main research problem relating to the circumstances of the inception of the *Letter of the Polish Bishops to the German Bishops* has concerned the authorship of the text, the identity of editors and others who may have had an influence on the final wording, and the nature of that influence. Archbishop Bolesław Kominek has always been considered to be the main initiator of the project. This was even acknowledged by Polish communist leader Władysław Gomułka, when as early as 14 January 1966, in a speech to the Front of National Unity (FJN), he referred to Kominek as the “main author”, “main editor” and “inspirator” of the *Letter*.⁴⁰ In scholarly works also, researchers have essentially been unanimous in recognising Kominek’s authorship. Alongside the Wrocław archbishop, persons mentioned as co-authors, editors and consultees on the text on the Polish side include primate Stefan Wyszyński,⁴¹ archbishop Karol Wojtyła,⁴² and the bishops Kazimierz Kowalski,⁴³ Bernard Czapliński,⁴⁴ Jerzy Stroba and Herbert Bednorz.⁴⁵ The text of the letter is also reported to have been read by Fr. Dr Jan Puzio and the prelate Walerian Meysztcowicz.⁴⁶ Listed on the German side are the bishops Franz Hengsbach of Essen, Otto Spülbeck of Meißen, Joseph Schröffner of Eichstätt and Gerhard Schaffran of Görlitz,⁴⁷ Fr. Alfred Sabisch,⁴⁸ and the journalists Walter Dirks⁴⁹ and Johannes Schauf.⁵⁰

It should be recalled that besides the manuscripts of Bolesław Kominek (the original manuscript of the Letter and the handwritten corrections and notes on the second draft) we have available several more sources concerning alterations made to the text: corrections made by hand on the second draft by a person other than Kominek (I shall further refer to this person as “author A”),⁵¹ a letter of bishop Kowalski,⁵² a typescript

⁴⁰ *List Biskupów*, film directed by M. Bork, 2015, time: 29:00–29:20.

⁴¹ Ewa K. Czaczkowska, *Kardynał Wyszyński. Biografia*, Kraków 2013, p. 538.

⁴² W. Kucharski, *Najważniejsze źródła...*, p. 177.

⁴³ P. Madajczyk, *Na drodze...*, pp. 82–84.

⁴⁴ Ewa K. Czaczkowska, *Kardynał Wyszyński...*, p. 543.

⁴⁵ Enclosure no. 2 “Letter to the episcopate of Germany” to a letter of 14 September 1966 from Maria Winowska to Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, [in:] J. Nowak-Jeziorański, M. Winowska, *Korespondencja 1955-1989*, edited and prefaced by A. Nowak, Wrocław 2016, p. 174.

⁴⁶ W. Kucharski, *Najważniejsze źródła...*, p. 174.

⁴⁷ E. Heller, *Macht Kirche...*, p. 90, cf. S. Gawlitta, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–139.

⁴⁸ »Aus eigenem Entschluss und in eigener Verantwortung... ohne einen Auftrag von irgendeiner Seite«. *Römische Gespräche zwischen Alfred Sabisch und Erzbischof Kominek vor dem Briefwechsel der polnischen und deutschen Bischöfe 1965*, J. Köhler (ed.), *Archiv für schlesische Kirchengeschichte*, vol. 63 (2005), pp. 153–185.

⁴⁹ E. Heller, *Macht Kirche...*, pp. 91–92.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 92.

⁵¹ PPIK, *Botschaft der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt, Dezember 1965*, typescript/ms.

⁵² Letter of 24 October 1965 from Kazimierz Kowalski, bishop of Chełm, to archbishop Bolesław Kominek with remarks on the text of the *Letter* and of a letter to the episcopate of Austria, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia...*, no. 1, pp. 216–219.

of the *Letter* with the German bishops' corrections,⁵³ a letter of bishop Otto Spülbeck with remarks on the text,⁵⁴ and a letter of bishop Franz Hengsbach with suggested changes to the text.⁵⁵

The following table lists the passages which were added or amended in the course of editing work and appear in the final version of the *Letter*, having been absent from archbishop Kominek's manuscripts (the original and his additions to the second draft), together with information on authorship.⁵⁶ It should be pointed out that certain passages from the manuscript were deleted during the editing process. However, if no new text was inserted in their place, it is difficult to establish who is responsible for the deletion.⁵⁷ The table also omits changes of punctuation.

Sheet no. ⁵⁸	Text in Kominek's manuscripts	Text in final version (added parts appear in bold)	Author of change
1	[...] auch mit Hilfe Gottes unsere beiden Völker im einander noch näher bringen.	[...] auch mit Hilfe Gottes unsere beiden Völker im gegenseitigen Dialog einander noch näher bringen	
1	Erzherzog	Herzog	bishop Kowalski
2	Slavenaposteln	christliche apostel	
2	Johannes XIII	Silvester II	
2	Gnesen (Gniezno)	Gniezno (Gnesen)	
2	Gnesen	Gniezno	
2	unverändert wenigstens formell	Weiterhin	German bishops
2	Adalbert (św. Wojciech)	Wojciech-Adalbert	
2	fand	erlitten hatte	bishop Kowalski
2	Wegs	Weges	bishop Kowalski
2	Gnesen	Gniezno	
2	Das sind die geschichtlichen Anfänge des polnischen christlichen Polens	Das sind die geschichtlichen Anfänge des christlichen Polens	German bishops
2	staatlichen Souveränität	staatlichen Einheit	

⁵³ New Documents Archive, Office of Religious Matters (AAN UdsW), ref. no. 78/41, *Botschaft der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, 28 October 1965, sheets 34–43.

⁵⁴ PPIK, 1965, Letter of 27 October 1965 from bishop Otto Spülbeck to archbishop Bolesław Kominek, Rome, unpaginated.

⁵⁵ PPIK, 1965, Letter of 28 October 1965 from bishop Franz Hengsbach to archbishop Bolesław Kominek, Rome, unpaginated.

⁵⁶ I omit misprints and changes of punctuation.

⁵⁷ I do not mark deleted text in the table if it is not known who made the deletion.

⁵⁸ Sheet numbers refer to the final version of the *Letter*, the typescript signed by the Polish bishops. The comparison of the texts is based on the critical edition *Orędzie biskupów polskich do ich niemieckich braci w chrystusowym urzędzie pasterskim*, by W. Kucharski in collaboration with J. Giel, P. Przybylska-Moskwa, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia...*, pp. 383–430.

2/3	Auf diesen Fundamenten christlich, kirchlich, national und staatlich zugleich - wurde durch alle Generationen hindurch weiter ausgebaut von Herrschern, Königen, und Bischöfen und Priestern 1000 Jahre hindurch.	Auf diesen Fundamenten – christlich, kirchlich, national und staatlich zugleich - wurde sie durch alle Generationen weiter ausgebaut von Herrschern, Königen, Bischöfen und Priestern 1000 Jahre hindurch.	
3	polnisch ist gleich katholisch	polnisch ist zugleich katholisch	
3	Aus ihr heraus entstand auch der polnische Religionsstil, in dem seit Anfang an das religiöse mit dem nationalen eng verwoben und verwachsen ist.	Aus ihr heraus entstand auch der polnische Religionsstil, in dem seit Anfang an das religiöse mit dem nationalen eng verwoben und verwachsen ist, mit allen positiven, aber auch negativen Seiten dieses Problems.	
3	Die Legende bringt sein Entstehen mit dem h[ei][igen] Wojciech zusammen, ähnlich wie sie es mit den polnischen weißen Adlern im Nest von Gnesen tut.	Die Tradition bringt sein Entstehen mit dem h[ei][igen] Wojciech zusammen, ähnlich wie die Legende es mit den polnischen weißen Adlern im Nest von Gnesen tut.	bishop Kowalski
3	Volkslegenden	Traditionen und Volkslegenden	bishop Kowalski
3	die das	welche die	author A
4	[...] und durch die bewundernswert geschickte Mieszko I. [...]	[...] und durch die bewundernswert geschickte Politik Mieszko I. [...]	author A
4	Jahrhundert	Jahrhunderten	German bishops
4	[...] brachte im Mittelalter in jeder Hinsicht einen regen [...]	brachte im Mittelalter einen in jeder Hinsicht regen	German bishops
4	—	Anfangs	author A
5	Krakau	Kraków	
5	ungeheure	Große	German bishops
5	riesigen	Großen	German bishops
5	Krakau	Kraków	
5	Veit Stoss aus Nürnberg	Veit Stoss aus Nürnberg (Wit Stwosz)	
5	[...] der sein ganzes Leben [...]	[...] der fast sein ganzes Leben [...]	
5	Krakau	Kraków	
5	[...] seine Werke	seine Werke dort	bishop Spülbeck
5	Krakau	Kraków	
5	großen Wohltäter	Brüder	
5	Kulturträger	Boten der wahren Kultur zu ihnen kamen	bishop Kowalski
6	—	Besonders	author A
6	heilige Hedwig [...]	heilige Hedwig (Jadwiga) [...]	
6	Heinrich des Bärtigen	Heinrich des Bärtigen (Brodaty)	
6	nachmalige Äbtissin	Gründerin	
6	Trebnitz	Trzebnica (Trebnitz)	bishop Hengsbach

6	Nach ihrem Tode und ihrer baldigen Heiligsprechung strömten ohne Unterlaß Scharen des polnischen Volkes zu ihrer Grabstätte in Trzebnica	Nach ihrem Tode und ihrer baldigen Heiligsprechung strömten ohne Unterlaß Scharen des polnischen und deutschen Volkes zu ihrer Grabstätte in Trzebnica	
6	nationalistischen Leuten	nationalistischen Fanatikern	bishop Kowalski
7	saubere	Lautered	bishop Spülbeck
7	saubere	Reine	bishop Spülbeck
7	und diese	; dieser	
7	Adalbert-Wojciech	Wojciech-Adalbert	
7	Bischof Stanislaus von Krakau	Bischof Stanislaus Szczepanowski von Kraków	
7	jähzornigen König Bolesław dem Verwegenen	König Bolesław dem Verwegenen	
7	Krakau	Kraków	
8	St. Wojciech-Kirche (St. Adalbert)	H[ei]l[igen] Wojciech-Kirche (H[ei]l[igen] Adalbert[-Kirche])	
8	Krakau	Kraków	
8	Gnesen	Gniezno	
8	—	und die selige Jolanta	bishop Kowalski
8	Krakau	Kraków	
8	Jesuitennovize	Jesuitennowize	German bishops
8	Krakau	Kraków	
8	St. Andreas Bobola	H[ei]l[ige] Andreas Bobola	
9	20 polnische Kandidaten	30 polnische Kandidaten	
9	Krakau	Kraków	
9	Kasimir dem Großen	Kasimir dem Großen (Kazimierz Wielki)	
9	Krakau	Kraków	
9	Wratislavia, Racibor, Gliwice, Głogów, Nysa, Opole	Wratislavia (Breslau), Racibórz (Ratibor), Gliwice (Gleiwitz), Głogów (Glogau), Nysa (Neisse), Opole (Oppeln)	bishop Hengsbach
9	Nicolaus Copernicus – Polonus	Nicolaus Kopernik (Copernicus)	
9	—	Er studierte in Kraków Astronomie beim Professor Martin Bylica.	author A
9	Unter ihnen befindet sich der berühmte Paulus Włodkovic	Unter ihnen befindet sich auch der berühmte Paulus Włodkovic	author A
10	den Kreuzritterorden	die deutschen Ordensritter, die sogenannten „Kreuzritter“	German bishops
10	Aus den Kreuzrittern	Aus dem Siedlungsgebiet der „Kreuzrittern“	German bishops
10	sind später Preußen entstanden	sind später jene Preußen hervorgegangen	bishop Spülbeck

10	und schließlich Hitler	und schließlich Hitler als Endpunkt	
11	[...] und zweifellos nicht zu Unrecht [...]	[...] und zweifellos nicht ganz zu Unrecht [...]	
11	[...] bis zum äußersten geschwächt begann es wieder unter größten Schwierigkeiten seine neue eigenstaatliche Existenz...	[...] bis zum äußersten geschwächt begann es damals wieder unter größten Schwierigkeiten eine neue eigenstaatliche Existenz...	
11	An die 6 Millionen	Über 6 Millionen	German bishops
11/12	—	Hunderte von Priestern und zehntausende von Zivilpersonen wurden bei Ausbruch des Krieges an Ort und Stelle erschossen (278 Priester in einer einzigen Diözese Kulm). Die Diözese Wloclawek allein verlor im Kriege 48% ihrer Priester, die Diözese Kulm 47%.	bishop Kowalski
12	—	Viele andere waren ausgesiedelt. Alle Mittel- und höheren Schulen waren geschlossen. Die Priesterseminarien waren aufgehoben.	
13	Ist	—	
13	die westliche Oder – Neiße Grenze für Deutschland, wie wir wohl verstehen, eine äußerst bittere Frucht des letzten Massenvernichtungskrieges	die polnische Westgrenze an Oder – und Neiße ist , wie wir wohl verstehen, für Deutschland eine äußerst bittere Frucht des letzten Massenvernichtungskrieges	
13	auf interalliierten Befehl in Potsdam 1945! – geschehen	auf interalliierten Befehl der Siegermächte - Potsdam 1945! – geschehen	bishop Kowalski
13	—	Ein großer Teil der Bevölkerung hatte diese Gebiete aus Furcht vor der russischen Front verlassen und war nach dem Westen geflüchtet.	bishop Kowalski
13	[...] eine Existenzfrage (keine „größerer Lebensraum“ frage) [...]	[...] ist es eine Existenzfrage (keine Frage „größerem Lebensraumes!“) [...]	
13	Und	Aber	
13	Potsdamer Westgebiete	„Postdamer [sic] Westgebiete“	
14	wie apokalyptische Reiter	und zwar hin und zurück wie apokalyptische Reiter	
14	Seuchen und Tod u[nd] Tränen	Seuchen und Tränen, u[nd] Tod	
14	Auch	Eine	bishop Spülbeck
14	Und	wir wissen, daß	
14	(Lichtenberg, Metzger, Klausener und anderen)	(Lichtenberg, Metzger, Klausener und viele andere)	
14	Euch	Ihnen	bishop Kowalski

15	Beichtstühle und Kommunionbänke	Beichtstühle und Kommunionbänke in Częstochowa	
16	Schließlich haben in diesem Jahr [...]	Schließlich haben wir uns in diesem Jahr [...]	
16	—	Sowie	
16	—	Überbringen Sie auch, wir bitten Sie darum, unsere Grüße und Dank den deutschen evangelischen Brüdern, die sich mit uns und mit Ihnen abmühen, Lösungen für unsere Schwierigkeiten zu finden.	
16	Euch	Ihnen	bishop Kowalski
16	Ihr	Sie	
17	Wir Euch dazu herzlichst ein	Wir laden Sie dazu herzlichst nach Polen ein	
17	—	die Regina Mundi und Mater Ecclesiae.	

Among the 94 identified changes to the text, it has not been possible to identify the author of 58 of them. It is possible that some of the changes and additions were made by Bolesław Kominek himself. According to the findings of Edith Heller concerning the work of Walter Dirks on language corrections to the *Letter*,⁵⁹ several of the editorial modifications of an expert linguistic nature can be attributed to him.

Of those 58 changes introduced by an unidentified author, 23 are changes to proper names – chiefly (but not exclusively) toponyms – involving addition of the Polish name or replacement of the German name with a Polish one. It would appear that the author of the changes was a Pole. Most of them were introduced after 28 October – that is, following the corrections made by the German bishops.

In three cases, factual errors made by the manuscript's author were corrected. In the original version the establishment of the archdiocese of Gniezno was wrongly dated to the pontificate of John XIII; in the final text this was corrected to Sylvester II. Saint Hedwig (Jadwiga) of Silesia was wrongly referred to as abbess (*nachmalige Äbtissin*) of the Cistercian convent in Trebnitz (Trzebnica). The duchess was never in fact an abbess, and in the final version she is identified correctly as the founder (*Gründerin*). Also wrongly stated was the number of beatification processes under way at the time of the writing of the *Letter*. The first and third of these changes may be assumed to have been made by a Pole, while the correction concerning Saint Jadwiga may have been made by either a Pole or a German. Given that all of these changes were not introduced until the third or a later draft, this must have taken place later than 15 October. The first two corrections were made before 28 October, as the amended

⁵⁹ E. Heller, *Macht Kirche Politik...*, pp. 91–92; cf. S. Gawlitta, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–160.

text appears in the typescript that was reviewed by the German bishops.⁶⁰ The last correction is made on that typescript. The errors may have been noticed by the auxiliary bishop of Wrocław and church historian professor Wincenty Urban, who was in Rome that October. However, there is no evidence to show that he was among those who read the typescript of the *Letter*.

It can be seen from the table that, apart from the changes proposed by bishop Kowalski, only the sentence relating to the Protestants (*Überbringen Sie auch, wir bitten Sie darum, unsere Grüße und Dank den deutschen evangelischen Brüdern, die sich mit uns und mit Ihnen abmühen, Lösungen für unsere Schwierigkeiten zu finden*) was of major significance for the content of the document. Some light is shed on the authorship of this passage by the account of Fr. Michał Czajkowski, who suggested that it was added by archbishop Kominek himself, despite primate Wyszyński's resistance.⁶¹ This question remains open pending further research.

Another such open question is that of the identity of "author A". That person's proposed insertion relating to the astronomer Marcin Bylica would appear to indicate that it was a Pole, possibly a historian, or a person from Kraków familiar with the history of the Jagiellonian University. It has not been ascertained whether this person might have been, for instance, archbishop Karol Wojtyła, although the handwriting does not appear to be that of the future pope.

The discovery of the manuscript provides an opportunity to re-examine the role of Stefan Wyszyński in the composition of the *Letter*. The primate raised the matter of the *Letter* on three occasions in conversations with Maria Winowska.⁶² Moreover, in *Pro memoria*, he makes several mentions of his discussions with German bishops and of Polish–German relations (on 4 October, 5 October, 3 November, 11 November, 14 November, 17 November, 18 November, 29 November and 1 December).⁶³ Two notes – from 15 and 22 October – directly concern the content of the letter to the German bishops. In the first of these the primate writes: "Dr M. Winowska, editorial matters. Remarks on the draft letter to the German Episcopate. Composed by archbishop Kominek."⁶⁴ This is a somewhat enigmatic record. However, as I noted above, the closeness in time of this note and Kominek's return from Fiuggi, and presumably the making of the second draft of the *Letter*, allows us to hypothesise that the primate's influence was behind the insertion of the passage relating to the Great Novena. The second note states: "M. Winowska – draft of letter to the Episcopate of Germany";

⁶⁰ AAN UdsW, ref. no. 78/41, *Botschaft der polnischen Bischöfe an Ihre deutschen Brüder in Christi Hirtenamt*, 28 October 1965, sheets 34, 37, 38.

⁶¹ Extract from a report by a secret collaborator, pseudonym "Jankowski", on the circumstances of the inception of the *Letter*, 21 March 1967, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia...*, no. 38, p. 295.

⁶² 15 October, 22 October, 11 November: see AAW, S. Wyszyński, *Pro memoria*, 1965, sheets 182, 185, 199, typescript.

⁶³ W. Kucharski, Czy kardynał Stefan Wyszyński był współautorem orędzia do biskupów niemieckich? Uwagi do rozważań Ewy K. Czaczkowskiej, *Przegląd Zachodni* 2017, no. 1, pp. 226–227.

⁶⁴ AAW, S. Wyszyński, *Pro memoria*, 15 October 1965, sheet 182, typescript.

this appears to be linked to the third draft of the *Letter*.⁶⁵ However, there is nothing in the sources to indicate that Wyszyński made any other interventions as regards the text of the *Letter*. From the discovered manuscript it may be assumed that the primate did not raise objections to the idea of the letter or to the conciliatory formula proposed by archbishop Kominek, as Hansjakob Stehle has suggested may have occurred.⁶⁶ Indeed, the best known phrase, and the most controversial for society at the time – “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” – remained unchanged from the first to the final version of the *Letter*.

There is also no support for the suggestion made by some researchers⁶⁷ that a Polish–German committee was formed to edit the text of the *Letter*. There was undoubtedly a working group consisting of Polish and German bishops (called by Kominek a *colloquium charitativum*), overseen by cardinals Wyszyński and Döpfner, and holding discussions on Polish–German relations or a closer relationship between the Churches in Poland and Germany.⁶⁸ The sources indicate that the German bishops were merely informed about the prepared text, and were asked to submit their remarks after it had been written; moreover, their proposed changes were only of a cosmetic nature.

It also appears that we can reject the hypothesis of some researchers that the *Letter* was composed over several months, or even years,⁶⁹ although, as noted by Robert Żurek, its content may undoubtedly have been influenced by the speech to *Pax Christi* that Kominek had prepared five years earlier, since I found a typescript of that speech among the Wrocław archbishop’s working papers at the Polish Papal Church Institute in Rome. Nonetheless, the speech was not quoted directly in the *Letter*. Thus, the similarities with earlier texts indicate only Kominek’s consistent way of thinking about Polish–German relations founded on dialogue. No confirmation is found either for the assertion by Jan Żaryn that the editing of the *Letter* lasted for two years.⁷⁰ Doubt is also cast on the account of Hansjakob Stehle implying that Kominek had been working on the *Letter* since April 1965.⁷¹ The German journalist, writing *post factum*, formulated this suggestion somewhat enigmatically: “Already in April 1965, when I paid Kominek a visit in Rome, he was considering the idea of an initiative of this type.”⁷² Presumably Kominek was thinking about some kind of steps with respect

⁶⁵ Ibidem, 22 October 1965, sheet 185, typescript.

⁶⁶ H. Stehle, La Pologne tourmentée fête millénaire, *Études* 1966, no. 6, p. 792. Cf. B. Kerski, R. Żurek, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–29.

⁶⁷ E. K. Czaczkowska, Rola kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w powstaniu Orędzia biskupów polskich do biskupów niemieckich. Nieznane dokumenty w Archiwum Prymasa Polski, *Przegląd Zachodni* 2016, no. 3, p. 195.

⁶⁸ S. Gawlitta, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–139.

⁶⁹ B. Kerski, R. Żurek, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁷⁰ J. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce (1944–1989)*, Warsaw 2003, p. 235.

⁷¹ H. Stehle, „Versuchen wir zu vergessen”. Warum deutsche Bischöfe nicht gleich in die Hand der Polen einschlugen, *Die Zeit* 1990, no. 46; cf. J. Rydel, Nowe elementy mozaiki. Nieznane niemieckie dokumenty dyplomatyczne o Liście Biskupów z 1965 roku, *Więź* 2011, I, p. 103.

⁷² H. Stehle, *Seit 1960. Der mühsame katholische Dialog über die Grenze*, [in:] *Ungewöhnliche Normalisierung Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Polen*, W. Plum (ed.), Bonn 1984, p. 158.

to the Church in Germany or German society more broadly, but the manuscript proves clearly that the text came into being at one particular moment, in Italy.

The discovered manuscript also allows us to reject the suggestion that the Letter was influenced by the so-called Eastern Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany. There is nothing to support the particularly appealing suggestions of Hansjakob Stehle,⁷³ to which I myself inclined in my previous work,⁷⁴ that archbishop Kominek initially planned to prepare a letter to the Protestants in addition to a somewhat routine invitation to the German Catholic episcopate to attend the millennial celebrations, and that only as a result of discussion with the German Catholic bishops were the two texts combined into one. The *Letter* was in fact intended from the start to be addressed to the Catholic bishops. When it was written, the Wrocław archbishop was not aware of the Eastern Memorandum, and therefore the manuscript makes no mention of the Protestants – that passage was not added until the third or fourth draft, before 28 October 1965.⁷⁵

To sum up: the discovered manuscript proves beyond doubt that the author of the text of the *Letter* was the archbishop of Wrocław, Bolesław Kominek. He wrote the text by hand in German. The source appears to confirm the witness accounts that the text was composed in a short time at the house of the Sisters of St. Elizabeth in Fiuggi between 7 and 13 October 1965. It should also be noted that in subsequent drafts only 17% of the text of the Letter was altered, and most of the changes (amounting to about 10% of the text) were made by Kominek himself. This means that more than 93% of the final version of the *Letter* was written by the hand of archbishop Bolesław Kominek. Significant additional content was proposed by bishop Kazimierz Kowalski. Other changes, including the suggestions of the German bishops, did not have a significant impact on the *Letter's* message. The famous sentence “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” is already present in the first version of the text. The content of the *Letter* may have been influenced by primate Stefan Wyszyński, through a suggestion of the insertion of a passage referring to the period of the Great Novena. That passage was written by archbishop Kominek. I do not rule out the possibility that the primate may have been involved in the formulation of guidelines for the document as a whole; that question requires further research. However, the *Letter* was not influenced by the so-called Eastern Memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany: the document was intended from the very beginning to be addressed to the Catholic bishops in Germany, and the manuscript contains no reference to the German Protestants or to the Memorandum. Further research is needed to identify all of the persons who were consulted on the wording of the *Letter*, to determine the precise form that the consultations with the German bishops took, and to establish which sources inspired the author when composing the text.

⁷³ H. Stehle, *La Pologne tourmentée fête millénaire...*, p. 791; *Dokumenty*, selected and compiled by W. Kucharski, D. Misiejuk, [in:] *Wokół Orędzia...*, no. 35, pp. 289–291.

⁷⁴ W. Kucharski, *Najważniejsze źródła...*, p. 177

⁷⁵ The passage in question appears in the typescript reviewed by the German bishops.

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Keywords: Letter of the Polish bishops to the German bishops, Polish – German reconciliation, archbishop Bolesław Kominek, millennial letters, exchange of letters between Polish and German episcopates

ABSTRACT

The discovery of the manuscript of the 1965 conciliatory Letter of the Polish Bishops to the German Bishops sheds new light on a number of issues related to the circumstances of the composition of what is a fundamental document for Polish–German relations. This article presents the new source and compares it with the final version that was signed by the Polish bishops on 18 November 1965 and conveyed to their German counterparts. Questions relating to the authorship of the text and its inception are re-addressed. The new source enables a re-examination of hypotheses concerning the time and place of composition of the Letter and the extent to which the text was influenced by persons other than archbishop Bolesław Kominek. The author makes a comparative analysis of the original and final texts, and uses methods of source analysis to gain insight into the process of the drafting of the Letter.

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CONTEXTS AND REASONS FOR POST-WAR MIGRATION FROM UPPER SILESIA TO WEST GERMANY AND CHANGES IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF *AUSSIEDLERS* FROM POLAND

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, West Germany was a kind of promised land for many Polish citizens, offering a better life in freedom. This led, in a certain period, to mass emigration to the Federal Republic of Germany. Emigration on the ground of “German descent” was particularly attractive, as this way of legalising one’s stay guaranteed fast German citizenship and support from the West German state in starting a new life.

From the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, emigration to West Germany changed the demographic landscape of Poland, especially in such regions as Upper Silesia, which saw a huge outflow among the native population. At the same time, workers recruited to work in industry came to the Upper Silesian Industrial Region from other parts of Poland. The emigration of native or autochthonous¹ people to West Germany took on dramatic proportions in the second half of the 1980s, when those emigrating were mainly of generations born many years after World War II – relatively young people, often with small children, and also enterprising and resourceful. For them, documents inherited from their ancestors were a ticket to a better, Western world, to prosperity and democracy. Unlike those leaving in earlier years, they usually did not know German, which they started to learn only after arriving in Germany, on language courses organised specially for *Aussiedlers*.

¹ Analysing the statistics on emigration on grounds of “descent”, Jan Korbel notes that: “All tables (...) support the argument that, even if counted with extreme caution and prudence, even if we take into account the mistakes and irregularities during verification, ethnic mobility, family divisions and the so-called re-Germanisation, it must be assumed that at least two-thirds of the total number of people who emigrated from Poland to West Germany for good by the end of the 1960s were people with verified German descent (and from so-called mixed families), including those not necessarily convinced of their Germanness and not always ethnically motivated”(J. Korbel, *Polska – Górny Śląsk – Niemcy. Polityczny bilans 50-lecia Poczdamu*, Opole 1995, p. 32). Bearing this context in mind, it should be assumed that the emigration to Germany in later times also included members of the local population who had inherited the right to German citizenship.

This paper focuses on several aspects – historical, social and political – related to the issue of Polish citizens leaving Upper Silesia and claiming German descent. It is also an attempt at a sociological reconstruction of the *Aussiedlers*' paths to and within Germany from the 1970s onwards.

It should be taken into account that since the exodus² of Polish citizens to the West, especially to the Federal Republic of Germany, both countries have undergone huge transformations. It is therefore interesting how people who emigrated to Germany during the previous regime or just after the watershed of 1989 see the changes in the Federal Republic of Germany, also in relation to the Polish systemic transformation: what were the reasons for their departure, what were their first impressions of Germany, and how do they view their decision to leave from today's perspective?

In this article, I deliberately use the term *Aussiedler* [resettler] rather than “displaced person”, in view of a certain arbitrariness of use of the latter term with regard to people leaving for Germany claiming “German descent”, as in the majority of cases their decision to leave Poland was voluntary. This issue will be discussed in more detail below.

METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

This paper is based on material collected during field research in Germany as part of an individual postdoctoral project “Die Welten der (Spät-)Aussiedler aus Oberschlesien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” carried out at Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main and funded by the DAAD. As part of the project, several dozen interviews were conducted – mainly unstructured interviews with a standardised amount of sought information – with people who emigrated to Germany between 1970 and 2000 and obtained *Aussiedler* status. Besides, the material was supplemented by a number of expert interviews.³ The interviews with the *Aus-*

² The migration in the 1980s, especially to West Germany, was such a significant and socially interesting phenomenon that the German political scholar and columnist Wolf Oschlies published a report on emigration from Poland: *Exodus Poloniae? Polnische Ausreise- und Emigrationsfragen 1980-1982*. He cites opinions that the majority of the applicants for tourist visas were people of “German descent.” The use of the word “exodus”, especially with regard to the emigration of the 1980s, is justified, as evidenced by statistics on migration to various Western European countries and on overseas migration. The data contained in the statistical yearbooks do not give a full picture of migrations, because simply summing the data from individual countries registering immigrants from Poland gives a total that well exceeds the official Polish data. This may be related to the fact that “the official definition of an emigrant used by the Central Statistical Office is a person who has deregistered from his/her permanent address” (K. Iglicka, *Kontrasty migracyjne Polski. Wymiar transatlantycki*, Warsaw 2008, p. 19). At that time many people emigrated illegally, and some did not renounce their Polish citizenship.

³ The expert interviews were conducted with activists of Polish immigrant community organisations in Germany, activists of organisations of Lower and Upper Silesians, German officials, former employees of the transit camps in Friedland and Unna Massen, social workers of the time, representatives of social and cultural life dealing in their activities (including artistic work) with the *Aussiedler* question, priests serving in the Polish Catholic Missions in Germany and representatives of the German Catholic Church, as well as German politicians associated with the Federation of Expellees. The interviews were

siedlers were conducted in Hessen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate.

The respondents were purposefully selected, and originated from different social and professional groups. Among them were both classic “winners” of migration processes and people who can be classified as “losers”. Obviously, this type of categorisation may be considered controversial. The Upper Silesians with whom I spoke placed themselves into various identity categories – some claimed a strong German identity, others a regional Silesian identity or a Polish identity, while in some cases there was no clear self-classification, or else the “European” category was chosen. In addition, they were involved in social and organisational activities (Polish, Silesian or German) to different extents, with the majority of them being uninvolved or “invisible”.⁴

The research focused mainly on Upper Silesian people living in Germany, as it was from this region that most Polish citizens emigrated on the ground of German descent. However, as they themselves admit in the interviews, in most cases they were considered by the Germans to be “Poles” or people “from Poland”. Of course, it should be remembered that Upper Silesians living in Germany often distance themselves from both the Germans and the German “Polish immigrant community”. They also immerse themselves in their ethnic and regional identity, which is safe in the event of identity problems, because it allows them to combine Polishness and Germanness. But first and foremost, the group is heterogeneous in terms of their identity, family history and main reasons for emigration.

German statistics and various compilations based on them⁵ clearly show that since the 1950s, the highest percentage of people emigrating to Germany have been Upper Silesians coming from the provinces of Katowice and Opole. Between 1971 and 1975, this group accounted for 51.2% of those leaving Poland, while between 1976 and 1979 their number increased to 71.9%. In 1980–1985, about 60% of migrants in this category came from Upper Silesia.⁶ The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s saw a record number of people leaving for Germany, and in this case too it should be

supplemented by participant observation: at the 2nd Congress of Polish Organisations in Germany, held in Düsseldorf in October 2014, the Congress of Silesian Compatriots in Hannover in June 2015, the formal gala of the Polish immigrant community during the presentation of the annual Polish community prize “Polonicus” in Aachen, a visit of the former Unna Massen workers to the former camp for *Aussiedlers*, a visit to the camp in Friedland, Polish religious services, and an *Aussiedlers*’ pilgrimage from the Diocese of Essen to Kevelaer in May 2015. During all of the meetings, I held conversations with participants and documented them – hence the significant number of interviews and discussions. The selection of experts was also aimed at gathering as much material and as many opinions as possible on how Upper Silesians are perceived in Germany, and explaining various complexities.

⁴ Peter Oliver Loew, author of a book about Poles in Germany, titled it *Wir Unsichtbaren. Geschichte der Polen in Deutschland* (“We the invisible. The history of Poles in Germany”) München 2014. However, as the author points out, this term was first used in relation to Poles in Adam Soboczyński’s 2006 article “Wir Unsichtbaren” published in *Die Zeit*. The issue of the “invisibility” of Poles in Germany was also commented on in a humorous and idiosyncratic way by Adam Gusowski and Piotr Mordel in their book *Der Club der polnischen Versager*.

⁵ J. Korbel, *Polska – Górny Śląsk – Niemcy. Polityczny bilans 50-lecia Poczdamu*, Opole 1995.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

assumed that the majority of them were Upper Silesians. In total, in the analysed period, over a million Polish citizens, mostly from Upper Silesia, left Poland claiming “German descent”. This is confirmed by, for example, reports and articles about *Aussiedlers* published in the German press, as well as research on the *Aussiedlers* from Poland.

Table 1
Poles who emigrated claiming “German descent”

Year	Total number of <i>Aussiedlers</i>	<i>Aussiedlers</i> from Poland	% of <i>Aussiedlers</i> from Poland	Year	Total number of <i>Aussiedlers</i>	<i>Aussiedlers</i> from Poland	% of <i>Aussiedlers</i> from Poland
1970	18,590	5,624	30.2	1985	38,968	22,075	56.6
1971	33,272	25,241	75.9	1986	42,788	27,188	63.5
1972	23,580	13,476	57.1	1987	78,523	48,419	61.6
1973	22,732	8,902	39.2	1988	202,673	140,226	69.2
1974	24,315	7,825	32.2	1989	377,055	250,340	66.4
1975	19,327	7,040	36.4	1990	397,073	133,872	33.7
1976	44,248	29,366	66.4	1991	221,995	40,131	18.0
1977	54,169	32,861	60.7	1992	230,565	17,749	7.7
1978	58,062	36,102	62.2	1993	218,888	5,431	2.5
1979	54,809	36,274	66.2	1994	222,591	2,440	1.1
1980	51,984	26,637	51.2	1995	217,898	1,677	0.8
1981	69,336	50,983	73.5	1996	177,751	1,175	0.7
1982	47,993	30,355	63.2	1997	134,419	687	0.5
1983	37,925	19,122	50.4	1998	103,080	488	0.5
1984	36,459	17,455	47.9	1999	104,916	428	0.4

Source: author’s own compilation based on: W. Arnold (ed.), *Die Aussiedler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Forschungen der AWR Deutsche Sektion. Part 1: Herkunft, Ausreise, Aufnahme*, Vienna 1985, p. 41; J. Korbel, *Polska – Górny Śląsk – Niemcy. Polityczny bilans 50-lecia Poczdamu*, Opole 1995, p. 39; A. Trzcielińska-Polus, „Wysiedleńcy” z Polski w Republice Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1980–1990, Opole 1997, p. 41; S. Worbs, E. Bund, M. Kohls, C. Babka von Gostomski, *(Spät-)Aussiedler in Deutschland. Eine Analyse aktueller Daten und Forschungsergebnisse*, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2013, pp. 31–32.

THE UPPER SILESIAN CORNER⁷ AND BIG POLITICS

Upper Silesia is a region which in the past used to be a classic example of a cultural border region.⁸ Although nowadays its ethnic character has changed, its former

⁷ In 1934, referring to the historian Ezechiel Zivier, Emil Szramek wrote of the geographical location of Upper Silesia: “Geographically speaking, Silesia is a kind of corner and for centuries it has shared the fate of all corners, that is, they are hit and bumped into. And each collision and pressure causes a movement that is either external, that is, a change in position, or an internal, heat-generating movement that either binds or blows something up” (E. Szramek, *Śląsk jako problem socjologiczny*, Katowice 1934, p. 24).

⁸ As a border region, Upper Silesia was a topic discussed by Paweł Rybicki and Józef Chlebowczyk, whose works are already among the classic treatises on Upper Silesia. The type of borderland that Upper

changing state affiliation has left its mark. The cultural difference between the former Austrian part and what became (after the Silesian wars) the Prussian part of the region remains visible. Polish, Czech, Austrian and Prussian influences are noticeable in its culture and architecture, customs and place names. Thus, these influences affect both the identity of the inhabitants of the region and their collective memory. This is important especially with regard to the former Prussian Upper Silesia, because those Upper Silesians who emigrated to Germany highlight the dual Upper Silesian soul, which places them somewhere between Poles and Germans. As one of the interviewees remarked:

(...) I would say this about myself, my mother taught me discipline, accuracy and reliability, and my father taught me imagination, and so colloquially speaking, a Pole sits on a horse with a sabre, “hurrah” [he laughs] but not a German, a German is thorough, slow but accurate. I on the other hand am in between, I have both this and that (...). I have noticed a lot of things here that I knew in my childhood, but which only started to make sense here, my mother instilled some things in me but I didn’t understand that: what for, when something else was going on around?⁹

The interviews also reveal other small but significant differences between those who emigrated from the eastern part of Upper Silesia, which belonged to Poland in the interwar period, and those who had been born in the areas which were incorporated into Poland after World War II.

The “corner” location – to use the evocative metaphor popularised by Emil Szramek in his classic dissertation from 1934, *Śląsk jako problem socjologiczny* (“Silesia as a sociological problem”) – combined with German citizenship law meant that many native Upper Silesians were still entitled to German citizenship many years after the war, inheriting it from their ancestors. This was not the first time that big politics had entered the lives of the inhabitants of the region and determined their fate. However, on both sides of the former border, it affected their lives most painfully during World War II, when the *Deutsche Volksliste* (the German People’s List) and the compulsory service of young men in the *Wehrmacht* were introduced in the territories incorporated into the Reich.¹⁰ The next generations, born after the war, would benefit

Silesia represented was defined by Chlebowczyk as contact borderlands, “areas of coexistence of linguistic and ethnic groups with a clear separate identity” (J. Chlebowczyk, *O prawie do bytu małych i młodych narodów. Kwestia narodowa i procesy narodotwórcze we wschodniej Europie środkowej w dobie kapitalizmu (od schyłku XVII do początków XX w.)*, Warsaw–Cracow 1983, p. 30).

⁹ Interview conducted on 1 February 2015 and 1 March 2015 in F.; the respondent left Poland in 1991.

¹⁰ The situation of the Upper Silesians during World War II and the problems related to the registering on the German national list and the service of men in *Wehrmacht* uniforms is best illustrated by the then popular verse: “If you don’t sign it up, it’s your fault, because they’re gonna send you to Auschwitz, and if you sign it up, you old donkey, Hitler will send you to the *Ostfront*” (quoted after R. Kaczmarek, *Górny Śląsk podczas II wojny światowej*, Katowice 2006, p. 186). On the other hand, Aleksandra Kunce, in discussing that period, states that: “an important moment on the map of the Silesian past is the time of World War II, the so-called ‘za Niyemca’ period (the German times). This is a bad time regardless of the national option chosen. For it forces people to make unambiguous national and religious declarations, it leads to the closing of the family within their own home and adoption of an attitude of vigilance against

from the collective citizenship, the *Volksliste*, or military ID of that time to gain the possibility of emigrating to the West.

The post-war history of the region is closely tied to the dramatic consequences of the “liberation” by the Red Army, the deportation of labourers to the East, and verification and rehabilitation of the native population. It was also a time of displacement of the German population and German Upper Silesians. A common theme in the family stories of the interviewees from that period is that of waiting. Waiting for husbands, fathers, brothers who, as *Wehrmacht* soldiers, had not yet returned from the war or post-war exile. It was also a struggle to be able to stay in the land of their fathers, at home. There is also the theme of returns – to the homeland after the evacuation, hoping to meet loved ones who had not yet returned from the front:

(...) the war is almost over, the enemy from the East is attacking, I mean the “liberator of Poland”, and those there get an order to leave, whole villages must leave – as it was colloquially said – before the front, and they had to retreat, so this Krzanowice was evacuated to Bavaria, these people had a gathering point, this logistics in Czechowice-Dziedzice, from there by trains to the West, (...) these German authorities tell those ... exiles or whatever you call them, that they can stay here [in Bavaria – author’s note], but they can also go back, so my cousins, my grandmother’s aunts, that they are going back, that their husbands are waiting, but nobody was waiting there (...) ¹¹

It was also a time of waiting for men who had been deported to the East. One of the most dramatic memories from that period is that of an elderly couple, especially the man, whose father had been deported to the East on Ash Wednesday of 1945. But waiting did not always mean pain. One of the interviewees, who studied at a teacher’s college and was evacuated with the entire school, returned home to Gliwice after having been separated from his family during the war:

(...) everyone had to go on their own, as they liquidated everything, everyone chose how they wanted to go. I went to Jelenia Góra [he laughs] and then these people were evacuated by the Red Cross. I got to Czechoslovakia (...) first I worked for a farmer, but the farmer had to flee Czechoslovakia (...) and then there was a *Lager*, then the Americans came, the army. They said that we would go back home, to Gliwice in Silesia. There were more people, so I joined them and got into the carriage, the train (...) but then they handed us over to the Russians, and from the *Lager*, I worked for the farmer there but then I wanted to go home, it was already 1946, so I got to the Polish Consulate and then I got to Poland. ¹²

The respondent did not speak Polish but, as he said: “we had to know the Lord’s Prayer” and say that “we want to go to holy Poland”.

the enemy – often a neighbour they know. Like no other period, this period – marked by family separation, uncertainty – is bad for everyone. It is a burden because it forces people to fight against their neighbours, it is marked with the death of both. Despite the differences in the assessment of economic conditions (some were better and some worse off), despite the difference in the assessment of individual contributions to military activity, this time is judged similarly” (A. Kunce, *Śląskie okno, Śląsk*, 11/2000, p. 18).

¹¹ Interview conducted on 4 November 2014 in O., departure in 1990, born 1954.

¹² Interview conducted on 1 May 2015, departure in 1979, born 1929.

(...) and then I had to go home on my own, at night I went home (...) I came home but the gate was closed, I had to jump over the fence, I knocked, my father came, “who’s there?” I said [the name is given – author’s note], no. Then they were surprised that I was walking just like that at night because there were various bands, but luckily I got home.¹³

At first, the interviewee’s father did not recognise his son after a few years of separation and called out to his wife: “come here, someone here says that he is [the name is given – author’s note].”

Some people, especially those identifying as German, felt that it was not they who had left Germany, but that it was the German state that had abandoned them. It was a kind of post-war migration while still living in the same place. As one of the interviewees noted:

(...) I was born in the same house as my mother. My mother was born in Germany and I was born in Poland.¹⁴

As described by the interviewees and confirmed by scholarly studies, the Polish–German border itself did not seem certain:

The Federal Republic of Germany (...) disavowed the relevant decisions of the Potsdam Agreement, taking the position that as *res inter alios gesta*, this agreement was not in fact binding on Germany. That state assumed (...) that the new western Polish border was only a provisional one until the conclusion of a peace treaty with a united Germany. This reservation regarding the peace treaty (...) was also taken to mean that the German Reich formally still existed within the borders of 31 December 1937, that is from the period before the beginning of the Nazi annexations and conquests. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany considered itself to be identical or at least partially identical with the Reich thus understood.¹⁵

The same is reflected in the statement of one of the elderly interviewees, whose family did not want to leave for Germany just after the war:

(...) my grandfather, who is such a Pole, you know, he said, he’s got a roof over his head here and is not going anywhere, and some said “we will stay here because they will all come back” and indeed, even those people from the East (...) moved into the houses, they said “we are not doing anything here because we don’t know whether they will come back or not.”¹⁶

One of the most important events in post-war Polish–German relations was the signing of a normalisation treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Polish People’s Republic. The document, regulating – among others – the issue of the Polish–German border, was initialled by the two countries’ foreign ministers in

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Interview conducted on 28 May 2015, departure in 1981, born 1957.

¹⁵ L. Janicki, Podstawy prawne stosunków Polski ze zjednoczonymi Niemcami, *Przegląd Zachodni*, 16/1992, p. 11.

¹⁶ Interview conducted on 1 May 2015 in D., departure in 1979, born 1934.

November 1970. It was signed in December of the same year by Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz and Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt. Another important document was the “Protocol Record” of 9 October 1975, signed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Poland, Stefan Olszowski, and German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, which entered into force in 1976. This document provided that Poland consented to the emigration of 120–125 thousand people to Germany in the next four years.¹⁷

The signing of the normalisation treaty and subsequent agreements had a significant impact on the demographic structure of Upper Silesia and Germany. In the case of Poland, it meant the loss of relatively young citizens who, if not yet college graduates, had completed secondary and vocational education, and were thus needed for the development of the economy of the time. On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Germany gained citizens of working age, while incurring practically no costs of educating them.¹⁸ Besides, the average age of the *Aussiedlers* was lower than that of citizens of West Germany at that time, because many of them came with children.¹⁹ Of course, at first, the German state incurred costs related to social assistance, language courses and welfare benefits, but in the end these were outweighed by the profit gained. This situation was reflected in the views of leading German politicians of that period.²⁰

In this context, not only political issues – the link between economic and humanitarian matters, and a kind of trade: Upper Silesians for marks²¹ – are interesting, but also legal ones, because according to the then interpretation “no one has lost the rights that they were entitled to under the binding West German laws (e.g. citizenship)”.²² As a consequence, after 1970 and especially after the Helsinki arrangements of 1975, there was a significant increase in the number of people leaving for Germany compared with previous years. Many of those who left would later receive future generations of Upper Silesians, who thanks to their family ties would legalise their stay in Germany. Therefore, it is reasonable to discuss emigration from Upper Silesia in terms of a chain migration. German authors²³ have pointed out that the

¹⁷ Cf. Z. Łempiński, *RFN wobec problemów ludnościowych w stosunkach z Polską (1970-1985)*, Katowice 1987, pp. 288-289.

¹⁸ Cf. A. Trzcielińska-Polus, „Wysiedleńcy” z Polski w Republice Federalnej Niemiec w latach 1980-1990, Opole 1997, pp.63-67.

¹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-31.

²⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-77.

²¹ The Helsinki conference arrangements would be another turning point. Helmut Schmidt, in his book *Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn*, quotes a statement by Edward Gierek that the Silesians change their nationality depending on the economic situation – when the Poles do well, Silesians are Poles; when the Germans do well, they are Germans (H. Schmidt, *op.cit.*, p. 481). The context of this statement is also important – a private conversation between two politicians on a night walk during a break in the negotiations between the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany at the conference in Helsinki in 1975.

²² D. Bingen, *Polityka Republiki Bońskiej wobec Polski*, Cracow 1997, p. 136.

²³ S. Stępień, *Jugendliche Umsiedler aus Schlesien. Eine empirische Untersuchung über Konsequenzen der Wanderung*, Weinheim–Basel 1981.

people who contributed to the migration chain were those family members who had left for Germany just after the war. Undoubtedly, however, the migration chain was most influenced by departures and migration networks that formed after the signing of the normalisation treaty. This topic is also discussed by the interviewees. Usually, the interviewees were going “to someone” who already lived in West Germany, and themselves would often support those who came later – usually family, but sometimes friends. This – according to one of the interviewees, a Polish priest in ministry – distinguishes that migration:

(...) This is the difference that I told you is what makes Silesians different from others, first their parents or one parent or grandparents came here, and then they brought young people to live here. As for the other Poles, the opposite is true: first the young leave and then they bring older ones to live here, their parents or even grandparents (...) this is how I see it and understand from talking to people.²⁴

The younger generation, born in the People’s Republic of Poland and brought up in an atmosphere of suspension, felt the painful impact that the possibility of emigration had on family life. As one of the interviewees noted:

(...) I was born in Gliwice in 1964. I was brought up in the familoks [multi-family houses]. (...) In our times there was no value at all, absolute discomfort, a toilet on the staircase, no gas, no heating (...) My mother wanted to move into an apartment block very much, but my father kept going to the *Reich*. When I was seven, I knew three words in German: *Antrag*, *Absage*, *Widerruf* [she laughs] and so my whole life passed in three stages, my father kept applying to be allowed to emigrate to Germany permanently, and he was refused (...) nothing could be planned. All my mother’s plans were thwarted.²⁵

People often applied over many years, and it happened that each time their applications were rejected. Consent to leave was often given when the interviewees were near retirement age or their children were, for example, just about to take their secondary school leaving examination. This caused further complications and was the cause of drama after their dream arrival in Germany. It happened that consent was never given, which is why a large number of people chose the “illegal” route by buying a guided tour, visiting relatives and friends, obtaining tourist and transit visas, and then legalising their stay in one of the transit camps in Germany.

AUSSIEDLER MEANING WHO?

Bearing in mind the complexities of the history of Upper Silesia and the legal problems, the question arises: Who are the *Aussiedlers*? For the first time, the term *Aussiedler* or “displaced person” officially appeared in German legislation in 1957 in

²⁴ Interview conducted on 16 February 2015 with a Polish priest serving in Germany.

²⁵ Interview conducted on 17 November 2014 in K., departure in 1981, born 1964.

a law on expellees, as a term describing an independent group which had previously been neither mentioned nor named, but fell into the category of “expellees”.²⁶ Two important legal provisions applied to Polish citizens: the first, contained in Article 116 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, granting the right to German citizenship to those (and their descendants) born in territories belonging to Germany before 1 January 1938, and the second recognising the citizenship the Third Reich had granted during World War II.²⁷ Those who lived in the parts of Upper Silesia that had belonged to Germany in the interwar period usually emigrated under Article 116, while those born in the eastern part of Upper Silesia that had belonged to Poland took advantage of the citizenship granted to them or their ancestors during the war.

Polish citizens emigrated to Germany both legally and illegally. In the former case, they applied for permission to leave the country; in the latter they went to Germany because they had an invitation or tourist or transit visas, or had purchased a foreign guided tour. This kind of departure was kept secret even from their closest family. Those who emigrated in the 1990s, after the borders had been opened, did so quite openly, without concealing their destination from their families or anyone else. The manner and time of departure are of great importance in the case of the Upper Silesians living in Germany today. Some differences between those leaving in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s can be discerned. The majority of people who emigrated in the 1970s with their entire families on the basis of an application for permission to leave came from the part of Upper Silesia which had not belonged to Poland until 1945. Later emigrants, who had lived longer in Poland, more often left having obtained a tourist visa or an invitation, although there are some exceptions in these cases as well.

People who came to Germany and registered as *Aussiedlers* were offered more help than other immigrant groups. This meant that such departures became more and more popular in due course. There were even special publications for *Aussiedlers*: guides and information brochures published in West Germany. There was also a Pol-

²⁶ G. Weber, A. Nassehi, R. Weber-Schlenker, O. Sill, G. Kneer, G. Nollmann, L. Saake, *Emigration der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Studien zu Ost-West-Wanderung im 20. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 2002, p. 160.

²⁷ Tadeusz Folek provides the following interpretation of the German legal regulations: “There is no concept and institution of ‘West German citizenship’ in the Federal Republic of Germany, but only ‘German citizenship’ in the sense of continuing ‘general German citizenship’” (Folek, 1987, p. 189). The status of the German borders is taken to be as of 31 December 1937, but those who became citizens of the Third Reich through registration on the DVL are also included. This is something of a paradox, in that this is a Nazi law that is still in force. As Folek notes, for many *Aussiedlers* this is a law allowing them to “leap into the free world” (Folek, 1987, p. 190). He describes the position as follows. The Third Reich declared only military surrender, not the liquidation of the state. Thus, general German citizenship still exists, so citizens of the Third Reich and their descendants are entitled to German citizenship. It is assumed that all those applying for such citizenship are Germans. Moreover, declarations submitted after the war are not relevant. Another paradox is that according to the People’s Republic of Poland, acts of granting of citizenship in the time of the Third Reich were unlawful and therefore invalid, but the state allowed its citizens to leave for Germany with a travel document according to which they could be stated not to be Poles. Cf. T. Folek, *Prawo azylu i dziedziczenie obywatelstwa niemieckiego. Przepisy ustawowe wraz z komentarzem według stanu prawnego na dzień 1 maja 1987*, Cologne 1987, p. 193.

ish response to the demand for information regarding the legalisation of residence in West Germany. Tadeusz Folek wrote a series of guides (updated whenever the law was amended) containing German citizenship regulations and interpretation of German law. He also published – despite the reservations he had²⁸ – information about the possibility of legalising one's residence based on "German papers".

In a monumental work devoted to *Aussiedlers* from Transylvania, German scholars note that they were Germans in legal terms but foreigners in cultural terms.²⁹ A similar remark can be found in a book by Peter Olivier Loew, who places *Aussiedlers* from Poland in the category of Poles living in Germany.³⁰ On the other hand, in the first sentence of the foreword to the book *Aussiedler. Die Voraussetzungen für die Anerkennung als Vertriebener. Arbeitshandbuch für Behörden, Gerichte und Verbände* published in 1988, Ernst Liesner states that "the *Aussiedlers* are Germans".³¹ He also says that their reason for going to Germany is discrimination in their place of origin, a feeling of isolation, and hence the desire to leave to be able to live like Germans among Germans.³² This way of portraying the *Aussiedlers* was common in official German publications.

On the other hand, Aleksandra Trzcielińska-Polus says of the term *Aussiedler*:

[It] was coined immediately after the end of World War II to describe the German population subject to forced displacement from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to Germany, as agreed at the Potsdam Conference. It is still used today, although the nature of the departures of the people it refers to has changed dramatically.³³

However, what is the most important issue here, arousing some controversy and having a negative impact on the perception of this group in Poland, is the fact that, under the law, the *Aussiedlers* are "expellees". Therefore, it is assumed that their departure was not voluntary.³⁴ The fact of being expelled, not only under the law but also

²⁸ T. Folek, *Pobyt cudzoziemców, azyl polityczny, obywatelstwo, adopcja w Republice Federalnej Niemiec. Vademecum Prawne cudzoziemca w RFN*, Cologne 1985, p. 5.

²⁹ G. Weber et al., *op. cit.*, p. 120.

³⁰ As Peter Oliver Loew points out: "the group of displaced and late displaced people from Poland is, despite all the common features, extremely heterogeneous: some have assimilated completely, while others have not done so at all and, as they approach retirement, are thinking about returning to Poland. Between these extremes, a whole range of intermediate, dual and hybrid identities can be found. This is particularly true of the Upper Silesians, who, after moving to Germany, quite often retained their specific regional features (and their language, a dialect of Polish), thus cultivating an identity that is neither Polish nor German" (P. Loew, *op. cit.*, p. 214).

³¹ E. Liesner, *Aussiedler. Die Voraussetzungen für die Anerkennung als Vertriebener. Arbeitshandbuch für Behörden, Gerichte und Verbände*, Bonn 1988, p. 3.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³³ A. Trzcielińska-Polus, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³⁴ Dariusz Niedźwiecki quotes a typology of forced migration proposed by Krystyna Kersten. It includes, in this order, expulsion, displacement, deportation and resettlement. "Expulsion (...) refers to a migration process whose sole perpetrator is the expelling party with the purpose of removing a specific individual or social group from a given area. In the case of displacement, we deal with a planned action

formally, is emphasised by the authors of the study devoted to the Transylvanian *Aussiedlers*.³⁵ Since the 1970s the term *Spätaussiedler*, meaning “later displaced person”, has been used. However, this term officially began to be used after the change in the law and refers to people who emigrated after 1993.³⁶

To describe the *Aussiedlers* as “resettled persons” – such formulations can also be found in the literature on the subject³⁷ – would be more appropriate, because in the case of resettlement “apart from a resettlement institution, implementing some sort of a plan for the relocation of the population, also the people changing their place of residence actively participate in the process. So this is the process of a partly voluntary change of place of residence. In other words, you can resettle, not just be resettled.”³⁸ In this sense, Upper Silesians would be “resettled persons”, but in the majority of cases we are not dealing with classic resettlement. Moreover, it can hardly be called an organised action when the departure was prepared in secret and effected using a tourist visa.

THE REICH MYTH AND REASONS FOR RECLAIMING GERMAN CITIZENSHIP BY DESCENT

When discussing the reasons for the mass emigration of Upper Silesians to West Germany, many factors should be taken into account, as it was a combination of economic, political, identity and family motivations that caused such a large outflow of the native population from Upper Silesia. Also, one should mention the attitude of the Polish authorities towards national and ethnic minorities³⁹ and a common feeling among Upper Silesians that they were treated as second-class citizens. Compared with immigrants to Upper Silesia from other regions of Poland, they lived in worse conditions – they were not given preferential housing, at work they were overlooked for promotion, and they suffered discrimination because of the dialect and language they used.

It should be stressed that migrations from Upper Silesian were chain migrations. This migration chain was reinforced by letters from those who had left earlier, parcels sent by them, or the exchange rate of the mark against the Polish zloty. The country

aimed at a certain community, while the displaced party plays a passive role in the process, being subject to direct coercion by the displacing parties” (D. Niedźwiecki, *Migracje i tożsamość. Od teorii do analizy przypadku*, Cracow 2010, p. 24). On the other hand, deportation – as opposed to displacement – may also apply to individuals, and the place of deportation is strictly defined (cf. *ibid.*, p. 24).

³⁵ G. Weber et al., *op. cit.*, p. 160.

³⁶ Cf. P. Loew, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

³⁷ S. Stepień, *Jugendliche Umsiedler aus Schlesien...*, B. Hager, *Probleme soziokultureller und gesellschaftlicher Integration junger Migranten dargestellt am Beispiel der oberschlesischen Übersiedler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Dortmund 1980.

³⁸ D. Niedźwiecki, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

³⁹ S. Łodziński, *Równość i różnica. Mniejszości narodowe w porządku demokratycznym w Polsce po 1989 roku*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2005.

itself made an impression on those coming to Germany to visit. Undoubtedly, for the interviewees from the generation who left in the 1970s, their German descent was often a decisive factor. However, this strong identity overlapped with the economic, professional or housing situation in the region of their origin. Then, various family situations made up what I have described as “painful memory”.⁴⁰ All of this can be analysed in terms of “bad faith”, a term proposed by Jean-Paul Sartre and used by Peter Berger to discuss social roles. This bad faith, as Berger writes, “is to pretend that something is necessary that in fact is voluntary.”⁴¹ All the push and pull factors that make one feel that the best solution is to go to Germany accumulate in this bad faith.

Even then the myth of the *Reich* or the Golden West was dominant, as seen in the story of a confectioner who ran his own bakery and confectionery in Poland, and now for several decades has been doing the same in Germany:

(...) those were the days when people fled to Germany. In 1976, you know, I had had my own business for two years, in 1974, so it happened that Germany impressed me (...) We were on holiday in Poland: me, my wife and our small child, I drove to Międzyzdroje to spend my holidays there and we, two families, stayed in a caravan. A German came in a car with a big caravan and I liked that because we, two families were squeezed in such a small shed [he laughs] and we both “OK, woman, we’re getting the heck out of here” [he laughs] (...) I got the papers and I left right away, and it worked out, everything’s been fine since then. (...) I had never been to Germany and I thought that the grass was made of gold here [he laughs], that gold fell from the sky, but my eyes have opened (...) that’s right, it’s cool, you know, the only thing you need is a lot of money and then it’s cool everywhere. Now it is fine all over the world, once people had money, but you couldn’t buy anything in Poland, and now it’s the other way round, there’s no money, and you can buy anything [he laughs].⁴²

Although it took place in the 1970s when most emigration was done legally, this departure was illegal – being based on a tourist visa to Italy. Another interviewee, a doctor, also left for Germany illegally in the 1970s. This is what she says about her first impressions, back in 1963, and in her account one can find an element of “bad faith”:

My parents left in 1959, more or less, I visited them twice, my father was seriously ill, that’s why they came here. He regained his strength and then, in 1971, my husband and I decided to come here (...) that inability to go anywhere or pursue a professional or academic career. We really only wanted to come here, complete a specialist training programme and go back, but then... the martial law. (...) I was enchanted, especially as it was the south where I went, Lake Constance, a beautiful area, everything so clean [she draws out the vowels], so polished, the cars so nice. I know nothing about cars but even the petrol smelled different. When I saw women scrubbing the pavement in front of their houses, I was completely dumbfounded, although it is also done in Silesia (...) My husband said, he didn’t come until 1971, that when he saw how many kinds of bread, cheese and sausages were offered in shops, he was staggered, he stood with his brother-in-law and looked and said “will

⁴⁰ J. Kijonka, Górnośląska rodzina i dom – przestrzenie pamięci i zapomnienia, *Pedagogika Społeczna*, 1/2016.

⁴¹ P. L. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*, Carden City, New York 1963 (polskie tłumaczenie *Zaproszenie do socjologii*, Warsaw 2000, p. 135).

⁴² Interview conducted on 6 December 2014, departure in 1976 at the age of 24.

we be able to try everything at least once in our lives?" I didn't because such things did not appeal to me, but the possibility itself. (...) Me and my mum, we went to the market and there were bananas, so big! There were no bananas in Poland back then and it was all so nice, so clean, and these people were so kind. At that time, the atmosphere in Poland was horrible, no one greeted anyone, everyone was so sad, grey and no one smiled, and suddenly they greet each other here. I didn't know if they knew each other, "good morning, good morning". Everywhere, full of these flowers, it is really beautiful there, they plant these flowers everywhere. It was September, and these apples so big and fruit orchards wherever you went. Then our neighbour took us to Switzerland, the same there, Austria so beautiful, I went by train, people were kind, nice, I was enchanted.⁴³

Admiration associated with the first visits to Germany, and the impression made by the order and wealth, are common experiences of my interviewees. However, the trip to Germany itself is not an easy "rite of passage". Crossing the border between East and West Germany was a unique experience. The recollections of this experience are often accompanied by expressions using colours – from a grey, dark reality to a colourful world illuminated at night. Children's first impressions are also noteworthy:

(...) We had family in Germany. They left Poland just after the war and went to Germany (...) they kept in touch with us, we got parcels in Poland, I always knew there was something else out there [he laughs] besides grey communist Poland (...) my parents always wanted to leave, but they didn't get *Zusage*. (...) and then in 1985 we went to Germany for the first time. I must say that I liked it very much because we only visited amusement parks [he laughs] I thought that the reality was like that, with amusement parks (...) I brought back coloured pencils and erasers that were unknown in Poland. I gave them away in class, I shared them with my classmates, friends (...), and in 1987 it was so that we wanted to leave for good, my parents asked my brother and me if we wanted to leave (...) he wanted to and so did I because I liked it there, there wasn't much deliberation because the world appeared so colourful there [he sighs].⁴⁴

Another interviewee gave the following account:

I would like to tell you about a circumstance where I felt that I was in a completely different world (...) as we crossed the GDR border. The GDR was like a ghost state, nothing was going on there, there were no people, no movement, nothing. We waited all night at the border on a sidetrack. (...) We crossed the East German–West German border, there were a lot of cars, it was amazing! I couldn't believe that there can be so many cars in one place in the world. We drove next to Wolfsburg, these must have been Volkswagen's car parks, it might be the reason why I remember it. And my father "yeah, you're gonna see what nice things they have here." All the time, he and mum wanted to comfort us by saying that it is great here and everything is the best. These were the beginnings, those camps, it was horrible, how unkind the officials were. At least my dad spoke German, but there were displaced people who did not speak German at all although they had German papers (...) the Germans could not understand that: "how can it be that you come here as Germans and you can't speak German?"⁴⁵

⁴³ Interview conducted on 4 May 2015 in W., departure in 1971, born 1940.

⁴⁴ Interview conducted on 4 December 2014 in W., departure in 1987.

⁴⁵ Interview conducted on 17 November 2014 in K., departure in 1981, born 1964.

The first impression fades quickly and is replaced by a difficult start in Germany. In the case of the family of the first interviewee quoted above, there is even a desire to return to Poland, but there is nothing to return to. Proverbial bridges had been burned, the flat given up. The German reality turned out to be more difficult than expected. Life also brought an unknown experience to the interviewee's parents – that of being unemployed. He had an opportunity to attend a language course at a boarding school, but when he finally started attending school, he was not accepted as German by his peers. In the case of the second interviewee, who had come to Germany as a teenager, the German course itself, which was part of an innovative programme where young people without disabilities lived together with their mentally handicapped peers, turned out to be a difficult experience.

The beginnings in Germany involved going through many formal procedures, not always pleasant and easy, even if you were staying with your family. Migration put those ties to the test very painfully. Being put up by the family was a traumatic experience for the interviewees, who had often left their flats or even houses in Poland. Relatives soon ceased to be so hospitable, and even if the interviewees got a temporary flat (waiting for a permanent flat could take years), especially at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s the conditions were makeshift. It was not uncommon for the whole family to live in one room and share a kitchen and the bathroom with several other people or families. It also happened, as in the case of a couple I interviewed, that one large room was divided by curtains and wardrobes and used as a flat for two families. How this period was remembered varies and depends on the interviewee, the expectations with which she or he came to Germany, and even the age at which she or he decided to emigrate. There are those – and they are the majority – for whom it was a traumatic period, and they are reluctant to talk about it. Some got to know their friends in those difficult times. According to the interviewees, the most difficult conditions prevailed after the reunification of Germany, when, as they admit, there were too many people who needed help. Besides, changes in the law in the 1990s also made it difficult to start a new life in Germany.

Regardless of how this period is assessed in retrospect and what course life in Germany later took, it is remembered in the accounts as a difficult time. It can be summarised in the words of one of the interviewees:

(...) If someone told me to do what I did again, I wouldn't do it, no. At the moment I recall it with a cool mind, but I don't know if anyone would do that again (...) coming here. One *Lager*, then another one, such a small flat, Jesus Christ, it was horrible! These are things I will never forget. I don't talk about it just like that, on a daily basis (...) I wouldn't do it again (...) it was horrible. I have no one to whom I could say "come here, it's great here", no one!⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Interview conducted on 22 May 2015 in F., departure in 1988, born 1948.

The interviewee touches upon an important topic here: letters and persuasion of friends to emigrate to Germany or legalise their stay in Germany. Parcels, and the creation of a certain image, played an important role:

Husband: We sent large parcels to the family, we had not tried kiwi yet but we packed parcels weighing 40 kilograms for our parents.

Wife: The first parcels really did weigh 40–50 kilograms, we bought anything to send our parents, and a car from Silesia used to come and collect these parcels every week. We used to send three parcels: to his sister, who had four children, to my parents and my husband's parents, and then when my parents came here, the situation changed and we sent two parcels [she laughs] and we really did it regularly, because we wanted to help, and finally, after two years we got a flat.⁴⁷

This, however, often added to the disappointment upon arrival:

(...) One thing was written in the letters and then something else actually happened, help was no longer offered though it was declared, you had to fend for yourself, and besides, relationships in my family were kind of twisted and rough, I'm talking about my distant family, even though today my parents are still alive, by the way, my father is 90, born in 1924 and my mother in 1932, they are separated... Well, and my marriage also fell apart for one reason or another, and I live alone.⁴⁸

It was not only the first encounter with the officials and poor housing conditions in temporary flats that were difficult, but above all the experience of unemployment and degradation. While doctors and engineers did well, lawyers and teachers could not find jobs in their professions. In addition, Germany, especially by the 1980s, was a computerised country, and despite their technical education, many people could not find jobs corresponding to their professions. A comparison between jobs in Poland, better ones through being behind a desk, and physical labour in Germany is a common theme in the interviews. In such a situation, even if someone found a job relevant to their profession, it meant commuting a long distance or even spending only weekends at home. The difficult situation was aggravated by the fact that in most cases, by definition the decision to emigrate to Germany meant leaving Poland for good, and returning home was not possible. The period of adaptation lasted up to several years, and as one of the interviewees noted:

(...) it may have been only initially for a year or two, I also know people who could not withstand the pressure, also in my family, my cousin who had dreamed of going to Germany, and she did, but unfortunately she did not settle in here and after a month's stay in a camp she could not stand it anymore: "what am I going to do here? I've got a house there and I have to start from scratch here?" and she went back, there were those who could not stand the transition, the transition period, but if someone decided, it usually was, transitional periods are known to be difficult everywhere, these official matters, for example, German officials had the upper hand, they were dominant, it was the same, as I remember when we queued for passports, there the clerk was God, nobody had anything to say.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Interview conducted on 25 March 2015 in K., departure in 1989, born 1951 (husband) and 1957 (wife).

⁴⁸ Interview conducted on 4 November 2014 in O., departure in 1990, born 1954.

⁴⁹ Interview conducted on 3 November 2014 in E., departure in 1997, born 1968.

Emigration was often the cause of human drama. It was linked to – in the case of illegal departures when only one person in the family left – the separation of spouses, which often resulted in divorce. On the other hand, for children who stayed in Poland as a kind of “deposit”, the separation from their parents was a painful experience, because even if they managed to leave with the help of the Red Cross, they would be leaving their safe, familiar world to join parents who, after a year or even several years, had become strangers to them.

WITH HINDSIGHT

Despite the difficult beginnings, most of my respondents got on with their family and professional lives. Certainly, often the struggle against reality, working to furnish a long-awaited but empty flat as soon as possible, contributed to the breakdown of families. For the generations who remembered pre-war Germany, being seen as foreigners was a painful experience. Despite their German identity, they were treated as Poles by their neighbours and colleagues. Moreover, as Weronika Grabe pointed out in a publication titled *Upper Silesian “resettlers” in Germany*:

German culture, despite being cultivated in their families to some extent, was alien to them because at that time West German society had already experienced a cultural revolution associated with the turning towards the West, towards American models in particular, and the customs fostered in Silesian homes seemed archaic in this context, often associated by the young generation of West Germans with the war years. Different life preferences for patterns of behaviour, ideals, the role of the family and religion made the newcomers different from their West German fellow citizens.⁵⁰

Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that one of the interviewees remarked that she was glad that they had emigrated so late when her son was already an adult and her daughter almost of age, because she had already acquired behavioural patterns different from those of German youths. Another interviewee noted:

(...) like my cousin who had waited 18 years to leave, he was 48 when he arrived [in 1989 – author’s note] and what could he do here? He worked at a Mercedes in Düsseldorf alongside the Turks, who were at home here. This man is disappointed to this day because the Germany he dreamed of did not exist, it was the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, which changed drastically after 1968, and people in Poland did not want to see that it was a completely different country (...) these people were terribly disappointed.⁵¹

The following years brought even greater changes in Germany. Today, this is a different country than the one my interviewees emigrated to. When they left they did not know German and learned it on special courses. More often than not they put all their

⁵⁰ W. Grabe, *Górnśląscy „przesiedleńcy” w Niemczech*, in: A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schulz (eds.), *Być Polakiem w Niemczech*, Poznań 2000, p. 235.

⁵¹ Interview conducted on 23 April 2015 in E., departure in 1981.

energy into adjusting to the people around them as much as possible, which resulted in their children not knowing or having only a passive knowledge of the Polish language. Some admitted in the interviews that just after their arrival, not knowing German yet, they had whispered among themselves in Polish, afraid to use that language openly. At present, they feel somewhat bitter, because later *Aussiedlers* came from the former USSR, and migrants from Africa and Asia came to Germany, and above all the number of Turks increased; and all of them, or people with a so-called migrant background, were not ashamed of their languages, they spoke aloud in public places. Obviously, we are dealing here with a feeling of superiority over other – non-European – immigrants. An illustration of this is given by one answer to the question of how the country has changed while the interviewee has been living in Germany:

(...) Soooo much, oh my! How it has changed! (...) these officials do not understand the problem; they will never assimilate. We Poles assimilate in different countries (...) anyway, they do not want to assimilate here. German people had *Wohlstand* in the 1970s and nowadays, day after day their situation is getting worse, it ruins them and we can see it all. But we Poles lived under communism and we managed to learn how to deal with many difficult matters (...) we wouldn't have achieved anything if we hadn't saved, we can do that. It's different now, the famous *Ordnung muss sein*, it's history now, I liked it when we talked about offices and stuff like that, it was all so organised and it is getting worse now.⁵²

And the respondent's wife adds:

(...) in Germany, everything was done by word of honour. If I told a clerk something was the case, the clerk believed me (...) as more people from all over the world started to come here and they are coming in large numbers from various parts of the world, the more they learned through experience, they felt that they were being regularly cheated. At the moment, it does not work like that anymore, the regulations have changed, there many more inspections and rightly so because there are many sly dogs who use every opportunity. There are also a lot of sly dogs from Poland who cheat, trick others as much as they can, use the German regulations to their advantage, just like Turks, Arabs, Russians, all nationalities milk the Germans.⁵³

This is an exceptionally sharp but honest answer. However, such opinions are quite common. There is another important issue emphasised here – the wealth of Germany as a state. Besides, some people still talk about the so-called *Begrüßungsgeld* as evidence of Germany's prosperity and openness to foreigners. The German mark is often regarded by the respondents as a strong currency for which you could buy more both in Germany and in Poland:

(...) at Aldi, for example, for 100 marks you had to take another trolley, and today I can carry 100 euros' worth in one bag.⁵⁴

⁵² Interview conducted on 2 March 2015 in F., wife's departure in 1983, her husband joined her after eight months.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Interview conducted on 30 April 2015 in F., departure in 1990, born 1952 (husband), 1954 (wife).

And the respondent's wife adds:

(...) well, when we came here twenty or so years ago, life was so much easier. They had everything here, you could pay for anything... I mean, anything you needed to get by. And so once a month, my family and I could afford to go out somewhere and eat something, and when my husband started working, we went to a Greek restaurant once a week.⁵⁵

Another couple commented on the current situation in Germany:

Wife: They've got poorer.

Husband: It seems to me that they are getting poorer, anyway, all Europe is getting poorer.

Wife: It used to be cleaner, there was better order, there were no empty shops, it has changed a lot!

Husband: Poverty is swamping the whole of Europe, not only Germany.

Wife: And terribly dirty.⁵⁶

At the same time, Poland also saw enormous economic and political changes. Slowly, my respondents began to revert to using Polish in public places, also because the image of Poland in Germany had changed. The change began, as the interviewees note, just before Poland joined the European Union. Then the young generation, born in Germany, or "brought" to Germany by their parents, began to regret not knowing Polish. Their Polish descent, after years of jokes about Poles, was no longer concealed. Due to the changes in Poland, as time went by, the gifts that they used to bring to Poland were no longer attractive. The following conversations show some of the ideas that had grown up around those who left for Germany and their wealth. One of the couples I who spoke to note that:

Wife: We always had to give, we had to bring something. There was always a comment when we visited Poland: "well, she came with only a bar of chocolate." I don't really like visiting Poland, because we have quite a lot of friends and you need to bring something for everyone and they have children, now the children are grown up but there are grandchildren and again you need to bring something for them. You cannot come empty-handed, think about everyone, pack (...) this is the age-old problem of everybody here, they are still dissatisfied and you did your best, really (...).

Husband: The point is that they used to be happy with these gifts, because they couldn't get anything in Poland, and now they can have anything they want and here, for example, we wear second-hand clothes on one occasion or another, but if you bring second-hand but good clothes for them, they feel offended. But it is not that we bring worn-out clothes.⁵⁷

Another couple comment:

Husband: This process began in the mid-1990s, German goods were known in Poland, those from Aldi: "don't bring that".

⁵⁵ Interview conducted on 18 April 2015 in K., departure in 1990.

⁵⁶ Interview conducted on 9 March 2015 in S., departure in 1989 to stay with family who had emigrated in 1978.

⁵⁷ Interview conducted on 2 March 2015 in F., wife's departure in 1983, her husband joined her after eight months.

Wife: I use washing powder from Aldi and they want Persil or Ariel in Poland. I use cream from Aldi and his mother wants me to bring her L'Oreal (...) it annoys me, I don't buy it for myself. I've found goods from Aldi to be just as good but for less money.⁵⁸

Many interviewees point out that family and friends who stayed in Poland were not even aware of how economical and modest a life they had to live to be able to afford certain goods or – as in the case of children – branded products that would allow them to function without inhibitions among their peers.

It is worth emphasising that despite some criticism of the Federal Republic of Germany, difficulties with acculturation and problems in professional and private life, in the case of health problems, illness or disability, medical care is of a higher standard and more accessible to patients. Some owe their lives to emigration.

(...) but I have to say that when it comes to health or something, medicine and all that, I am happy to be here. This saved my life, I have [a pacemaker – author's note], which I got immediately, while in Poland I heard that you had to wait, and in my situation, my heart would have stopped (...) but technology and medicine, all that is more advanced than in Poland, I hear from my friends that they waited for this or that. I got it the next day (...) medicine and medication are better (...) our mother would certainly not have lived to 95 in Poland with her lungs, her asthma problems, certainly she would not, here she has the equipment (...) she gets everything.⁵⁹

Moreover, they all emphasise that the prospect of retiring in Germany looks much more attractive due to the healthcare there. Thus, even if someone has returned to Poland, they are still registered in Germany and adopt a strategy of regular trips between the two countries. This compensates for their feeling bad in the new homeland due to a fall in the social hierarchy.

CONCLUSION

The emigration of many Polish citizens was related to legal measures adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany and arrangements made at the highest levels of government. Although the way in which Poles left aroused moral objections and was criticised in Poland, the normalisation treaty and subsequent liberalisation of regulations concerning the granting by the Polish authorities of permission to emigrate, and the availability of passports which facilitated illegal emigration, provided many with the easiest way of getting out of the People's Republic of Poland. However, to make such departures possible, a suitable political atmosphere was needed in both countries, but above all in Germany at the time:

(...) I came to Germany, I got German papers although I didn't speak German and yet I got the papers. It was a political decision. Such was the atmosphere in Germany then that those who iden-

⁵⁸ Interview conducted on 30 April 2015 in F., departure in 1990.

⁵⁹ Interview conducted on 9 March 2015 in S., departure in 1978.

tify with their origin, let's accept them, let's give them money. I got 100 euros... marks as greeting money, *Begrüßungsgeld* as it was called, because that was the political climate then. They wanted to accept all those who were eager to come to Germany. It stopped with the unification of Germany, but that's how it was then. I even think the term *Spätaussiedler* was coined for the needs of this political climate.⁶⁰

This, however, as the interviewee remarks, has changed:

The climate of such economic hospitality has deteriorated, what the Germans call the *Willkommenskultur*, that is, open arms, come, we welcome you, help you to get started, the benefits are quite generous, abundant and they will allow you to start a new life. I actually benefited from it myself, but it has changed. The jobs market has become much more difficult, the benefits are lower and the opportunities to start a new life are worse than they used to be years ago. And on the other hand, because of my profession, I know that this is related to EU regulations.⁶¹

For many arrivals, coming face to face with the country that they knew only from stories, letters or short visits was a difficult experience. In turn, the encounter between people with Polish roots living in Germany and the *Aussiedlers* also led to surprise. This issue was discussed by one of the interviewees who was brought up by his father – a displaced person himself – as a Pole, and who, because he knew Polish, made extra money teaching German to the *Aussiedlers*. It came as a shock to him that so many years after the war, people were coming to Germany presenting such documents as military ID or *Volkslisten*, with all their associated symbolism.

Undoubtedly, the influx of so many “German foreigners” was a logistical, social and economic challenge for West Germany. The actions taken by that country at that time provide an important experience which may help to handle challenges related to, for example, the refugee crisis, despite the fact that, as one of the workers in a camp for the resettlers said with disarming sincerity, the forms of integration of *Aussiedlers*, especially young people, were associated with various pedagogical concepts that were popular at that time.

Today it is difficult to reconstruct the full path the *Aussiedlers* had to travel. However, there are still publications in the libraries describing social and integration programmes – for example, through sports activities. This is an important lesson for today's Germany, because immigrants from Poland were one of the fastest integrating or even assimilating groups. This was undoubtedly influenced by cultural proximity and the involvement of many institutions, including the Catholic Church – but this is a topic for a separate study. The fact that Upper Silesians nevertheless tend to distance themselves from the German community may be an important lesson for the Federal Republic of Germany, because they are critical of the state, and – often working in the broad field of medical care – they express opinions that are sometimes very bitter towards that community.

⁶⁰ Interview conducted on 10 March 2015 in K., departure in 1981, born 1956.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

This example of migration is also important for yet another reason – it shows what influence politicians' decisions have on social and demographic developments in the long term. In this case, it was a mass exodus of people from Poland to Germany, which affected the social structure of both countries. Upper Silesians now living in Germany emigrated for various reasons. The main cause mentioned in the interviews was usually “lack of one thing or another” or an intricate and complicated situation in their place of origin. As one of the interviewees noted – if I had felt good, I wouldn't have left. Did the emigrants get what they had expected when leaving Poland? There is no single answer to this question. It is certain that they now live in a different country from the one they were leaving for, and the country from which they emigrated is now also completely different.

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Keywords: sociology of migration, *Aussiedler*, Federal Republic of Germany, Upper Silesia, Polish diaspora

ABSTRACT

This article aims to present the problems of emigration from Poland to Germany from a historical perspective and in the context of changes that have taken place in both countries. It presents the opinions of people who emigrated to West Germany and obtained Aussiedler status about the changes that have taken place in Germany since they decided to emigrate there from Poland.

The main issue presented in the article is the experiences and views of the individuals in this group, the reasons for their migration, their first encounter with the Federal Republic of Germany, and their opinions about their decision to migrate. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the opportunity to emigrate from the People's Republic of Poland to West Germany was the dream of many Polish citizens. Such migration was accompanied by great expectations and hopes, which were not fulfilled in the case of all migrants. As in every migration process, there have been winners and losers. The reality of German capitalism, language barriers and unemployment were the most frequent problems encountered by the immigrants.

The paper was written using various qualitative research methods, especially interviews with people who migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany between 1970 and 2000 and obtained Aussiedler status there. This migration has not yet been the subject of an in-depth study in Poland.

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IMPLANTING MEMORIES OF MIGRATION: A CONCEPTUALISATION AND THE EXAMPLE OF THE EMIGRATION MUSEUM IN GDYNIA

INTRODUCTION

Emigration, as a social phenomenon, has always existed. The list of reasons for peoples to migrate is a finite one, and has been relatively well described by the contemporary social sciences and humanities. These matters are, by the nature of things, somewhat unoriginal (being frequently taken up), but at the same time discursively attractive. For this last reason at least, the phenomenon of emigration is a favourable subject for narrative construction,¹ as we have sufficient knowledge about it, and speak of it every day. With time, however, observations on the subject of migrants take on the attributes of stereotypes (simplifying, explaining the unknown) or the status of social facts (enabling people to believe that others think similarly as they do), and come to resemble a building material for group identity.

Migration narratives and knowledge about emigration evolve – to a greater or lesser extent (the degree of creativity is probably gradable here) – in the environment of human memory. Poznań sociologist Marian Golka writes that: “Memory – both individual and social – is a kind of conversation with the past. Every community, in order to endure, must conduct that conversation.”² This necessity is not as old as the phenomenon of horizontal human mobility itself. It can rather be linked to the phenomenon of the

¹ Cf. E. Jaźwińska, W. Łukowski, M. Okólski, Przyczyny i konsekwencje emigracji z Polski, *Prace migracyjne* no. 7, 1997; P. Kaczmarczyk, M. Okólski, *International migration in Central and Eastern Europe – current and future trends*, conference paper: United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/events/pdf/expert/8/P12_Kaczmarczyk&Okolski.pdf; M. Okólski, Europe in movement: migration from/to Central and Eastern Europe, *CMR Working Papers* no. 222/80, 2007; I. Grabowska-Lusińska, M. Okólski, *Emigracja ostatnia?*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2009; M. Nowak, Polska migracja: motywy mobilności, jej dynamika i propozycja socjologicznej rekonceptualizacji, *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny* vol. 3, 2014; M. Jaroszewicz, M. Lesińska, *Forecasting migration between the EU, V4 and Eastern Europe: Impact of visa abolition*, OSW Report 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/migration_report_0.pdf; J. Wołkonowski, Przyczyny i struktura emigracji obywateli Polski po akcesji do UE, *Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu* no. 401, 2015.

² M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2009, p. 7.

18th- and 19th-century state, and more precisely to the emergent idea of a public – construed narrowly or more broadly – and the need for a clear message that will integrate the social masses. It can be further stated that, from the point of view of those masses, or of individual citizens, such a message may have lesser or greater significance (no doubt dependent on their level of self-awareness). It has a much more fundamental significance, however, for the management of the state organisation. A contemporary example may be the attitude to emigration expressed by the authoritarian states of “people’s democracy” before 1989. Not only was emigration a cause of shame (it exposed the dysfunctionality of the system), but it was also restricted by all available means (as is well illustrated by the ideological meaning of the Berlin Wall). The other side of the coin is represented by the publicly perceived mass presence of migrants in the contemporary United Kingdom, which has proved able to trigger social tensions and take on the form of “moral panic” – collective and public reaction, agitation or fear (as evidenced in the arguments made in the context of the Brexit referendum).³

Given the public and social contexts, the topic mentioned in the title of this paper – the implantation of memories of migration – may be expanded to include issues of functionalist thinking (answers to questions of whether a particular fact of emigration reinforces or undermines the cohesion of the community, etc.) and didacticism. After all, migration memory is transferred from generation to generation, contemporarily not just in the form of individuals’ recollections about the travels of their parents or grandparents (or artifacts left by them), but more and more often in the form of a structured and institutionalised message, which may be the subject of public debate.⁴ According to Golka (and in line with classical views such as those of Jan Assmann,⁵ and also with those of contemporary researchers from the Institute for Western Affairs, such as Anna Wolff-Powęska⁶), social memory is not merely a fact or a reduplicated record of experience, but also a construct.⁷

³ Cf. A. Rzepnikowska, Racism and xenophobia experienced by Polish migrants in the UK before and after Brexit vote, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2018.

⁴ The same Marian Golka outlines the relation between “micro” experiences and “macro” messages, describing the connection between individual and collective memory, where it can be recognised “most simply, that individual memory is a feature of our ‘I’ in the singular, while social memory is a feature of our different notions of ‘we’.” M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2009, p. 11.

⁵ Cf. J. Assmann, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, translation from German by John Czaplicka, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/modernlanguages/postgraduate/modules/ctml/memory/j_assmann_cultural_memory.pdf (accessed autumn 2018).

⁶ Cf. A. Wolff-Powęska, *Pamięć – Brzemień i uwolnienie. Niemcy wobec nazistowskiej przeszłości (1945-2010)*, Wyd. Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2011.

⁷ Elsewhere, Golka defines social memory as: “[...] socially created, transformed or unified and accepted knowledge, relating to the past of a given community. This knowledge includes various content, fulfils various functions, survives thanks to various cultural carriers, and reaches the consciousness of individuals from various sources. Its relative unification takes place thanks to mechanisms of social life. By the same token there takes place, within a given group, a relative unification of notions concerning the past.” M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2009, p. 15.

The notion of social memory has a very broad literature, which may be described as interdisciplinary;⁸ there is no place here to reconstruct it systematically. I thus propose to focus on one thread, referring both to the presence and absence of particular content in social discourse, which creates an exceptional space for the “offering” of memory implants. Emigration as a phenomenon is a perfect object for similar manipulations, since inherently (as a category describing social mobility) it entails change or the questioning of the status quo (even at the level of the best-known definition, whereby mobility means “any change of position”).

An excellent training ground for sociological analysis of the phenomenon of implants of social memory and emigration is provided by a recently established Polish institution: the Emigration Museum in Gdynia, which focuses on 19th- and 20th-century Polish emigration, bringing together in an original way the marinist aspects of the phenomenon (indicating the relationship of emigration with the sea and with a port) as well as the technological and socioeconomic aspects. This proposed example is well aligned with the goal of making precise the concept of implantation of memory, based on the assumptions of “cultural memory”, and also referred to by Łukasz Skoczylas, defining the appropriate use of the notion in respect of events that are not remembered directly, when generational transfer begins to operate, having a particular influence on the form the message takes.¹⁰

It may sound paradoxical (although it is no paradox in fact) that we cannot be entirely clear what is the principal subject of the exhibition at the Gdynia museum: the process of migration, the migrants themselves, the reasons for manifestations of social mobility, the phenomenon of complex national identities (being a Pole outside Poland: in America, Asia, the Middle East, Australia, etc.), the achievements of Poles abroad, or the relatively young city which treats the phenomenon of emigration as an element of its own identity.

CONCEPTUALISATION

Memory implants as values and social facts

In defining the meaning of memory implants, we shall refer to the originator of the notion, Marian Golka, who saw such an implant as a kind of prosthesis: for when

⁸ Cf. B. Pabjan, *Pamięć zbiorowa mieszkańców miasta. Studium o badaniach pamięci zbiorowej*, *Folia Sociologica* 54, 2015.

⁹ Based on Sorokin’s original definition, Henryk Domański states that mobility is understood to mean “any transposition of an individual or a social object – anything created or modified by human action – from one position to another.” H. Domański, *O ruchliwości społecznej*, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2004, p. 13.

¹⁰ Cf. Ł. Skoczylas, *Implanty pamięci społecznej. Socjologiczna teoria w interdyscyplinarnym zastosowaniu badawczym*, in: D. Gortych, Ł. Skoczylas (eds.), *Implanty pamięci społecznej. Teoria i przykłady*, Poznań 2017, p. 16.

we forget, for when we try to reach places that memory fails to reach – or overlooks for various reasons. It is not, however, merely a form of substitute, in the sense of a specific artifact, image or story filling the space left by something that is no longer there, but rather an object or value in a sense close to Florian Znaniecki's theory of values.¹¹ The latter, we may recall, regards value as one of the central categories, referring not so much to things or to features of things discovered in objects, as to features assigned by people in connection with their activity.¹² Here the value differs from a thing or object in that it has a specified significance.¹³ Consequently, social values (as distinguished from other values in Znaniecki's conception: objects to which an actor or the objects of action have assigned a significance) will also include people "experiencing and acting, insofar as they are the object or subject of actions aimed at changing or maintaining the social bonds between them".¹⁴ The adjective *social*, apart from causing one to think of a community, also alludes to the interactive (communicative) context of human activity. In this sense, after all, it is ideally suited to narratives constructed on the basis of individual accounts, including letters and autobiographies, which are heavily used by the creators of exhibitions and contemporary museologists. "Implantation" in relation to such material recalls methodological strategies that we associate with the use of the "humanist coefficient", which becomes easier when the interpreter and the interpreted material come from a single cultural circle or simply a single culture (defined, for example, by a common language). As Znaniecki argued in a paper from the 1920s:

A myth, a work of art, a word, an instrument, a legal scheme, a social organization are what they are only as conscious human phenomena; we know them only with reference to some known or hypothetically reconstructed complex of experiences and activities of particular empirical, limited, historically determined conscious individuals or collectivities who produced them or who were, or are, now using them.¹⁵

¹¹ G. Motoi, Values as an object of study for the American and the French sociology. A review of F. Znaniecki's and R. Boudon's perspectives, *Social Sciences and Education Research Review* (4) 2 222–231 (2017); E. Hałas, *Cultural Sociology in Poland*, in: S. Moebius et al. (eds.), *Handbuch Kultursoziologie*, Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften, 2016, [https://elzbieta-halas.pl/pliki/Crisis_of_Fluidity/Crisis%20of%20Fluidity%20Florian%20Znaniecki's%20Theory%20od%20Civilization%20\(2\).pdf](https://elzbieta-halas.pl/pliki/Crisis_of_Fluidity/Crisis%20of%20Fluidity%20Florian%20Znaniecki's%20Theory%20od%20Civilization%20(2).pdf)

¹² Elżbieta Hałas writes that: "when [Znaniecki] speaks of values, he has in mind the objects of thought and empirical data. After Nietzsche and Arthur Schopenhauer, he uses the term 'value' as the most general category of description of the world, different from things. At the same time he gives it a more precise sense. Firstly, in accordance with his assumption of the constructed nature of the human world, Znaniecki states that values are not features that we discover in objects, but features that we assign to objects. Secondly, a positive or negative assessment of an object is made with regard to the operation and use of that object for some active purpose, even if this 'use' is merely experimental and 'intellectual'." E. Hałas, *Znaczenia i wartości społeczne. O socjologii Floriana Znanieckiego*, Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, Lublin 1991, p. 16.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 17ff.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁵ F. Znaniecki, The Object Matter of Sociology, *The American Journal of Sociology* no. 4, vol. XXXII, 1927, p. 536.

In summary, implants of social memory, being material and non-material values (in Znaniecki's sense), also take on, in the process of "implementation", specific socially identified meanings; they are reflected in knowledge, and the context of their collective presence is activity. As Golka writes:

[...] when some memory carriers are destroyed, particular memory implants appear – things created secondarily and *post factum*: buildings, records, images or films, and also content of knowledge, which are to make up gaps in memory, recreate its assumed content or even create it in a new form conforming to the current policy of the community or the current system of interests, values and goals. Implants, by their nature, may be more or less faithful.¹⁶

These definitions should be broadened to highlight the social context. From the proposed standpoint, such an implant will be an **intentionally created value filling anticipated (as they may in reality either exist or not exist) gaps in the memory of a specific group or in social memory, creating a new, discursive or material quality** – including for instance **specific (new) spatial artifacts**. In the proposed sense, the phenomenon of memory implants is seen to be a fairly common tool for restoring the continuity of collective memory or creating new memories, by building links and imparting meanings where they were not previously perceived. In every case, however, the phenomenon of "rationalisation" occurs, encompassing two processes relating to experience: subjectification (internalisation) and objectification (construction of a picture of the world). While the need to create memory implants may be related directly to the phenomenon of forgetting, it may also be, paradoxically, a factor that supports the integration of a community (when remembering does not serve identity; for example, when conditions have made it necessary to leave the community). Here, forgetting is "everything that lies outside the social consciousness of members of the group".¹⁷ Referencing Paul Ricœur, Golka goes on to say that forgetting is "total nothingness", or else a type of "blotted out matrix", which implies the existence (in opposition to nothingness) of something incomplete and ephemeral that was left and may serve as a starting point for a process of creation (or "recalling") – for example, a record of an emigrant's story, an old ticket for an Atlantic voyage, a postcard from a relative abroad, and the like. This is apparently the principal factor that distinguishes memory implantation from indoctrination, which involves the printing of specific content into the individual consciousness. The process itself involves the more or less conscious use of the aforementioned "humanist coefficient", which can be assumed to be a necessary condition for effective implementation. Without it, the object is nothing more than a thing (something), and the text a set of words connected by semantic and syntactic rules.

The proposed viewpoint entails significant theoretical consequences (in relation to the theory of sociology). Aid is provided by two paradigmatic contexts: the pragmatic

¹⁶ M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2009, p. 161.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

and the interactive (interactionist), both associated with Znaniecki's culturalism.¹⁸ In the fields of psychology and neuroscience, on which we do not elaborate here, the issues outlined are concerned with the mechanisms of remembering and recall and problems related to false or disputed memories,¹⁹ which can trigger particular social consequences.

Memory implants and emigration

A memory implant is distinguished from an implant of social memory by its existence in the form of values, which are "a feature of our different notions of 'we'".²⁰ Emigration, developing from the act of experiencing an individual relocation (someone's decision and its consequences) into an element of collective consciousness, is transformed into a "wave of migration". Individual reasons for decisions, in the mouths of "guardians of memory" – historians, or historical sociologists – take on the attributes of structural pressure in a specified place and time which led to certain consequences. Anonymous migrants in a new location take on the form of a community or group that is closed in terms of identity (such as Polish peasants or the Polish diaspora in the United States). It should be added that the intentional use of memory implants need not be merely of the nature of a neutral "densification" of history (a rational manoeuvre from the standpoint of the aforementioned "guardian of memory", seeking successive facts in a cause-and-effect sequence). It is often a response to a need expressed by various actors or institutions. It constructs or reconstructs the aforementioned matrix, looking at it from a specific Mannheimian perspective. The determinants of implantation are complex; Golka suggests that their type is influenced by:

[...] political factors (memory policy), cultural factors (documentation of monuments to the past that are at risk of destruction), factors relating to urban and transport planning (the need to develop empty space within a city), and economic factors relating to tourism (attraction of the attention and money of tourists). There are different causes and circumstances for the creation of these implants: a sense of an emptiness, nostalgia, desire for revenge, and so on. Sometimes also a sense of the rapid passing of time makes us want to counteract it by means of such implants.²¹

We often speak of the "restoration" of specified values or aspects of social consciousness through publishing, through the inspiring of discussion, and indeed through the creation of new objects in the public space.

As described in the cited Polish works on memory implants, the motivation for implantation may be, for example, in the case of the City of Poznań, the need to un-

¹⁸ Cf. E. Hałas, *Znaczenia i wartości społeczne...*, p. 55ff; G. Motoi, Values as an object of study for the American and the French sociology...; E. Hałas, *Cultural Sociology in Poland...*

¹⁹ Cf. J. M. Talarico, K. S. Labar, D. C. Rubin, Emotional intensity predicts autobiographical memory experience, *Memory & Cognition* 32, 2004.

²⁰ Cf. M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna ...*, p. 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

derline its capital city status through the construction (“reconstruction”) of Przemysł’s Castle.²² This was not done for reasons of urban planning or even commemoration, but was motivated by the symbolic meaning and the desire to create an original (through allusion to the late Middle Ages) cultural space,²³ presently serving as a museum of the applied arts.

Similarly, from the proposed point of view, an implantation might be the idea of underlining the importance of emigration through description of the phenomenon in relation to a specific place, serving as a symbol with a much expanded scale, scope and complexity, and the offering of objects that will make it possible, in a specified manner, to understand the causes of the interpreted phenomena – these objects themselves being implants. Such a place, in the context of emigration, is located in some sense between “here” and “there”. This would appear to be a necessary condition, and is underlined by references to the port and to the voyage that links the different spatial contexts.

The dual sense of emigration, social consciousness, and the “ontology” of migration-related memory implants

A feature of emigration as a phenomenon is that it displays, in an intriguing manner, two different aspects: absence from one place; and on the other hand, the migrants’ appearance in a new place, where they constitute a factor changing the status quo.²⁴

The face side of the coin of emigration in the second half of the 19th century was the Galician countryside, from which people “escaped” due to hunger and a lack of prospects. The reverse side of the same coin was New York’s Ellis Island and the Polish district of Chicago, where the emigrants arrived and settled after many weeks of travel. The link between these metaphorical sides of emigration is the voyage, marked by class differences, social interactions, and the trauma of being “in between”.

The relationship between the two worlds (“there” and “here”) is maintained by acts of communication, whose records – in the form of letters – constitute sources of knowledge both for historians and for sociologists attempting to interpret social relations. The latter have created, on an epistemological base, a unique picture of a culture, or more precisely, the culture of Polish peasants in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. I have in mind the works of William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, who in the early 1920s published the five-volume work *The Polish*

²² D. Gortych, G. Hinterkeuser, Ł. Skoczylas, *Implanty pamięci?: od/budowa zamków w Poznaniu i Berlinie: interdyscyplinarne studium przypadku*, Wydawnictwo Rys, Poznań 2017.

²³ One who lobbied for the initiative was former Wielkopolskie provincial governor Włodzimierz Łęcki, who said: “We want to build a castle, a symbolic building for Poznań. In 10 or 15 years people will not be asking themselves when it was built.” M. Kabscha, Pan Łęcki i jego zamek, *epoznan.pl*, 24 September 2010, https://epoznan.pl/news-news-21049-Pan_Lecki_i_jego_zamek

²⁴ In a way, they are forgotten in one place and remembered in another.

Peasant in Europe and America,²⁵ a fundamental work in humanistic sociology, or the 1976 book by Helena Znaniecka-Lopata, *Polish Americans: Status Competition in an Ethnic Community*.²⁶

OPERATIONALISATION

The status of these and other academic works is different from that of carriers of social memory, at least if they are to be treated in the proposed sense. This is particularly so because **different societies show tendencies to produce different social facts and values, and the implant of migration memory will exist in a collective sense and not an epiphenomenal sense, insofar as it can be reconstructed in the knowledge of a specific community, perceived as shared by others, and as that memory has some kind of consequence for their social life.**²⁷ A similar relativisation is supported by Florian Znaniecki's concept of culturalism – reconstructed above in a synthetic version. For Znaniecki, the building blocks of a “social personality” were individual experiences considered as factors in the construction of a specific type, which a researcher arrives at through analysis of biographies.²⁸ In the proposed sense, these scholarly generalisations are useful as a construction material for memory implants (this is not the case with the Emigration Museum, however). Implants, apart from the fact that they may be different in the memories of different communities, inherently remain – as areas of publicised knowledge – entities *in statu nascendi*. In the context of popularisation (including the museum context) and in relation to the wider body of public knowledge, they change awareness or reinforce certain images, similarly to the stereotypes used in communication about literature.²⁹

Let us be more precise then: an analysis of specific examples of conveyed messages on the subject of emigration will have the status of an analysis of migration-related memory implants in the full, social meaning of the term if specific implanted content can be discerned in the results of social research, or more precisely, for example, in public opinion (when it takes on the status of social fact). This gives rise to a difficulty of interpretation, namely of how much each attempted implantation (even if origi-

²⁵ W. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group*, vols. 1–5, Gorham Press, Boston 1918–20.

²⁶ H. Znaniecka-Lopata, *Polish Americans: Status Competition in an Ethnic Community (Ethnic Groups in American Life series)*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976.

²⁷ I refer here to Marek Ziółkowski's criteria for social consciousness: “The three fundamental – conceived idealistically – criteria for social consciousness are, in my view: 1) a community of beliefs, 2) awareness of that community of beliefs, 3) the undertaking on the basis of those consciously shared beliefs of practical actions, accordingly individual or collective.” M. Ziółkowski, Społeczne uwarunkowania kształtu i przemian świadomości klasowej polskiej klasy robotniczej, *Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny* no. 1, 1987, p. 314.

²⁸ W. Thomas, F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America...*, vol. 3, p. 11ff.

²⁹ G. Grochowski, Stereotypy – komunikacja – literatura, *Przestrzenie Teorii* no. 2, Poznań 2003.

nating from scientific knowledge) is successful in the sense of creating social values. This is especially significant since the notion is often applied not only to architectural objects (which are built and remain in the urban panorama), but also to other material objects, films, or even narrative elements.³⁰

It should be added that, according to Marian Golka's understanding, any implant remains a "substitute" in memory or a fragment of the past contained in objects (in some sense artificial, being inserted there by the implementor, or even fake). Moreover, the originator of the notion does not question the existence of "implants", regarding their appearance in the public space as a sufficient ground to recognise and analyse their social presence.

This position would appear to be too inclusive. Supplementation of the perspective of memory implants with elements of empirical inference, linking of the "ontology" of implants with the sphere of values ("objects of thought and experimental data") and social consciousness, makes it possible to apply the concept more precisely.³¹ In the case of "social implants of migration memory" they take on an additional public sense, co-creating a discourse on the subject; they may have a significant – although (for now) difficult to pin down – influence on the behaviours of individuals and whole communities. This provides a further tool for explaining a certain class of social phenomena, such as the concentration in time of decisions to migrate, or limitations on the scale of emigration in a particular community.³²

It is interesting to refer to a survey in which Poles were asked about grounds for choosing a country to which to emigrate, at a time when relatively large numbers of respondents were considering moving abroad for a limited time (56% in 1991, 59% in 1992) or permanently (6% in 1991, 7% in 1992). In some sense the results illustrate Poles' state of awareness, with regard to reasons for emigrating in the early years of the Polish transformation (1992),³³ after regaining full sovereignty, but before obtaining access to European labour markets. One in three of those declaring a wish to leave Poland indicated as a criterion the "friendliness" and openness of the receiving community, while one in four indicated the presence of a Polish émigré community, and a similar number referred to the presence of friends or family in that country (24%). The next most common responses were location close to Poland (23%) and ease of finding work (22%).³⁴ Of key importance was the sphere of social bonds (both weak and strong) related to the presence of Poles in the country in question. It is interesting

³⁰ The multifaceted nature of the phenomenon may be observed, for example, in a collective scholarly work on memory implants: D. Gortych, G. Hinterkeuser, Ł. Skoczylas, *Implanty pamięci? ...*

³¹ This appears particularly important when we seek a basis for operationalisation in the humanistic methodology of Florian Znaniecki, who attached particular significance to sources created by subjects of study themselves, not requiring the participation of the researcher. Znaniecki keenly made use of, for example, migrants' correspondence and diaries submitted for competitions.

³² Cf. M. Nowak, *Polska migracja: motywy mobilności...*

³³ CBOS survey: The desire to move abroad – motivations and preferred countries. Survey report BS/346/55/92, July 1992.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

that relatively few respondents indicated as a criterion the ease of finding work. The country where it should be easiest to find work, according to those surveyed, was the United States. The most likely destination country, in view of its proximity, was Germany.

Against this background, how are we to reconstruct implants of migration memory when considering a particular conveyed message? Our reference point, serving also as a metaphorical mirror, will be the Emigration Museum in Gdynia.

CASE STUDY. THE EMIGRATION MUSEUM IN GDYNIA

The Emigration Museum in Gdynia³⁵ is a relatively young cultural institution on the map of the Tri-City conurbation (Gdańsk–Sopot–Gdynia), standing out from other Polish museums by way of its dynamism and the subject matter covered. It is one of a growing number of institutions³⁶ that are moving away from the conventional presentation of the past through artifacts, instead favouring the creation of narratives.³⁷ They attempt to explain the past in a way that assumes an active approach on the part of the viewer, who – following the path intended by the creators of the exhibition – acquires knowledge in an accessible and visually well-designed form. Interestingly, collections (authentic objects from the past gathered in one place) are sidelined, while centre stage goes to the narrative, made credible by the collection of facts and their arrangement in a defined sequence, according to a selected plan. The concept of narrative museums is described with reference to Freeman Tilden and his work *Interpreting Our Heritage* from the late 1950s.³⁸ The proposals contained in that work are well described in contemporary museological discussions (compare, for example,

³⁵ The creator of the exhibition was selected by way of a competition. The winner, chosen in late 2012, was a company from Kraków: ae fusion Studio sp. z o.o. Cf. an article published on the museum website, *Wyniki konkursu na koncepcję wystawy stałej*, published on 20 October 2012, http://www.polska1.pl/pl/dzialania/aktualnosci/wyniki_konkursu_na_koncepcje_wystawy_stalej/ (accessed March 2019). The museum opened in May 2015.

³⁶ Museums with similar exhibition strategies are relatively numerous. We may list, after Maria Kobielska: the Warsaw Rising Museum, the Museum of the Poznań June '56 protests, the Museum of Kraków (with branches including Oskar Schindler's Enamel Factory, the Marketplace Underground, the Eagle Pharmacy and Pomorska Street), the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk, the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw, and others. Cf. M. Kobielska, *Polska pamięć autoafirmacyjna*, *Teksty Drugie* no. 6, 2016, p. 360.

³⁷ In the historiographic literature, this now well-developed school is referred to as the narrativist orientation; its origins are linked to Hyden White and his *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-century Europe*, John Hopkins Univ. Press, Baltimore 1973. See also E. Domańska, *Biała Tropologia: Hayden White i teoria pisarstwa historycznego*, *Teksty Drugie* no. 2 (26), 1994; A. Radomski, *Badanie narracji historycznej. Próba konceptualizacji kulturoznawczej*, *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska Lublin–Polonia*, vol. LVI, sec. F, 2001.

³⁸ F. Tilden, *Interpreting Our Heritage*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1957.

the popularising project titled *Muzeoblog*³⁹ and texts by Maria Kobielska⁴⁰), and even in brochures with instructions on how to create a similar offering. One element that seems to be important for our present purposes is the answer to the question of how “interpretation” is to be understood in the vision of a museum based on narrative. Tilden enumerates several principles: “Interpretation is an art, which combines many arts, whether the materials presented are scientific, historical or architectural. [...] The chief aim of Interpretation is not instruction, but provocation. [...] Interpretation should aim to present a whole rather than a part.”⁴¹ Interpretation, according to this understanding, is a particular type of memory implantation, based on the art of building generalised associations on the basis of diverse existing sources. It is also a form of education, and it is here that implantation, in the form of “provocation”, is most visible.

The interpretative conception of the Emigration Museum is revealed even by the slogan printed on the admission ticket: *łączymy historie* (“we connect stories”). As is written in the description of the museum on its website:

The history of departures from the Polish lands is hundreds of years old. People traveled to different parts of the world for sustenance, in search of freedom, or for a different life. After Poland regained its independence, this situation remained unchanged. The journey was tackled on foot, by rail, aboard ships or – later – airplanes.⁴²

The authors go on to refer to the uniqueness of the location of the museum, and end by explaining what they understand by the main slogan:

It is the ambition of this institution to make them [the achievements of emigrants] known to Poles at home, but it is also to encourage our compatriots living at home and abroad to get to know each other. Through educational and cultural projects, the museum hopes to become a place of encounter and discussion. We feel we fulfill a particular duty in achieving this end at the best possible address [...].⁴³

Thus, the museum presents not a single history of emigration, but at least three narratives, for which the phenomenon of migration serves as a unifying force. It is in-

³⁹ Muzeoblog publishes texts and event reports which are to serve as an invitation to discussion with users; the reader may thus gain knowledge and make comments, or simply follow the discussion on a specified topic. Its patron is the Małopolska Institute of Culture. See <https://muzeoblog.mik.krakow.pl/2012/03/20/tilden/index.html> (accessed autumn 2018). Cf. also A. Wilińska, *Współczesne muzea narracyjne. Analiza przestrzeni muzealnej na przykładzie Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego i Muzeum Fryderyka Chopina*, master’s degree thesis written under the supervision of Dr Iwona Kurz, 2014, <https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/9276/A.%20Wili%C5%84ska,%20Wsp%C3%B3%C5%82czesne%20muzea%20narracyjne.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (accessed autumn 2018).

⁴⁰ Cf. M. Kobielska, *Polska pamięć autoafirmacyjna*, *Teksty Drugie* no. 6, 2016.

⁴¹ F. Tilden, *Interpreting Our Heritage...*, p. 9.

⁴² From the website of the Emigration Museum, http://www.polska1.pl/en/omuzeum/idea_eng (accessed autumn 2018).

⁴³ *Ibid.*

teresting in the case of this museum that the narratives clearly correspond to different perspectives and different historical scales, and the key part played by emigration is different in each case. Each of the narratives offers a different set of memory implants, often making non-obvious and sometimes controversial links between the facts presented.

Narrative 1. Emigration as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution

The first of the narratives alludes to the modernising changes of civilisation, with technological processes and natural phenomena at their core. On display close to the entrance to the exhibition is something that at first glance resembles a steam engine, accompanied by an account of its history. James Watt's invention serves as a focal point, leading on to a description of the phenomenon of immigration from countryside to town, referring on one hand to the introduction of mass production based on machinery and industrialisation, while on the other illustrating the promise of a better life associated with the city as a space for the development of mass employment (based on the power of machines and technological innovations). We will find here, for example, descriptions of the main migrant cities across the Atlantic, particularly New York and Chicago. This narrative, providing a ground for the introduction of further objects illustrating the nature of change in civilisation (mass transport, improvements in its speed and efficiency), ends with an account of the restriction of the wave of migration to the United States (with the change in that country's policy in the 1920s). Subsequent parts of the exhibition at most explore the evolution of transport, referring to the example of the development of passenger aviation by the Polish carrier LOT in communist times, and – for reasons that are not entirely clear – displaying the Polish mini Fiat car as a symbol of the mobility (but not emigration) of Poles in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, the most interesting object of the story woven around the universal phenomenon of modernisation is the potato. This vegetable symbolises on the one hand the restricted menu of the Galician peasants (one of the groups that most often undertook the risk of a transatlantic journey), and on the other, one of the historically significant motivations for emigration from Europe, which we associate with the period of famine that led to mass emigration from Ireland to the United States in the mid-19th century (1845–1849). The link between this event, constitutive to the identity of Ireland,⁴⁴ and the processes taking place in Central Europe is debatable, but for the designers of the exhibition it provides an inspiration to include, for example, a short history of the potato in the Polish lands. The “implant” here performs the role of an element that fixes the attention, irrespective of whether the link between migration and the object in question – the potato – is as unambiguous as is suggested.

⁴⁴ Cf. A. Achouri, From Ireland to America: Emigration and the Great Famine 1845–1852, *International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies* vol. 2, issue 4, 2016.

Narrative 2. Emigration as an expression of the struggle for freedom

The next narrative is related to the fortunes of Polish statehood from the Middle Ages onwards. This is not a story of the masses or of “ordinary people” (as was the case in the descriptions of a particular peasant family emigrating to the USA due to poverty), but a story of figures that left their mark either on history in a wide sense, or on the history of specific countries to which Poles emigrated.

Motives for emigration are often linked to political events, or attention is drawn to the exceptional careers of Poles outside their home country: there are descriptions here of Zawisza the Black, a mediaeval knight who won tournaments in Europe, of Michał Piotr Boym, explorer of the Far East, and others. The various personalities are woven into the story of the loss of Polish statehood in the 18th century and of emigration as a consequence of successive insurrections.

In a further part of the exhibition, emigration is linked explicitly with the national cause, and becomes a pretext to tell the story of the Polish struggle to regain independence. A description of the events of 1848 reads: “Polish emigrants were active on all fronts of the Spring of Nations. The Polish cause was interwoven with the demand for freedom.” This passage acquires the force of a distinguished or even leading narrative thread, explicitly linking the phenomenon of emigration simultaneously to the desire for freedom and to the national struggle. The aforementioned interweaving should be regarded as another “memory implant”, particularly in the juxtaposing of concrete political events with the phenomena of immigration, described above as the history of modernisation and of mass movements of labour, inspired by material needs (migration from countryside to town and across the Atlantic) against a backdrop of wars and revolutions. This thread is continued, leading from the events of World War I, the regaining of independence (which, it transpires, does not interrupt the process of emigration), through World War II, the mass resettlements to and from the Polish lands (and Poles remaining outside the country’s borders after the war ended), up to various turning points of the communist era: the events of March 1968 and the resulting emigration,⁴⁵ the “carnival” of Solidarity and a further wave of departures, up to 1989,⁴⁶ which is treated as a watershed in the regaining of freedom.

Displayed as a symbol of Polish wanderings is a railway carriage (another implant of migration memory), on whose walls are shown fragments of the well-known comedy film *Sami swoi* (“Only our own”). The economic motivations for migration are constantly present, but are placed within a geopolitical context, with critical assessments first of the policies of the partitioning powers (hunger and the fragmentation

⁴⁵ The anti-Jewish campaign had already begun in 1967. As a consequence of repression and the offering of the possibility of emigration from Poland, several thousand Poles of Jewish origin left the country. See: D. Stola, Jewish emigration from communist Poland: the decline of Polish Jewry in the aftermath of the Holocaust, *East European Jewish Affairs* vol. 47, 2017.

⁴⁶ P. Pleskot, Polish Political Emigration in the 1980s: Current Research, Perspectives, and Challenges, *Polish American Studies* vol. 72, no. 2, 2015.

of farms in Galicia), and then of the Polish People's Republic (the dysfunctionality of the communist state). The freedom motif, it seems, remains the most interesting component of the narrative, and at the same time the most intriguing non-material memory implant, explicitly revealing the tension between the vision of the masses emigrating "for bread" in modernising societies, and the motifs of the Polish struggle for independence, or later for real sovereignty, woven no longer around large communities with a Polish (or more widely, Central European) ethnic identity, but around an account of armed struggle, world wars, forced resettlements of Polish people, and the most important figures of contemporary Polish history. Particularly noteworthy is the significant part of the exhibition devoted to the London-based government-in-exile,⁴⁷ as an example of an attempt to maintain political continuity with the Second Republic, and a significant element of thought relating to Polish forced emigration.

Narrative 3. Emigration as the modernist city, port and ship (?)

The last of the narratives is probably the most intriguing. It connects the phenomenon of emigration with a location: with Gdynia and the building housing the museum. The motif of one part of the exhibition is the port, whose construction began in the early 1920s, and the associated effort on the part of the Second Polish Republic to develop a maritime economy. The management of emigration is presented here as a part of what may be defined as the determination of an ambitious young state to expand the scope of its influence. Describing the location and development of Gdynia, the creators of the exhibition write:

At lightning speed, between Kępa Oksywska and Kamienna Góra, the port's quays and docks came into being, and with them new buildings and residential districts. In 1922 Gdynia had barely 1300 inhabitants, when it received its town charter in 1926 its population was already 12,000, and on the eve of World War II it was receiving the largest ships and was the most modern port on the Baltic Sea. The well-developed emigration infrastructure, including the Marine Station, and ever more comfortable liners served thousands of emigrants who said farewell to their homeland here [...] (exhibition material).

The exhibition creators appear to be arguing that emigration was treated as a kind of safety valve, but also as an investment in the future. They write that:

[...] emigration was favoured by the policy of the Second Republic. The authorities considered that it effectively defused social and economic tensions. [...] Also numerous institutions came into being to support emigration, such as the Emigration Office, and later the Emigration Syndicate (exhibition material).

⁴⁷ The Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile was formed in Paris on 30 September 1939 after Poland's defeat by Germany, and in June 1940 was relocated to London. Together with the President and the National Council, it formed the Polish political representation recognised by the Allies during the Second World War.

With the onset of the Great Depression at the end of the 1920s, the emigration “push factors” (to use a concept from migration studies) began to weaken, and there was also a decline in willingness to accept Polish emigrants, due to the increase in unemployment and worsening of the economic situation in destination countries. Forms of organisation of waves of emigrants are presented in the exhibition as an “industry” forming part of national policy, but on the other hand they serve as a mark of the organisational success of the Second Republic and Gdynia itself. A continuation of this functional image is provided by a part of the exhibition devoted to the Polish diaspora, particularly in the United States. Attention is also drawn to the Maritime and Colonial League, which was connected with Polish emigration in that, for example, it arranged settlement by Poles in Argentina, Brazil and Liberia.



Figure 1. Model of the *Batory*, a Polish-flagged transatlantic liner, which serves as a point of inspiration for a large section of the exhibition. Photograph: M. Nowak.

A central element of the exhibition, and a further example of a memory implant, is a model (over 10 metres long) of the liner *Batory* during its construction. This is undoubtedly an example of provocation in the style of Tilden – the original ship was in fact built in Italy, and arrived complete in Gdynia in 1936, where it became a symbol of Polish oceanic ambitions. A significant amount of exhibition space is devoted to the story of this vessel and its technical specifications.

CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE GENERALISATIONS

Any conclusions from the analysis presented here must necessarily be of a synthetic kind. The problem raised in the title, from an empirical point of view, can be considered on at least two planes. Evaluation of what is presented in the Gdynia mu-

seum, and how, may proceed in many directions; the author has focused on the social aspects of migration, addressed by contemporary migration studies and the sociology of mobility. A second plane relates less to what is lacking in the exhibition, for example, and what can be described as a consequence of “forgetting”, but above all to the construction of not one but several narratives on emigration, serving to recall something that the creators of the exhibition consider worthy of being remembered. We are further concerned here with the “implantation” of elements that either had been forgotten, or came to exist through intellectual and scholarly reflection.⁴⁸

Exploring the first plane (what can be seen in the exhibition), it should be recalled that three narratives are developed, referred to in the above section headings as (1) emigration as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution; (2) emigration as an expression of the struggle for freedom; and (3) emigration as a modernist city, port and ship.

The first of the narratives best corresponds to the view of migration that is dominant in the literature, offering inferences typical of the analysis of push and pull factors in the migration that was seen in our part of Europe. This is not an uncontroversial picture, at least as regards the “starting point”. What draws the attention – referring to the second plane – is the absence of a universal social context related to capitalism as an economic formation, indicating economic and political factors, such as the commoditisation of the labour force, which took place alongside the move away from feudal relations – and in Central and Eastern Europe, from the system of manor farms and secondary serfdom (seen, for example, in the sociological theory of world-systems of Immanuel Wallerstein, but also in analyses by Polish historians associated with Marian Małowist, Witold Kula and Jerzy Topolski⁴⁹). We know from the exhibition that people were driven to leave their homes by hunger; we know nothing of the reasons why it was the Polish lands from which mass emigration took place, or whether (and why) this was a 19th-century phenomenon. Nor do we know whether the lands of partitioned Poland were particularly different from other areas in our region or in the whole European continent. Were there some additional push and pull factors at work here; after all, national consciousness is an experience associated rather with the elites of Polish society than with the peasant masses, or with the multinational bourgeois societies of the end of the 18th century. The use of a steam engine (a reference to the mobility of the peasant masses) or a potato (in reference to the description of the sources of hunger among the Galician peasants) clearly shows them to have the status of implants of migration memory, which nonetheless focus the attention on decidedly

⁴⁸ This last element was important in that it provided a basis to answer the question: what is the contemporary narrative on emigration (including migration-related memory implants) and what are its consequences?

⁴⁹ For a synthetic interpretation of the historical-philosophical views of these researchers, see K. Brzechczyn, *Odrębność historyczna Europy Środkowej*, Wydawnictwo: Fundacja Humaniora, Poznań 1998. Cf. also A. Sosnowska, *Explaining Economic Backwardness. Post-1945 Polish Historians on Eastern Europe*, CEU Press, Budapest–New York 2019.

peripheral threads in the relevant processes, which are well described at analytical level in our part of Europe.

Much less controversial is the narrative representing the other side of the coin from emigration: the fortunes of Poles in the United States, Ellis Island, the New York of those times, and above all Chicago. This narrative reveals little known aspects of our mass presence, in some way helping to create the United States, and does so even in a less positive light, as when it refers to the mafia formed by representatives of the first generation of Americans of Polish origin, already born on foreign soil.

It should be pointed out that the universalising narrative begins arbitrarily (alluding to the consequences of the Industrial Revolution, which is linked only indirectly with emigration) and equally arbitrarily ends (almost completely ignoring the continuity of migration phenomena, which as we know, intensified – for example – after countries in Central and Eastern Europe joined the European Union and political decisions were taken to open up labour markets). The authors of the exhibition paraphrase, in a provocative manner, Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the "end of history", which is supposed to have occurred at the same point in time that in their opinion marks the end of the story of emigration.

The omission, except on one short summary information board, of the migration of around three million Poles (and many hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Bulgarians, Romanians, etc.) over the past decade and more is, in this regard, symptomatic and troublesome in an academic sense. This is all the more so given that the scale of these waves of Polish migration was by no means incomparable to those seen in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The reason for this decision – as we must assume it to be intentional – becomes clearer when we analyse the second of the listed narratives. This no longer describes the history of emigration *per se*, but rather the history of Poland in the context of population movements, the observed phenomena being perceived above all in reference to Polish statehood, or more precisely, with a focus on the 19th century and the effort to regain independence, followed by, in the 20th century, the regaining of full sovereignty after 1989. The second narrative, although decidedly more distant from the scholarly context of the analysis of migration-related phenomena (as emigration is clearly not a phenomenon exclusive to Poland), is visibly dominant in the exhibition, generating further memory implants. Principal of these is the very association of Polish political history with migration phenomena and with emigration. As the authors of the exhibition see it, Poles demonstrated a tendency to emigrate in the context of the national cause, and successive waves of emigration had their origins in the consequences of Poles' military efforts, failed uprisings and the Second World War. This perspective links emigration to a striving for political independence, or in more general categories, to the accepted understanding of freedom as ethnic self-determination. What does this self-determination signify? It may be identified, at least to some extent, with the independence that was won as a result of World War I and after 1989. A fairly clear problem arises, which may be formulated as a question about the class dimension of emigration under the adopted viewpoint, and about

a particular narrowing of perspective. The freedom narrative almost entirely omits the social and economic determinants that are regarded as fundamental to analyses of migration. There is one exception: the place in the exhibition devoted to official attitudes to migration in communist Poland and the gloomy image of the Polish People's Republic as a justification for Poles' decisions to leave, and on the other hand the factor of fascination with foreign lands.

Problems also arise at a conceptual level, as to whether the narrative on emigration can be seen as equivalent to issues of forced resettlement, deportations, but also – for example – exile as a consequence of events such as war. Examples of each of these phenomena will be encountered by a visitor to the Emigration Museum. I perceive this problem particularly clearly in relation to one of the implants used in the exhibition, namely the above-mentioned railway carriage and the story told within it, of resettlers from “beyond the river Bug”⁵⁰ travelling towards western Poland.

In the “freedom narrative” it is hard not to get the impression of a certain parochialism, or at least a clear narrowing of perspective and the building of a memory implant that tells much about us ourselves, using too freely the semantic device of synecdoche. It was no doubt the same “parochialism” that caused the successive waves of Polish emigrants to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden and Spain after 2004 to be ignored, being seen as following a different model than the narrative of the Great Emigration following the November Rising, or the formation of a Polish diaspora in London as a consequence of the implementation of the Yalta agreement.

The last of the narratives – emigration as a modernist city, port and ship – raises the most questions and is the most intriguing. It takes up a story about emigration, attempting to link it to a specific place. Emigration is to be associated here with a port that was built from scratch, with a ship (launched in Italy, as we discover) on which migrants travelled, but also with Gdynia: a modernist phenomenon which came to be symbolised by the role it played connecting interwar Poland with the rest of the world. Emigration here is not an individual choice, an escape (as in the narrative of the flight from hunger), nor is it the seeking of freedom (at a time of political servitude and the struggle for independence); it is however an expression of the will to find new life opportunities, in another place, arrayed in an organised form (bringing to mind the idea of colonisation, or of a journey to the “promised land”). From a passive reaction to historical circumstances, it becomes the realisation of some socially functional project. The memory implant here is the “building of a liner”, and the liner itself is a symbol of abandoned effort towards territorial expansion. Moreover, emigration itself becomes a form of success, as evidenced by the long list of those who fared well in a very wide range of fields (and to whom a significant amount of exhibition space is devoted). In a certain sense, the last of the memory implants used by the authors is an association of emigration with success in life,

⁵⁰ J. Kochanowski, *Gathering Poles into Poland. Forced Migration from Poland's Former Eastern Territories*, in: P. Ther, A. Siljak (eds.), *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001.

paraphrasing the image of the Promised Land as shown in Andrzej Wajda's film of that title, here identified not with 19th-century Łódź, but with the panorama of New York or the dense buildings of Chicago.

It should be emphasised in summary that the exhibition, although controversial in its narrative layers, is highly intriguing and provides a stimulus for discussion. Its aim of constructing a multidimensional narrative is more than achieved. What it tells us about Poles' attitude to emigration, on the one hand, is hard to place within scholarly analysis, and in fact hinders interpretation of the phenomenon other than through the notion of memory implants and the telling of an interesting story. On the other hand it turns migration into a Polish phenomenon, or at least identifies the uniqueness of the Polish experience against others, which indeed are given almost no space at all. In some sense, because of that decision, it helps to understand the fascination of Poles with emigration as a radical way of changing one's individual destiny or as an escape from political oppression. At the same time it blurs the answer to the question of why, in a survey of 1992, so many Poles declared a wish to move abroad to work, being quite prepared to leave a homeland that now enjoyed full sovereignty. By underlining a fascination with America, it addresses the question of why we believe it easy to find work in the United States (the "shoe shiner to millionaire" myth) and why, to a certain extent, we tend to associate emigration with transatlantic voyages specifically. The picture presented is neither entirely coherent nor complete, but it is undoubtedly interesting.

To conclude, particularly noteworthy are two implants that are present indirectly, but very strongly, in the emigration narrative, namely the **association of emigration with political freedom** and with **success**. Among Poles, these two implants of migration-related memory have probably attained the status of social implants. This is not, of course, an achievement of the authors of the exhibition, although it is without doubt an element of an intriguing diagnosis of the migration-related memory implants functioning in practice, not only present in the exhibition, but also shared in the views of Polish people, and bringing concrete social consequences.

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Keywords: emigration, memory implant, social memory, Emigration Museum in Gdynia

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to apply to the phenomenon of emigration the conceptual plane proposed along with the concept of "memory implants". The use of this category requires a reconceptualisation, which is carried out based on the ideas of Marian Golka and Florian Znaniecki. Passing chronologically through the stages of the research process, the author proposes working definitions of concepts, and then applies them in the description of a specific case: the exhibition displayed at the Emigration Museum in Gdynia. The conclusions that follow from the analysis describe the content of the museum's narrative of migration, identify the points where memory is implanted, and

illustrate how these implants operate. At the same time the analysis indicates, at least potentially, the cultural factors that allow one to understand the mass character of the Polish experience of emigration. The paper serves as a qualitative exploration, based on a neo-classical approach to the theories of Florian Znaniecki, including his concept of value and the humanistic coefficient, as well as an interpretation of the contemporary concept of memory implants, as developed by Poznań sociologists. The case study material was collected during two visits to the Emigration Museum in September 2018.

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WHERE IS POLAND? CONSTRUCTING THE STATE'S GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IN CENTRAL EUROPE

In 2004, Poland became a member of the European Union (EU), which symbolically completed “Poland’s return to Europe”. This process was accompanied not only by changes in Polish identity but also in the perception of the Polish state within the EU and its repositioning in the international community. This paper aims to show the construction of a country’s geopolitical position related to the processes of integration in Europe.

The category of the state’s territory is a continuous topic of interest within the theory of international relations. In this respect, its understanding, along with the understanding of the contexts that influence the perception of the state’s territory, is a perfect reflection of changes in international relations, including the processes of European integration. The present paper focuses on the construction of the state’s territory and its geopolitical position. I assume that this position is subject to the processes of construction (which I also call “staging”), carried out by the government, which employs foreign policy tools for this purpose. Governments stage not only their position but also the “size” of the country, understood as their power resulting from such classically realistic categories as area, population and geopolitical position. This way, through symbols expressed by words and pictures, states shape their international identity.

This topic is addressed as a result of more than ten years of research on public diplomacy and nation branding. It concerns primarily Poland but also comes to include other countries of Central-Eastern Europe which joined the EU after 2004. What they share is not only the hardships of transition to democracy after 1989, but also many other problems linked with their desire to rise to prominence in international relations. Many of these states have been struggling with international “invisibility”. There are, among them, countries that gained or regained independence after 1989, which is why they made efforts aimed at positioning in international relations as their new actors.

Clarification is needed as to the concept of Central Europe (used in the title of this paper) as the region where Poland is situated. The issue of defining this region in time and space has been addressed many a time by researchers investigating geopolitics or its clash with geography. As A. Wolff-Powęska and E. Schulz wrote in 1999,

“the countries of Central Europe are referred to as Inter-Europe”.¹ Another researcher working at the junction of geopolitics and geography is M. Kuus, who has analysed geopolitics with reference to Estonia after it regained independence. She also classifies her work within “the Central European framework”. Kuus noted that in the early 1990s Central Europe was identified with the Visegrád Group countries, that is with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a decade later with the former satellite states of the Soviet Union, and in 2007 (when her book was published) with practically all countries that had joined the EU or NATO by that time. That meant a significant “shift in the borders of Europe”.²

It was partially due to subjective reasons that the term “Eastern Europe” was abandoned in the title. As Poland joined the EU, it became closer, both politically and economically, to Western Europe. I will make an attempt to show the symbolic dimension of this process in the section devoted to “the return to Europe”, which will concern not only Poland but also other post-communist countries in Europe. I will also focus on the Baltic states; yet it should be noted that in their nation branding Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had long avoided employing this name, which became a constituent of their location policies. In their case, the use of the term “Central Europe” is not fully justified. However, since the main focus is on Poland and its central position in Europe (even though Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians also think the centre of Europe is situated in their territories), the name “Central Europe” occurs in the title. The expectation that a state’s position in Central Europe is particularly suited to its staging on the international arena can be found in the book by A. Wolff-Powęska and E. Schulz. In its introduction, the authors emphasise that:

“In its common sense, being a Central European sometimes means ‘not being an Eastern European or a resident of the Balkans’, ‘being superior to others’, more civilised, different from barbaric nations”.³

This view was echoed in 2007 by M. Kuus:

“Up to this day Central Europe connotes a place that lies geographically within Europe but culturally and politically is still learning to be fully European. Central Europe remains a waiting room between Eastern Europe and Europe proper. To examine Central Europe then is to examine the places that are relegated to a liminal position midway between Europe and the East”.⁴

¹ A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schulz (selection and editing), *Przestrzeń i polityka. Z dziejów niemieckiej myśli politycznej*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2000, p. 104.

² Merje Kuus has authored the book *Geopolitics reframed*, which is frequently cited in this contribution. Her publication provides valuable insights when confronted with the concepts of “the end of geography” – see below. M. Kuus, *Geopolitics Reframed. Security and Identity in Europe’s Eastern Enlargement*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007, p. XI.

³ A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schulz, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁴ M. Kuus, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

In my previous research I have shown that the distinctive features of Central Europeans also include “being normal, being a normal state and being a normal European” (see below “the return to Europe”). Under other approaches, Middle Europe or Central Europe is defined, for example by German researchers and politicians, as the region where Germans occupy a central place, and where the centre of Europe marks “the zone of the split”⁵ between East and West. In this context, in some historical periods Central Europe was synonymous with Germany. Also worthy of mention is the significance of the concept of Middle Europe (*Mitteleuropa*) in German political doctrines. Researchers concerned with Central Europe usually stress that this region is geopolitically “underdefined”. Elaborating on the EU’s eastward enlargement, which is of paramount importance also in the present study, M. Kuus in the introduction asks the question: “Where is Central Europe?”⁶ The meta-analysis of the term for this part of Europe, besides the answer to the question about which part is meant depending on when it is defined and by whom, brings – at the start of this research – conclusions pertaining to the social construction of concepts from the intersection of geography and politics. As I will show, Poland’s position in Central Europe was not taken for granted even in the annual foreign policy addresses. These will be cited here to show how the process of defining Poland’s regional position has evolved. Finally, in the closing section of the paper, I will demonstrate that after 2015 Poland began to be perceived as returning to Eastern Europe. Thus, the past few years have seen a reversal of the 2007-2015 policy which focused on Poland’s symbolic shift to the West.

The growing popularity of public diplomacy and nation branding in foreign policy at the turn of the millennium was accompanied by the practitioners’ belief that the international perception of a country can be freely shaped by employing the available tools of political communication. This point drew my attention to the symbolic power of states and the use of their soft resources in the construction of their international position. The construction of a state’s geopolitical position (its location) will be understood here as a process which occurs within public diplomacy and nation branding. However, not all actions from this category can be classified within this framework, and not all of them are intentional. This is because they have an impact upon the international perception of states and this process is never under full control.

I view public diplomacy as the process of a state’s international positioning through its soft resources so as to achieve mutual benefits in an international community. Mutuality is synonymous with the perception of international relations as a win-win game. The new public diplomacy, which has been evolving since the end of the Cold War, is a form of foreign symmetric political communication with an increasing role played by non-state actors. Traditionally, following the approach of

⁵ H. Brill, *Niemcy w obrębie geostrategicznych sił wielkich mocarstw i supermocarstw (1945-1990)* (in: A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schulz, *op. cit.*, p. 670.

⁶ M. Kuus, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

Ph. Taylor,⁷ I believe that one of its components is the government's use of the media to spread its message abroad. Under this perspective, the new public diplomacy results from a merger with cultural diplomacy. Importantly for the ensuing discussion, "the new face" of public diplomacy in the 21st century is based on dialogue and the interchange in the roles of the sender and receiver. This mitigates the risk of escalation into asymmetric political propaganda.⁸ The perspective of the new public diplomacy does not, however, preclude the assumption that a state's location policy can become incorporated into its foreign propaganda activities. This happens whenever a state pursues a deliberate location policy which is based on untrue premises or is designed to harm potential stakeholders.

FROM THE GEOPOLITICAL POSITIONING OF STATES TO THE "SPATIAL TURN"
IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The position of a state in international relations has been a leading research topic in geopolitics since the turn of the 20th century. The birth of geopolitics, which has been termed "spatial thinking"⁹ by A. Wolff-Powęska and E. Schulz, implemented actions to broaden "the living space" of states and nations and to take power over the world through control over its strategic regions. Under M. Sułek's approach, "a state's power is created by people, the quantity and quality of tools (for work and struggle), the ability to take collective action as well as space and time".¹⁰ All of these factors are of a measurable nature. The geopolitical approaches correspond to those from the area of geo-information. Those who followed Wallerstein took over the concept of world-systems, defining some of the states as global information centres, and others as regional centres, informational neighbours or informational peripheries. Under this approach, the size of a country and its international role, among other things, contribute to its visibility in the international information flow. By contrast, the invisibility of a state, which results from its small area, its relatively small population and economy, can go hand in hand with the invisibility caused by the media parochialism, often reinforced by a language barrier.

The spatial turn in social sciences is accompanied in international relations by a change in the perception of state boundaries, from "hard" to "soft" boundaries in

⁷ Ph. Taylor, *Public diplomacy on trial*. (in:) A. Fischer, S. Lucas (ed.) *Trials of Engagement. The Future of US Public Diplomacy*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp.19-32.

⁸ Propaganda is understood in line with the approach of Jowett and O'Donnell, which was proposed nearly 30 years ago and is constantly updated. G. Jowett, V. O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*. London: Sage. Sixth Edition, 2017.

⁹ A. Wolff-Powęska, E. Schulz, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁰ M. Sułek, *Dynamika zmian parametrów potęgi państw regionu Azji i Pacyfiku 1985-2015*. (in:) A. Jarczewska, J. Zajączkowski (ed.), *Region Azji i Pacyfiku w latach 1985-2015*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2016, p. 580.

the 21st century.¹¹ The “softness of state boundaries” has long been investigated in research on media systems. Since the deregulation of radio and television in the mid-1980s, in Europe it has been increasingly difficult to assign specific boundaries to media outlets as their products have been crossing administrative barriers with greater ease. For Biersteker, “soft boundaries” also mean new forms of exercising power by the state that controls networks which in turn operate beyond the state’s administrative borders. Hence, the territory of a state can be construed as an area encompassing the range of a network, which is (to some extent) controlled by this state.¹²

“The spatial turn” in international relations is linked with the adoption of elements of constructivism and the claim that the state (the government or the executive) can influence the way it is perceived. This includes the perception of its position and role or even its affiliation to a geographically determined group of states. In this sense, a state’s position can be constructed in such processes as the creation and spread of narratives, both domestically and abroad. These processes allow states to acquire the status of middle-rank powers despite a small number of hard resources. However, it would be too simplistic to argue that this change can be effected only by spreading narratives, including nation branding efforts. In essence, governments achieve expected results thanks to their foreign policies, which in small and medium-sized countries are geared towards attaining the status of “a good citizen of the international community”. These include efforts undertaken within bilateral and regional cooperation with a view to resolving global problems, including engagement in global organisations. A state’s location, i.e. deliberate efforts aimed at changing the perception of its geopolitical and geographical position (including geo-economic position, e.g. whether a country is part of the poor South or rich North, or in Europe, whether it belongs to the Nordic countries or the infamous PIGS group, see below), can be effected through cooperation with the countries of the target region, which serves as a model for the perception of a given state. In this contribution, I will also address the symbolic dimension of membership in international organisations, primarily in the EU.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF GEOPOLITICAL LOCATION

In the present paper I draw upon the foundations of constructivism in the theory of international relations, which is grounded in the views of A. Wendt on the perception of state identity. In essence, Wendt’s reflections on this identity bring to mind the discussion on the image and perception of states. What is relevant to the ensuing analysis is Wendt’s assumption that the state has a collective identity because “the material basis” of the state identity is composed of “many bodies and the territory”. Wendt goes on to argue that the state “does not even have a ‘body’ if its members do not share

¹¹ T.J. Biersteker, *State, Sovereignty and Territory*. (in:) W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B. Simmons (ed.), *Handbook of International Relations*. Second Edition. Los Angeles: Sage. 2013, p. 259.

¹² T. J. Biersteker, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

a common narrative about themselves as a corporate actor”¹³. Based on the idea of “a common narrative”, the state, especially its executive, creates multiple strategies of public diplomacy and nation branding. The narratives which stage the location of a given state are not effective if they are not shared by its citizens. Polarized societies can also represent different “local narratives”. The narrative on belonging to Europe (Western Europe) can be contrasted with the “Eastern European” narrative while the Nordic narrative (see below) with the regional (Central European) one. However, within the constructivist approaches, there is also strong emphasis on the territory as an element constituting the state. In Wendt’s view, “if there is no territory, there is no state”: “the state is a place”.¹⁴

Wendt’s idea of “a common narrative” is grounded in Anderson’s understanding of the nation as an imagined community. Under this approach, the nation “imagines” the existence of a community, that is of the nation itself. One of the elements of this imagination is the territory, understood both as a real “place” delineated by state borders and as “an imagined territory”. In the extreme cases of expansionary policies, it can take on the form of “living space”, which, if it is to be seized, can trigger war, as exemplified by the German idea of *Lebensraum*.¹⁵ While the concepts of “living space” were put into practice through conquests by large countries, medium-sized and small states, in their branding campaigns, develop the idea of belonging to “imagined territories” that have a positive reputation in the international community. This way, they enhance their prestige in international relations, which allows them to achieve greater status than one resulting solely from their hard resources.

“An imagined territory” also entails identification with a region which embodies values that a given state finds desirable. Under the constructivist approach, the staging of a state’s geopolitical location can thus mean redefining a collective identity. When a given country incorporates the values of the region to which it aspires, it “shifts” geographically in the symbolic dimension. This is manifested, for example, in political discourse. This process is emphasised by both Adler (who develops the idea of “imagined security communities”) and Wendt:

“The territorial nature of states does not exclude the expansion of the sense of their ‘self’ by incorporating other states, thereby defining their interests in a more collective way. In this case, territorial boundaries would take on the meaning proposed by Locke or Kant that would still differentiate the state, at the same time locating it in larger “cognitive regions”¹⁶ (Adler 1997a) in which countries cooperate to achieve common goals.”¹⁷

¹³ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999 [Polish translation: A. Wendt, *Spoleczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2008, p. 212].

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹⁵ *Lebensraum* “was perceived as space for settlement, maintenance, culture and the exploitation of raw materials. In the ideology and politics of geo-politicians the space was real as well as mystic and idealistic” according to A. Wolff-Powęska and E. Schulz, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

¹⁶ E. Adler, *Imagined (Security) Communities. Cognitive Regions in International Relations*. “Millennium. Journal of International Studies”, 26 (2), 1997, pp. 249-277.

¹⁷ A. Wendt, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

In this context, Poland is a case which lends itself well to construction. First, its central position in Europe makes it possible to construct a message about the state's geographical position. According to Wendt, "(...) even if the placement of territorial boundaries is clear and unchanged, their social significance can vary"¹⁸. This means a symbolic "shifting" of the state: such as, for example, after 1989 from the east of Europe to the west, and after 2008 to the north. The east to west direction was strengthened by Poland's entry into NATO in 1999 and into the EU in 2004. However, these processes are dynamic as they are linked with subjective perception and, in addition, they are subject to all changes that occur in international relations. Also possible is backward location; that is, a state's return to the previously occupied symbolic space due to the change of political regime and strategic alliances.

In contrast to realistic geopolitics, a state's geopolitical position, viewed from the perspectives of the spatial turn, changes only symbolically. There are no proposals for border changes. It is the state's international identity that undergoes change and efforts are undertaken to shape the state's perception by linking it with a new geopolitical region: a symbolic "shift" on the map occurs. This shift can also be understood, in accordance with Adler's approach, as identification with "a transnational and non-territorial" region, where values perceived as valuable or desirable prevail.¹⁹ These include, for example, a supranational network of interrelated knots which can include countries or non-governmental organisations. Such regions can also take on a specifically situated dimension: in the case of Poland, two regions earned this status: the EU from 2004 and the Scandinavian (Nordic) states between 2008 and 2015. For Adler, Scandinavia is one of the regions described as "security communities", that is "transnational cognitive regions whose people possess collective identities, and share other regulatory and normative structures". If we follow the author's view that these "shared cognitive structures, such as liberal civic cultures, provide purpose, meaning and direction to material structures and power resources, and help to constitute and reproduce common interests",²⁰ then we receive an explanation of one of the reasons for "state shifting" on the map and backward location. Especially in societies that are strongly divided in terms of identity and core values there can appear a problem of incoherent and "migrating" locations which are determined by the rhythm of elections. This is called swinging location, which, if translated into branding efforts, can contribute to the loss of the state's international credibility since every swing ushers in another set of values, forming the basis of a given state's identity.

The states' stakeholders usually do not have sufficient knowledge or interest in its affairs to gain a better understanding of and insight into the country that undergoes swings in location. Conversely, such processes contribute to an incoherent image abroad and pose a threat to credibility. Such credibility is earned when states connect not only with "imagined security structures" but also with the genuine (territorial) structures, such as (for the countries of Central-Eastern Europe) the EU or NATO

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ E. Adler, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 276.

whose members share “regulatory and normative structures”. Poland’s entry to both of these institutions soon boosted its image through its identification as a Member State and its location within these two organisations.

According to Adler, “community regions” are supra-territorial in nature. In this contribution I will focus on territorially defined regions whose values are so attractive that association with them is a constitutive element of the state’s desired image. This is the first understanding of space construction. The second one concerns the size of the country or, more precisely, its international role as a small or medium-sized state until it reaches or assigns itself the status of a middle (medium range) power. The above introduction also leads to the conclusion that “the spatial turn” in the theory of international relations inevitably brings attention to discourse. In the present paper I concentrate on political discourse, notably on frames (schemes) which occur in discourse as well as on metaphors.

CENTRAL EUROPE COMES BACK TO EUROPE

The location of a state, as understood here, in the first place means its intentional symbolic shift on the map, towards the region to which a given state aspires or with which it identifies. Such shifts are more feasible for small and middle-rank countries. A central position, as is the case with Poland in the centre of Europe, facilitates such shifts, yet for the same reason this can change due to the intentional efforts of other countries which use hard resources, such as war. To ensure international security, states not only use location but, as appropriate, they change their narratives on the size of their territory and resources.

In terms of hard resources, Poland fits the model of a middle-rank country which after 2004 sought to play the role of a middle power. This was not linked with any narrative that would change the perception of the size of its territory. In the case of small countries, such as the Baltic states, the acceptance of a small territory and population prevails. Their branding campaigns are not designed to change the perception of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as small countries. However, it is emphasised that their location can also be an asset and that the existence of small countries in international relations is natural as “Goliath cannot exist without David”.²¹ In their branding campaigns, small and middle-rank countries promote their economic achievements to show that they are economically stronger than other small states. In Central Europe, these countries keep an eye on visibility and gain it by employing soft power tools to signal their hard geopolitical position, as is the case with Poland situated between Germany and Russia.

The idea that international visibility (which is only partially linked with international presence, and consequently with active engagement in the efforts of the international community) improves the state’s security was explicitly articulated by

²¹ *One Country, One System, Many Stories*. 2015. <http://brand.estonia.eu/en/home>, (accessed 18 May 2015).

Lithuania.²² Nation branding is related to the state's security, especially in the case of Central-Eastern Europe as in this region spatial thinking is dominated by geopolitics and a turn to the past. M. Kuus goes further and points to the link between geopolitics and identity in this region. Both relationships, which result from the experiences of the Central-Eastern European countries, have an impact on the metaphors that occur in the discourse on the position and international role of these countries. Since these metaphors indicate favoured or avoided geographical directions, which entail positive or negative associations, they will be categorised as orientational metaphors, as in Lakoff and Johnson.²³

In the aforementioned publication, Adler used the example of the Eastern European countries (he also indicated how this region was classified in the mid-1990s) to show how “imagined communities” and “security communities” work:

“Since the end of the Cold War, the states of Eastern Europe, including Russia, have been knocking at the doors of the institutions that symbolically and materially represent this North Atlantic community – the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe and even the Western European Union (WEU). These countries are seeking an avenue through which they can exert an influence on politics in the ‘West’, as well as reap the benefits of Western markets by becoming full members of a political community (...). From the perspective of the states already organised in this North Atlantic security community, new members can be admitted only after the ‘applicants’ have learned and internalised their norms. For the original members, ‘it’s not enough to behave like us, you have to be one of us’”²⁴.

“A return to Europe” is an orientational metaphor which commonly occurs in Central and Eastern Europe as the slogan of the velvet revolutions and singing revolutions (in the Baltic states) as well as of the Ukrainian Maidan in late 2013 to 2014. Both in 1989 and in later years, the original metaphor of “return” was soon replaced by the belief shared by these countries about their belonging to Europe, which is expressed by the metaphor “We are Europe”, not only in geographical terms but also as “an imagined Europe”. If integration aspirations are to be understood as attempts to join “the normative space”,²⁵ this return meant symbolic recognition as a European state, frequently as a “normal” European state. There is no doubt, however, that throughout the post-1989 revolution, the western countries had the power to decide what was normal in Europe. Thus, it is the normative power of a western state or a group of states that decided (as argued by Adler) whether the countries of Central Europe were already “one of us” or not yet; or, in other words, who is and who is not Europe. As a result of this process, the early branding campaigns of the states which intended to join NATO and the EU in 2004 emphasised

²² B. Ociepka, *A New Brand for Postcommunist Europe*. (in:) C. Victorin, J. Gienow-Hecht, A. Estner, M. Will (ed.) *Nation Branding in Modern History*. New York: Berghahn Books. 2018, p. 201.

²³ G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 1980 [Polish translation: *Metafory w naszym życiu*. Warsaw: PIW. 1988, p. 36ff].

²⁴ E. Adler, *op cit.* p. 256.

²⁵ M. Kuus, *op. cit.*, p. X.

not so much the distinctive features of the aspiring countries but their similarity to the “old” members of these organisations. This appears to run counter to the idea of branding.²⁶ In 2003, Poland ran a branding campaign with regard to the fact that if France was to hold an accession referendum on whether Poland should join the EU, the accession process would be halted because most of the French were opposed to Poland’s membership. At that time, Poland’s branding messages said: “We are just like you, we are Europe”.

For Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, their entry into the EU in 2004 did not symbolically conclude the process of “a return to Europe”. At that time, these countries were named “New Europe” (which is another orientational metaphor) by Donald Rumsfeld just before the US intervention in Iraq.²⁷ Within the EU itself, at least until 2014, they were perceived as “anti-Russian western neophytes”. Their geopolitically conditioned russophobia was for many years an obstacle to being recognised by the countries of Western Europe as “just like us”. A change in this regard occurred only after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. These developments revised the reasons for “New Europe’s” fear of Russia.

The idea of “a return to Europe” has its geographical dimension (in terms of both traditional and “imagined” geography), which came to light in the branding campaigns of the Central and Eastern European countries. It entails identification with Europe (implicitly, Western) as a desired community or imagined space. The post-communist countries of Central Europe had been seeking to join Europe by establishing regional cooperation. In the cases under discussion, this meant that cooperation was established first within the Baltic states or the Visegrád Group and then, inter alia, within the Weimar Triangle. After joining the EU and NATO, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia made efforts (also within their branding campaigns) to change their perception from being Baltic states to being Nordic states. This change meant that these countries sought to reject the post-communist image of the former Soviet republics situated on the Baltic Sea in order to join the desired space of northern Europe, which especially after the 2008 crisis was perceived as an area of normality as well as political and economic stability. In the case of Lithuania, that change was recommended by the Saffron and Wally Olins consultancies, which offered advice on the development of the country’s economic image. In a Saffron guide, which focuses on Lithuania, there is an explicit recommendation:

“Our considered recommendation – and we would give the same advice to Latvia or Estonia – is to cease, as much as possible, using the word ‘Baltic’ in cultural contexts and begin using it only in geographic, naturalistic, commercial and occasionally political contexts”²⁸.

²⁶ For more, cf. B. Ociepka, *Poland’s New Ways...*, p. 73.

²⁷ Rumsfeld znów dzieli sojuszników, mówiąc o starej i nowej Europie. “Gazeta Wyborcza” 11 June 2003.

²⁸ Saffron Brand Consultants. *Selling Lithuania Smartly: A Guide to the Creative-Strategic Development of an Economic Image of the Country*. 2009, p. 88.

Following the 2008 crisis, identification with northern Europe meant emphasising healthy foundations of the state's economy. Although Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were hard hit by the consequences of the crisis, they soon rebuilt their economic stability and Estonia based its image on the new technologies sector in the economy. Estonia was an exception among the three states on the Baltic as it deliberately referred simultaneously to the values of the West and East, which were found equally valid to the Estonian identity. In their branding efforts, Estonian governments also attempted to work towards deeper integration of its ethnic Estonian and Russian citizens.²⁹

The construction of space is not solely restricted to the states on the Baltic. Slovenia also employed branding to become symbolically "separated" from the former Yugoslavia (which was identified with the politically volatile and economically underdeveloped Balkans) to connect with the "normal" part of Europe through EU membership.³⁰

WHERE IS POLAND?

I have already argued that Poland's central position in Europe, defined as fate in geopolitics, becomes a virtue under constructivist approaches. This position allows for a state's symbolic shift, in line with the prevailing narrative about belonging to "imagined regions". The analysis of the major trends of Polish foreign policy after 1989 shows that the eastern direction has been excluded largely due to the great involvement of the Polish media, with their traditional anti-Russian bias. After 2004, Poland emphasised its European identity, strengthened by its entry into the EU, by focusing first on Central Europe. Also highlighted were relations with the Baltic states (Poland's Baltic identity, which did not, however, mean that the country was part of the Baltic states), which located Poland in the north of Europe because following the 2008 economic crisis, "Nordic" became a desired identity in Europe. A good example of increased cooperation with the Scandinavian countries was a Polish-Swedish joint proposal for an Eastern Partnership within the European Neighbourhood Policy. As a result, in the last stages of the Civic Platform government, Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski emphasised Poland's relations with the Nordic states and this kind of Polish perception made its way into the European mainstream media.

After 2015, when Law and Justice (PiS) came to power and the EU flag was symbolically withdrawn from the sphere of government perception, one can put forward a hypothesis that Poland came back to Central Europe as an imagined territory,

²⁹ G. Szondi, *Filary zarządzania reputacją: dyplomacja publiczna w Europie Wschodniej z perspektywy public relations*. (in:) B. Ociepka (ed.), *Dyplomacja publiczna*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2008, p. 83.

³⁰ Z. Volčič, *Branding Slovenia: 'You Can't Spell Slovenia Without Love...'* (in:) N. Kaneva (ed.), *Branding Post-Communist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the "New" Europe*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 152.

which is epitomised by the concept of “Intermarium” or the Three Seas Initiative. After 2015, emphasis on Poland’s cooperation within the Visegrád Group symbolised its orientation towards the countries of Central Europe. Long-term research on the mutual perception of Poles and German found in 2018 that Poland was again more frequently perceived by Germans as belonging to Eastern Europe. According to the Polish-German Barometer surveys by the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP), in 2018, 20% of Germans associated Poland with “Eastern Europe, a country, a European Union member state”, as compared to 16% in 2016.³¹

In the case of Poland, I will begin with the content analysis of annual foreign policy addresses. It will allow us to focus on the definition of Poland’s geopolitical position (included in these reports) and, most of all, how it has evolved over the years. The strategies of foreign policy and the foreign ministers’ addresses that are based on them are – just like branding campaigns – social constructs. As they result from social processes, they reflect how a state’s identity is conceived of by its elites. The deconstruction of such documents is designed to search for metaphors which embody the territorial understanding of Poland’s identity and its geopolitical position. Following Lakoff and Johnson’s classical taxonomy (as already shown above), I will attempt to check whether this identity and position are conceptualized by orientational metaphors (which provide a spatial orientation to concepts) and structural metaphors, in which concepts are metaphorically understood in terms of other concepts.³²

NEIGHBOURS, VISEGRÁD AND THE THREE SEAS. POLAND RETURNS TO THE EAST

Poland’s geopolitical position was already mentioned in the first speech of the foreign affairs minister after the 1989 upheaval, that is, in the address by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who stressed that in 1990 “Poland’s place both politically and militarily is significant”.³³ In 1994, Minister Andrzej Olechowski made Poland’s political and economic situation in Europe dependent on “the relation with the Communities”,³⁴ having in mind the European Communities, as did Władysław Bartoszewski in 1995.³⁵ In 1994-1995, the Western orientation was already very clear. In the annual

³¹ *Barometr Polska – Niemcy. Polacy i Niemcy. Dzieląca przeszłość, wspólna przyszłość? Wyniki Barometru Polska-Niemcy 2018*. Hamburg-Warsaw: Körber Stiftung, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Fundacja Adenauera, 2018, p. 4. According to the ISP project coordinator Agnieszka Łada, this association occurs more frequently in 2016 than in the years 2013-2015.

³² G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, *op. cit.* p. 36ff, p. 86ff.

³³ The address delivered during the North Atlantic Assembly on 29 November 1990 (in:) K. Skubiszewski, *Polityka zagraniczna i odzyskanie niepodległości. Przemówienia, oświadczenia, wywiady 1989-1993*. Warsaw: Interpress, 1999, p. 100.

³⁴ The government’s report on the main trends of Polish foreign policy in 1994. 12 May 1994. <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/>, (accessed 30 June 2012).

³⁵ Foreign Affairs Minister Władysław Bartoszewski’s address on the main trends of Polish foreign policy in 1995. 24 May 1995. <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/>, (accessed: 30 June 2012).

foreign policy addresses, the focus shifted from the construction of Poland's position first in Central-Eastern Europe, through Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe (the 1999 address) to Europe. Since Poland joined NATO, emphasis has been placed on the broader context of Poland building its position within the Alliance. In his 2003 address, Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz described Poland as "a participant of the world process" in view of the upcoming EU membership.³⁶ In 2007, Anna Fotyga stressed that Poland was "an important Member State in the European Union", which, inter alia, acted on behalf of "medium-sized and small states".³⁷ In 2008, Minister Radosław Sikorski spoke about Poland's global role thanks to EU membership and such initiatives as, for example, the Community of Democracies.³⁸ In 2009, he defined Poland as "a predictable partner in Europe".

As indicated several times, the 2008 was a milestone for developing the perception of the small and medium-sized EU member states analysed here. The economic crisis, which primarily affected the Southern European EU countries (PIGS was the acronym used to refer to Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain – the countries with the greatest debt), changing the way they were perceived. After 2008, Poland, unlike Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, was not hit by the recession. This success, which was initially underestimated in Europe and worldwide, was promoted in the international community by the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who called Poland "a green island" in a sea of European recession. This is one of the best known metaphors of that period relating to positive associations with the green colour as the symbol of healthy growth and the sea, which is conceptualised as the realm of the unpredictable, and at the same time of something which is widespread and pervasive, that is the area of the 2008 recession.

The continuous growth of the Polish economy, since EU accession, is to date the most positive message about Poland which has inspired state branding messages. It brought positive results; for example, it eradicated negative connotations associated with the "Polish economy" stereotype (*polnische Wirtschaft*), which had been deeply rooted in the German-speaking countries for a long time. For the sake of completeness, it should also be remembered that the "green island" metaphor was met with criticism in Poland because the positive economic experiences it epitomised were not shared by all Poles after 1989. As a result, the metaphor of Poland's positive positioning in Europe was internally rejected and employed in domestic discourse primarily to criticise the Civic Platform, which was in power until 2015. However, this metaphor is still present in the international discourse because outside Poland it reflects the real perception of the growth of the Polish economy after 1989. Through an understanding

³⁶ The annual foreign policy address in 2003, 2 January 2003, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/>, (accessed: 30 June 2012).

³⁷ Foreign Affairs Minister Anna Fotyga's address on the Polish foreign policy in 2007, 11 May 2007 <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/>, (accessed: 30 June 2012).

³⁸ Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski's address on the Polish foreign policy in 2008, 7 May 2008. <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/>, (accessed: 30 June 2012).

of the significance of its rejection, it would be possible to show the foreign stakeholders of the Polish branding efforts how the Poles' basic narratives about Poland vary.

The good economic situation in 2008 and in subsequent years was associated with the developments in northern Europe, especially in the Scandinavian countries. At that time, Poland tightened cooperation with Sweden within the Eastern Partnership project. For Poland, the model of the Scandinavian states was synonymous with achieving the status of a good citizen of the international community. These countries, small in terms of size and population but economically strong and associated with welfare, were able to attain an international position which was higher than it would result from their hard resources. They owed this to their foreign policies, which emphasised efforts on behalf of peace (Norway) and development cooperation (Norway and Sweden). As a result, the Scandinavian countries usually ranked high in nation brand indexes, such as Simon Anholt's Nation Brand Index and Good Country Index.³⁹ What was northern in the Europe of 2008 was viewed as normal and, from the Polish perspective, as desirable. The North had become an orientational metaphor, which set the desired "geographical" direction of Poland's location. Focusing on the northern direction after 2008 occurred not only in Poland; also the international media began to associate Poland with its desired region. For example, in 2012 "Spiegel Online" noted that:

"Tusk and Sikorski (...) assume a leading role (of Poland – BO) in the northern alliance of Europe's economically sound countries, and they have the support of their fellow Poles."⁴⁰

A year later "The New York Times" commented:

"Warsaw is much closer to Germany and other North European countries. Unlike France, these countries support structural reforms in order to bolster Europe's competitiveness."⁴¹

Between 2008 and 2014, the northern position as well as belonging to the imagined community of the Nordic welfare states became desirable values for Poland. This was confirmed, for example, in a survey of 40 representatives of the Polish elites and think tanks, conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations shortly before the 2015 parliamentary election. When asked about the best partners for cooperation on European issues, the Polish respondents opted for Germany (in first place),

³⁹ In 2017, Sweden was ranked in the top ten in the *Anholt Nation Brand Index* and its rankings grew. According to the Good Country Index, also by Simon Anholt, the top ten included not only Sweden but also Norway. For more, see: *Nation Brand Index* <https://nation-brands.gfk.com/>; *Good Country Index*: <https://goodcountry.org/index/results>.

⁴⁰ E. Follath, J. Puhl, *Poland emerges as a Central European powerhouse. The miracle next door*. Spiegel Online, 25 May 2012. www.spiegel.de/international/europe/poland-has-become-the-success-story-of-eastern-europe-a-834413.html (accessed 13 September 2020).

⁴¹ J. Dempsey, *Poland and France Move Toward a Europe Less Dependent on U.S.* "The New York Times" online version, 8 March 2013. www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/eur. (accessed 13 September 2020).

followed by Sweden, Lithuania, Estonia and Romania. The Visegrád countries did not top the list.⁴² However, the northern (Nordic) position did not mean that Poland emphasised belonging to the Baltic states. Conversely, even though the Baltic Sea as the northern border is important in Polish foreign policy and constitutive to the Polish national identity, “Baltic” is not a value invoked in Poland’s branding campaigns (besides tourism and economy).

The government’s documents on Poland’s nation branding, which contain basic elements of Poland’s self-image, show that by 2015 the Baltic region was perceived as more of an area of tourism growth, stripped of any political context. According to “The Directions for Poland’s Promotion until 2015” Poland, thanks to its central position, was to serve as a natural meeting place for the Baltic region. After the 2015 presidential election, this region was mentioned in the first address by the new Polish president, Andrzej Duda, who called for new cooperation among the states “from the Baltic to the Adriatic”. According to President Duda, such cooperation was to strengthen Poland’s international position.⁴³ In the annual foreign policy addresses, Ministers of Foreign Affairs usually refer to the Baltic Sea states as Poland’s partners while the region itself is mentioned as one of the key areas. In the strategy of Polish foreign policy for 2012-2016, the North (viewed literally as a geographical direction and also metaphorically as a direction of international cooperation) was mentioned as the third vector of foreign policy behind the western and eastern, and ahead of the southern.⁴⁴

What is important in determining Poland’s location are frequent references to the metaphor “Poland from sea to sea” in public discourse. This metaphor is derived from the Polish conservative-nationalist mythology and originated in the Jagiellonian period, when Poland, a 15th and 16th century European power, stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea.⁴⁵ The metaphor expresses Poland’s aspirations to become a superpower within the region by referring to the period when the state (at that time called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) occupied the largest area in its history. From the perspective of Lakoff and Johnson’s taxonomy this is, however, an atypical metaphor as it does not allow assigning an unequivocal value to “the sea”. Yet, given the cultural background of its origin, we know that “from sea to sea” means from North to South, but in this case neither of these directions carries positive or negative values. The metaphor rather signals a change in the axis of Poland’s location: a shift from East-West to North-South.

⁴² J. Janning, *Poland: Europe’s unlikely influencer*. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_poland_europes_unlikely_influencer_7028. 19 May 2016, (accessed 20 June 2016).

⁴³ Address by the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, before the National Assembly on 6 August 2015. <http://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/art,1,oredzie-prezydenta-rp-andrzeja-dudy-przed-zgromadzeniem-narodowym.html>. (accessed 14 August 2015)

⁴⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. *Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2012-2016*. Warsaw, March 2012, p. 19.

⁴⁵ M. Nurek, *Klimaty polityczne w rejonie Bałtyku przed i po wybuchu drugiej wojny światowej*, (in:) *Bałtyk w polityce polskiej w tysiącleciu*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2000, p. 182.

In the breakthrough year of 2015, Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna located Poland, without any doubt, in Europe understood as the EU. In his annual address, he defined northern Europe as a synonym of “innovation, responsibility, good management, and financial stability”.⁴⁶ After the change of power in 2015, the new minister, Witold Waszczykowski, delivered two addresses. In 2016, he emphasised that Poland was part of Europe. Given all changes of Polish governments and foreign ministers that occurred from 2004 to 2018, Poland’s location in Europe, without the pre-modifiers “central” or “central-eastern”, was a constant element of these addresses.

In 2016, Waszczykowski strongly emphasised the implications of Poland’s position between East and West. He revisited the definition of Poland’s location in Central Europe and – thanks to the cooperation within the Visegrád Group – Central and Eastern Europe. Poland was labelled as a part of “our region” contrasted with “old Europe”. Hence, 2016 saw the return of the once-criticised division of Europe, introduced by Rumsfeld in 2003:

“An integral component of Poland’s European policy is regional cooperation. We have high hopes for it but we also notice problems which we are going to face (...). The idea of greater European integration or the so-called ‘small Schengen’ is primarily targeted at the countries of ‘old Europe’. Our region is not included. We will be opposed to such solutions.”

In the same speech, Waszczykowski made a reference to the new location on the North-East axis:

“This government will be pursuing a regional policy grounded in the special position of Poland in Europe. Our country unites two large European areas: the Baltic Sea region in the broad sense and Central Europe including the Baltic States up to the Adriatic Sea. Not only will we become engaged in various formats of cooperation within the particular regions but as a country we will also be seeking to bring the north and south of Europe closer together so that they would create a new regional identity within the European Union. In the area of politics, this approach is reflected by the aforementioned summit of nine Central and Eastern European leaders in Bucharest organised on the initiative of Poland and Romania, our key regional ally. In the area of economy and transport (or infrastructure), we will make every effort to make Via Carpathia a network connecting various parts of Europe.”⁴⁷

As a result, the 2017 address included the concept of the Three Seas. For the second time the notion of the region as a part of Europe was invoked. The address also emphasised cooperation within the Visegrád Group as well as with the Baltic and Bal-

⁴⁶ The Foreign Affairs Minister’s address on the objectives of Polish foreign policy in 2015 https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/ministerstwo/historia/ministrowie_sz_1918_2018/wystapienia_grzegorza_schetyny/informacja_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_o_zadaniach_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej_w_2015_roku, (accessed 13 March 2016).

⁴⁷ The Foreign Affairs Minister’s address on the objectives of Polish foreign policy in 2016. 29 January 2016. https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose2016/expose_2016 (accessed 14 January 2017).

kan states. In the context of security, the foreign minister used the phrase “our entire area” “situated between the Baltic, Adriatic and the Black Seas”.⁴⁸

In Minister Czaputowicz's address of 2018, Poland was still defined within the EU framework, but also as “largest country in the region”. In the section devoted to security, the minister used the phrase “Poland and Central-Eastern Europe”, which could suggest that Poland did play such a role in this region. That address also strongly emphasised regional cooperation within the Visegrád Group and within the Three Seas Initiative in its new format. The change in the conceptualisation of Central Europe (this term also occurred in Czaputowicz's report) was reflected in a shift in the geographic dimension of cooperation: from East-West to North-South. This is confirmed by the fact that the Visegrád Group countries have been looking forward to cooperation with the Scandinavian countries. Thus, after 2016, the annual foreign policy addresses, which set the tone for Poland's foreign policy narrative, indicate the country's relocation to Central Europe. This approach emphasises Europe's regionality and once again separates the countries of Central Europe from “old Europe”. A new region in Europe emerges from the 2016 and 2017 addresses, a region to be led by Poland as the largest country: not yet a large country, but the largest one in the region.

Developed after the 2015 parliamentary election, the new “Strategy of Polish Foreign Policy 2017-2021” includes a new definition of Poland's geopolitical position with a prominent role ascribed to the Baltic region:

“Poland is situated in Europe's focal point at the junction of two geopolitical tectonic plates: Western Europe, with NATO and the European Union being its institutional face, and Eastern Europe, which is largely dominated by Russia. The Republic of Poland is a keystone on the North-South axis, between the broadly understood Baltic region, Central Europe and the Balkan states as well as the Adriatic and Black Sea areas. This location is a source of problems but it also provides a unique opportunity to strengthen our country's international position.”⁴⁹

The metaphor of Poland's position at “the junction of two geopolitical tectonic plates” adds a dramatic dimension to “The Strategy”. It brings to mind an earthquake, which in this case must occur at the junction of Western and Eastern Europe. In 2018, the “geopolitical earthquake” metaphor became increasingly common; for example, it was invoked in an article by Jerzy Baczyński, the editor-in-chief of the “Polityka” weekly magazine:

“We are witnessing a geopolitical earthquake: the Euro-Atlantic tectonic plate, which has so far stabilised the entire planet, is now bursting and extending.”

⁴⁸ The Foreign Affairs Minister's address on the objectives of Polish foreign policy in 2017. http://msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/minister_witold_waszczykowski_o_prioritetach_polskiej_dplomacji_w_2017_roku, (accessed 12 December 2017).

⁴⁹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. *Strategia polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2017-2021*. www.msz.gov.pl, (accessed 20 December 2017).

In the above example, however, the metaphor applies to Euro-Atlantic relations.⁵⁰

A similar definition will not be found in the previous document of 2012 entitled “The Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy 2012-2016”. Searching for metaphors that would fit the patterns “Poland is...” or “Poland as a country...” does not bring any results. In this case, it seems more useful to search for interpretative frames. This is because that document was written from the perspective of Poland as an EU Member State and for this reason it was permeated by the spirit of “Europeanness”. It outlines the objectives of Polish foreign policy from the perspective of an EU Member State, which also aspires to play a significant role in this organisation. Implicit in this document is the metaphor of Poland as an EU key Member State. The second important frame is economic in nature. In the “Priorities”, Poland’s geographical position is considered primarily from the economic perspective. The document shows potential benefits that arise from Poland’s position on both the East-West and the North-South axes. It also emphasises the advantageous position between the Baltic and Adriatic Seas, not so much in geopolitical but economic terms. Also the old-new Europe divide is addressed in the economic context.⁵¹

In the 2012 document, of primary importance is the growth of Poland as an EU Member State and the economic factor. In the first part of the 2017 document, the predominant approach sees Poland as a NATO member, yet the economic factor is still highly relevant. Both documents address the issue of the relatively poor global location of Poland. The 2017 document includes a definition of the expected image of Poland as a country engaged in development cooperation.

“Poland should strive to achieve the status of a country which is clearly perceived as a provider of ‘international public goods’, a country which is not only a ‘recipient’ but also a ‘donor’ of stability.”⁵²

Both strategic documents contain passages on the image of Poland. They are lacking in orientational metaphors, which are components of state location; however, they present foundations upon which Poland’s external image is to be built.

It remains to be seen whether the orientational and structural metaphors that conceptualise Poland’s location also occur in documents devoted to public diplomacy and the Poland brand. The analysis will once again be based on the governments’ and governmental agencies’ documents issued after 2004. One of them is a 2014 policy paper of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute (hereinafter AMI), which is the main institution of Polish cultural diplomacy. The cited documents are devoted to the promotion of Poland (promotion is still a predominant term in the language of the governmental documents that address the issues of public diplomacy and branding). As was the case

⁵⁰ J. Baczyński, *Nieznosna lekkość słów*. “Polityka” 12 June 2018 <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnik-polityka/kraj/1752054,1,nieznosna-lekkosc-slow.read>, (accessed 20 June 2018).

⁵¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. *Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2012-2016*. Warsaw, March 2012.

⁵² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. *Strategia...*

with the strategy of foreign policy, two documents will be discussed here: the first from the time of the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party coalition government before 2015, the other one written after the 2015 election won by PiS. There are no such documents from the period of the first PiS-led coalition government (formed 2005-2007 with the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence) since at that time there were no institutions or governmental strategies in the field of nation branding. In the ensuing analysis, I will draw upon reports on public diplomacy (from 2010-2015), the government's official promotional brochures available online and addressed to foreigners (in English). As was the case with the governmental documents, I will focus on the identification of metaphors and interpretative frames which define Poland's geopolitical position and its role in international relations.

The AMI's mission, which fits the idea of "the end of geography" was stated in 2004 as follows: "To keep making Poland credible as an irreplaceable link of the international flow of high quality ideas, values and cultural assets".⁵³

This statement includes the metaphor of Poland as a link in a global network thus, this is a case of defining a state in a non-territorial manner which comes through when it serves as a link of "the international flow of high quality ideas, values and cultural assets". This is the first such a clear-cut case of Poland's network location, which seems to be following the direction outlined by Biersteker. This document is also a proof of the economisation of Polish foreign policy before 2015, under which the state can be perceived as "a desired provider of high quality content for international cultural exchange".⁵⁴ In this perspective, a state's territory is a secondary concern. Poland's influence as a state on the network of "international cultural exchange" involves the provision of high quality cultural products, i.e. content.

According to "The Directions for Poland's Promotion until 2015", a document adopted in 2009, Poland "is in search of a new place on the map of international political relations". One of the results of this "search" is the location of the state, which, as stated above, is progressing prominently after 2009. "The map of international political relations" is a metaphor of the international setting which carries geopolitical entailments. It focuses on the fact that in the document adopted 20 years after the 1989 upheaval, Poland is defined as a country "in search of" a place, and not one with a specific position. In the description of this process, we first learn what Poland is not doing: it does not aspire "to be a self-proclaimed leader of the region". In fact, what we have here is double negation; "not aspiring" to be "a self-proclaimed leader" can be regarded as a signal (reaction testing) of aspirations hidden in the metaphor of "regional leader". According to the document, it is the region which underwent a transformation after 1989 in Central-Eastern Europe.⁵⁵

⁵³ Instytut Adama Mickiewicza, *Strategie dziedzin i megaprojektów w latach 2014-2017*. Warsaw: IAM.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

The 2016 directions for promotion define Poland as “a secure, large, stable and intriguing country in the centre of Europe”. For the purposes of the present paper, two elements of this definition are noteworthy: Poland as “a large country” and Poland as “a country in the centre of Europe”. This is one of the rare cases of defining Poland as a large country in the government’s promotional documents. In this case, this goes hand in hand with security and stability, which like “intriguing”, should be regarded as components of a desired image. I have chosen to verify this definition in a short survey administered to students attending classes in English (most of them were international students)⁵⁶ in 2018 at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow and the University of Wroclaw. A total of 65% of the students approved the definition (the total of *I strongly agree* and *I agree* responses). For the Polish students, the approval percentage was higher, at 74. None of the respondents commented on Poland being called a large country although there were responses suggesting a lack of opinion (*I don’t know*).

The ideas from the 2009 and 2016 promotional documents were elaborated in what was called “Rules for Communicating the Poland Brand”. Its first edition was published in 2013, the second in 2016 in a “standardised” form, as defined in the title.⁵⁷ The first document takes as its starting point the definition of Poland’s position proposed by W. Olins in 2004: “Poland is a part of the West but it also understands the East”.⁵⁸ The authors of the document, in their search for phrases (metaphors) that would best describe Poland and could be employed in branding campaigns, referred to the country’s central position in Europe to emphasise that it translates into the “intensity” of Poland as its distinctive feature. As they argued, “we, Poles, are unable to stay in the middle; instead, very frequently we approach one of the extremes”. Applying geographical thinking in decoding this metaphor, in fact we arrive at a definition of, or a reason for, swinging location. The other document of 2016 does not feature metaphors that could be employed in state location.⁵⁹

The last document that will be analysed here is the English language brochure entitled *Discover Polska* (the first edition dated 2015), which was published online as a primer for those interested in Poland.⁶⁰ It provides basic information about Poland

⁵⁶ The sample consisted of 71 graduate students at the University of Wroclaw and Jagiellonian University. The survey was conducted in March and May 2018. The respondents were asked to provide answers ranging from “I strongly agree” to “I disagree”. They were also allowed to comment on the definition.

⁵⁷ The documents were respectively adopted by the Council for the Promotion of Poland, an intragovernmental body which operated until 2015 and the Inter-Ministerial Team for the Promotion of Poland Abroad, established in 2016.

⁵⁸ *Zasady komunikacji marki Polska* [Rules for Communicating the Poland Brand]. The document adopted by the Council for the Promotion of Poland in 2009, p. 6.

⁵⁹ The metaphors and frames investigated here are also not found in the “Public Diplomacy” reports of 2010-2015 as these documents are “technical” in nature and provide information about organised events and do not contain major messages. Thus, in terms of examples related to state location, they proved useless.

⁶⁰ These brochures began to be published online in 2014 and the last available edition was prepared in July 2017. In June 2018, the brochure was no longer available online and the URL discoverpolska.pl led to a clothing company’s website.

to target readers who hardly know anything about the country. Its introduction locates Poland “at the very heart of Europe”, which for the first time triggers the metaphor of the country as “the heart of Europe”. Not only does the metaphor highlight Poland’s geographical position (an orientational metaphor) but it also evokes warm associations with the heart and the energy of its beat. Without a heart there is no life, without Poland there is no Europe. The document also features the bridge metaphor: Poland is “a bridge between East and West”.⁶¹ “The bridge” requires explanation in this context because it does not occur for the first time in political discourse. In the early 1990s, the “bridge” metaphor was employed in Polish-German relations. It was thought, both on the Polish and German side, that the role of the “bridge” between Poles and Germans could be played by Silesia. At that time and in that context, this meant that Silesia, with its history and population, including a large proportion of the German minority, coupled with a strong sense of regionality, could play a positive role in overcoming hostility (i.e. intercultural barriers) between Poles and Germans as well as in interstate relations. Similar entailments can be found in the metaphor of Poland as “the bridge between East and West”. In 2015, this metaphor applied to the Polish efforts to serve as Ukraine’s ambassador in the EU. A similar function was held by Germany in Polish-European Communities relations after 1989: that period gave rise to the metaphor of Germany as the “ambassador” or “advocate” of Poland (and even the entire Central Europe)⁶² in its “return to Europe”, and finally in the process of European integration. In terms of country location, the metaphors of the “bridge”, “ambassador” and “advocate” serve as elements connecting the conflicting sides, with the focus of meaning on the process of agreement, and not on contrasts.

In the 2017 edition of *Discover Polska*, the sentence containing the metaphor of Poland as “a bridge between East and West” (*Poland has always been a bridge between the East and the West*) was shifted from the first page to the section on the foundations of Polish foreign policy. Given the two groups of orientational metaphors, Poland as a bridge and Poland “between the seas”, one can see a change in Poland’s location as a “bridge” from the East-West to the North-South axis. This results not only from a weakening of the concept of Poland as Ukraine’s ambassador after 2015 and further shifts in the country’s position, but also from redesigning Poland’s regional leadership in Central Europe. The new axis also shows a change in the perception of Central Europe and in the way to escape from assigning Poland to Eastern Europe.

CONCLUSION

Governments stage a geopolitical position, which is a component of the country’s desired image. Poland proves in this context to be a particularly suitable case for anal-

⁶¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, *Discover Polska 2015* (accessed 13 November 2015).

⁶² B. Koszel, *Niemcy-Polska-Unia Europejska: wspólne interesy i sprzeczności*. (in:) A. Wolff-Powęska and D. Bingen, *Polacy-Niemcy. Sąsiedztwo z dystansu*, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 2004, p. 34.

ysis. The assumption that a central position in Europe is conducive to the country's location has been confirmed. It also shows that it is possible to combine geopolitical arguments, rooted in realism, with location arguments which are derived from constructivist approaches. The process of Poland's location after 1989 took place first on the East-West axis, and after 2008 also on the North-South axis. In the latter case, this meant identification with the Nordic "imagined welfare community", and later with the Three Seas and Intermarium initiatives. The location of Poland is lacking in a global dimension with the exception of the above-mentioned extracts of the foreign policy addresses from 2003 and the 2011-2013-2015 period. Globalism and globalisation are of no concern to the Polish political elites and thus they rarely occur in metaphors. This makes Poles oblivious to events taking place outside their immediate neighbourhood. After 2015, strong emphasis on Poland's central position, as a chance and a threat, is also found in branding documents, which confirms the author's assumption that centralness can be staged.

State location occurs by the introduction into political discourse (first for internal and then for external purposes) of orientational metaphors, which in this case refer to geographical directions. If, according to Lakoff and Johnson, "happy is up" and "sad is down",⁶³ then in the processes of state location, given the examples of Poland and the Baltic States, "normal is in the North and West, abnormal (in the sense of the state's normality in the international community) is in the South and East" and "welfare is in the North, crisis is in the South".

The above analysis has confirmed that a central geographical position is conducive to the construction of a state's geopolitical position. The practices of small and middle-rank countries prove that, as is the case with Poland, they have limited tools for geopolitical location. To locate a country in line with the desired image, it is not enough to construct messages targeted at foreign audiences. Such a campaign needs to be preceded by real efforts geared towards gaining or maintaining international credibility. Only the combination of these two strategies provides the grounds for successful geopolitical location.

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Key words: location, return to Europe, geopolitics, European Union, Poland, branding.

ABSTRACT

The aim of the present paper is to introduce the concept of state location, understood as governmental policy aimed at the redefinition of the state's geopolitical position and its role in international relations, as framed by the processes of European integration.

The author begins her analysis with the assumption that public diplomacy and nation branding are the basic tools of state location. It is hypothesised that although the very idea of location

⁶³ G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 37

is deeply rooted in constructivism as a theory of international relations, it is not at odds with the realist approaches. To verify this hypothesis, the author confronts state location with the concept of the "spatial turn" in social sciences. She elaborates on the cases of Poland and the Baltic states. The author argues that Poland's central position as a middle rank country is a case that is suitable for location.

The author employs discourse analysis, indicating these narratives in Polish political discourse after 2004 which included orientational metaphors that shifted Poland from East to West and then to the North. Finally, the author proposes the concept of a swinging location, illustrating it with the example of Poland returning to Central Europe, "between the seas".

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THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG MEMBER STATES IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW. TWILIGHT OR RENAISSANCE?

INTRODUCTION

It has not, in recent years, been an isolated opinion that “behind what is by common consent called the ‘2015 migration crisis’, another crisis is concealed, namely the crisis of the European integration project, which is to a large extent based on a requirement for solidarity between the Member States which have decided to take part in that project”.¹ Even before the migration crisis it was written that the solidarity among Member States required by the Lisbon Treaty² in the area of asylum policy was being realised only to a very small extent³ and no one saw any threat to the existence and functioning of the European Union (EU) as a whole in this, either in objective or subjective terms. Five years have passed since the climax of the migration crisis and the undertaking of unprecedented measures in order to ameliorate it, which divided Member States. The EU has not, in either legal or political terms, changed from what it has been since the beginning of its existence, including the time of the European Communities. It is full of disagreements and at the same time there is much discussion of solidarity both in EU institutions and in Member States. No one seems to question solidarity either as a value and a principle within the legal and institutional system of the EU. By its very nature solidarity is treated as a “community value”.⁴ Speaking of solidarity means speaking about a community, even in some single, limited dimension. Making use then of the idea of “principle” in the context of a legal system must be accompanied by an awareness that principles limit the actions of those they apply

¹ Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 26 July 2017, C-643/15 and C-647/15, *Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union*, EU:C:2017:618 (hereinafter C-643/15 and C-647/15), pt. 24.

² Official Journal of the European Union. UE C 306 on 17 December 2007, p. 1.

³ Ch. Tuschhoff, *Internationale Beziehungen*, Konstanz – München 2015, p. 178.

⁴ Z. Brodecki, A. Łunecka-Bartkiewicz, *Spacer idei przez prawo*, “Gdańskie Studia Prawnicze” vol. XXXI, 2014, p. 62.

to (here Member States and EU institutions) and specify the intended results in terms of social realities,⁵ and therefore determine the outlines of acceptable discussion.

Keeping all this in mind, it is worth questioning the real place and role (“force”) of the principle of solidarity among Member States in the current EU. Any departure from it as a principle would doubtless mean the collapse of the EU. Public debate on the principle of solidarity whose result, as opposed to its course, is not known is not the same thing as questioning the principle of solidarity. It may, however, be an opportunity to recall the foundations upon which the EU was built and the goals set out for it. One of these is actually the principle of solidarity. There are no formal obstacles to attempting once more to fill it with meaning. That is why the goal of this article is to find an answer to the question (certainly felt by many to be somewhat provocative) of whether at present the situation can be described as the twilight or rather a renaissance of the legal principle of solidarity among Member States.

In relation to the above, the following areas will be analysed: the essence of the legal principle (definition, types and functions), the nature of the principles of the EU legal system, the qualification of solidarity in the EU legal system (the relations between value and the principle in terms of the Treaties of the European Union [hereinafter the Treaties], the manner of expression of the principles in the Treaties), the understanding of the principle of solidarity among Member States in doctrine and the judiciary as well as the role of this principle in the jurisprudence of EU courts and also its effectiveness and prospects (adherence by Member States, its place in deliberations on the future of the EU and new concepts). The hypothesis will be tested that, contrary to popular belief, the principle of solidarity among Member States has, at present, entered into one of its strongest periods in its history, both as a value and a principle of the legal systems of the European Communities and the EU. Theoretical and dogmatic legal methods will be used.

THE CONCEPT OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE

The dictionary definition of “principle” refers to, inter alia, “a law governing certain processes and phenomena; also: the formula clarifying the law”, “a standard of conduct”, “a manner of conduct established by law or custom in given circumstances” and “the basis for the functioning or creation of something”.⁶ A principle is then something that governs, standardises or is the effect of such actions. In the last of the meanings given here the special role of principles is apparent. The general understanding of the concept of “principle” is then close to the meanings it is given by jurists although the “legal principle” is defined in different ways and therefore is considered to be one

⁵ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. I)*, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” no. 8, 2009, p. 11.

⁶ *Słownik języka polskiego PWN*, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/zasada.html> (accessed 18 January 2019)

of the most poorly illuminated concepts in the science of law.⁷ Is the subject of analysis both in legal theory and in particular legal sciences.⁸

Representatives of the general science of law understand legal principles (the legal principles, principles of a system of law, principles of parts of a system of law) as norms contained in the applicable provisions of the law or flowing from them with logical consistency. The role of legal principles is to set the direction of development of a legal system or its parts, to highlight the essential properties of a legal system or its parts and to provide general interpretive guidelines for the entities interpreting the law. In this view, legal principles are norms of applicable law, whose meaning is fundamental for an entire system of law or its parts. Legal principles should express socio-political ideas which arise from the foundations of the system upon which a given society is based and from the social policy that is carried out within it. Legal postulates, however, should not be regarded as legal principles,⁹ which is the prevalent doctrinal view.¹⁰

Features of legal principles then include being binding in nature, having precedence over other norms in the legal system and having a special role in the legal system. Their binding nature is most often manifested in the fact that a given principle is explicitly expressed in a legal text, can be reproduced from a legal text or is based on an undisputed legal doctrine that recognises the principle as binding, with a simultaneous lack of provisions for excluding its application in a specific legal system. The precedence of principles of law may be expressed by a higher hierarchical position in the legal system, in particular in the case of legal principles formulated in constitutions. A principle may also have a hierarchically higher position due to the importance of the social injunctions contained therein, a strong axiological justification, and a wider scope of application in comparison with ordinary legal norms. The exceptional importance of principles is manifested in the fact that they are especially important from a particular, above all a social, point of view. The role of principles is to provide guidelines and signposts in creating, interpreting, and applying the law, including filling general clauses with content and removing legal loopholes, as well as to be representatives of ideas and carriers of value. In this way, legal principles ensure axiological coherence and uniformity of interpretation and application of law.¹¹ The features that distinguish legal principles from ordinary legal norms also include a lack of a clearly defined scope of application and an associated lower level of conclusive-

⁷ A. Kościółek, *Zasada jawności w sądowym postępowaniu cywilnym*, Warsaw 2018, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/monograph/369443705/11> (accessed 22 January 2019).

⁸ J. Goździewicz-Biechońska, *Wadliwość decyzji administracyjnych w procesie inwestycyjno-budowlanym*, Warsaw 2011, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/monograph/369233535/34> (accessed 23 January 2019).

⁹ H. Rot, *Wstęp do nauk prawnych*, Wrocław 1994, pp. 42-43. For more, see W. Jakimowicz, *Wolność zabudowy w prawie administracyjnym*, Warsaw 2012, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/monograph/369256510/52> (accessed 23 January 2019).

¹⁰ J. Nowacki, Z. Tobor, *Wstęp do prawnictwa*, Warsaw 2002, p. 108.

¹¹ Z. Zawadzka, *Wolność prasy a ochrona prywatności osób wykonujących działalność publiczną. Problem rozstrzygania konfliktu zasad*, Warsaw 2013, pp. 28-31.

ness and the possibility of choosing a principle by the authority applying the law in the event of a conflict of principles, based on the criterion of the axiological justification of individual principles (the hierarchy of values expressed by two or more rules).¹²

This way of understanding legal principles, however, is sometimes rejected, since only evaluations derived from accepted values and their hierarchical arrangement can be the basis for treating certain legal norms as principles of a legal system and even if these principles are distinguished according to specific criteria, the choice of criteria also remains a matter of judgement. The procedure of deriving principles from the provisions of applicable laws by inductive inference is similar in nature because induction also leads to a subjective selection of certain elements of these provisions as being of greater importance, which leads to the determination of normative directions.¹³

The manner of understanding legal principles presented here is defined as directival, due to the perception of the principles of law as being directives of conduct. In non-directival (descriptive) terms, a legal principle is defined as a pattern for forming a specific legal institution or set of legal institutions in a selected dimension, and this pattern may be reportative, referring to law in force (mapping-rules), or designative, oriented towards laws which are yet to emerge (modelling-principles). The latter type of principles in the descriptive sense is difficult to clearly distinguish from directival principles in the form of postulates.¹⁴ Taking into account both directival and non-directival approaches, and bearing in mind that the first does not have to be limited to legal norms, it is possible to distinguish, as K. Rączka points out, legal principles in normative, postulative and descriptive senses.¹⁵

Also, in the doctrine of constitutional law, despite much discussion, there is no uniform definition of the term “principle”. Some researchers argue that creating a definition is not possible because some principles are legal norms and others are not, in which case they are known as directives, general clauses or values.¹⁶ According to one position, the concept of a principle of law is understood as a constitutional norm which results from a group of other norms. It regulates the essential features of a given institution and has been recognised as particularly important by doctrine and practice as it expresses fundamental values. Thus, the main category in legal discourse is the category of the legal norm although it should be emphasised that the systemic or con-

¹² Z. Pulka, *Podstawy prawa. Podstawowe pojęcia prawa i prawoznawstwa*, Poznań 2008, pp. 46-49.

¹³ J. Nowacki, Z. Tobor, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-111.

¹⁴ A. Kościółek, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ K. Rączka, in: M. Gersdorf, K. Rączka, M. Rączkowski, *Kodeks pracy. Komentarz*, Warsaw 2014, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587661972/459849> (accessed 22 January 2019). The division into legal principles in the postulative sense and legal principles in the directival sense mentioned by J.H. Szlachetko (J. H. Szlachetko, *Udział podmiotów spoza systemu administracji publicznej w stanowieniu aktów prawa miejscowego przez organy jednostek samorządu terytorialnego*, Gdańsk 2016, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/monograph/369390200/20>, (accessed 23 January 2019), should be considered too simple since it does not enumerate all the differences between legal principles identified in doctrine.

¹⁶ A. Domańska, in: D. Górecki, (ed.), *Polskie prawo konstytucyjne*, Warsaw 2012, p. 56.

stitutional principle is supreme in nature and is the most important determiner of the state system.¹⁷ The rules of the political system define the basic methods (at the formal level) and content (at the material level) of exercising power, indicating the ideas and goals that should be achieved in this process.¹⁸ The principles of law are similarly defined in the doctrine of administrative law, that is as norms belonging to a specific legal system, which are considered particularly important in this system, because they express the values constituting the axiological foundations of either the entire system or its individual branches.¹⁹ As for other considerations, it should be emphasised that the constitutional and administrative legal approaches overlap with respect to supranational public law.²⁰

In this article, legal principles are understood as legal norms contained in legal acts or derived from them by state authorities competent to adjudicate their interpretation. They are superior to other legal norms due to their location in the structure of the legal system and have particular significance since they express the values underlying the system, establish the directions and framework for its development and ensure its coherence and uniformity in the processes of establishing, interpreting and applying the norms that constitute it. Legal principles are therefore regarded as conduct directives binding on the addressees. At the same time, such a position means accepting the perception of legal principles as normative forms of values essential for the establishment and functioning of a given community.

PRINCIPLES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In the absence of a legal definition and a catalogue within the Treaties, the principles of EU law remain among the most inconsistently understood concepts of this legal system.²¹ As A. von Bogdandy noted, the authors of the Treaties invoke the concept of principles very often, in most of the different language versions. Its use in the texts of the Treaties is attributive in nature. In this way, the authors of the Treaties give greater importance to specific elements or even to whole provisions thereof. This makes it easier for readers to navigate the text. A principle usually lays down general requirements, makes statements about the whole, and often has a rather vague content. For each use of the word “principle”, an individual analysis of the legal consequences resulting from a given norm must be made, in particular in the area of legal remedies

¹⁷ B. Banaszak, *Prawo konstytucyjne*, Warsaw 2010, p. 19. Cf. P. Sarnecki, in: P. Tuleja, (ed.), *Prawo konstytucyjne*, Warsaw 1995, p. 31.

¹⁸ L. Garlicki, *Polskie prawo konstytucyjne. Zarys wykładu*, Warsaw 2016, p. 68.

¹⁹ J. Ciechanowicz-McLean, *Działalność administracji publicznej w świetle zasad prawa ochrony przyrody*, in: M. Górski, J. Bucińska, M. Niedziółka, R. Stec, D. Struś, (eds.), *Administracja publiczna – człowiek a ochrona środowiska Zagadnienia społeczno-prawne*, Warsaw 2011, p. 70.

²⁰ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. I)*, pp. 10-11.

²¹ P. Justyńska, in: J. Galster, (ed.), *Podstawy prawa Unii Europejskiej z uwzględnieniem Traktatu z Lizbony*, Toruń 2010, p. 218.

and judicial review.²² The principles of EU law may, however, also be unwritten principles derived from Treaty norms by EU courts.

A review of the sections concerning principles in all publications regarding the body of EU law cited in this article showed that representatives of doctrine also adhere to an attributive approach to principles in the EU legal system. They avoid both defining the concept of principle and defining it in terms of the characteristics of principles. P. Justyńska writes, in a very clear way deserving of praise, that the principles of the EU legal system relate to the foundations of this system and play a special role in the process of applying and interpreting EU law and the legal systems of Member States. They also affect the validity of both EU and national laws as they must be created and amended in accordance with them.²³ A. von Bogdandy puts it similarly when he points out that the principles of primary law are special legal norms concerning the entire legal order of the EU. Fundamental principles as a subcategory define the overriding normative frame of reference for all primary law, and indeed for the entire EU legal order. The substantive concept of fundamental principles does not include all norms (or elements of norms) referred to as principles in the Treaties or in the jurisprudence of EU courts, but only a few provisions which are also referred to as fundamental or structural principles in national constitutions.²⁴ The principle of solidarity is one of the principles understood in this manner.²⁵

In a slightly different doctrinal approach to the issue of EU legal principles, three types of general principles of EU law are distinguished. Firstly, there are the principles underlying the EU system and relating to relations between the EU and its Member States (the principle of the primacy of EU law over national law, the principle of subsidiarity), the legal position of individuals (the principle of direct effect) or relations within the EU (the principle of institutional balance). These principles were “discovered” by the Court of Justice of the EU through a process of inductive reasoning. Secondly, there are principles derived from the provisions of EU law, relating to relations between EU institutions and Member State authorities, on the one hand, and individuals, on the other, such as the principle of equality, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of human rights. Thirdly and lastly, the principles of substantive EU law have been identified, which constitute the basis of EU freedoms or EU policies.²⁶ In this context, the principle of solidarity, in its current various versions in the Treaties, should be classified under both the first and third categories of general principles of EU law.

The principles of EU law are assigned three functions. Firstly, the legal system of the EU is young so legal principles, and in particular general legal principles, enable

²² A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. I)*, pp. 9-10.

²³ P. Justyńska, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

²⁴ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. I)*, p. 10.

²⁵ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. III)*, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” no. 10, 2009.

²⁶ A. Wróbel, in: A. Wróbel, (eds.), *Stosowanie prawa Unii Europejskiej przez sądy*, vol. I, Warsaw 2010, p. 49

gaps in the system to be filled. Secondly, EU law is often merely general in nature and uses imprecise terms. Thus, the principles make it possible to correctly determine the content of legal norms, which would not be possible without referring to them. Thirdly, the dynamism of the process of integration within the EU makes it necessary to interpret its laws in such a way that goals are achieved, regardless of changing realities and economic and political conditions.²⁷ Each of these functions was fulfilled by the principle of solidarity during the existence of the European Communities and the EU. Moreover, it seems that it has performed them mainly in this order, especially when examining the issue of its functions from the perspective of recent years (the economic crisis in Greece and the migration crisis in the entire EU).

Returning again to the qualification of the principle of solidarity above, it should be noted that solidarity expresses a horizontal obligation of unity between the Member States, but in order to consider infringements of it or the specific obligations of Member States, it must be introduced into acts of secondary law or linked to Article 4 (3) TEU,²⁸ which establishes the principle of sincere cooperation or the “principle of fidelity to the Union”²⁹ or “the principle of fidelity to the Treaties”³⁰, according to which the EU and the Member States respect each other and assist each other in performing tasks that result from the Treaties. The principle of sincere cooperation is often identified, especially in Poland,³¹ with the principle of solidarity, but while these principles are interrelated (loyalty to the EU is also an expression of solidarity within the EU)³² such a position should be considered incorrect since in Article 24 TEU both terms (“loyalty” and “mutual solidarity”) are used in close proximity. Advocate General Yves Bot also mentions the “principles of sincere cooperation and solidarity”.³³ Identifying the principle of sincere cooperation with the principle of solidarity is not currently justified by the fact that the principle resulting from Article 10 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter the TEC)³⁴ was referred to in doctrine as the principle of solidarity.³⁵ At that time, the TEC did not name the principle formulated in this article in any way. However, at present Article 4 (3) TEU introduces

²⁷ D. Gibasiewicz, *Zasada neutralności podatku od wartości dodanej w orzecznictwie Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2012, p. 86.

²⁸ S. Morano-Foadi, *Solidarity and Responsibility: Advancing Humanitarian Responses to EU Migratory Pressures*, “European Journal of Migration and Law” no. 19/3, 2017, pp. 247-248.

²⁹ A. Haratsch, Ch. Koenig, M. Pechstein, *Europarecht*, Tübingen 2012, pp. 92-93.

³⁰ M. Herdegen, *Europarecht*, München 2013, pp. 87-88.

³¹ See, for example, P. Justyńska, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-276; A. Wentkowska, in: J. Barcik, A. Wentkowska, *Prawo Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2014, pp. 294-296.

³² K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, *Podstawy prawa europejskiego*, Warsaw 1998, p. 246.

³³ Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 13 June 2018, C-213/17, X v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, EU:C:2018:434 (hereinafter C-213/17), pt. 99.

³⁴ Official Journal of the European Union C 321E, 29.12.2006, p. 37.

³⁵ See D. Lasok, *Zarys prawa Unii Europejskiej*, Toruń 1995, p. 187; J. Galster, C. Mik, *Podstawy europejskiego prawa wspólnotowego. Zarys wykładu*, Toruń 1998, p. 174; C. Mik, *Europejskie prawo wspólnotowe. Zagadnienia teorii i praktyki*, vol. I, Warsaw 2000, pp. 530-532; A. Wróbel, in: A. Wróbel, (ed.), *Wprowadzenie do prawa Wspólnot Europejskich (Unii Europejskiej)*, Krakow 2004, p. 79-83;

the term “the principle of sincere cooperation”. Omitting from present considerations the understanding of the principle of loyal cooperation and the consequent obligations of Member States towards the EU, the EU towards Member States and Member States towards each other,³⁶ attention should be paid to the different meanings of the terms “loyalty”³⁷ and “solidarity”. The principle of solidarity under EU law (formerly law of the European Communities) was and is an expression of the conviction that not only benefits but burdens should also be fairly distributed among Member States. This is its original and present meaning.³⁸

SOLIDARITY AS A VALUE AND PRINCIPLE OF EU PRIMARY LAW

The primary law of the EU does not define the concept of “solidarity”. Therefore, it is worth referring to common understandings of this concept. The “Dictionary of the Polish language” of PWN presents two meanings: 1. a sense of community and shared responsibility resulting from agreement of views and aspirations, 2. collective and individual responsibility of a specific group of people for the entirety of a common obligation.³⁹ On the other hand, “The Dictionary of the Polish Language”, edited by W. Doroszewski, indicates that the concept of solidarity means: “1. being solidary; agreement in conduct and aspirations, unanimity, mutual support; 2. *leg.* responsibility of each of those jointly liable for the entire obligation (...); shared responsibility.”⁴⁰ Therefore, both dictionaries emphasise two elements: agreement (views, aspirations, behaviours) and joint responsibility for a common commitment. Dictionary definitions also mention community and mutual support. Solidarity should therefore be associated with agreement, shared responsibility, and mutual assistance. However, this way of defining the concept of “solidarity” is sufficient only in terms of values and not principles.

Solidarity as a value appears only in the preambles of the Treaties. The Treaty on the European Union (hereinafter TEU)⁴¹ mentions solidarity for the first time in the preamble, where Member States expressed their desire to deepen solidarity between their peoples, respecting their history, culture, and traditions. As in the TEU,

A. Lisiecka, *Prawo wspólnotowe w porządku prawnym państw członkowskich*, in: E. Piontek, (ed.), *Szkice z prawa Unii Europejskiej. Tom III. Problemy konstytucyjne*, Krakow 2005, p. 229-230.

³⁶ On the topic of sincere cooperation in EU law, see K. Lenaerts, P. Van Nuffel, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-250; A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. III)*, pp. 5-6.

³⁷ See *Słownik języka polskiego PWN*, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/szukaj/lojalność.html> (accessed 28 January 2019).

³⁸ Ch. Thun-Hohenstein, F. Cede, *Europarecht. Das Recht der Europäischen Union unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des EU-Beitritts Österreichs*, Vienna 1996, p. 35.

³⁹ *Słownik języka polskiego PWN*, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/sjp/solidarnosc;2575796.html> (accessed 22 January 2019).

⁴⁰ *Słownik języka polskiego pod red. W. Doroszewskiego*, <https://sjp.pwn.pl/doroszewski/solidarnosc;5498841.html> (accessed 29 January 2019).

⁴¹ Official Journal of the European Union C 202, 7 June 2016, p. 13.

the preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the TFEU)⁴² refers to solidarity, expressing the intention of the Member States to confirm the solidarity that binds Europe with overseas countries. The reference to this dimension of solidarity was determined by historical and cultural reasons.⁴³ The fact that solidarity was introduced into the preambles to the Treaties underlines the importance of this value in the EU legal order in two dimensions: internal, related to nations, and external, which is geographically limited.

In the normative parts of the Treaties, the term “solidarity” is very rarely accompanied by the term “principle”. And yet, even if the concept of principles does not appear, these parts in fact concern the principles of EU law, an example of which is Article 2 TEU, which presents the fundamental principles of the EU as values and, consequently, a manifestation of the ethical beliefs of EU citizens.⁴⁴ In the doctrine, Article 2 TEU as a whole is referred to as the principle of homogeneity as it is a legal principle that provides the central order of the EU and the constituent orders of the Member States with a certain degree of compatibility, which allows them to continue to coexist.⁴⁵

In Article 2 TEU, which concerns, according to the Treaty terminology, the values upon which the EU is founded and which are shared by Member States, solidarity is mentioned as one of the fundamental elements of society along with pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice and equality between women and men. To achieve the goals of the EU, as indicated in Article 3 TEU, it is necessary to promote solidarity between generations (paragraph 3, subparagraph 2) and solidarity among Member States (paragraph 3, subparagraph 3), and to contribute to solidarity between all peoples and not just Member States (paragraph 5) since this is what the EU is supposed to do within its external relations. Once again, the reference to solidarity appears in the General Provisions on EU External Action. According to Article 21 TEU, the EU actions in the international arena are based on the principles that underpin its creation, development, and enlargement and which it intends to support worldwide. These principles include respect for solidarity. In turn, in specific provisions regarding its common foreign and security policy, the EU was obliged to conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based, inter alia, on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States (Article 24 (2) TEU), which are required to support the EU’s foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity (Article 24 (3) TEU), as well as to concerted action to strengthen and develop mutual political solidarity (Article 24 (3) paragraph 2 TEU). This group

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁴³ Z. Brodecki, M. Drobysz, S. Majkowska-Szulc, *Traktat o Unii Europejskiej, Traktat ustanawiający Wspólnotę Europejską z komentarzem*, Warsaw 2002, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/publication/151028389> (accessed 18 January 2019).

⁴⁴ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. I)*, p. 9.

⁴⁵ M. Zieliński, *Wartości Unii Europejskiej*, in: B. Krzan, (ed.), *Ubi ius, ibi remedium. Księga dedykowana pamięci Profesora Jana Kolasy*, Warsaw 2016, p. 651.

of provisions also includes the concept of constructive abstention,⁴⁶ meaning that if a Member State abstains from voting when the Council is making a decision and at the same time makes a formal declaration, it is not bound to implement the decision but accepts that its adoption binds the EU and in a spirit of mutual solidarity refrains from taking any action that could contradict or impede the action of the EU on the basis of that decision (Article 31 (1) paragraph 2 TEU). In total, the concept of solidarity appears nine times in the normative part of the TEU. In addition, Article 32 paragraph 1 of the TEU provides that Member States are in solidarity with each other as regards the international arena.

Thus, in the TEU, solidarity appears in various forms, including solidarity within societies, between generations, between nations, solidarity in general, solidarity among Member States towards the EU and, finally, solidarity among Member States. In Treaty terms, solidarity is a value, purpose and principle, and solidarity among Member States, which the TEU mentions four times, is both a goal (Article 3) and a principle (Article 24 and Article 32) even though the word “principle” is not used. As pointed out by A. von Bogdandy, the axioms of Article 2 TEU, although referred to as “values”, should be understood as legal norms and principles (basic principles). “Values” from Article 2 TEU were agreed under the procedure of Article 48 TEU and produce legal effects (Article 3 (1), Article 7, Article 49 TEU and Articles 258 and 259 TFEU). This means that they are legal norms, and due to their precedence and constitutive nature they are also basic principles.⁴⁷

It should, however, be emphasised that Article 2 TEU defines solidarity not as an EU value, but as a value of a dispersed European society,⁴⁸ which must raise the question of the real role of the EU and its instruments in the implementation of Article 2 TEU in this regard. It seems that M. Szpunar, an Advocate General of the Court of Justice, found the correct answer, arguing that the status of EU citizen connects society in the Member States and European society treated as a whole as the peoples of Europe, which, on the basis of civic and political solidarity, is still in the process of being constructed. It is necessary, however, in the context of political, economic, and social globalisation as it gives them rights and obligations that cannot be unduly restricted by national authorities.⁴⁹

Leaving no room for doubt, however, the TEU introduced the principle of solidarity among Member States into the common EU foreign and security policy. Although

⁴⁶ Communication from the Commission to the European Council, the European Parliament and the Council. A stronger global actor: a more efficient decision-making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 12 September 2018, COM(2018) 647 final, p. 9.

⁴⁷ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. I)*, p. 10.

⁴⁸ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. III)*, p. 12. See also E. Dagilyté, *Solidarity: a general principle of EU law? Two variations on the solidarity theme*, in: A. Biondi, E. Dagilyté, E. Küçük, (eds.), *Solidarity in EU Law. Legal Principle in the Making*, Cheltenham/Northampton, MA 2018, p. 74.

⁴⁹ Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar delivered on 4.02.2016, C-165/14 and C-304/14, *Alfredo Rendón Marín przeciwko Administración del Estado and Secretary of State for the Home Department against CS*, EU:C:2016:75, pt. 117.

this principle is a legal norm, it concerns political solidarity and, it should be emphasised, the Court of Justice of the EU is not, in principle, competent to render decisions relating to the common foreign and security policy or with regard to acts adopted on the basis thereof (Article 24 (1), subparagraph 2, sentence 5 TEU and Article 275, first paragraph TFEU). Therefore, there are no operational mechanisms in this area to ensure compliance with EU law, which is characteristic of this legal system.⁵⁰ The principle of solidarity among Member States and the specific obligations that arise there from thus acquire an international legal nature, with all the consequences that come with that for the effectiveness of the related EU Treaty norms. In other areas, however, solidarity among Member States is a norm typical of the EU legal order.

In the normative part of the TFEU, the concept of solidarity appears first in the provisions concerning the area of freedom, security and justice, specifically in Article 67 (2) sentence 1, according to which the EU ensures the absence of identity checks of persons crossing internal borders and develops a common policy in the field of asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity among Member States. On the basis of Article 80, sentence 1 of the TFEU, EU policies on border control, asylum and immigration and their implementation are to be governed by the principle of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, among Member States. Acts of the EU adopted on the basis of the Treaty provisions concerning border control, asylum and immigration policies contain, where necessary, appropriate measures for the application of this principle (Article 80, sentence 2 TFEU). In the area of EU economic policy, the Council, at the request of the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity among Member States, on measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular in the event of serious difficulties with the supply of certain products, in particular in the field of energy (Article 122 (1) TFEU). According to Article 194 (1) TFEU, EU energy policy has the goal, in a spirit of solidarity among Member States, to ensure the functioning of the energy market, to ensure the security of the energy supply in the EU, to promote energy efficiency and energy savings, as well as to develop new and renewable forms of energy, and to promote interconnections between energy grids. Finally, in the area of external actions, the solidarity clause of Article 222 TFEU, applies so that the EU and its Member States can act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if any Member State becomes the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or human-made disaster (paragraph 1, sentence 1). The procedure for adopting a decision that specifies the conditions for the application of the solidarity clause by the EU is governed by Article 222 (3) TFEU. In total, the authors of the TFEU reference the concept of solidarity seven times in its normative part in relation to four areas of European integration. Although the principle of solidarity among Member States is explicitly mentioned only in a single case, the expressions “in a spirit of solidarity among Member States” and

⁵⁰ Cf. P. Bogdanowicz, M. Taborowski, *Brak niezależności sądów krajowych jako uchybienie zobowiązaniu w rozumieniu art. 258 TFUE (cz. I)*, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” no. 1, 2018, p. 6.

“jointly in a spirit of solidarity” should be seen as a way of formulating the principle of solidarity.⁵¹

The preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the Charter) states that the EU “is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”.⁵² Title IV of the Charter also concerns solidarity although the concept of solidarity does not appear in the normative part of this act apart from the title. The title of the unit, however, indicates that the rights listed therein are based on the concept of solidarity. They include the right of employees to information and consultation within the undertaking (Article 27), the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 28), the right of access to placement services (Article 29), the right of protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article 30), the right to fair and just working conditions (Article 31), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article 32), the right to family and professional life (Article 33), the right to social security and social assistance (Article 34), the right to health protection (Article 35), the right of access to services of general economic interest (Article 36), the right to environmental protection (Article 37) and the right to consumer protection (Article 38).⁵³ As a side note, it should be remembered that Title IV of the Charter is considered one of the most contentious areas in the history of this document. Areas of dispute included not only the fundamental question of whether social rights and principles should be included in the Charter, but also how many social rights should be included, what specific content they should have, which enumerated rights should be binding and whether they should be classified as fundamental rights or also rather as principles.⁵⁴ This state of affairs shows just how difficult a matter solidarity is in terms of policy and law both as a value and as a principle, and how much emotion it evokes, regardless of its dimension.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG MEMBER STATES IN EU LEGAL DOCTRINE AND IN EU CASE LAW

In 1969, the Court of Justice of the European Communities stated that solidarity is the basis of the entire Community system.⁵⁵ In doctrine, solidarity has been presented as an imperative for the stronger to help the weaker and as a shared responsibility of Member States, expressed as mutual assistance, as well as a balance between the benefits and

⁵¹ Cf. Z. Brodecki, M. Drobysz, S. Majkowska-Szulc, *op. cit.*

⁵² Official Journal of the European Union C 202, 7 June 2016, p. 389.

⁵³ Cf. Z. Brodecki, A. Łunecka-Bartkiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

⁵⁴ Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 22 September 2011, C-411/10, *N.S. przeciwko Secretary of State for the Home Department*, EU:C:2011:611 (hereinafter opinion C-411/10), pt. 172.

⁵⁵ Judgment of the Court of 10 December 1969. *Commission of the European Communities v French Republic*. - *Joined cases 6 and 11-69*, EU:C:1969:68, pt. 16.

burdens that result from EU membership.⁵⁶ This latter aspect echoes the judgment of the Court of Justice in 1973, which is now referred to⁵⁷ and which is fundamental to the correct understanding of the principle of solidarity between EU Member States. The Court held at that time that the Treaty allows Member States to enjoy the advantages of the Community, but also obliges them to respect its law. If a state unilaterally disturbs the balance between benefits and burdens on account of imagined national interests related to Community membership, then it is questioning the equality of the Member States before the law of the Community. Such a breach of the obligation of solidarity which the Member States assume upon their accession to the Community adversely affects the very foundations of the Community's legal order.⁵⁸

It follows from this judgment that the obligation of solidarity among Member States is a principle that Member States must accept when joining the EU. This principle prohibits a Member State from unilaterally disturbing the balance between the rights and obligations that come from its membership in the EU.⁵⁹ The principles of solidarity and equality among Member States are therefore inherent in the EU (European Communities).⁶⁰ The sharing of efforts and tasks among Member States is governed by solidarity.⁶¹ Cohesion policy is a mechanism for redistribution and achieving equilibrium among Member States and is an expression of solidarity between them and between their peoples.⁶² However, in the context of, inter alia, Article 3 (3) TEU, an unlimited selective approach, even in an area of EU law where a certain degree of differentiation is permissible, would be incompatible with the principle of solidarity among Member States and with the principle of equality of Member States before the Treaties as a cornerstone of European integration.⁶³ Since the burden of external border control had been unequally shared due to the geographic location of Member States, the Lisbon Treaty emphasised the principle of solidarity in the areas of border controls, asylum and immigration.⁶⁴

⁵⁶ B. Krzan, in: K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, M. Szwarc-Kuczer, A. Wróbel, (eds.), *Traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej. Komentarz. Tom II (art. 90-222)*, Warsaw 2012, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587648184/445624> (accessed 29 January 2019).

⁵⁷ See opinion C-643/15 and C-647/15, pt. 242.

⁵⁸ Judgment of the Court of 7 February 1973. *Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic*. Case 39-72, EU:C:1973:13, pts. 24 and 25. Cf. Judgment of the Court of 7 February 1979. *Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*. Case 128/78, EU:C:1979:32, pt. 12.

⁵⁹ Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 21 June 2007, C-273/04, *Republic of Poland v Council of the European Union*, EU:C:2007:361, pt. 51.

⁶⁰ D. Florea, *International and European Law Principles*, "The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration" no. 16/1(23), 2016, p. 223.

⁶¹ Opinion C-411/10, pt. 31.

⁶² Opinion of the Advocate-General Bot, C-166/07, *European Parliament v Council of the European Union*, EU:C:2009:213, pt. 85.

⁶³ Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 13 May 2015, C-44/14, *Kingdom of Spain v European Parliament Council of the European Union*, EU:C:2015:320, pt. 35.

⁶⁴ A. Mrozek, *Zwischen "Raum der Freiheit", "Raum der Sicherheit" und "Raum des Rechts" – der Mechanismus des supranationalen Grenzschutzes an den europäischen Außengrenzen*, "Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik" issue 11-12, 2014, p. 397.

As an Advocate General of the Court pointed out in 2017, while stressing the importance of solidarity as a founding and existential value of the EU, the requirement of solidarity, expressed as early as the Treaty of Rome in 1957, continues to be at the heart of the integration process continued by the Lisbon Treaty. Although the absence of this value in Article 2 sentence 1 TEU enumerating the values upon which the EU is based is surprising, solidarity is included in the preamble to the Charter as an element of the “indivisible, universal values” upon which the EU is built. Moreover, Article 3 (3) TEU states that the EU promotes “solidarity between Member States”. Solidarity is therefore invariably part of the set of values and principles that make up the “base of the European construction”.⁶⁵ More specifically, solidarity is both a pillar and an overarching principle of EU policies on border control, asylum and immigration, which are dealt with in Title V Chapter 2 TFEU, devoted to the area of freedom, security and justice. In view of the very real differences between Member States that result from their geographic location and their sensitivity to mass migratory flows, the adoption of measures under Article 78 (3) TFEU and their effective application are all the more important. Measures such as the relocation mechanism thus give concrete meaning to the principle of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility between Member States laid down in Article 80 TFEU.⁶⁶

While commenting on the principle of solidarity between Member States in the framework of the EU energy policy provided for in Article 194 (1) TFEU, another Advocate General of the Court noted that the reference to solidarity among Member States, which was added as the text of the Lisbon Treaty was being drafted, occurs in a context in which the principle of solidarity among Member States had taken on the character of a “constitutional principle”. The idea of solidarity between Member States is not only expressed in various parts of the Treaties, but also constitutes, in accordance with Article 3 (3) sentence 3 TEU, one of the objectives of the EU. The principle of solidarity among Member States is of particular importance in the light of energy supplies, as is apparent from both Article 194 (1) letter b and Article 122 (1) TFEU.⁶⁷

The role of Advocates General in restoring the memory of the original and fundamental importance of the principle of solidarity in general and the principle of solidarity between Member States in particular within EU law, in recent years, cannot be overestimated. This is because EU courts are economical in referring to the principle of solidarity between Member States in the justifications of their judgments. Often they do not do so, even when the Advocates General cite the principle of solidarity.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Cf. W. Jedlecka, *Solidarność jako propozycja przewyciężenia kryzysu w Unii Europejskiej*, “Przełąd Prawa i Administracji C”, part 2, 2015, pp. 632-633.

⁶⁶ Opinion C-643/15 and C-647/15, pts. 18-20 and 22.

⁶⁷ Opinion of Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi delivered 26 July 2017, C-226/16, *Eni SpA, Eni Gas & Power France SA, Union professionnelle des industries privées du gaz (Uprigaz) v Premier ministre, Ministre de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de la Mer, interveners: Storengy, Total Infrastructures Gaz France (TIGF)*, EU:C:2017:1005, pt. 32-34.

⁶⁸ Examples include the cases C-73/08, *Nicolas Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot and others v Gouvernement de la Communauté française*; C-44/14, *Kingdom of Spain v European Parliament Coun-*

In 2009, A. von Bogdandy noted: “Although solidarity between Member States was not the basis for significant judicial action, it helped to strengthen important legal concepts such as legal community and the principle of sincere cooperation”.⁶⁹ However, in the last dozen or so years, primarily in the context of measures adopted on the basis of the TFEU, EU courts have on several occasions referred to the principle of solidarity, thus recalling its existence and significance in the EU legal order.

In its assessment of the validity of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States,⁷⁰ the Court of Justice considered the choice in Article 2 (2) of this Framework Decision, 32 categories of acts that constituted a basis for surrender under the European arrest warrant, without verification for the double criminal liability for the committed act. It also stated that the Council was entitled, on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and taking into account the high degree of trust and solidarity between the Member States, to consider that the prohibited acts in question posed such serious threats to public order and public security that double verification of criminal liability is not necessary.⁷¹ In this case, the Court therefore confined itself to a reference to solidarity between Member States. It is worth emphasising that the Framework Decision itself did not do this, neither in the normative part nor in the preamble.

In another judgment, the Court of Justice decided that the example of implementing the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States under Article 80 TFEU is Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 (hereinafter Directive 2001/55/EC) on the minimum standards for granting temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and the measures supporting a balance of efforts between Member States in accepting such persons and the consequences thereof,⁷² but the solidarity mechanisms it provides are reserved for wholly exceptional situations that fall under the scope of this Directive, namely the mass influx of displaced persons.⁷³ Thanks to this judgment, it is possible, without fear of contradiction, to indicate an example of the implementation of the principle of solidarity between Member States as a Treaty norm in secondary EU law. Unfortunately, this example is still theoretical as Directive 2001/55/EC has yet not to be applied.

cil of the European Union; C-226/16, Eni SpA, Eni Gas & Power France SA, Union professionnelle des industries privées du gaz (Uprigaz) v Premier ministre, Ministre de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de la Mer, interveners: Storengy, Total Infrastructures Gaz France (TIGF); C-213/17, X v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.

⁶⁹ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. III)*, p. 13.

⁷⁰ Official Journal of the European Union UE L 190, 18 July 2002, p. 1.

⁷¹ Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Arbitragehof, 3.05.2007, C-303/05, *Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad*, EU:C:2007:261, pt. 57.

⁷² Official Journal of the European Union UE L 212, 7 August 2001, p. 12.

⁷³ Summary of the Judgment, 21 December 2011, *Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform*, EU:C:2011:865, pt. 93.

EU courts have ruled that Article 122 (1) TFEU does not constitute an appropriate legal basis for possible EU financial assistance through the creation of a financing mechanism for Member States facing or likely to encounter serious economic difficulties. The spirit of solidarity between Member States upon which the Council is to take measures both appropriate to the economic situation and within the scope of the provision indicates that such steps are to be based on aid between Member States. Moreover, Article 122 (1) TFEU cannot serve as a basis for adopting a measure or principle that would authorise a Member State to decide unilaterally to default in full or in part.⁷⁴ This time, the arguments made by EU courts contain elements that interpret the principle of solidarity between Member States. It should be understood as aid between Member States and, at the same time, a prohibition against the unilateral discharge of obligations by Member States.

In another case, the Court of Justice found that, notwithstanding the establishment of provisional measures in international protection, the admission into a Member State of an unusually large number of third-country nationals seeking international protection could also be facilitated by other Member States. This could be accomplished either unilaterally or in a manner agreed upon by the Member State in question, in a spirit of solidarity, which pursuant to Article 80 TFEU is the basis of the Dublin III Regulation,⁷⁵ in which Article 17 (1) provides for the possibility of examining applications for international protection even if these states are not responsible for examining them on the basis of the criteria laid down in the regulation.⁷⁶ It follows from this judgment that applying the principle of solidarity between Member States involves the voluntary sharing of obligations arising from EU law. As an Advocate General has pointed out in another case, the automatic nature of the transfer of responsibility is difficult to reconcile with the principles of sincere cooperation and solidarity between the Member States, which underpin the Common European Asylum System, as well as the Dublin III Regulation.⁷⁷

In a case on the possible annulment of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015, which established provisional measures for international protection in favour of Italy and Greece (hereinafter: Decision (EU) 2015/1601),⁷⁸ that concerns the

⁷⁴ Judgement of the Court (Full court), 27 November 2012, C-370/12, *Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General*, EU:C:2012:756, pts.115 and 116; Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber), 30 September 2015, T-450/12, *Alexios Anagnostakis v European Commission*, EU:T:2015:739, pts. 41 and 42; Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 12 September 2017, C-589/1 P, *Alexios Anagnostakis v European Commission*, EU:C:2017:663, pts 69 and 71.

⁷⁵ Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, (Official Journal of the European Union L 180, 29 June 2013, p. 31).

⁷⁶ Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 July 2017, (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof – Austria) – Proceedings brought by Khadija Jafari, Zainab Jafari, EU:C:2017:586, pt. 100.

⁷⁷ Opinion C-213/17, pt. 99.

⁷⁸ Official Journal of the European Union L 248, 24 September 2015.

so-called mechanism of relocation of third-country nationals seeking international protection, the Court of Justice expressed the view that the Council was obliged to take into account the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States upon which, pursuant to Article 80 TFEU, the implementation of the common EU asylum policy is based. This includes the financial level. The Council cannot, therefore, be accused of making a manifest error of assessment in finding that it must adopt interim measures by establishing a binding relocation mechanism due to the extraordinary nature of the situation within the meaning of Article 78 (3) TFEU in connection with Article 80 TFEU and the principle of solidarity between Member States enshrined in it. When one or more Member States find themselves in an emergency situation within the meaning of Article 78 (3) TFEU, the burdens related to the application of interim measures adopted on the basis of that provision in favour of that or other Member States should, in principle, be shared between all the other Member States, in accordance with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States. The determination of the Member State of relocation should therefore be based on criteria related to solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States.⁷⁹ In this context, the principle of solidarity, along with the principle of fair sharing of responsibility, appears as a method of sharing burdens between Member States.

In September 2019, in a case lost by the European Commission, in which Poland alleged a breach of the principle of energy solidarity committed by the Commission, the General Court ruled on the scope of this principle under Article 194 (1) TFEU. It stated that the “spirit of solidarity” mentioned in Article 194 (1) TFEU is a specific expression of the general principle of solidarity between Member States, referred to, *inter alia*, in Article 2 TEU, Article 3 (3) TEU and Article 24 (2) and (3) TEU, as well as in Article 122 (1) TFEU and Article 222 TFEU. Next, referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice in 1969, the General Court claimed that this principle underpins the entire EU system in accordance with the obligation set out in Article 4 (3) TEU. In the interpretation of the General Court, the principle of solidarity includes rights and obligations both for the EU and for Member States, because on the one hand the EU is bound by the obligation of solidarity towards Member States, and on the other hand, Member States are bound by the obligation of solidarity towards each other and the common interests and policies of the EU. As part of energy policy, this involves, *inter alia*, the obligation of mutual assistance should a Member State find itself in a critical or threatened situation with regard to gas supplies due to natural disaster or terrorist attack. The principle of solidarity also includes a general obligation for the EU and its Member States to take into account the interests of other actors when exercising their respective authority. In particular as regards EU energy policy, this means that the EU and its Member States must, when exercising their authority, avoid measures that could harm the interests of the EU and other Member States with respect to the security of supplies, their economic and political efficiency and the diversification of

⁷⁹ Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 September 2017, C-643/15 and C-647/15, *Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union*, EU:C:2017:631, pts. 252, 253, 291 and 329.

sources or delivery of energy supplies so as to take account of their interdependence and actual solidarity. The General Court further argued that the application of the principle of energy solidarity does not mean that the EU energy policy cannot in any particular case have negative effects on the specific interests of a given Member State. However, when applying this policy, EU institutions and Member States are required to take into account both the interests of the EU and the interests of individual Member States, and to weigh these interests in cases when they might conflict.⁸⁰

The quoted part of the recent, non-final judgment of the General Court, concerning the principle of energy solidarity between Member States, deserves, on the one hand, attention and on the other, criticism. Firstly, the General Court referred to the judgment of 1969, thus reactivating the “judicial life” of the principle of solidarity in its original and fundamental meaning. It proposed a return to the roots in the interpretation of the Community/Union term “solidarity”. Secondly, however, by using the term “the general principle of solidarity between Member States” and listing its Treaty foundations, the General Court blurred the distinction between the principle of solidarity in general terms and one of its aspects, that is the principle of solidarity between Member States. There was then not much difference in equating the principle of solidarity between Member States with the principle of sincere cooperation in its entirety, that is taking into account the obligations of the EU towards the Member States and the latter towards the EU. Without assessing whether such an approach had an impact on the outcome of the case, it should be considered incorrect for the reasons mentioned above. Were it not for the aforementioned blurring of the line between the two principles, the General Court would have had to use a completely different line of argument in support of its decision, referring, for example, to a fair sharing, also voluntary, of the benefits and obligations arising from EU law and the necessity of not avoiding these obligations. The considerations of the General Court opened the way to terminological and semantic chaos, for which there is no justification under the current Treaties. The appeal brought by the Federal Republic of Germany⁸¹ gives the Court of Justice the opportunity to recall the 1969 judgment, combined with an interpretation of the principle of solidarity between Member States in the context of EU energy policy in such a way as to ensure the clarity of the meaning and scope of this principle and its relation to the principle of sincere cooperation within the meaning of Article 4 (3) TEU.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY BETWEEN MEMBER STATES IN POLITICAL PRACTICE AND THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE EU

In its 2017 White Paper on the Future of Europe, the European Commission limited itself to stating: “The refugee crisis, which saw 1.2 million people coming to Europe in 2015, is of a scale unprecedented since the Second World War. This has

⁸⁰ Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) 10 September 2019, T-883/16, *Republic of Poland v European Commission*, ECLI:EU:T:2019:567, pts. 69-73 and 77.

⁸¹ Case C-848/19 P. *Germany v Poland*

led to a contentious debate about solidarity and responsibility among the Member States”.⁸² However, this document does not include an analysis of the conclusions of the “debate about solidarity and responsibility among the Member States”. Certainly, the first of the five scenarios for Europe for the period to 2025 mentions Member States increasing financial solidarity with regard to foreign missions,⁸³ and the section entitled “The way ahead” includes the statement: “We want a society in which peace, freedom, tolerance and solidarity are placed above all else.”⁸⁴ However, searching the document for reflections on the place and role of the principle of solidarity between Member States in the Europe of the future turns out to be in vain. The European Commission failed to utilise the potential of this legal and political principle, in its deliberations on the future of the EU. In this context, the value of the position of the Committee of the Regions should be appreciated, as it expressed the expectation: “(...) in the search for the broadest possible consensus, rather than allowing minimalist compromises to prevail, political solutions anchored in common solidarity — the fundamental principle of a united Europe — will be pursued, an approach that will also serve to overcome the current sense of scepticism and thus restore people’s faith in the European project”.⁸⁵

When working on the framework for EU financial policy for 2021-2027, the European Commission recalled that in 2018 “Solidarity lies at the heart of the European Union and is one of its core values”⁸⁶ and that “Solidarity between Member States is one of the founding principles of the Union”.⁸⁷ Such statements seem to reflect the realisation by the Commission that it is necessary to speak of EU solidarity in its traditional meaning in order to restore it to its role in European integration as both a value and a principle. In its 2019 work program, the European Commission mentioned enhancing solidarity between Member States in the context of a “resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy” and a “well-functioning Common European Asylum System based on the principles of responsibility and solidarity” as part of the drive for a new migration policy.⁸⁸ The Commission’s

⁸² White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, Brussels, 1 March 2017 COM(2017) 2025 final, p. 5.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁸⁵ Resolution of the European Committee of the Regions on the European Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe — Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025, 2017/C 306/01, 12 May 2017, Official Journal of the European Union C 306, 15 September 2017, p. 1, pt. 5.

⁸⁶ Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions. A modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends: The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, Brussels, 2 May 2018, COM(2018) 321 final, p. 50.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁸⁸ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions. Commission Work Programme 2019. Delivering what we promised and preparing for the future, Strasbourg, 23 October 2018, COM(2018) 800 final, pp. 4, 9.

2020 work program included solidarity among the values that the “European way of life is built around”.⁸⁹

As mentioned in the State of the Union 2018 address by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, thanks to an unprecedented show of solidarity Greece managed to overcome economic difficulties. When, however, it comes to the problem of maintaining the Schengen area without internal borders, Member States have not yet found the right balance between the responsibility each state must assume for its own territory and the necessary solidarity. The address includes the words: “We cannot continue to squabble to find ad-hoc solutions each time a new ship arrives. Temporary solidarity is not good enough. We need lasting solidarity – today and forever more. We need more solidarity not for solidarity’s sake but for the sake of efficiency”.⁹⁰

In fact, however, temporary solidarity was not sufficient either, and therefore was not fully effective. The mechanism for relocating third-country nationals applying for international protection was not fully implemented - most Member States participated, but the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) refused to admit third-country nationals.⁹¹ Of course, the fact that a legal norm, in this case a legal principle, is not respected does not change its status as a legal norm, the obligation of which rests with the addressees, all the more so when it is not respected by a definite minority of them. Weakened solidarity between Member States⁹² continues to be solidarity. The principle of solidarity as a legal norm should be considered in terms of effectiveness, and the means of ensuring it are provided for in Articles 258-260 TFEU. Therefore, given the persistent failure of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to fulfil their obligations under the Council Decision on relocation, the European Commission launched infringement procedures against these three Member States.⁹³ The Court of Justice was thus given the opportunity to develop its current interpretation of the principle of solidarity between Member States in the context of the Common European Asylum System.⁹⁴ It is to be hoped that the body will take advantage of this opportunity.

⁸⁹ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions. Commission Work Programme 2020. A Union that strives more, Brussels, 29 January 2020, COM(2020) 37 final, p. 8.

⁹⁰ State of the Union Address. 2018. The Hour of European Sovereignty. Authorised version of the State of the Union Address 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu-2018-speech_en.pdf (accessed 25 January 2019).

⁹¹ By 07 March 2018, a total of 33,846 people had been relocated, including 12 to the Czech Republic and 16 to Slovakia. (Annex 4 to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration. Brussels, 14 March 2018. COM(2018) 250 final, p. 1).

⁹² K. Helme, *The Implications of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement on the EU’s Role as an International Human Rights Actor*, “Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies” no. 10/2, 2018, p. 69.

⁹³ Report from the Commission, Monitoring the application of European Union law, 2017 Annual report, Brussels, 12 July 2018, COM(2018) 540 final, p. 40.

⁹⁴ See cases C-715/17, *European Commission v Republic of Poland*; C-718/17, *European Commission v Hungary*; C-719/17, *European Commission v Czech Republic*.

The Court of Justice may also refer to its doctrine of practical effectiveness (*effet utile*), which obliges Member States to achieve the objectives of EU laws and may generate the required legal effects in the event of a conflict of this law with national provisions or practices. The principle of effectiveness is a concretisation of the EU rule of law, which defines the shape of the EU legal order in light of its special relationship with the legal orders of Member States.⁹⁵ Due to the fact that Decision (EU) 2015/1601 was not annulled by the Court, it is easy to predict that the Visegrad Group countries will lose their infringement proceedings. With regard to the future, however, it seems that the principle of effectiveness would be compatible with the principle of “flexible solidarity” proposed by the Visegrad Group, which would allow Member States to decide on the specific ways they would contribute to joint undertakings, taking into account their experience and potential.⁹⁶ This concept could take different forms within the framework of the Common European Asylum System, such as payments instead of admitting third-country nationals.⁹⁷ The European Commission, initially opposed to such a solution, did not rule it out in 2018, continuing to remind those involved that “solidarity is not a one-way street”.⁹⁸ In addition, Member States, such as France and Germany, have shown their willingness to discuss measures to implement solidarity, but not the principle itself.⁹⁹ Austria, which held the presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2018, proposed a return to what has been the EU’s motto since 2000 (“united in diversity”), namely a community “United in Diversity” and not “Divided in Equality”.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ A. von Bogdandy, *Podstawowe zasady prawa UE – teoria i doktryna (cz. II)*, “Europejski Przegląd Sądowy” no. 9, 2009, pp. 6-7.

⁹⁶ G. Gotev, ‘Flexible solidarity’ becomes new tool in response to refugee crisis, “EURACTIV”, 20 September 2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/flexible-solidarity-becomes-new-tool-in-response-to-refugee-crisis> (accessed 30 January 2019).

⁹⁷ According to a compromise proposed during the Bulgarian presidency of the Council of the European Union, Member States would choose third-country nationals needing international protection on the basis of particular criteria or would pay another Member State 30,000 Euro for each person whose entry they refused (B. Fox, *Umverteilung von Geflüchteten: EU hofft auf Einigung*, “EURACTIV.com”, 17 May 2018, <https://www.euractiv.de/section/eu-innenpolitik/news/umverteilung-von-gefluechteten-eu-hofft-auf-einigung>, accessed 25 January 2019). During the second half of 2018 there was also talk of other recipients to be paid by Member States refusing to accept third-country nationals in need of international protection. One example was a fund for Africa. By the end of 2018 Member States had not reached agreement in this area.

⁹⁸ A. Meier, *EU-Kommissar Oettinger: “Solidarität ist keine Einbahnstraße”*, “Der Tagesspiegel”, 9 April 2018, <https://www.euractiv.de/section/europakompakt/interview/eu-kommissar-oettinger-solidaritaet-ist-keine-einbahnstrasse> (accessed 25 January 2019).

⁹⁹ A. Robert, *Freikauf von der Verteilerquote für Flüchtlinge*, “EURACTIV.fr”, 29 June 2018, <https://www.euractiv.de/section/eu-aussenpolitik/news/eastern-europe-could-pay-to-avoid-taking-in-refugees> (accessed 25 January 2019).

¹⁰⁰ H. Vytiska, *So will Kurz die EU zukunftsfit machen*, “EURACTIV.de”, 19 February 2018, <https://www.euractiv.de/section/europakompakt/news/so-will-kurz-die-eu-zukunftsfit-zu-machen> (accessed 25 January 2019).

However, it should be emphasised that the EU motto expresses the idea of tolerance¹⁰¹ and really has nothing to do with the principles governing the interpretation and application of EU law, in particular the requirement of uniformity in this respect, and therefore cannot be a circumstance that excuses liability for refusing to comply with this law, in particular primary law, which remains unchanged. Traditionally, the principle of solidarity between Member States is related to their equality before EU law, which is conditional on a balance between the benefits and burdens of EU membership. In addition to the benefits, the burdens should also be fairly distributed among the Member States. Solidarity as a value is primarily about agreement at the conceptual level. It is doubtful that this understanding of solidarity as a value and principle is compatible with the concept of flexible solidarity, the essence of which was reflected in the Austrian postulate. In fact, this is about differential solidarity. This can be defined in two ways, either as solidarity that is diversified or solidarity that is differentiating. The first assumes the possibility of distinguishing elements that differ from each other from the whole, the second refers to divisions based on differences, which is contrary to the essence of solidarity. A differentiating solidarity would be the opposite of solidarity. The line between diversified solidarity and differentiating solidarity is not sharp, and the concept of flexible solidarity is itself “flexible”. That is, it is so spacious that it can accommodate both understandings of differential solidarity. Therefore, filling this new concept with content requires caution and deliberation, both of which so far have been demonstrated by Member States and EU institutions, which is commendable. The discussion is invigorating both for the EU and the very principle of solidarity. In today’s EU, however, Z. Brodecki’s astute observation that departures from the canons of state unity and the uniformity of law are violations of the principle of solidarity remains valid.¹⁰²

CONCLUSIONS

Solidarity in the EU is twofold in nature in that it is both a value and a legal principle. The definition of a legal principle (a normative form of a value) adopted for the purposes of these considerations made it possible to not engage in examinations of the issue of the unclear nature of solidarity in the light of certain provisions of the Treaties, in particular Article 2 TEU. An element of EU solidarity, either understood broadly or in the specific form it takes is that which occurs between Member States. In this case, the accuracy of ascribing the nature of a legal principle

¹⁰¹ Z. Brodecki, *Preambula Konstytucji dla Europy*, in: S. Dudzik, (ed.), *Konstytucja dla Europy. Przyszły fundament Unii Europejskiej*, Krakow 2005, p. 61.

¹⁰² Z. Brodecki, *Komentarz do Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej sporządzonego w Maastricht dnia 7 lutego 1992 r.*, in: Z. Brodecki, (ed.), *Traktat o Unii Europejskiej, Traktat ustanawiający Wspólnotę Europejską z komentarzem*, Warsaw 2006, <https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587721737/519178> (accessed 30 January 2019).

should not raise any doubts. The requirement of solidarity among Member States has taken the form of many legal norms, and in addition legal norms contained in the Treaties, and therefore it is possible to speak of the constitutional standing of this requirement (obligation). Moreover, it is a horizontal obligation in the sense that it applies to many policies as a whole. As a result, the principle of solidarity between Member States takes precedence over other legal norms relating to the areas covered by this principle, and firstly over the norms of secondary EU law. Secondary legislation must provide for appropriate solutions for the application of this principle. Withdrawing from it would necessitate amending the Treaties pursuant to Article 48 TEU. From this point of view, the principle of solidarity among Member States determines the directions and framework (limitations) for the development of the EU legal system, which also applies to concepts such as flexible solidarity. The exceptional importance of the principle of solidarity among Member States in the EU legal system also lies in the expression of one of the values underlying this system, which is a special value as it embodies both compatibility and community and thus, the very essence of the process of European integration. This principle can therefore be described as a measure of EU uniformity.

One weakness of the principle of solidarity among EU Member States is the lack of a legal definition. The Court of Justice had to interpret the concept, which it first did in the 1970s. The definition formulated at that time was simple, but extremely accurate and clear and has not lost its strength and timeliness, not to mention the fact that it could be an example of an exemplary interpretation for the current adjudication panels of EU courts. Alongside the definition, the Court's conclusion at that time that the breach of the obligation of solidarity by Member States had a negative impact on the Community's legal order, down to its foundations deserves special attention. Interestingly, the Court did not avail itself of its own judgments from forty years ago in its recent rulings on the principle of solidarity among Member States. They were mentioned, however, by Advocates General and recently the General Court. Undoubtedly, there is still no universal interpretation of the principle of solidarity between Member States on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon that would encompass all aspects of the issue, including general criteria for selecting forms of aid and determining the extent of participation by individual donors that would be applicable in a comprehensive manner regardless of the type of policy. However, in the last dozen years or so, EU courts have referred to the principle of solidarity several times, not allowing its importance in the EU legal order to be forgotten. The European Commission also began to draw the attention of Member States to the principle. Member States themselves have initiated a debate on how to best understand the principle of solidarity, as it applies to them, and the new forms that it can take.

The context of this debate has been negative due to non-compliance by some Member States with the principle and more specifically with the secondary legislation that implements it as well as the reluctance of the Commission and most of the Member States toward the concept of flexible solidarity. Nonetheless, debate is another contribution, apart from judgments of EU courts, documents of other EU institutions

and the voice of doctrine,¹⁰³ to the revival of solidarity as a value and legal principle after being overshadowed for several decades by a number of enormous challenges and being treated as something obvious and assured once and for all in a Europe that is unifying in an unprecedented manner. The judgements of EU courts, the fulfilment by the Commission of the obligation imposed on it in Article 17 TEU (which ensures the application of EU law and supervises its application under the control of the Court of Justice of the EU) and the aforementioned debate all prove that solidarity among Member States remains a central principle of the EU legal and institutional system. It has not lost its political power or, above all, the ability to (indirectly) produce legal effects. The migration crisis and the attitude of some Member States have contributed to the flourishing of the principle of solidarity as a subject of reflection regarding both the legal system and future of the EU. This does not, of course, pre-determine the fate of the entire integration project. In the history of the principle itself and the entire organisation, a new chapter will be added by the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Key words: legal principle, EU legal system, solidarity, principle of solidarity among EU Member States, flexible solidarity in the EU

ABSTRACT

In recent years, in relation to what has been called the “2015 migration crisis”, much has been said both in EU Member States and in institutional forums concerning solidarity in the EU, both as a value and as a legal principle. Solidarity itself was said to be “in a state of crisis” and consequently, so was the entire project of European integration. The goal of this article is to answer the question whether the EU is facing the twilight of the legal principle of solidarity among Member States, or, on the contrary, a renaissance. Therefore, the issues discussed include the qualification of solidarity in the EU legal system (relations between values and principles in Treaty terms, the ways the principle is expressed in the Treaties), understanding of the principle of solidarity among Member States in doctrine and in the judiciary and the role of this principle in the jurisprudence of EU courts as well as its effectiveness and its prospects for the future (observance by Member States, its place in reflections on the future of the EU, the concept of flexible solidarity). The hypothesis is that, contrary to popular belief, the principle of solidarity among Member States has now entered into one of its strongest periods in its history as a value and principle of the legal system of the European Communities and the EU. Theoretical and dogmatic legal research methods are utilised. The result is the conclusion that solidarity among member States remains a central principle of the legal and institutional system of the EU, without losing the strength of its political influence and, above all, the capacity to (indirectly) produce legal effects. The migration crisis and the attitude of some Member States have contributed to the flourishing of the principle of solidarity as an object of reflection regarding the legal system and future of the EU.

¹⁰³ See the monograph cited in footnote 48.

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THE EUROZONE CRISIS A MULTITHEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

In this article, it is the intention of the author to explain the Eurozone crisis from the perspective of three theories found in European studies. These are neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism. At the same time, he maintains that only a joint analysis from all these perspectives can make it possible to understand and scientifically explain what has been happening in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since 2010, when problems began affecting its Member States from Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy) as well as Ireland. Such a multilateral conceptual approach, which by definition combines several theoretical perspectives also makes it possible to explain other crises in the EU, such as the processes of integration and disintegration occurring in Europe.

The article aims to elaborate a multilateral or multitheoretical methodological approach in political science (especially in European studies). It results from the conviction that a single theoretical framework, even if it is systematically modified and applied to research material, most often cannot fully explain the complex nature of political changes. In the same way, a better framework is an attempt to simultaneously illuminate specific research material from several scientific perspectives in order to better clarify and understand the phenomena that are occurring. The basic methodological challenge is the choice of the most suitable theories or theoretical claims and their appropriate application to empirical material. This research focuses on three theories. Neofunctionalism perceives a crisis situation as an opportunity for new regulations and European institutions, and therefore progress in integration. It explains then the expansion of authority in the euro area and the EU, including the increase of informal authority by the European Central Bank (ECB), the main institution which contained the crisis. The intergovernmental approach in turn highlights the leadership roles of the largest Member States, especially visible in times of trouble in the euro area. Finally, constructivism accurately shows the role of economic and political ideas as well as political narratives used by politicians and spread in the media during the crisis in question.

The methodological assumptions will be checked against the example of the Eurozone crisis in order to evaluate to what degree particular theories explain its exist-

ence, to what degree they cannot do this and thus compel scholars to search for other theoretical justifications. Finally, it will be shown that important elements of different theories complement each other in describing the crisis in question. At the same time, it is assumed that no theory is able to explain it on its own or that such explanations will be incomplete.

NEOFUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS

The theory of neofunctionalism assumes that crises serve to mobilise European integration since they compel reforms with the goal of eliminating problems. One of the basic claims of this theory is the famous maxim of Jean Monnet that Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for them.¹ In this way, difficulties serve to mobilise Member States to develop further supra-national cooperation, including the expansion of authority at the level of the union and the appearance of new regulations or European institutions. In essence, the Eurozone crisis has favoured this type of change. At its beginning, in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created. It was intended to be merely a temporary measure and to extend temporary loans to countries affected by problems. In 2012, in connection with an escalation of the crisis, it was reconstructed as the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and at the same time the scale of its financial operations was increased (with a share capital of 80 billion, lending opportunities were increased to 700 billion euro). Although the ESM existed formally outside EU treaties, and was, strictly speaking, an intergovernmental (and so not supranational) institution, its creation can be regarded as a manifestation of the neofunctionalist approach to integration.

Further measures were taken within the framework of European law and included the subsequent passing of the Sixpack and then the Twopack. Both sets of regulations were intended to strengthen the fiscal policy discipline of Member States, including through the European Semester, the ex-ante monitoring of draft national budgets along with the scope for introducing necessary structural reforms meant to support the stability of public finances at the national level.² A further change was the Fiscal Pact which was meant once more to strengthen fiscal discipline, inter alia through the requirement of introducing criteria for acceptable structural deficits into national constitutions. This was another treaty concluded outside the framework of the EU and so formally it did not serve either as an expansion of EU law or as an increase in European institutional authority. Nonetheless, it can, with a certain dose of tolerance, be recognised as a step in accordance with the assumptions of neofunctionalism.

¹ J. Monnet, *Memoirs*, William Collins, London 1978, p. 417.

² F. Schimmelfennig, *European integration in the euro crisis: the limits of postfunctionalism*, "Journal of European Integration" 2014, 36(3), pp. 321-337; T.G. Grosse, *Semestr Europejski: poprawa zarządzania czy zmiana ustrojowa?* "Analiza Natolińska" 2013, no. 7 (65), <http://natolin.edu.pl> (accessed 27 October 2013).

A further reform was the introduction of a banking union, that is a strengthening of the control of banks by the ECB as well as the orderly restructuring and liquidation of banks threatened with insolvency. The ECB was an institution, which in an explicit manner increased its powers during a time of crisis. This expansion of authority took place without the appropriate treaty authorisation and, in the opinion of some legal experts, even violated the rule of law within the EU. Nonetheless, this is an example of the development of integration even if it initially took place in an informal manner. The ECB turned out to also be a supranational institution of enormous financial potential which could rise to the challenge of the crisis.³ All this served well in defending EMU from disintegration and in expert opinion it was the intervention by the ECB that halted the crisis and not the other, earlier mentioned, reforms.⁴

The actions of the ECB are then in accordance with neofunctionalism although at the same time they can be a basis for supplementing this theory. Attention should be drawn to the fact that they point to a specific manner of developing integration. The bank did meet the needs of the crisis situation but it caused a great amount of political controversy and at times violated existing treaty law.⁵ The ECB broke, for example, the principle of the national sovereignty of fiscal policy and the exclusive responsibility of Member States for their debt (Article 125 (1) TFEU). It also breached the prohibition against the mutualisation of debt and also the prohibition against the ECB becoming the lender of last resort (Article 123 (1) TFEU). In addition, the ECB in many situations lost its status as a politically independent institution (when, for example, it forced borrower countries to accept terms and conditions set by lending countries). The ECB like other EU institutions also violated the treaty independence of some public policies, left to the exclusive authority of Member States (Article 5 TEU). According to the treaties, budgetary policy remains the right of countries but despite this during the crisis it was ever more strictly monitored and even supervised by EU institutions.

According to Frank Schimmelfennig, the neofunctionalist model clearly explains the resistance of the euro area to problems for two basic reasons.⁶ Firstly, supranation-

³ F. Schimmelfennig, *European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of the euro and Schengen crises*, "Journal of European Public Policy" 2018, 25:7, pp. 969-989.

⁴ This primarily refers to the declaration by President of the ECB M. Draghi in 2012, in which he warned financial markets that the bank would use whatever measures were necessary to stop speculative attacks on the EMU. These words were made credible through the far-reaching policy of quantitative easing. Cf. T. G. Grosse, *Kryzys w strefie euro*, [in:] *Oblicza kryzysu. Analiza zarządzania kryzysowego z perspektywy ekonomicznej i politycznej*, (ed.) M. A. Cichoński, T. G. Grosse, Centrum Europejskie Natolin, Warsaw 2016, pp. 11-56.

⁵ Ch. Kreuder-Sonnen, *An authoritarian turn in Europe and European Studies?* "Journal of European Public Policy" 2018, vol. 25, no 3, pp. 452-464; C. Joerges, *Three transformations of Europe and the search for a way out of its crisis*, [in:] C. Joerges and C. Glinzki (eds.), *The European Crisis and the Transformation of Transnational Governance. Authoritarian Managerialism versus Democratic Governance*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 25-46; J. White, *Emergency Europe*, "Political Studies" 2015, 63(2), pp. 300-18.

⁶ F. Schimmelfennig, *European integration (theory) in times of crisis...*

al institutions, especially the ECB were already strong before the crisis and could effectively react to problems. Secondly, the EMU deepened the interdependence between countries and specifically during the crisis made weaker countries dependent on aid from other Member States as well as the ECB. Simultaneously the deep integration of the EMU made the costs of disintegration, such as the exit of a member extremely high. For example the collapse of the EMU could bring about a decline in GDP of even 40-50% in the case of the weakest countries and up to 20% in the case of Germany.⁷ As can be seen it was exactly the countries most affected by the crisis who would be in a worse situation. This stopped the process of disintegration even when the progress of reform in the euro area was not satisfactory for these countries and the costs of the crisis, both socially and politically, were very high. It is worth pointing out that international interdependence or developed institutionalisation, and especially the great potential of the ECB can also be explained by the institutional theory.

The theory of neofunctionalism also makes it possible to clarify to a certain degree the lack of success of reform in the euro area. It is worth referring to the concept of “spill-back” (the reversal of integration which is the opposite of the process of “spill-over” integration).⁸ This phenomenon, on the basis of the theory described, might result from, among other factors, the dysfunction of the integration project and at the same time growing Euroscepticism among European societies and Member States. Indeed, no “withdrawal” from the EMU, such as the partial renationalisation of authority held in common has been observed. Nonetheless, there have been many examples of resistance to change or slowing of reforms. The political conditions also exist for a potentially more drastic “withdrawal” from integration in the euro area as manifested perhaps by the partial or complete departure from the EMU by Member States. The threat of such a situation took place at the height of the Greek crisis in 2015, when Greek voters declared, in a referendum, that they would not accept the terms of creditors concerning drastic fiscal savings and reforms which were painful for Greek society. Another real threat of withdrawal from the EMU was the plan to introduce a parallel currency in Italy, which gained in importance when a Eurosceptic group took charge of the government in 2018.⁹ Another risk is lurking in Germany itself. During the crisis, a political force (*Alternative für Deutschland*) appeared demanding that the country leave the EMU.¹⁰

⁷ Ibid., p. 983.

⁸ Cf. H. Vollaard, *Explaining European Disintegration*, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2014, pp. 1-18, DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12132; J. Ruzkowski, *Od finalité politique do multifinalité. Teoretyczne podstawy zwrotu w paradygmacie poznania przyszłej Unii Europejskiej*, [in:] Z. Czachór, T.G. Grosse, W. Paruch, *Integracja europejska – Polska perspektywa*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw 2018, pp. 265-282.

⁹ B. Bossone, M. Cattaneo, M. Costa, S.S. Labini, *A parallel currency for Italy is possible*, “Politico” 5 July 2018, <http://www.politico.eu> (accessed 29 July 2018).

¹⁰ One of many declarations by politicians of this party on the necessity of Germany leaving the EMU: *German rightwing politician attacks ECB for ‘destroying’ social system*, “Financial Times” 31 July 2018, www.ft.com (accessed 31 July 2018).

Various experts, sectors of society and politicians did not agree to EU reforms that could turn it into a transfer union. German political analysts and legal experts were among the strongest critics of breaking European treaties through unconventional interventions by the ECB, which moreover was met with numerous petitions directed to the Court of Justice of the EU and the German Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*). To their disappointment, both courts most often stood on the side of European integration and approved of the anti-crisis policy in the euro area (although at times with some reservations).

It is worth drawing attention to the fact that, similarly to the concept of spill-back, postfunctionalist theory presents an explanation of the crisis of integration.¹¹ It is a critical look at the foundations of neofunctionalism. They have been insufficiently verified during the period of serious economic disruptions, which affected Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. According to postfunctionalism, the crisis politicised discussion of the EU including reform of the EMU. This created a climate that impeded or slowed down far-reaching changes, which were intended to improve the situation of the euro area. At the same time, the increasing electoral politicisation at the national level became support for national democracy and Member State authority which impeded progress at the supranational level, also including neofunctionalist spill-over (that is the spread of authority from the economic to the political realm).

Postfunctionalist theory makes it possible to perceive the greatest weakness of neofunctionalist theory. It seems that it cannot satisfactorily explain the problems of reforming the euro area despite the presence of an existential crisis.¹² It is not entirely explainable why reforms were delayed, half-hearted or incomplete as well as ineffective (not counting the intervention of the ECB), dictated by particular interests and not by the good of the entire area or concern for its long-term survival and stability. It does not explain why there was no integrative spill-over from the economic to the political arenas. This is all the more interesting if the fact is taken under consideration that one of the basic shortcomings of the monetary union is that economic integration is not accompanied by sufficiently advanced attempts at introducing political union. Some argue that only progress in political integration in the direction of federalism could save the EMU from more crises.¹³ Finally, neofunctionalist theory does not perceive the growing politicisation of elections in Member States or the increasingly divergent interests between them. They were strengthened by the support of local voters, which

¹¹ L. Hooghe, G. Marks, *A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus*, "British Journal of Political Science" 2009, 39(1), pp. 1-23.

¹² Cf. T. G. Grosse, *Zmiana modelu integracji, czyli o fiasku neofunkcjonalnej koncepcji kryzysu*, "Myśl Ekonomiczna i Polityczna" 2015, no. 4(51), pp. 108-132.

¹³ J.E. Stiglitz, *The Euro and its Threat to the Future of Europe*, London 2016; T.G. Grosse, *Wprowadzenie. Polityki europejskie w dobie zmiany modelu integracji*, [in:] T.G. Grosse (ed.): *Polityki Europejskie w dobie kryzysu*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warsaw 2016, pp. 9-32; T.G. Grosse, *Federacja w Europie, czyli dążenie do utopii?* [in:] Z. Czachór, T.G. Grosse, W. Paruch, *Integracja europejska – Polska perspektywa*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw 2018, pp. 79-106.

created disputes between governments that are difficult to overcome. Many of the problems described can be explained in a significantly more satisfactory manner by the liberal intergovernmental approach applied to European studies.

THE LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH

Intergovernmental theory emphasises the role of states in processes of integration. National governments under the influence of domestic (including electoral) conditions often have different approaches to the future of Europe. This is what happens in a crisis, which can sharpen differing interests. That is why states engage in tough negotiations with each other and even in the face of common challenges their demands concerning courses of action may be diametrically opposed. In the case of the Eurozone, scholars point to the redistributive conflict occurring between rich states with more competitive economies, focusing on Germany and the Netherlands and those mired in structural problems and excessive debt, most of all in Southern Europe, for which France has become an advocate.¹⁴ The differences mentioned so far blocked reform of the EMU and made them sub-optimal and insufficient.¹⁵

The German approach to monetary union from the very beginning was based on emphasising the need for fiscal discipline in Member States and in the case of the monetary policy of the ECB on counteracting inflation and the maintenance of a strong currency, even at the cost of an exchange rate that is less favourable for exports. France, on the other hand, sought to complement its stabilisation policy (deficit and public debt levels) with a pro-growth policy. It also accepted manipulation of the exchange rate with the goal of improving the competitiveness of exports outside the euro area. Germany focused on the political independence of the ECB and observance of regulations, mainly because it wanted in this way to support the central bank's anti-inflation policy and fiscal discipline in countries that had been economically weakened. For these same reasons, German politicians accepted an increase in the technocratic rule of the EMU (from the ECB and European Commission [EC]). Such an approach can be recognised as being in agreement with the assumptions of neofunctionalism although it should be remembered that this was inspired by and in accordance with German economic interests. France, however, sought to politicise management at the discretion of Member States in order to make the decision-making process more elastic, including in reference to ongoing economic conditions. Therefore, it attempted to establish economic governance in

¹⁴ F. Biermann, N. Guérin, S. Jagdhuber, B. Rittberger, M. Weiss, *Political (non-)reform in the euro crisis and the refugee crisis: a liberal intergovernmentalist explanation*, "Journal of European Public Policy" 2017, DOI:10.1080/13501763.2017.1408670.

¹⁵ T.G. Grosse, *Zmiana modelu integracji, czyli o fasku neofunkcjonalnej koncepcji kryzysu...*

the EMU (or at least a finance minister), and an increase in political oversight over the activities of the ECB and EC.¹⁶

Strong differences between the two sides appeared during the crisis. Germany was averse to economic redistribution from the richer countries to those in crisis. It only reluctantly accepted the creation of permanent institutions protecting against the crisis, especially economic aid funds. It recognised that possible support for the weakest states should only take the form of short-term loans (and not grants), which in addition were strongly conditioned on large-scale structural reforms and fiscal savings in these countries imposed from above. The costs of the crisis were to be borne by the debtors countries, with too great budgetary outlays in relation to their tax collection potential. On the other hand, France and its allies demanded a more symmetrical division of the costs of the crisis. They sought a transfer union, that is permanent flow of economic and social investment to the poor countries with less competitive economies and trade deficits. They wanted to soften fiscal policy and to pool the debt, principally in order to increase structural and pro-growth investments in the weakest areas of the monetary union. France also sought to strengthen or create new institutions in the EMU, including the already mentioned finance minister, an investment budget for the euro area as well as financially strong and permanent institutions securing banks and Member States against bankruptcy.¹⁷

Negotiations between the two sides were difficult although in the course of time, and under the influence of the crisis situation, they led to gradual reform. In 2012, for example, France agreed to the Fiscal Pact proposed by Germany, which in exchange approved the transformation of the EFSF into the permanent ESM.¹⁸ Nonetheless, political changes effected during the crisis were closer to the position of Germany and its allies, especially the Netherlands and Finland and later the Baltic states as well.¹⁹ Further regulations strengthening fiscal discipline and EU supervision of structural reforms in Member States were accepted. New institutions intended to secure financial support for banks or at-risk countries were created with great resistance, and the aid they did give was to take the exclusive form of loans extended under demanding conditions. The activities of the ECB seemed to diverge from German expectations although they were finally accepted by Germany when they turned out to be useful for the durability of the EMU.

¹⁶ For more, see: U. Krotz, J. Schild, *Shaping Europe. France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2013, pp. 183-185.

¹⁷ Cf. J. Schild, *Leadership in hard times: Germany, France, and the management of the Eurozone crisis*, "German Politics & Society" 2013, 3(1), pp. 24-47.

¹⁸ Ch. Schweiger, *National interests and differentiated integration in the EU under crisis conditions. The case of Germany, France and Britain*, [in:] J.M. Magone, B. Laffan, Ch. Schweiger (eds.), *Core-periphery Relations in the European Union. Power and conflict in dualist political economy*, Routledge, London – New York 2016, p. 67.

¹⁹ S. Bulmer, *Germany and the eurozone crisis: between hegemony and domestic politics*, "West European Politics" 2014, 37(6), pp. 1244-1263.

The conflict over redistribution brought about by the crisis was asymmetrical in nature; this means that an increasingly large negotiating advantage was obtained by Germany and its allies. This is in accordance with the intergovernmental approach. This theory not only highlights conflicts between the preferences of particular countries but also shows that these are resolved according to the will of the strongest countries. This concerns not only the conflict between Germany and Greece, which was most starkly visible in the summer of 2015, and which was resolved in accordance with German interests. This happened despite the will of Greek voters, which was clearly and democratically expressed in a 2015 referendum. The economic and political strength of Germany in the EMU was decisive, and democratic procedures in peripheral Greece were disregarded, not only by its partners in the EMU but even by the Greek government itself.²⁰

What is more, the balance of forces in the monetary union also turned out to be asymmetric between Germany (and its allies) and France (and its political base in Southern Europe). In this way, the intergovernmental approach also explains why the solutions pursued during the crisis were sub-optimal, perhaps good for the particular interests of some creditors but less so for the entire system, or its long-term stability and even survival. This process is defined by the author of this paper²¹ as the “asymmetry of rationalities” of anti-crisis reforms.

In 2018, President of France Emmanuel Macron went on a new reformist offensive symbolised by a speech he gave at the Paris-Sorbonne University.²² Despite the fact that the crisis seemed to be over, which had a demobilising effect on European decision makers, he decided to tip the scales of changes in the EMU toward the demands of France and Southern Europe. Macron renewed, among other issues, the proposition of creating a separate budget and a finance minister for the euro area. He argued that the budget for the area should come primarily from European taxes, which was intended to lessen the resistance of the richer Member States. Due to elections and difficult coalition talks, Germany waited half a year to respond to Macron’s speech. In the coalition agreement of the new government from 2018, only five of 177 pages were devoted to future EU policy.²³ The contents of these entries clearly dampened French expectations.²⁴

²⁰ J.K. Galbraith, *Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice. The Destruction of Greece and the Future of Europe*, Yale University Press, New Haven – London 2016.

²¹ Cf. T.G. Grosse, *Kryzys w strefie euro...*

²² *Initiative pour l’Europe – Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique*, “Elysee.fr”, 26 September 2017, www.elysee.fr (accessed 30 September 2017).

²³ *Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD 19. Legislaturperiode*, CDU, www.cdu.de (accessed 27 March 2018).

²⁴ For a broader discussion of this document, see: T.G. Grosse, *Strefa EURO: kryzys, drogi wyjścia, zagrożenia*, Analiza, Nowa Konfederacja, Warsaw, April 2018, https://nowakonfederacja.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TGGrosse-Strefa_euro.pdf (accessed 27 April 2018).

During the negotiations conducted in 2018 only a modest investment line was foreseen for the euro area (about 25 billion euro) within a subsequent multi-year financial perspective for the entire EU until 2020. This was not a sufficient investment mechanism for stimulating structural reforms or softening the effects of a possible downturn. German politicians were reluctant to envision a separate budget for the EMU or for any kind of new investment measures for the weaker economies of the currency union. In addition, the investment funds mentioned, like the earlier introduced stabilisation loans, were primarily designed to have a mobilising effect to create a savings policy and structural reforms in the countries receiving them. Due to pressure resulting from a complication domestic situation related to migration policy, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel agreed to a summit with France at Schloss Meseberg (2108) on the subject of introducing a modest budget for the euro area at some undefined future time. Macron took advantage of Merkel's weakened position to obtain a declaration from the Chancellor on the euro area in exchange for concessions in migration policy.²⁵ This is in line with the assumptions of the liberal intergovernmental approach, which finds relevant factors for international negotiations within domestic conditions. Nonetheless, the agreement from Schloss Meseberg was rejected by the Baltic and Nordic countries as well as Benelux. In addition, the German side agreed that the funds for euro countries (without regard for their final institutional format) be granted only as loans and extended under explicit conditions. This had long been typical of German negotiation practices regarding EMU reform.

A change in name for the ESM to the European Monetary Fund (EMF) was planned, however, only with a small increase in powers (for example in the area of restructuring debt). Although the fund was not finally renamed, a heated discussion arose around it. A discussion over this institutional restructuring basically concerned secondary questions from the point of view of the entire system, for example whether the ESM would be under EU law or be subject to influence from the European Commission. It also concerned whether ESM stabilisation loans would necessarily entail losses for private investors engaged in trading bonds of countries receiving support from the ESM – in a manner similar to the restructuring of Greek debt with private creditors in 2012. This was a German demand, which was opposed by France and Italy. This could limit interest by bond investors in the debt of countries most threatened by next crisis. The German proposition was also completely divergent from the French idea of mutualised debt, which Germany consistently opposed for many years. In the opinion of German politicians, the basic function of the ESM was to stabilise the currency union in case of crisis and encourage to structural reforms and fiscal consolidation in problematic states.

The discussion on debt mutualisation for the Eurozone resumed in the summer of 2020, when next Multiannual Financial Framework was discussed. It was decided to create the European Recovery Fund (the so-called Next Generation EU), which

²⁵ *Eurozone reform: solving the Franco-German puzzle*, "Financial Times" 28 June 2018, <https://www.ft.com> (accessed 29 June 2018).

was to additionally support countries affected by the health crisis and the economic collapse that followed. Macron's goal was, on the one hand, to create a mechanism allowing for the issuance of a common European debt, and on the other, to direct the funds obtained in this way to the Eurozone countries in the south of the continent, as well as to France. After intense pressure from Paris, Chancellor Merkel agreed that this instrument should be based on common bonds issued by the European Commission, guaranteed by the EU's long-term budget and all 27 Member States. However, it should be remembered that the recovery fund was intended by German politicians to block much more ambitious large-scale and indefinite debt-incurring proposals presented by the countries of the South. Moreover, Merkel's goal was to create an instrument for all EU countries, and not only for the euro area, so that more countries could guarantee the repayment of the common debt.

Another planned reform concerned the completion of a banking union. This was, in particular, a question of introducing European deposit guarantees. Up to that time, this had been opposed by Germany, but in 2018 the country conditioned its approval for this reform on the obligation of a prior increase of banking reserves and the elimination of the problem of too many high risk loans in the banking sector.²⁶ These had surpassed 750 billion euro in the monetary union itself and the solution to this problem could last many years. Nonetheless, at the euro area summit in June of 2018, preliminary approval was given for undertaking negotiations on the future introduction of a system of deposit guarantees in the EMU as well as ESM guarantees for the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and so, additional protection for financial institutions within the banking union.²⁷

After the 2017 German federal election and the extended coalition negotiations, Merkel was in a significantly weaker political position and the parties creating the government had less support among voters while the Eurosceptic opposition was becoming stronger. Macron attempted to take advantage of this domestic weakness exerting political pressure for further reforms to the EMU. However, her domestic weakness also hampered Merkel's ability to compromise. As the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz (the successor of the Christian Democrat minister Wolfgang Schäuble) said: "A German finance minister is a German finance minister, regardless of his party affiliation".²⁸ This meant a continuation of the policy of the previous administration regarding the disposal of German taxpayer money and fiscal discipline in the EMU. The minimalist approach to reforms in the monetary union was also supported by the Nordic and Baltic countries as well as Benelux, which similarly to Germany argued for a strengthened policy of austerity instead of far reaching institutional changes, es-

²⁶ J. Spahn, *It's Time for the EU to Get Real*, "Politico", 22 March 2018 www.politico.eu (accessed 27 March 2018).

²⁷ *Euro Summit meeting (29 June 2018) – Statement*, EURO 502/18, Brussels, 29 June 2018.

²⁸ G. Chazan, *Franco-German engine lacks pulling power to drive EU27 reform*, "Financial Times" 3 April 2018, p. 3.

pecially the creation of new transfer instruments.²⁹ Therefore, German concessions to Macron's 2018 offensive were relatively insignificant – more in theory than practice, often postponing the reform agenda to some unspecified future time.

The intergovernmental approach explains why the Eurozone was not well prepared for another crisis. It remained a suboptimal system, which was continually developing below the level of its economic potential.³⁰ At the same time, it was asymmetric in nature, bringing benefits primarily to Germany while being a problem for the majority of other countries.³¹ It accumulates surpluses in the northern countries (mainly in Germany) and debt in the south, and at the same time it has a deflationary (and so anti-growth) tendency.³² Its basic flaw is the lack of solutions for stimulating economic growth in the weaker parts of the union, or automatic stabilisers reacting to asymmetric shocks, that is worsening economic conditions in one Member State. As a result, countries in trouble have huge problems in regaining economic competitiveness, and this process occurs primarily through internal devaluation and not economic development. It is then very expensive socially and brings about political unrest. The decentralisation of fiscal policy of the EMU at the national level is a problem, which prevents mutual debt and the introduction of common taxes, which could stimulate investment. Further, there are no instruments for the elimination of macroeconomic imbalances (especially in current accounts and therefore primarily in trade).

The worst aspect of the euro area, however, is that it is very difficult to reform.³³ Firstly, German voters do not want any reform that would lead to a transfer union, and defend their taxes from being transferred to southern countries. Secondly, Germany does not want to give up the financial and competitive advantages the asymmetric monetary union brings them. Further, the mechanisms of cumulative debt in the area turn most countries in Southern Europe into German client states, that is countries which are dependent upon loans, and thus geopolitically compliant.

At this point it is worth examining the main adversaries in the monetary union and reflect upon the question of Franco-German leadership in the EU (and EMU) or the “collective” regional hegemony effected by this team. Doubtless, the cooperation of the two countries was the primary mechanism of progress in integration, and at the same time after Brexit the political position of both countries within the EU has

²⁹ Northern EU states to minimise euro reform, “EUobserver” 6 March 2018, <https://euobserver.com> (accessed 27 March 2018).

³⁰ G. Strange, *The euro crisis, euro reform, and the problem of hegemony*, “Asia Europe Journal” 2018, 16(2), pp. 125-139.

³¹ R. Jessop, *Variiegated Capitalism, das Modell Deutschland, and the Eurozone Crisis*, “Journal of Contemporary European Studies” 2014, 22(3), pp. 248-260; J.E. Stiglitz, *The Euro and its Threat to the Future of Europe...*; S. Kawalec, E. Pytlarczyk, *Paradoks euro. Jak wyjść z pułapki wspólnej waluty?* Wydawnictwo: Poltext, Warsaw 2016.

³² B. J. Cohen, *The international monetary system: diffusion and ambiguity*, “International Affairs” 2008, 84(3), pp. 455-470; B. J. Cohen, P. Subacchi, *Is the euro ready for prime time?* “Chatham House Briefing Paper” 2008.

³³ T. G. Grosse, *Polska a przyjęcie euro*, “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny” no. 2(73), April-June 2018, pp. 84-93.

been strengthened.³⁴ It can also be assumed that both countries have so far to a lesser degree concentrated on mutual rivalry or balancing forces in internal EU relations, and more on balancing external powers such as the US. In the opinion of some,³⁵ after Brexit the countries of Southern Europe, which are more protectionist, clearly gained in importance in the Council of the European Union in relation to the somewhat more liberal German and like-minded Nordic, Baltic and Benelux countries. This means that German influence might be balanced by a coalition of countries from Southern Europe under French leadership. Therefore some scholars maintain that there is no alternative in Western Europe to the Franco-German “motor”, otherwise the progress of integration will be blocked.³⁶ This could mean the necessity of gradual concessions by Germany to further French reform offensives.

Although this is not a probable solution, in the opinion of the author there are serious threats for such a scenario. Firstly, the construction of the EMU will systematically strengthen Germany and weaken France and the countries of Southern Europe. France certainly will not be able to reform the euro area enough to change this asymmetry. Secondly, France certainly will not make sufficiently deep internal reforms to be able to regain competitiveness with Germany. Thirdly, the geopolitical advantage of France over Germany that results inter alia from its military potential and permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can easily be levelled by Germany. This could happen both by progress in EU defence policy and by reforms in managing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (leading, among other results, to the introduction of majority voting and the emergence of a common representation of the EU in the UNSC). In addition, as research indicates, the primary determinant of geopolitical position has historically not been military but rather economic potential.³⁷ A strong economy makes it possible to build appropriate military abilities quickly, as in the case of Germany’s ability to create nuclear weapons. It should be noted that discussion on this topic has gained strength both in Germany and other NATO countries,³⁸ which means that for geopolitical relations in Europe, economic potential is the most critical and the asymmetry of the euro area is key to this.

The above considerations can be applied to an intergovernmental (or simply realist) approach, yet at the same time are difficult to capture within the theory of

³⁴ U. Krotz, J. Schild, *Back to the future? Franco-German bilateralism in Europe’s post-Brexit union*, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2018, vol. 25, no. 8, pp. 1174-1193.

³⁵ H.-W. Sinn, *Die Bedeutung des Brexit für Deutschland und Europa*, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” 16 March.

³⁶ U. Krotz, J. Schild, *Back to the future? ...*

³⁷ Cf. M. Beckley, *Economic Development and Military Effectiveness*, “The Journal of Strategic Studies” 2010, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 43-79.

³⁸ Cf. criticism of this idea in the US: R. Herzog, *German Nukes Would Be a National Tragedy*, “Foreign Policy” 10 March, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/german-nukes-would-be-a-national-tragedy/> (accessed 29 July 2018); U. Kühn, T. Volpe, *Keine Atombombe, Bitte*, “Foreign Affairs” July/August 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte> (accessed 29 July 2018).

neofunctionalism. Finally, for this part of the article it is worth turning attention to the attempts made to explain German leadership in the euro area also in reference to the rational choice institutionalism.³⁹ In the intergovernmental approach, German initiative or passivity regarding reform of the EMU is decided primarily by domestic German conditions as well as relations with political adversaries that are more or less asymmetrical. An additional aspect is the balance of costs and benefits of German policy for that country which is highlighted by the rational choice institutionalism. It can then be concluded that the theory described argues in favour of Germany maintaining its current benefits which result from the asymmetric construction of the monetary union and for Germany to discard all ideas that would lead the Eurozone to becoming a transfer union.

CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATIONS

Constructivism, in academic terms, is primarily explanatory in nature, and not normative. Nevertheless, in scholarship ideas are often utilised for political activities, as strategies for the development of European integration. Therefore, such activities are referred to as “constructivist methods” in integrative processes.⁴⁰ At the same time, its three functions have been described by the author. Firstly, there is “constructing reality”, for example a single political community in Europe. Secondly, there is “masking reality”, *inter alia* covering up imperfections in the process of integration within a particular political narrative. Thirdly, there is “legitimising reality”, for example searching for justification and social support for particular anti-crisis policies. The final section of this article will refer to the role of ideas in the Eurozone crisis in a synthetic manner, which relates to the theory of constructivism.

Most scholars note the role of this factor, especially in German politics.⁴¹ It had a limiting effect on the introduction of more decisive reforms, including increasing investment or social transfers from richer and more competitive countries to weaker and struggling countries. According to these opinions, it was not only the interests of German taxpayers and the pressure they put on politicians that brought about German diplomatic measures to torpedo the ideas mentioned above. Of great importance were the opinions of the German intellectual elite and their long attachment to ordoliberal economic ideas, which recommend fiscal savings, low inflation and a strong currency in monetary policy as the macroeconomic foundations of a successful economy. Thus,

³⁹ Cf. M.G. Schoeller, *Providing political leadership? Three case studies on Germany's ambiguous role in the eurozone crisis*, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2017, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1-20.

⁴⁰ T.G. Grosse, *Konstruowanie rzeczywistości jako metoda integracji europejskiej. Przykład Parlamentu Europejskiego*, [in:] *Zastosowanie konstrukttywizmu w studiach europejskich*, ed. J. Czaputowicz, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2016, pp. 87-105.

⁴¹ M. Matthijs, *Powerful rules governing the euro: the perverse logic of German ideas*, “Journal of European Public Policy” 2016, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 375-391.

not only German interests but above all ideas were able to determine the policy of the principle player in the Eurozone arena.

Similarly, in the opinion of many, neoliberal ideas are largely responsible for the crisis in the euro area.⁴² They recommended the free flow of capital within the EMU, which compounded problems due to design errors in the union. What is more, the challenge presented by the free flow of capital within the monetary union was not faced even under the influence of the crisis despite the fact that even John Maynard Keynes drew attention to the problem of regime instability in a situation in which there are no capital controls.⁴³

Both ordoliberal (and neoliberal) ideas turned out to be counterproductive in terms of counteracting the crisis.⁴⁴ For example, the austerity forced upon Greece turned out to be a massive shock and undid at least two decades of the country's development.⁴⁵ It was unusually costly for society but also very difficult for the political elite, which was forced to implement policy dictated by creditors and rejected by a majority of the electorate. The counterproductivity of this policy was also demonstrated by the fact that it did not actually reduce public debt, rebuild economic competitiveness or lead to satisfactory structural reform, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlighted in a staff report.⁴⁶ At the same time, the financial dependence of the country on other members of the EMU and international institutions increased. Even if Greece formally completed the third aid programme in 2018, it would remain indebted to creditors for decades to come, subject to monitoring and further conditions imposed on its fiscal policy. What is worse, there are no prospects for Greece that the path out of debt restrictions proposed by creditors is realistic and will end in success.⁴⁷ In order to be freed from its financial obligations, Greece should have by 2020 a budget surplus of 3.5% of GDP and by 2060 at least 2.2 %. Estimates by the IMF indicate that after 2038, over the next two decades, the costs of debt repayment will exceed 20% of Greek GDP.

It is difficult to not recognise these types of assumption as overly optimistic. They can also be interpreted as a message intended to create a feeling of satisfaction with having overcome the crisis, to lull public opinion and delay dealing with possible problems, leaving them for future governments to confront. If, however this is a case of Greece emerging from the crisis, then it should be recognised as a manifestation of

⁴² E. Stockhammer, *Neoliberal growth models, monetary union and the Euro crisis. A post-Keynesian perspective*, "New Political Economy" 2016, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 365-379.

⁴³ J. Kirshner, *Keynes, capital mobility and the crisis of embedded liberalism*, "Review of International Political Economy" 1999, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 315.

⁴⁴ M. Matthijs, *Powerful rules governing the euro ...*

⁴⁵ While the level of Greek GDP reached 235 billion euro in 2009, by 2017 it had shrunk to 178 billion. According to the IMF Greece can reach the level of development it had before the crisis sometime after 2025. *Greece, Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation*, International Monetary Fund, Washington 2017.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *IMF warns eurozone that Greece needs more debt relief*, "Financial Times" 31 July 2018, <https://www.ft.com> (accessed 31 July 2018).

the constructivist method, characteristic of processes of integration. One of its basic functions is “masking reality” and so covering up inconvenient facts and presenting a more optimistic interpretation in order to protect the process of integration, in this case the stability of the euro area.⁴⁸ Another example of similar manipulation was the concealment of certain actors’ own, at times special, interests under the guise of European interests common to the entire EU (or EMU).

Another function of the constructivist method in integration is “legitimising reality”. The primary goal here is searching for justification of a proposed policy and social authorisation within the EU. This function occurs both at the preliminary discussion stage, especially when negotiating a given policy and competing with different ideas and also at the implementation stage in order to ensure a better, more effective implementation of the solutions adopted. It is also worth noting that using the rhetorical justification of one’s own policy intended to pursue specific strategic interests is known as “strategic constructivism”. It is a case of realist assumptions in international relations combined with constructivism.⁴⁹

During the Eurozone crisis, different ideas for improving the economic situation competed with each other. Among them there were two main camps, German and French. One of the areas of dispute was the sphere of rhetoric. Both sides attempted to justify their positions and convince the largest number of countries and societies of the appropriateness of their solutions. In the German view, the behaviour of Greece was based on statistical fraud and violated the rules common to all countries. The residents of Southern Europe had learned to live above their means and then tried to shift the blame (and bills) onto other, richer countries in the EMU. They should, however, like Germany conduct structural reforms (such as the “Agenda 2010”) and work hard in order to rebuild economic competitiveness. An additional supplement to the German narrative was made up of ordoliberal economic ideas. France and its allies, in turn, appealed to Keynesian ideas and emphasised the necessity of solidarity between richer countries and those that are either poorer or in trouble. They emphasised that the German economy had benefitted greatly from membership in the EMU and also that the monetary union should be more balanced and not benefit only one or only a few societies.⁵⁰ According to

⁴⁸ Cf. T.G. Grosse, *Trzy oblicza konstrukttywizmu w Europie. Rozważania o kryzysie metody integracyjnej*, “Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka” 2014/2015, no. 17/18, pp. 35-50.

⁴⁹ For more, see: N. Jabko, *Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 2012; T.G. Grosse, *Strategiczny konstrukttywizm: Realistyczno-konstrukttywistyczne wyjaśnienie liberalizacji rynków finansowych w Europie*, [in:] J. Ruskowski, L. Wojnicz (eds.): *Teorie w studiach europejskich. W kierunku nowej agendy badawczej*, Instytut Politologii i Europeistyki Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, Szczecin–Warsaw 2012, pp. 145-166.

⁵⁰ It is worth noting that from the beginning of the crisis, Germany earned close to 3 billion euro on the interest alone on loans extended to Greece. Regardless of that, it was the only country of the EMU which during the entire crisis had a significant budget and export surplus. German exports in these years reached their highest level in history. Cf. *Germany made €2.9bn profit on Greece Since 2010*, “EUobserver” 21 June 2018, <https://euobserver.com> (accessed 29 June 2018).

research⁵¹ carried out in the years 2010-12 in the press of eight countries of the EMU,⁵² German arguments had gradually grown in importance. Doubtless, they have become one of the deciding factors in the success of German preferences in anti-crisis policy.

The ideas and narratives concerning European policy then are a true field of battle between Member States. Supranational entities such as the representatives of the European Commission and the European Central Bank take part in them as well. During the Eurozone crisis, they at times stood on the German side and at other times they supported French ideas and at times were forced to answer accusations from Member States or argue with propositions coming from particular countries. Nonetheless, it was primarily the governments of the largest countries that had the most to say in terms of anti-crisis policy, and debate in particular countries at times was of fundamental importance for the formation of the political agenda as well as the decision-making process in the EMU. Also, very significant were the arguments occurring in discussions between particular countries.

In the literature, the term “rhetorical trap” is employed to refer to a situation in which the relatively weaker side in negotiation, thanks to successful rhetorical tactics, manoeuvres the stronger side into declarations which later bring about specific decisions in accordance with the preferences of the weaker countries.⁵³ In the case of the Eurozone crisis, such a situation occurred during the process of creating a banking union. The institution was accepted by the German government with great reluctance since it was feared that it could be a way of using German taxpayer money to finance failing banks in other countries of the EMU. Promoters of the banking union, however, used a German anti-crisis slogan for their own ends. German diplomats had repeated many times that it was necessary to break the vicious cycle of bailing out failing banks from national budgets. Therefore, the basic justification for creating a banking union was precisely the German demand to stop financing banks from very indebted Member States. The banking union was intended to assume the responsibility for overseeing, and possibly saving from bankruptcy or liquidating threatened financial institutions. In this way, the agile argumentation by France and its allies forced German representatives to agree to create an institution they did not want.⁵⁴ This is a textbook example of a “rhetorical trap” into which German diplomats fell and at the same time a situation particularly well explained on the basis of constructivist theory.

During the economic crisis, the role of Eurosceptic ideas in national politics grew. There were many reasons for this, including the ineffectiveness of the EMU, reforms that were too severe socially, implemented not so much by governments (which can

⁵¹ M. Ojala, T. Harjuniemi, *Mediating the German Ideology: Ordoliberal Framing in European Press Coverage of the Eurozone Crisis*, “Journal of Contemporary European Studies” 2016, 24:3, pp. 414-430.

⁵² The research was conducted in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Finland.

⁵³ F. Schimmelfennig, *The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union*, “International Organization” 2001, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 47-80.

⁵⁴ D. Schäfer, *A Banking Union of Ideas? The Impact of Ordoliberalism and the Vicious Circle on the EU Banking Union*, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2016, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 961-980.

be replaced) but by European institutions and the IMF (which remain beyond the reach of national democracies). This was conducive in directing voter displeasure toward the EU. During the crisis, societies not only became more interested in European politics but more and more rebelled against it, finding the way that it disregarded democratic procedures in Member States to be undemocratic.⁵⁵ A telling example of such a situation was the previously mentioned referendum in Greece (2015) and another was the crushing of Cypriot parliamentary resistance to reforms dictated by creditors (including the forced loss of some depositor savings, to which the parliament had not originally agreed). In this way, the politicisation of anti-crisis measures grew for local voters along with ever greater scepticism toward integration, primarily in the countries most affected by difficulties but also among creditors, including in Germany. This relates to the theories described earlier, above all post-functionalism and the concept of spill-back (that is withdrawal from integration) within a neofunctionalist framework. It can be seen once more that some theories complement each other and provide additional explanations for the events occurring during the Eurozone crisis.

SUMMARY

The goal of this article was to propose a multitheoretical perspective as a methodological approach in European studies. In the author's view, examining processes of integration or disintegration in Europe from several different theoretical perspectives creates greater possibilities for explaining political reality. A single theory only rarely makes a full understanding of events possible. This is especially the case with reference to the Eurozone crisis. The theory of neofunctionalism, for example, does not envision Member States having differing interests which could hinder the process of integration. In the case of the euro area, there was a re-distributional conflict between the rich North and the indebted South, which blocked some reforms and at the same time caused the crisis to be solved in a sub-optimal or even counterproductive manner. Theories can, however, complement each other, one example being "strategic constructivism", which is a combination of realism and constructivism. Some theories can also at least in part overlap. Such is the case of postfunctionalism and the neofunctionalist concept of spill-back.

A useful tool in analysing the crisis in the euro area is the liberal intergovernmental approach. Not only does it illuminate different interests between Member States, but also indicates that in negotiations it is not necessarily the most suitable solution that emerges victorious but rather the one that is preferred by the strongest political grouping of countries. In the case of the EMU, such a group was led by Germany which had over the course of many years crystallised views on the functioning of the currency union, and so according to Germany, the dysfunction of the crisis resulted less from institutional shortcomings than from disregard of the rules established at the beginning

⁵⁵ Cf. T.G. Grosse, *O potencjale rewolucyjnym w Europie*, "Civitas" no. 15, 2013, pp. 71-98.

of the EMU. German negotiating power was the result above all of its economic strength and financial reserves. In the situation of the crisis, Germany also gained in importance relative to most of its interlocutor states, which were mired in crisis. Domestic German conditions were another factor which during the crisis strengthened Merkel in international negotiations although after 2017 her position began to weaken.

Other factors influencing the negotiating position of a country are rhetorical skills and the use of ideas for justifying (or legitimising) its preferred policies. While at the beginning of the crisis Germany's arguments gained the favour of other Member States, later the pro-European rhetoric offensive by the president of France became more effective. Effective political narratives often appeal to pro-European feelings, solidarity or the rule of law. They serve to stigmatise opponents and to limit their negotiating options. These were also the motifs utilised during the crisis of the monetary union. In this way, an important complement for the intergovernmental approach can be constructivism, especially the application of its assumptions to the needs of European studies, including the functional approach to constructivism as a method of "constructing", "masking", or "legitimising" integration. Another application of this theory may be the references to negotiating tactics, which includes the "rhetorical trap" described in this article.

The virtue of neo-functionalism in the analysis of the crisis is the prominence it gives to the interdependence between countries and the high costs of disintegration in the euro area. An important complement to this theory regarding this topic is the intergovernmental approach, which highlights not only the interdependence itself but also the fact that in the case of the EMU it is asymmetrical in nature. This means that weaker countries, especially those in crisis become dependent on the aid of the richest countries, above all Germany. That is why political commentators sometimes refer to Greece as a "de facto colony of the EU".⁵⁶ At the same time, the imbalance of potential between Germany and France is gradually growing. This could become a challenge for Franco-German leadership described at times as the "motor" of integration, all the more so since both countries have rather different ideas for improving the management and stability of the EMU. On the one hand, the currency union increases the interdependence between France and Germany, which should incline both countries to cooperation. On the other hand, it heightens the different interests of both countries and blocks progress on reforms. It is then a situation full of contradictions, and even paradoxes, eluding clear explanation through any single theory. That is why it should be analysed on the basis of several interrelated theoretical approaches.

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Keywords: neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism, multitheoretical perspectives, Eurozone

⁵⁶ M. Karnitschnig, *The Greek Rorschach test. The end of the bailout program offers crucial lessons for the future of the eurozone*, "Politico" 20 August 2018, www.politico.eu (accessed 29 August 2018).

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to explain the crisis of the Eurozone from the perspective of three theories in European studies. They are neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism. The author begins to develop a multitheoretical methodological approach in political science, particularly in the area of European studies. The basic problem of European studies is that scholars usually attempt to describe the Eurozone crisis from a single theoretical perspective which does not fully explain phenomena related to the crisis. That is why this article has as its hypothesis that in order to explain the crisis in its entirety, it is necessary to refer to more than one theory at the same time. In order to achieve the goals of the article, the research methods of the author were critical analyses of the sources and selected literature on the subject.

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THE LIBERAL PARADIGM IN THE FACE OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Within the liberal paradigm, a number of influential conceptualisations of the ongoing process of transnational exchange have appeared up to the present time. These constitute an academic justification for the establishment and functioning of international organisations. Over several decades these theories have made it possible to clarify and understand the multi-aspectual phenomenon of the institutionalisation of global politics through a comprehensive examination of its causes, courses and possible consequences.¹ Today the question occurs whether these schematics can serve to anticipate and explain the tendencies toward disintegration observed in relation to some international institutions. The potential breakdown of the liberal order together with the current contestation of the processes of globalisation, with which political analysts have been confronted in recent years has placed the relevance of the paradigm on the agenda, particularly as signs appear of it slowing down or even reversing in areas that have until now been saturated by pluralistic norms and/or supranational regulations.

The goal of this article is to reflect on the relevance of the liberal theory of international relations in academic procedures aimed at analysing ongoing disintegrational trends in the world. It is work asking whether this research school can be applied to the exploration of disintegrational processes playing out at the present time in places such as Europe. The hypothesis of the article is that the analytic value of the paradigm under examination is limited, especially in pointing out the reasons for, courses of as well as the results of the erosion of international institutions, although some elements of it remain valid.

For the purposes of this analysis the concept described has been reconstructed through the use of selected claims made by representative theoreticians of global politics from various directions of research into international relations. The conceptualis-

¹ Here it is worth underlining that the liberal theory of international relations filled the role of intellectual core in influential “middle-range” theories which include, for example, the liberal intergovernmental approach, the theory of regimes, institutionalism or neofunctionalism.

ation presented here, which is qualitative in nature, served for the formulation of the research methods used, which were then contrasted with the collapse of supranational institutions. The above is a summary of how an attempt has been made to utilise one of the most influential theories of global politics to describe the dynamic phenomenon of disintegration, the strongest example of which has been the issue of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU (hereinafter Brexit).²

INTEGRATION VIEWED FROM THE LIBERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The liberal paradigm was elaborated in opposition to the theory of realism while it took its inspiration from classical liberal thought arising from philosophy and economics.³ Unlike realism, it was based on a belief on the optimistic nature of humanity, for whom a desire to cooperate with others is a proper form of conduct. In reference to the idea of the social contract carried within it, it stressed the role of the law as the basic regulator of social life, due to its deep idealism transforming itself into a belief about the ability to overcome the tragic past.

It was on a wave of liberal doctrine that the US President Woodrow Wilson elaborated his view on the necessity of breaking with the anarchy of global politics by binding actors to reasonable legal norms. The idea presented did not, however, promote naive sentimentalism, consisting of the desire for the top-down construction of a community of states capable of self-limitation with the help of the instruments of international law. On the contrary, the essence of liberal theory was the perception of foreign policy as a process motivated by the preferences of various social groups functioning within particular states.⁴

State actors in this approach functioned as conduits for people's collective expectations, and their governments became agents of pluralistic societies and they were compelled to strive for the realisation of their preferences in the international arena in order to maintain power. In the estimation of liberal theorists, the most desirable political system was democracy which revealed the expectations of the electorate to the fullest degree. This type of government avoided unnecessary risks that could introduce uncertainty which would lead to potential losses.⁵ Therefore, antagonism between democracies remained an anomaly because peace and cooperation were the appropriate forms of operation due to the economic basis of individual motivations.

² G. Davies, *What does it all mean?*, "German Law Journal", Brexit Supplement, 2016, vol. 17, p. 8.

³ P.J. Borkowski, *Polityczne teorie integracji międzynarodowej*, Warsaw 2007, p. 44.

⁴ A. Moravcsik, *Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment*, in: C. Elman, M. Fendius Elman (eds.), *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003, p. 2.

⁵ Idem, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, "International Organization", vol. 51 no. 4, Autumn, 2007, p. 514.

Serving as the main instrument of foreign policy in democratic countries in the liberal vision was the institutionalisation of international relations, since supranational bodies supported the realisation of the expectations of various social groups. In this approach, states were no longer billiard balls, for which cooperation was temporary in nature as the theory of realism ordered. Their foreign and domestic policies merged and integrated, which led to a harmony of interests that implied that undertaking cooperation was natural. The pressure for international cooperation came from the societies themselves, which wanted, in this way, to maximise their economic utility. In this sense, common institutions made it possible to limit distortions in mutual interactions as well as to eliminate risks which could lead to potential costs for particular groups. This took on new weight in the time of progressing globalisation, which brought far-ranging interdependence in the social, political, and economic spheres.

According to liberal theory, each country contained a multitude of interdependent networks from both internal and external perspectives, with special emphasis on connections between individuals and social groups. These dependencies led to cross-border exchanges at the economic, cultural, and political levels, acting on the preferences of states as actors embedded in various relations. Governments in the globalised world, directed by the preferences from within, represented specific segments of society and attempted to aggregate the interests of the population.⁶ The increase of cross-border economic flows required the construction of common institutions that facilitated mutually advantageous cooperation. Integration at the supranational level served to solve problems of particular units in the globalising world. In this sense the liberal model became necessary and indispensable while the institutionalisation of economic cooperation heralded a rapid convergence in the area of politics as well. Since the process of institutionalisation was a factor supporting economic growth, various societies accepted the transfer of state functions to the supranational level. With time, such policies would lead to the transfer of their loyalties to the supranational level, resulting in the creation of a broader commonwealth of states.

In the opinion of liberal theorists, globalisation was advantageous, because the increase of international trade brought pressure from business interests for rational and predictable state policies. The free flow of goods and services led to political cooperation, while the unlimited circulation of the elements of production limited the influence of states on economic processes. Within this conceptual framework, risks can be reduced thanks to the actions of international organisations which make it possible to decrease the costs of negotiations and to bring about a convergence of interests. The inclination toward coordinated action resulted from the fact that it had become profitable for all considered, which led to peaceful coexistence as well as socio-economic development.⁷

⁶ Idem, *The New Liberalism*, in: C. Reus-Smit, D. Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, 2008.

⁷ A. Moravcsik, *Liberal Theories of International Relations: a Primer*, Princeton University, www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/primer, (accessed 15 January 2019).

Unlike *Realpolitik*, in which politics takes precedence over the economy, liberalism focused on economic processes as the determinant and at the same time catalyst of politics. Seen through the prism of the economy, the demand for international cooperation translated into integration being both unavoidable and irreversible.⁸ Economic development led to an increase in societal welfare and encouraged greater care in making high-risk decisions as well. Within the liberal theory, states were rational actors, which were guided by economic balances and economic viability in order to satisfy the interests of various interest groups. International integration was based on a series of rational choices made by the state, due to the interdependence of the globalised world. The above factors generated a demand for the creation of organisations that met the needs of democratic societies and that focused on caution and the avoidance of radical solutions. Within this model, states were capable of self-restraint and compromise due to public opinion being an instrument for exerting pressure on governments. The search for solutions in the form of common institutions became a positive sum game and disagreements and selfish actions resulted from governments improperly representing the interests of individuals. Breaking off cooperation was the result of errors by the political elite in recognising the true expectations of societies, which strove for peaceful coexistence.⁹

A CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL PARADIGM IN THE FACE OF DISINTEGRATIONAL TENDENCIES?

The progressive doctrine of the “end of history”, which dominated discourse after the collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s, favoured the mass institutionalisation of global politics including the development of the EU. Until the financial crisis of 2008, there was a general conviction that integration would bring benefits to those participating. Later, however, scepticism began to spread, leading to the idea that it would better to operate outside supranational institutions.¹⁰ At that time, the impulse towards consolidation was clearly weakened as the number of accession operations of various regimes declined and in some international organisations centrifugal tendencies began to strengthen. One of the clearest examples of this was the reorientation of US politics under the presidency of Donald Trump. The change of administration in early 2017 caused that pillar of the world liberal order instituted after World War II to begin to withdraw from some forms of multilateral cooperation. According to Donald Trump, the new US president, certain international institutions no longer served the interests of his country. This prompted Trump to test them by challenging the global

⁸ E.B. Haas, *International Integration: The European & The Universal Process*, in: D. Hekhuis, C. G. McLintock, A. L. Burns (eds.), *International Stability*, Wiley, 1964, p. 230.

⁹ F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, 1992 [Polish translation: F. Fukuyama, *Koniec historii*, Poznań, 2000, p. 51].

¹⁰ M. Avbelj, *Brexit: An End to the End of History*, “German Law Journal”, Brexit Supplement, 2016, vol. 17, p. 2.

liberal order, which the US had for several decades championed. At that time, the US expressed deep scepticism regarding European integration which resulted in a divergence of interests between the US and the largest EU member states. It is worth pointing out here that according to *Realpolitik* the strategic withdrawal of the US from Europe could lead to a slowdown in development and possibly even the disintegration of the EU.

In the opinion of liberal theorists, the ongoing crisis of integration can only be a temporary slowdown and, after a period of stagnation, cooperation will return to its previous course.¹¹ The perturbations described above could lead first to a variable geometry approach to integration and thereafter a greater diversity regarding the principles governing the functioning of international organisations. In this sense, it is not possible to reverse institutionalisation through a return to the previous state. In liberal opinion, there could at most be a temporary reduction in the level of transnational exchange together with the partial renationalisation of politics based on the transfer of some competencies back to the national level. Despite the impression of a growing crisis, many levels of international cooperation and integration still function in a satisfactory manner. In addition, new regimes and institutions are appearing in response to the needs of the international community. The only remaining threats are nationalism and populism as currents contesting the process of supranational cooperation, however, the process of integration itself still remains an important tool for solving common problems.¹²

In effect, liberalism requires that deinstitutionalisation be regarded as an increase in the flexibility of existing forms of cooperation, which result from the temporary divergence in interests of the parties involved. Such an understanding of the differentiation of international regimes can be based on the derogation of particular areas of cooperation or the transfer of selected competencies back to the national level to achieve a particular goal at a given time. For liberals, disintegration can also result in the replacement of current principles of cooperation with different rules, taking on the form of new institutions.¹³ For example, the European community overcame temporary crises in the past through increasing the level of regulation in stagnating areas. Such systems as EU cooperation then achieve a high level of durability, helping member states solve problems related to collective action as well as performing functions which state actors are unable to effectively complete. If states make the decision to carry out their functions independently, then the interest in common institutions weakens. This is, however, a long-term process and possible to reverse through a subsequent rekindling of the impulse to integrate. When there is a temporary deficit of

¹¹ S. Walter, *The Mass Politics of International Disintegration*, <http://www.stefaniewalter.de/>, (accessed 15 January 2019).

¹² H. Vollaard, *Explaining European Disintegration*, "JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies", vol. 52 no. 5, 2014, p. 1142.

¹³ I. von Borzyskowski, F. Vabulas, *The Costs of Membership Withdrawal from International Organizations*, PEIO Conference, Madison WI, 2018.

common interests, a type of organisational inertia means that institutions maintain themselves even when the conditions for their creation have disappeared. For this reason, in liberal opinion the decomposition of international regimes is by no means the sudden collapse of bodies, but rather in the worst case the creeping erosion of an existing legal framework brought about by ignoring legal regulations and a type of institutional hypocrisy.¹⁴

Sovereign states have the right to leave any organisation, but the vision of potential costs means that such a scenario is regarded as very improbable, especially regarding membership in the most integrated institutions. Deep institutionalisation means that even a serious economic crisis does not provoke the sudden collapse of an international regime, but at most changes in the rules of its functioning. According to such rules, the process of integration is irreversible in nature and cooperation between mutually dependent states is necessary. In this view, the disintegration of the European community is very unlikely since it would require the accumulation of various crises undermining the foundations of the Union.

The process of disintegration in the view of liberal theory is also difficult to imagine because it would lead to losing existing benefits in the area of cooperation. This is because it would generate barriers to cooperation, which international institutions had so far removed and thus, it would be costly in economic terms. If the result of the decomposition of international regimes is the renewed introduction of trade restrictions, this could lead to the rupture of international supply lines, leading to a reduction in the level of economic exchange. The necessity of adapting to new conditions would bring about significant transactional costs.¹⁵

It is also worth remembering that institutionalisation is a mutually beneficial process so that slowing it down, for example through the departure of one country, could result in it being less attractive for the remaining countries as well as for potential member states. International treaties are a result of compromise; however, a change of conditions that benefits one country will *ex post* worsen the situation of the remaining countries.¹⁶ Therefore, in liberal analyses it is possible to discern a trend of demonising the processes of disintegration in order, it would seem, to disavow the belief that unilateral departure from the international order could improve the situation of the departing country. In the liberal evaluation it is only through common institutions appearing as the “crowning of history” that it is possible to gain lasting improvement and therefore a belief in unilateral improvement through secession from international organisations is irrational. Achieving economic gains by withdrawing from multilat-

¹⁴ D. Webber, *How Likely Is It That The European Union Will Disintegrate? A Critical Analysis of Competing Theoretical Perspectives*, “European Journal of International Relations”, vol. 20 no. 2, 2013, p. 341.

¹⁵ T. Pepinsky, *Dis-Embedding Liberal Internationalism*, in: Workshop on the Challenges to the Contemporary World Order, Filzbach, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3054001, (accessed 15 January 2019).

¹⁶ L. Martin, B. Simmons, *International Organizations and Institutions*, in: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, B. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, 2013, p. 326.

eral cooperation would be unusually dangerous for the process of integration so decomposition must generate costs for the departing country in order to discourage the electorates of other countries from taking similar steps.¹⁷ Societies then should regard the process of disintegration as frustrating as well as leading to an uncertain future. Although generating costs for a departing country can also adversely affect the economies of the remaining countries, this particular “chilling effect” should reduce the enthusiasm of voters in other countries for making similar decisions.

The liberal perception of decomposition presented above has now come face to face with the currently observed policies of disengagement supported by the results of democratic elections or referendums (*vide* Brexit). This has undermined the future of international organisations since it made visible the crisis of functionalism which regarded institutions as a source of risk and not a method of solving problems of nation states. Hence, further integration is viewed more and more often as a road toward an escalation of crises. Electorates have begun to support policies that delegitimise international institutions, leading to renegotiations of the conditions of membership or the transfer of competencies back to the national level.¹⁸

Disintegrational tendencies initiated by liberal democracies operating under the influence of an electoral mandate are a relatively new phenomenon. They induce state actors to partially or completely withdraw from international bodies since significant sectors of the electorate are in favour of unilateral action at the cost of multilateralism. Disintegrational decisions can be characterised by a rather high level of democratic legitimacy, directing states to decrease the number of common public policies. The Post-Cold War development of international organisations certainly increased their socio-economic, cultural, and political diversity and at the same time limited the range of common interests of member states. Thusly, under the weight of increasing expectations disintegrational tendencies appeared, strengthened by recent economic disturbances. This seemed to contradict the thesis of inevitable economic and political convergence by members of common institutions.¹⁹

However, from the point of view of the liberal paradigm, the promises made by populist parties are empty because the renegotiation of international agreements has turned out to be unusually difficult. These more assertive countries then were forced to admit that the status quo was more advantageous than would be their situation outside of the international institutions they were attempting to leave. Despite the crisis, the power of integrational regimes has been highlighted as they have shown their resistance to the actions of national forces. On the other hand, there is a risk that the failure of democratic disintegrational initiatives will bring about an even greater aversion to

¹⁷ E. Jones, *Towards a Theory of Disintegration*, “Journal of European Public Policy”, vol. 25 no. 3, 2018, p. 440.

¹⁸ J.G. Ikenberry, *The End of Liberal International Order?*, “International Affairs”, vol. 94 no. 1, 2018, p. 7.

¹⁹ T. A. Börzel, *Researching the EU (Studies) into Demise?*, “Journal of European Public Policy”, vol. 25 no. 3, 2018, p. 475.

existing forms of international cooperation, which would strengthen the hand of populist parties fighting for the will of the electorate to be respected.

The institutions of the western world in fact consolidate democratic forms of social participation. When, however, voters are able to express their opinion, they may then support anti-establishment protest parties. As regards international organisations, voters often support nationalist tendencies creating chances for demagoguery and obscurantism to be propagated. An excess of direct democracy could destroy institutions, which is why the liberal environment is sceptical about plebiscites concerning international affairs. These convictions can lead to a rather ambivalent treatment of institutionalisation as well as the consolidation of the view that it is necessary to avoid referendums out of fear of the results. Perhaps it is not necessary to listen to the voice of the people if they are leaning toward protest parties calling for anti-establishment rebellion. However, inhibiting the forces of decomposition, against the expressed will of voters, can undermine the fundamental value of liberal theory and the role of democracy in revealing social preferences.

LIBERAL THEORY REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF BREXIT: A CASE STUDY

The result of the referendum on the departure of the UK from the EU is a challenge to the view of international relations embodied in the liberal paradigm. Although the economic crisis of 2008 had a non-trivial effect, it seems that Brexit happened primarily for non-economic reasons that do not play a prominent role in the liberal paradigm.²⁰ The balance sheet of profit and loss would certainly have inclined the majority of the British population to vote against leaving the EU so the result of Brexit challenges certain aspects of the liberal vision of the world order.²¹ The claim concerning the presumed power of globalisation and economic interdependence and the resultant inevitability of integration was questioned. The difficult-to-imagine departure of the UK from the EU has become a fact, which brings along with it a significant amount of risk and uncertainty. The event has challenged liberal thinking, which is in favour of stability as well as the predictability of economic and political processes. Despite the fact that some analysts see Brexit as a kind of masquerade which will ultimately end with the status quo being maintained, it has already led to a fundamental undermining of the doctrine of “ever closer union”.²² The second, after the United States, pillar of the liberal world questioned the existing order based on multilateral cooperation. One of the largest economies of Europe decided on the wave of a democratic referendum to leave what is perhaps the most integrated group of states in the entire world.

²⁰ C. Calhoun, *Brexit Is a Mutiny Against the Cosmopolitan Elites*, “New Perspectives Quarterly”, 2016, Summer, p. 53.

²¹ P. Mindus, *European Citizenship after Brexit*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 21.

²² A. Moravcsik, *The great Brexit kabuki — a masterclass in political theatre*, <https://www.ft.com/content/64159804-fc1f-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d/>, (accessed 15 January 2019).

Viewing the problem of Brexit from the point of view of liberal theory, it is worth asking whether being driven by the voice of the electorate or pursuing the benefits of economic mutual cooperation is more rational. Stopping the departure of the UK from the EU because of the costs involved would have meant eliminating the significance of the votes cast, which is difficult to reconcile with the part of the liberal paradigm which emphasises the preferences of individuals and social groups as the determinants of a state's external policy. After all, one of the principal slogans of Brexit supporters was the defence of the native system against a union suffering from a democratic deficit, although that organisation, in liberal opinion, remains the incarnation of democratic values, which radiate beyond the borders of Europe.²³

The realities of globalisation will probably incline the UK to maintain close relations with EU structures, principally due to economic factors such as the need to preserve access to the integrated market. A retreat by London from the common economic area would lead to the return of trade barriers, generating significant losses which would harm the citizenry.²⁴ The problems related to the border between the Republic of Ireland (an EU member state) and Northern Ireland, (which is part of the UK) have become a flagship example of the way that liberalism operates. It was possible to bring a long running violent conflict to an end thanks to the participation of the UK and Ireland in integration since the freedom of the internal market brought about a lessening of tensions regarding the political division of the island into two parts. The border between the two regions could remain open for the free flow of labour, products, services, and capital, allowing for the preservation of personal contacts between those living on both sides of the border.²⁵

In the opinion of liberal theorists, future relations should result in a kind of hybrid quasi-membership in the EU for the UK. In the age of globalisation, a real departure of a member state from the common market and customs area is too costly. Therefore London should strive to negotiate an agreement that would maintain the status quo in a way that the British public could accept. Although the UK did formally leave the EU on 31 January 2020, the details of future relations have yet to be established since not all of the necessary agreements have been finalized. It is likely that the negotiations regarding the full departure of the UK from the EU will result in an insignificant loosening of ties. The course so far has shown that the UK is experiencing profound difficulties in forcing through its own preferences. The EU is at a negotiating advantage, confirming at the same time the position of intergovernmental liberals regarding the nature of international give and take.

²³ S. Tilford, *The British and their exceptionalism*, "CER Insight", https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/insight_ST_3.5.17.pdf, (accessed 15 January 2019).

²⁴ A. Soares, *Living Within and Outside Unions: the Consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland*, "Journal of Contemporary European Research", 2016, vol. 12 no. 4, p. 836.

²⁵ E. Burke, *Brexit and the threat to Northern Ireland*, "CER Bulletin", Issue 115, August/September, http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/bulletin_115_eb_article1.pdf, (accessed 15 January 2019).

Economic pragmatism supports the maintenance of ties between London and the EU because the available data indicate the significant trade benefits that the UK has had from EU membership. The liberal environment doubts the probability of a final “hard” Brexit without a trade agreement, pointing to the enormous costs that British business would bear in such a scenario. Losses would also certainly be heavy for the EU-27 since the UK, as a country that has a trade deficit with the EU, remains an important recipient of EU goods and services.²⁶ Taking the interests of both the UK and the EU into account, there is a real possibility for a “soft Brexit” with an agreement making it possible for trade to continue unimpeded after the process of disengagement from EU structures has been completed.²⁷ It is also probable that a transitional period will take place that would make it possible for the economies to adjust to the new situation because it is not possible for economic connections to be severed without suffering significant losses by both sides.²⁸

The vote for the UK to leave the EU was caused by antipathy to globalisation, yet after leaving the EU, the UK will be obliged to function in the global economy without being attached to a regional organisation that is integrational in nature.²⁹ In liberal opinion it is a paradox that the idea of a “Global Britain” publicised by the UK government is supposed to result in new economic contracts in order to remove trade barriers with other parts of the world. As they argue, the process of removing customs and tariff barriers lasts decades and is, even then, often insufficient. In addition, the essence of the internal market which the UK has decided to leave is the removal of non-tariff barriers such as administrative and regulatory restrictions. A hard Brexit seems then unlikely because new barriers to development would arise for a country, which, as a “great trading nation”, is dependent on international connections.³⁰

CONCLUSION

So far, liberal thinkers have written much on the progress of institutionalisation and integration, but relatively little on the decomposition of common bodies, which raises the question of their relevance for understanding the currently observable disintegrational tendencies, for example in Europe. The liberal paradigm made it possible to explain the genesis of the institutionalisation of global politics, and the successes of its subsequent phases of development, enriching the research on the functioning of

²⁶ P. Welfens, *A Brexit Perspective*, “The International Economy”, 2017, Summer, p. 41.

²⁷ M. Matthijs, *Europe after Brexit. A Less Perfect Union*, “Foreign Affairs”, 2017, January/February, p. 85.

²⁸ D. Wincott, *Brexit dilemmas: New opportunities and tough choices in unsettled times*, “The British Journal of Politics and International Relations”, 2017, vol. 19 no. 4, p. 682.

²⁹ J. Morphet, *Beyond Brexit?: how to assess the UK's future*, Bristol, UK; Chicago, IL, USA: Policy Press, 2017, p. 16.

³⁰ A. Bongardt, F. Torres, *The Political Economy of Brexit: Why Making It Easier to Leave the Club Could Improve the EU*, “Intereconomics”, 2016, 4, p. 215.

supranational entities such as the EU. It became a justification for flourishing globalisation, dependent upon the construction of economic interdependence. The question then is whether the current trends toward disintegration will lead to an undermining of the foundations of liberalism, which previously had established guidelines for understanding integrational trends and prescribed trust in the inevitability of institutionalising international affairs. Crises such as Brexit show that integration is a rather fragile and non-obvious process whose inevitability can in fact be questioned. This event has called into question liberal claims, which remain largely ineffective in the face of the symptoms of disintegration, although some aspects of the theory are still relevant. The existing interdependences will probably mean that the UK will remain in some kind of close relationship with the EU which will allow it to avoid the significant costs of breaking up for both sides. These issues highlight, however, the tension between progressive convictions regarding the economic profitability and inevitability of institutionalisation on the one hand and the liberal postulate of heeding the voice of the people in a democratic manner on the other. Equilibrium between these competing demands has yet to be found.

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Keywords: liberal theory, disintegration, Brexit, the European Union

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to examine the usefulness of the liberal theory of international relations for scientific research aimed at explaining the trends toward disintegration occurring in some international institutions. It is worth reflecting on the possibility of using this theory to analyse the ongoing processes of disintegration that can be observed in Europe.

The hypothesis is that the research value of liberal thought, especially in exploring the causes, courses, and consequences of erosional phenomena of international regimes, is characterised by specific constraints. However, some of its elements remain valid. Considering the above, the liberal theory is presented based on the beliefs of the leading foreign policy researchers representing various trends in the analysis of international affairs.

A qualitative conceptual framework used in this work is used to reflect on the problems of disintegration in supranational bodies. The goal is to examine the new phenomenon of disintegration, one example of which is the departure of the UK from the EU, within the framework of a well-known paradigm for understanding international relations.

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THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE IDEA OF INTERCULTURALISM

The issues of the public and cultural diplomacy conducted by the European Union (EU) are still under-discussed. European politicians conduct debates on the role of culture in the process of European integration, however there is no scientific approach to the subject that includes the creation of a model of EU cultural diplomacy. This article first defines cultural diplomacy and indicates what tools and instruments it has at its disposal and then answers the question whether the EU has a cultural diplomacy strategy and what role multiculturalism plays in it. The next section will discuss the slogans that guide EU officials in constructing these programmes and answer the question whether they are also occurring in the context of migration. In connection with this, the question is to what degree social integration, cultural diversity and the idea of common values are helpful. The research hypothesis is that cultural diplomacy is a tool that serves the construction of European community and can turn out to be a chance for creating a bridge linking the EU with the world and an aid in maintaining “integrating charisma”. It is assumed as well that EU cultural diplomacy is an essential element in shaping relations between the EU and the rest of the world and thus plays a role in building the image of the EU and in pursuing its goals. For the purposes of this publication, cultural diplomacy is defined as communicative efforts undertaken by subjects acting internationally and whose goal is the management of the international community by utilising culture. Diplomacy is a tool that makes it possible for international actors to pursue their goals and strengthen their interests. It may be external in nature or be internal or national in orientation and these different perspectives complement each other. In the case of the EU, this last element is essential because the duality of the EU which is an important actor on the contemporary international stage and is subject to various factors from the external environment and on the other hand it is an actor which influences events itself.

As Jozef Batora and Brian Hocking write, the EU is a kind of experiment and can be perceived as a fascinating laboratory for the transformations and adaptations

of contemporary diplomacy.¹ Many researchers at present wonder about the role of the EU in contemporary international relations and consider it to be an exceptional phenomenon. It is a highly integrated international grouping, characterised by many features that occur together and create a new quality, making the EU unique.²

Culture, language, religion, values, and traditions influence the way a given society, country, or the EU itself is perceived. It is possible to completely accept the statement that “culture communicates”.³ In the face of such large cultural diversity, it is also a challenge for the EU, which is important to undertake, given the crucial meaning of cultural factors in communication, understanding and cognition. Cultural diplomacy can be defined, after Milton C. Cummings, as an exchange of ideas, information, arts or other aspects of culture between nations with the intention of fostering mutual understanding.⁴ Hasan Saliu draws attention to the fact that the goal of cultural diplomacy is the establishment and strengthening of bilateral relations beyond borders, including economic, trade, political, cultural or diplomatic borders in order to maintain relations with those interested (such as diaspora populations) abroad, but also with the goal of avoiding tensions because, according to him, international relations are like intercultural communication. Janusz Ruskowski points out that Europe as a space and at the same time a cultural reality contains two planes of reference. The first concerns the nations inhabiting it, that is ethnic cultures, which are carried and formed by it and which have interconnected and created a synthesis, a particular civilisation. The second plane concerns the creations of this civilisation, the effects of the human mind, artistic symbols, the effects of spiritual and rational reflections (including the material effects as well since European culture is also comprised of the elements of technological civilisation). It is possible to link these two planes of reference through the cultural diplomacy programmes conducted by the EU. They refer to the promotion both of cultural diversity and cultural heritage understood as the products of culture. Therefore, cultural diplomacy is perceived as a broad instrument in the normative sense, supporting culture as a factor of development, exchange, intercultural dialogue and, on the other hand, there is a more traditional (realistic) point of view that aims at “promoting the EU brand”, in other words the presentation of European cultural production. This first approach (which from the point of view of this article is crucial) also referred to as reflexive,⁵ is a policy which in and of itself has the goal of promoting balanced social and economic development. In the case of

¹ J. Batora, B. Hocking, *Diplomacy and the European Union: Introduction*, “The Hague Journal of Diplomacy” no. 2, 2009, p. 114.

² D. Milczarek, *Status Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, “Stosunki Międzynarodowe” no. 3-4, 2001, p. 12.

³ E. Leach, *Kultura i komunikowanie. Logika powiązań symbolicznych. Wprowadzenie do analizy strukturalnej w antropologii społecznej*, Warsaw 2010, p. 3.

⁴ M.C. Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United State Government. A Survey*, Washington 2003, p. 1

⁵ A. Triandafyllidou, *EU Cultural Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunitites*. European University Institute, 2017.

the EU, these are, for example, people-to-people diplomatic actions (such as the cultural exchange programme Erasmus), activities in the area of human rights (EIDHR),⁶ or within cross-border cooperation (ENI).⁷ By using these instruments, the EU has a chance, on one hand, to exert its influence through soft power and to increase its international visibility, and on the other hand to promote economic growth and social cohesion through civil society.⁸

Taking such an approach into account, it should be noted that the history of the creation of the EU beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and subsequent cooperation between the founding states are a good example of the political will and engagement of Europeans in preserving peace even in the most difficult situations. This determination and anti-war mentality make up a fundamental part of the cultural policy of the whole of Europe.⁹ The process of EU enlargement and its history doubtless have a large influence on the model of EU cultural diplomacy. The reasons for this are both European traditions and values, which serve specific and important functions in cultural diplomacy. The EU would not be able to muster such soft power resources without highlighting their roles. The concepts of European traditions and values are rather vague and function in discourse in an intuitive manner. They are, however, fundamental in the analysis of European integration. This is because they make it possible to understand the processes occurring in modern Europe. At present, historical, cultural, and axiological grounds for defining "Europeanness" are being sought. If the historical concept of Europe is taken as a point of departure, then it must be recognised that it is not only a continent but above all a cultural phenomenon. People are European to the extent that they participate in a specific type of culture, which is European culture.¹⁰ As R. Schuman said: "Europe should be a cultural community rather than a military union or an economic unit. The unity of Europe will not be born either exclusively or primarily through European institutions; their creation will be the result of a certain way of thinking".¹¹ Although economic unity became the foundation of the EU it should not be forgotten that specific EU policies and actions were and will be based on key standards and values which come from its history, development, evolution or especially its culture. A similar point is raised by Grażyna Michałowska, who counts, inter alia, common sources of fundamental cultural values and the early discovery of the role of culture in foreign policy as characteristics of

⁶ *European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights*.

⁷ *European Neighbourhood Instrument*.

⁸ R. Trobbiani, *EU Cultural Diplomacy: time to define strategies, means and complementarity with Member States*, Institute for European Studies, 2017, pp. 4-5.

⁹ In the preamble of the treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community the issue of maintaining peace and the role Europe can globally play in this area are underlined several times.

¹⁰ B. Hordecki, *Czy Unia Europejska integruje czy dezintegruje spuściznę Europy? Ujęcie retoryczne*, in: Z. Czachór (ed.), *50 lat i co dalej. Europa i Unia Europejska między integracją i atomizacją*, Poznań 2007, p. 89.

¹¹ D. de Rougemont, *List otwarty do Europejczyków*, Warsaw 1995, p. 29.

European culture.¹² She also cites scholars from the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (*Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen*) in Stuttgart and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have compiled a catalogue of rules related to cultural Europeanism:

1. A European is a person who wants to be European;
2. European culture does not belong to Europe alone;
3. Culture plays a central role in the process of European integration;
4. The goal of actions is an open Europe;
5. An especially important principle is the defence of freedom of research, learning, culture, information, individual autonomy, and responsibility for the development of the culture of small communities and national minorities;
6. The above principle is subordinate to the idea of unity in diversity;
7. Europeanism means peaceful federalism and the autonomy of states and regions;
8. Unity in diversity allows for the possibility of criticism and discussion.¹³

It can therefore be noticed that these principles are meant to build identification with Europe, including building a European identity encompassing a civilisation referring to art, literature, architectural styles, Roman law, and Christianity. The EU connects this legacy to states that are not members, and a European is a person who is linked to Europe by their intellectual formation.¹⁴ These are also principles that are often underlined in documents concerning EU cultural diplomacy.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Current challenges for Europe doubtless include the growth of nationalism, the increase in cases of discrimination, racism, and populism as well as the idea that the diversity of the EU is no longer understood exclusively as a value. It is worth turning attention to trends such as migration, which bring about discussions on topics related to “foreignness in Europe”. EU programmes in this area have always underlined the necessity of intercultural dialogue, fighting xenophobia and racism as well as building relations between European, North African, and Middle Eastern countries. These declarations, however, usually remain mere declarations.

“The political future of Europe depends on the destiny of culture and its destiny in turn depends on the degree to which we can recognise diversity as an asset and not a burden” said Zygmunt Bauman during the inauguration of the European Culture Congress in Wrocław in September 2011. His words convey the complexity but at

¹² G. Michałowska, *Zmienność i instytucjonalizacja międzynarodowych stosunków kulturalnych*, Warsaw 1991, pp. 284-285.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Z. Sokolewicz, *Kultura w procesie integracji europejskiej*, in: D. Milczarek, A.Z. Nowak (eds.), *Integracja europejska. Wybrane problemy*, Warsaw 2003, p. 451.

the same time the great value found today in the diversity of contemporary Europe and the world. During the 31st European Film Awards Agnieszka Holland said: “We are here to celebrate our differences, to unite in diversity! Because Europe is not one voice, but a choir of voices”.¹⁵ This diversity is crucial for understanding Europe and the EU. A great deal of weight is attached to political and economic conditions due to the conviction that culture does not require too many imposed solutions. Nothing could be further from the truth. Intercultural communication based on intercultural dialogue is crucial. Intercultural communication is understood first as a meeting and dialogue between people belonging to different national, ethnic, religious or language communities. It is a way of communication for people who represent different value systems, ideas, traditions, and communication styles. Intercultural communication requires that participants get to know, understand, examine, and experience something that is foreign for them and often incomprehensible. It demands engagement from all participants in the process.¹⁶

Martyn Barret points out that intercultural dialogue must be conducted at different levels. It cannot only be about breaking stereotypes but must create a place for mutual understanding. He maintains that it is necessary to search for common values and to engage in exchanges of experiences, and that intercultural competences among citizens is also particularly important.¹⁷ They are crucial for the comprehension of changes in cultural identities. Sławomir Magala holds that intercultural competences areas needed in order to understand symbols, interpret communication as well as to effectively complete common undertakings with people who have different types of cultural competences.¹⁸

The slogan “United in Diversity” accepted in the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008, which was an EU initiative, takes on new meaning and does not lose any relevance. Returning to the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, it can be seen how Europe as a community is understood. The authors of the document, representatives of Europe, perceive the meaning of dialogue on two levels which intersect and do not exclude each other. One of them is the creation of dialogue at the level of particular European countries, including public institutions, politicians, non-governmental organisations but also various religious, ethnic and diaspora groups. The second level is European, comprised of non-governmental groups and government representatives promoting European values. European identity should be built on a base of democracy, respect for human rights and diversity. Work on the creation of the White Paper showed how essential it is for there to be cooperation and consultation of various groups, including those of a religious or ethnic nature. Such cooperation is still

¹⁵ Speech given in Seville, 15 December 2018.

¹⁶ M. Ratajczak, *Różnorodność kulturowa w mediach. Doświadczenie europejskie*, Warsaw 2012, p. 16.

¹⁷ M. Barrett, *Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and differences*, Council of Europe Publishing, 2013, p. 28.

¹⁸ S. Magala, *Kompetencje międzykulturowe*, Warsaw 2011, p. 110.

necessary in cultural diplomacy. This raises the question if ideas such as multiculturalism and transculturalism can be of use.

Doubtless there has been no decrease in the number of opponents of multicultural policies. It is possible, however, to look at the problem differently: "Multiculturalism brings the potential of cultural ferment, creativity, innovation and mutual inspiration. Homogenisation and monoculturalism mean deprivation and the elimination of certain elements and values".¹⁹ Cultural diversity has been a constant part of life for years. But the question is whether Europeans today are ready to recognise it as a value in and of itself. "Multiculturalism [...], recognising the value of diversity and the richness of identities is the right way to build intercultural relations and to shape modern multicultural societies".²⁰

Will Kymlicka also drew attention to this. A supporter of the idea of multiculturalism, he often underlined that the goal of multiculturalism is social integration, the building of relations between groups, mutual communication between dominant and minority cultures and the necessary participation of all groups in society. Relations, the building of ties and creating relationships based on cooperation are also compositional elements of cultural diplomacy.²¹

Wolfgang Welsch argues at the same time that everyone is a "blend", which means that it is difficult to speak of completely separate cultures.²² Much diversity is found within every person.

"My critique of the traditional idea of single cultures, like the somewhat younger ideas of multiculturalism and interculturalism can be summed up as follows; If cultures actually, as the above ideas suggest, had the structure of islands or spheres, then true liberation would be impossible, as would solving the problems of coexistence and cooperation".²³

W. Welsch also argues that describing modern cultures as islands or spheres is simply wrong since they have lost their homogeneity and separateness. On the contrary, blending, and mutual penetration have become characteristic features. Therefore, this new conception of culture is called transculturalism. At the same time, he adds that this is not a new idea in historical terms. Transculturalism does not mean uniformity, quite the opposite – it is connected to the creation of new diversity.²⁴

¹⁹ J. Majcherek, *Mit wielokulturowości jako ideal aksjologiczny*, in: M. Szmeja (ed.), *Etniczność – o przemianach społeczeństw narodowych*, Kraków 2008, p. 201.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

²¹ W. Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford 2001, pp. 160-170.

²² K. Krzysztofek, *Pogranicza i multikulturalizm w rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej*, "Studia Europejskie", no. 1, 2003, p. 78.

²³ W. Welsch, *Transkulturowość. Nowa koncepcja kultury*, in: R. Kubicki (ed.), *Filozoficzne konteksty koncepcji rozumu transwersalnego. Wokół koncepcji Wolfganga Welscha*, Poznań 1998, p. 203.

²⁴ W. Welsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-209.

EU CULTURAL DIPLOMACY – THE CHALLENGES OF INTERCULTURALISM

When referring to the idea of cultural diplomacy, it is worth paying attention to the words of Jorge Sampaio, who holds that it is an essential element of the new diplomatic paradigm. This is because it emphasises culture and its significance in international relations. The tasks of cultural diplomacy include promoting human rights, tolerance and understanding, the principles of good governance, understanding the role of religious movements in international relations and the role of the media in civil society.²⁵ He also argues that in political programmes, cultural and religious diversity, intercultural dialogue and social coherence continue to gain in importance. It can also be seen that in the case of some countries there is a strong relationship between the utilisation of diplomacy in the international arena based on humanitarian and peaceful principles, intercultural dialogue and respect for human rights on the one hand and diplomacy based on state recognition and branding on the other. The examples of countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, or Canada demonstrate that depending on these values has a significantly positive effect on the positive image of countries and their recognisability.

This raises the question of how this problem is understood in EU cultural programmes. Although the EU itself uses the term in an unclear manner, choosing instead the broader concept of “culture in external relations”, it has recently begun adding to this formulation the idea of cultural diplomacy as one of the pillars for extending the EU’s strategy for international cultural relations. It contains at least two dimensions. The first is cooperation within the framework of the EU itself comprised of initiatives of Member States. The second includes financial activities of EU programmes for the inclusion of entities acting in the sphere of culture (or more broadly civil society), supporting mobility and intercultural dialogue, formal and informal educational initiatives as well as training in the area of cultural activity.

The first and at the same time the key document from the point of view of cultural diplomacy and multiculturalism in the EU is the “European agenda for culture in a globalising world” from 2007 and usually referred to as the “European agenda for culture”.²⁶ This document was a communication, yet it also contained working arrangements of European Commission services (the Directorate General for Education and Culture),²⁷ in which methods of supporting culture by the EU are described. The

²⁵ J. Nye, J. Sampaio, P. Potoroczyn, V. Viķe-Freiberga, A. Laskowski, W. Przybylski, *Soft power a sprawa polska*, “Kultura Liberalna” no. 31, 2009. <https://kulturaliberalna.pl/2009/08/10/nye-sampaio-potoroczyn-vike-freiberga-laskowski-przybylski-soft-power-english-version/> (accessed 29 September 2020).

²⁶ *First-ever European strategy for culture: contributing to economic growth and intercultural understanding*, Brussels 10 May 2007, IP/07/646. For more on this document and its goals, see: M. Ryniejaska-Kiełdanowicz, *Dyplomacja kulturalna jako narzędzie miękkiej siły Unii Europejskiej*, “Politeja” no. 37, 2015.

²⁷ *Culture & the European Union – Frequently asked questions*, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-07-180_en.htm, (accessed 29 September 2020).

agenda presents three principle goals that make up the cultural strategy of European institutions, Member States and the culture and creativity sector:

1. Promotion of cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue,
2. Promotion of culture as a catalyst for creativity in the framework of the Lisbon Strategy,
3. Promotion of culture as a vital element in the Union's international relations.

Of course, all these goals are fulfilled by the tasks of cultural diplomacy, but for the purposes of this article the most important are the first and third – directly referring to interculturalism. In the document, it is stressed that open-mindedness and intercultural exchange should be supported and its agenda encourages the mobility of artists and persons professionally connected with culture, the exchange of all forms of artistic expression, the propagation and broadening of intercultural competences and intercultural dialogue through the development of key competences in the process of lifelong learning, such as sensitivity and cultural expression as well as the ability to communicate in foreign languages. Unfortunately, no specific solutions in this area are indicated in the document, which indicates that there is no strategic approach to issues of interculturalism. The commission in its communication also proposed introducing open methods of coordination, that is systematising cooperation in the area of culture between EU Member States and institutions. This was to be an instrument of soft power in achieving common goals by the countries of the EU. This method is applied in sensitive areas, where Member States do not express their political agreement for the full harmonisation of the procedures to be used or for the increased role of common institutions. Culture is just such an area. According to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), Community powers regarding culture are limited to encouraging Member States to cooperate and to support and complement efforts in this area.

In 2010 a Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions was published concerning the European agenda for culture.²⁸ Along with examples of cooperation and activities undertaken in this area, further measures that should be taken were pointed out for culture to influence the development of the EU in a fundamental way. Attention was drawn to activities within the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, which also concentrated on raising consciousness and on the development of political debate concerning intercultural dialogue. This bore fruit at the level of the EU with a policy agreement on the necessity of propagating intercultural competences and the role of intercultural dialogue in external relations.

²⁸ Details are available at: *Commission Report to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the European Agenda for Culture*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC0390>, (accessed 29 September 2020).

In 2011, a resolution by the European Parliament on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external activities was issued.²⁹ The document includes the formulations "cultural diplomacy" and diplomacy in service of culture.³⁰ Recommendations and expectations for the European External Action Service (EEAS), which should include positions in its plans related to cultural aspects and the creation of a coordinating unit with this goal in mind. There was also an indication of the problem of strategic "deployment" of the cultural aspects of EU external policy, including culture in external relations of the EU and seeking complementarity with policy areas within the field of culture of Member States. A suggestion was made to create a coordination unit to achieve this as well as to establish closer cooperation of the EEAS with the networks of national culture institutions of the EU such as the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC).³¹

It can be recognised, however, that the documents mentioned above, and especially the "European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World", upon which high hopes were placed, did not meet expectations. There was still no coordination of actions or any strategic approach to cultural diplomacy and intercultural communication. Therefore, on the request of the Council in 2015, work was begun on a document, which would supplement these issues. In June 2016, the European Commission presented the "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations".³² It concentrated on three main directions for strengthening cultural cooperation with partner countries, supporting culture as a driver of sustainable social and economic development; promoting culture and intercultural dialogue in peaceful relations between societies; and enhancing cooperation in the area of cultural heritage. Pursuing these goals within international cultural relations, the EU wanted to gain a stronger international position, which was the num-

²⁹ *European Parliament resolution of 12 May 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external actions* (2010/2161 (INI)), <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0239+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, (accessed 29 September 2020).

³⁰ In the context of how artists work: "whereas artists act as de facto cultural diplomats exchanging and confronting different aesthetic, political, moral and social values". While in the context of diplomacy in service of culture, the European Parliament: "Emphasises the importance of cultural diplomacy and cultural cooperation in advancing and communicating throughout the world the EU's and the Member States' interests and the values that make up European culture; stresses the need for the EU to act as a (world) player with a global perspective and global responsibility."

³¹ The European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) is an association of national cultural institutes of EU countries, tasked with coordinating joint activities of cultural institutions, the exchange of experiences and skills as well as cooperation with local partners (including non-governmental organisations and cultural institutions) and the European Commission. The mission of EUNIC is the promotion of European values and the support of cultural diversity in the EU and outside of it. The association works in such fields as art, literature, education, multilingualism, science, and intercultural dialogue. EUNIC is an umbrella network, consisting of 34 institutes of culture among those belonging to members from 28 countries and 100 clusters from across the world. <http://www.eunic-online.eu/>

³² <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0029> (accessed 29 September 2020).

ber one priority for the Commission, and also the priority of the future global strategy of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

It indicated that in order to tighten effective cooperation with partner countries in the three proposed directions, interested EU entities must join forces to assure complementarity and synergy. This concerns governments at all levels, local cultural organisations and civil society, the Commission and the High Representative (via EU delegations in third countries), EU Member States as well as their cultural institutions.³³ As mentioned above, in the communication on culture from 2007, an open method of coordination (OMC) in the area of culture was advocated, as a non-burdensome but structured manner of cooperation for EU Member States at the European level.³⁴ In 2012, a group of experts from Member States, which had chaired the Commission and the EEAS, studied the strategic development of the approach to culture in EU external relations. In the report the group stressed the advantages of engaging the EU in cultural activities with partner countries thanks to new strategic methods of cooperation with Member States.³⁵ The European Parliament also initiated a preparatory action in the form of “Culture in EU external relations”, which supported “intelligent complementarity” based on commonly agreed upon cooperation between Member States, in particular between their cultural institutions and foreign spokespersons as well as with civil society.³⁶ The EEAS currently operates 139 delegations and EU offices around the world, which represent the EU and its citizens at a global level. The potential for cooperation and coordination in the development of EU cultural diplomacy and intercultural dialogue is therefore very great and presents an enormous challenge. The agreed upon approach then would make it possible for interested entities in Europe to pool resources and benefit from cooperation in third countries. The research carried out by the European Parliament presented many benefits of close cooperation for EU delegations, institutions of culture and EUNIC clusters. This is because common projects mean less risk, have greater influence, are more visible and create greater chances for learning.³⁷

In November 2015, the Council turned to the Commission as well as the High Representative to prepare “a strategic approach to culture in the EU’s external relations, outlining for this purpose a set of guiding principles”.³⁸ In response to these sug-

³³ The newest example from Tunisia shows the close cooperation between EU delegations, an institute of culture of a Member State and local government: The Commission launched a 10-million-euro programme with the goal of strengthening the Tunisian audiovisual sector/media. At the end of the year another project aimed at promoting engagement in culture at the local level will be launched (with a 4-million-euro budget) managed by an EU delegation and supported by the British Council.

³⁴ Since 2008, OMC groups have worked on issues such as the culture sector and the creative sector (including new business models and export strategies), mobility for artists and those professionally connected to culture, mobility for works of art and facilitating cyber access to culture.

³⁵ The report was also the basis of a debate among cultural ministers from the EU on the topic of culture as an element of soft power. This debate took place 17 May 2013.

³⁶ <http://cultureinexternalrelations.eu/>, (accessed 29 September 2020).

³⁷ European Parliament: *European Cultural Institutes Abroad*, January 2016.

³⁸ At a meeting the Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council, 23-24 November 2015.

gestions, a communication was published “Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations”, which primarily proposed a more strategic approach by the EU to cultural diplomacy.³⁹ Culture, in the document, refers not only to art and literature but includes a broad range of political strategies and actions “from inter-cultural dialogue to tourism, from education and research to the creative industries, from protecting heritage to promoting creative industries and new technologies, and from artisanship to development cooperation”.⁴⁰ This was intended to concentrate on three main approaches. It was to strengthen cultural cooperation with partner countries, to support culture as driving force for balanced social and economic development and to promote culture and intercultural dialogue in peaceful relations between societies, enhancing cooperation in the area of cultural heritage. The consequences of these actions were to bring the EU a stronger position in the international arena. The document contains strong references to the idea of the normative power of the EU, especially in the context of supporting cultural diversity, which is based on guaranteeing human rights and respecting freedom. It was stressed that the EU is obliged to promote a tolerant and pluralistic approach to international cultural relations. Attention was also drawn to aspects that are essential from a cultural diplomacy point of view, namely dialogue, mutual attention, and learning. It is also important to take into account regional differences and to adjust actions to differences and cultural contexts, hence activities within existing frameworks of cooperation and financial instruments. One document reads:

“...the EU, acting as global peace actor, should include culture and cultural exchanges and enhance education in EU external relations and development policy, as vehicles for strengthening common core values, such as the values of respect and mutual understanding, providing effective tools for a meaningful and sustainable approach to conflict resolution, peace-making and crisis prevention...”⁴¹

A kind of summary of previous actions and an attempt to create a strategy for cultural diplomacy or directions in which this should be followed was published in 2016. In it, three pillars of EU strategy in the area of international cultural relations are proposed.⁴² Stress is placed on the role of promoting human rights, diversity and intercultural dialogue while respecting subsidiarity and complementarity and maintaining a coherent policy through promoting culture within existing structures of partnership. One goal of constructing an EU strategy in international cultural relations is aide in the further development of channels of communication between communities and societies. Another goal is strengthening defence and the promotion of cultural heritage,

³⁹ *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations*, 8 June 2016, JOIN(2016)29 final.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2016 on the role of intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity, and education in promoting EI fundamental values.

⁴² *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations*, 8 June 2016, JOIN(2016)29 final

stimulating intercultural dialogue, and building peace. Thanks to these actions, the EU should gain a stronger position in the global arena, become a better international partner and will, to a greater degree, contribute to the achievement of sustainable economic growth, peace, and mutual understanding.

The creation, in 2016, of the Cultural Diplomacy Platform was crucial. A total of 939,800 euro was allocated for this purpose from funds for the Public Diplomacy component of the Partnership Instrument.⁴³ Activities conducted within the Platform are coordinated by cultural institutes of Member States. The leading institution is the Goethe Institute, working together with the British Council, the Centre for Fine Arts Brussels (BOZAR), the European Cultural Foundation, EUNIC Global and the Institut Français. The Platform has a consultative role in cultural policy. It creates a network of contacts and develops school programmes for cultural leadership. Most importantly, it is intended to contribute to the development of the EU's international cultural relations. The Platform aims to be a model for the implementation of cultural diplomacy since dialogue, including intercultural dialogue, can improve the image of the EU and help increase its international visibility. The bottom-up nature of its activities is unusually important as is the underlying interest in national culture that does not threaten the national identity of particular Member States. Hence, in its activities, emphasis is often placed on the role of intercultural dialogue within the EU itself and the negotiation of a common identity. This is intended not only to strengthen EU policy but also to be an important instrument against tensions, terrorist threats or populist narratives.

An especially important role is also assigned to EU delegations whose task is to monitor local structures such as EU cultural institutes. This function serves to ease coordination and cooperation. It is stressed that they should also take care to adapt the activities carried out to local cultural contexts and at the same time keeping in mind the strategic goals of the EU. Within the project, an idea also appeared to establish European 'Houses' of Culture. They would be based on partnerships between the EU and particular partner countries and would make it possible for cultural institutes and other interested parties to cooperate and provide services for local populations, participate in shared projects, offer scholarships as well as engage in educational and cultural exchange. These last activities, mobility programmes and cooperation with institutions of higher education, also help promote the EU in partner countries. Research from 2014,⁴⁴ conducted by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Exchange Executive Agency (EACEA), showed that 54% of students and personnel that had used the Erasmus Mundus mobility programme rated the experience as having had the greatest influence on their intercultural skills and competences. In international research cooperation, the international language of science is used in order to maintain open channels of communication and to facilitate the exchange of ideas by researchers

⁴³ The Partnership Instrument also includes the promotion of dialogue between cultures.

⁴⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/more_info/evaluations/docs/education/mundus2012-summary_en.pdf (accessed 11 December 2018).

without regard to cultural, national, or religious background. Youth exchange, European Voluntary Service,⁴⁵ training for young people and for those working with youth as well as the creation of networks of contacts between them are related with youth mobility between the EU and neighbouring countries. In the years 2014-2020, the EU intended to finance over 150,000 scholarships for students and personnel in Europe and other parts of the world as well as about 1000 shared projects, in which institutions of higher education and youth organisations both from the EU and outside of it participate.⁴⁶

In this context it is worth paying attention to two key entities. One is media, including above all public media and European cities, which in these documents are undervalued. Public media in many countries were recognised as an essential instrument of cultural diplomacy. Their public service aids in, *inter alia*, social integration, support of European culture and the culture of their own countries as well as the presentation of pluralistic content (considering both political and cultural pluralism). Public media in many countries are a platform for the presentation of various values and traditions. It is a kind of meeting place for different cultural groups. Many EU and UNESCO documents emphasise the meaning of public media in conducting intercultural dialogue.

As far as cities are concerned, it can be recognised that they have always been culturally diverse as differences in faith, language, customs, and traditions have been a permanent element of public space in cities. To this day, metropolitan areas create transcultural spaces which are platforms for intercultural dialogue (even when this does not occur at the national level). In urban policy, enormous weight has been attached to the importance of managing cultural diversity. Examples include specially created institutions, organisations, councils, and strategies created to facilitate intercultural dialogue. Doubtless, the European Capital of Culture programme is a great opportunity to bring Europeans together to get to know each other and engage in intercultural dialogue. It is an important element in the search for a new identity for a united Europe and at the same time is in line with the idea of urban diplomacy, one of the dimensions of which is culture.

CONCLUSION

In order to carry out its functions, the EU now needs culture both as an effective political tool which strengthens its reserves of soft power, and as a value necessary for the process of integration. It can also be noted that over the last few decades, the general global cultural landscape has undergone radical changes. The need for exchange and intercultural cooperation has grown together with the cyber revolution. In a world confronting many challenges and conflicts, culture has great potential for overcoming

⁴⁵ https://europa.eu/youth/EU/volunteering/european-voluntary-service_en

⁴⁶ http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/node_en

divisions, strengthening fragile societies, and improving international relations. Europe is perceived as a continent with a rich cultural heritage and dynamic creativity. Culture then is an integral element of the EU's external activities. Doubtless the EU itself is also an actor with a great internal need for intercultural dialogue and the negotiation of common identities.

Multiculturalism should be treated as a politically normative concept which outlines a manner of coexistence for different cultures that exist side by side⁴⁷ and cannot be passed over in describing issues of cultural diplomacy. It is the appropriate state, varied in scale and manifestations, of most modern societies. Rafał Riedel counts increased processes of mutual cultural diffusion and a kind of inspiration as positive consequences of multiculturalism along with the economic benefits that accrue from the arrival of immigrants. Negative consequences on the other hand include persecution, antagonism, conflicts as well as problems with identity. The EU is not handling these last problems well although one of its goals is to support and maintain cultural diversity. This goal was formally expressed for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. As can be seen from the considerations above, the EU attaches a great deal of weight to these issues, at least in documents, while its activities in this sphere remain mostly declarative in nature. It should also be noted that EU initiatives should assure "added value" and must reflect the cultural diversity of Europe. At the same time Member States should be completely engaged in the process of elaborating appropriate cultural policies and strategies which support the cultural diplomacy of the EU. It should be admitted that the potential of cultural diplomacy is not completely utilised and if, in the future, the EU is to fully implement the idea of multiculturalism, it should focus on two essential issues. Firstly, it should clearly define the means which cultural diplomacy will make use of as well as indicate the strategies or solutions that will serve in this area. Secondly, it should define the specific stakeholders in these activities which would allow them to be conducted effectively. This primarily concerns building cultural cooperation with countries from outside the EU on the basis of a network, strengthening understanding between nations through dialogue, the dissemination of information on the EU and its heritage and the exchange of cultural goods and connecting culture with development.

Responding then to the question contained in the introduction, it is necessary to recognise the lack of evolution of programmes of cultural diplomacy that would consider the current problems with which the EU is struggling. Perhaps it is a good time to look for a new model of cultural diplomacy. The experience, knowledge and practices elaborated so far in this process should be utilised in contacts with other regions, especially ones that are close geographically and with a common history of cultural exchange. There is no doubt that changing political circumstances influence EU actions. In conditions of peace and stability of the international system it is possible to carry them out with the help of, inter alia, the diffusion of European cultural norms or

⁴⁷ R. Riedel, *Europejski demos etniczny i obywatelski*, in: R. Riedel (ed.) *Horyzonty tożsamości europejskich*, Opole 2007, p. 76.

the promotion of its principles and values in the international environment. In time of crisis, however, the EU is unable to act effectively. This is affected, by the nature of foreign policy carried out by the EU or the divergent interests of Member States which also results in a lack of a coherent strategy of public diplomacy. This can be seen, for example, in the migration crisis. Migration represents an enormous challenge, yet also in recent years a social, political, and economic problem for Europeans and the EU. The UN compares current migration to that of the Second World War.

Countries in the EU and the EU itself should understand that concentrating on building potential in culture and intercultural dialogue does not mean withdrawal from defending EU interests abroad but rather creating better, more permanent conditions for their realisation in cooperation with countries of interest.

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Keywords: European Union, cultural diplomacy, interculturalism, intercultural dialogue, diversity.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to explore questions on the nature of cultural diplomacy, the tools and instruments it uses, and to determine whether the European Union (EU) has a cultural diplomacy strategy and what role issues of cross-cultural communication serve within it. Cultural diplomacy is defined by Milton C. Cummings as “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”. Here it is assumed that the cultural diplomacy of the EU is an important element shaping relations between the EU and the rest of the world so it serves a role in both creating the image of the EU and in achieving its political goals. The research hypothesis is that cultural diplomacy is an instrument for the reconstruction of the European Community and may play a role in creating a bridge that connects the EU with the world. The research methods used in this article consisted primarily in the collection and observation of data, which was based on an analysis of sources. These include EU documents, such as declarations, communications, reports, or parliamentary debates. Other useful sources were expert opinions, reports of institutions and of companies which have carried out communication activities on behalf of the European Commission and the Committee of Regions.

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FROM SOFT POWER TO SMART POWER FRANCO-GERMAN VISIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY INTEGRATION AND THEIR CRITICISM

“That is the direction in which we are already heading, even if many Europeans are not yet aware of that fact.”¹

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The activity of the European Union in the international arena, and its role in the system of global security, have to date been analysed primarily in the category of soft power. However, new threats to international security, along with the crisis of the integration project, have become key motivations for equipping the organisation with military means of exerting political influence. In this article we consider to what extent the new initiatives of the EU and its member states in the area of military integration (PESCO, the European Intervention Initiative, a “real European army”²) give the organisation the status of a “smart power” actor, and in what direction the previously stagnated Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is now developing.³ An analysis is made of French and German proposals aimed at the gradual communitarisation of defence policy and the creation of a European Defence Union, equipped with autonomous armed forces. The European Commission has signalled its support for these initiatives in official documents and in speeches by its President.

¹ European Commission, *The ‘Europe Speech’ given by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation*, Berlin, 9 November 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3654

² Words used by Emmanuel Macron in an interview for *Europe 1* in November 2018, and subsequently by Angela Merkel in a speech to the European Parliament on 13 November 2018.

³ For more see R. Zięba, *Próby ożywienia polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony Unii Europejskiej*, *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe*, no. 1/2017.

THE EU'S SOFT POWER

The EU has frequently been described in political discourse as a “soft power” actor in international relations. This is a concept popularised by the American political scientist Joseph Nye, who has researched the perception of power in international relations. In his theory, the exercise of soft power means subtly making others want the same things as you do, through uncoerced choice.⁴ In the case of the EU, soft power may thus be interpreted as non-military means of exerting influence on other actors in international relations, for the purpose of achieving desired results, but without the use of coercion. Examples of the EU's soft power resources include humanitarian and development aid and support for democratic transformations, often on the principle “more for more”.⁵

It should be noted that the term *power* itself may be variously defined, in view of the chaos which reigns among terminology used to conceptualise the factors defining the potential of actors in international relations. The assertions in this article are based on the assumption that power is defined as the strength and capacity that constitute the EU's potential to exert influence on other actors in international politics. In consequence, soft power and hard power refer here to the EU's soft and hard “strength”, which in fact accords with how the terminology is generally used in discussing such issues. The dichotomic parameterisation of power concerns in this context the scope of influence on other actors and the means used to exert it. In analysing the actions of the EU in the categories of “soft” and “hard” means of exerting political influence, one is obliged to consider the tools used by the organisation in pursuing the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In both cases the result is to be the achievement of a desired goal, but the means used to produce this result are different.⁶

Because the organisation, while making use of the military resources of its member states, lacks military potential of its own, and its actions in the international arena are based principally on dialogue and cooperation, it has frequently been described in the subject literature as a “civil power”,⁷ a “normative

⁴ J. S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York 2004 (Polish edition: *Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*, Warsaw 2007, pp. 5–7).

⁵ The “more for more” principle operates in the EU primarily in relation to the European Neighbourhood Policy, and means that EU financial support increases when the beneficiary states take stronger action to introduce democratic reforms. See European Commission, *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: EU support for sustainable change in transition societies*, SWD(2012)282 final, p. 14.

⁶ D. Miłoszewska, Europejska soft power w kontekście rozważań Josepha Nye'a, *Repozytorium UAM*, Poznań 2009, <https://repozytorium.amu.edu.pl/bitstream/10593/959/1/Europejska%20soft%20power.pdf> (accessed 15 December 2018), pp. 1–14; D. Milczarek, Status Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych, *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, no. 3–4, vol. 24, 2001, pp. 11–13.

⁷ J. Pliszka, *Doktryna soft power w działaniach zagranicznych Unii Europejskiej – próba bilansu*, http://robertgrzeszczak.bio.wpia.uw.edu.pl/files/2012/10/J.Pliszka_artykul_Doktryna-soft-power-w-dzia%C5%82aniach-zagranicznych-Unii-Europejskiej.pdf (accessed 11 December 2018).

power”,⁸ or explicitly a “soft power actor”,⁹ exerting its influence on the international community through “soft” capabilities.¹⁰ These include, above all, the attractiveness of its culture and its socioeconomic model, the building of a network of links through dialogue and cooperation, the strengthening of peaceful coexistence through the promotion and supranational diffusion of the principles and institutions of international law, diplomatic effectiveness, and human capital itself.¹¹ These are indicators that can be used to define soft power potential, but they may be variously interpreted depending on which segment of social reality is being analysed and in what context. The multifaceted external activity of the EU, and the proposals of member states relating to developing its military capabilities, being a consequence of new international circumstances, call into question the EU’s position as a soft power actor and create a new vision for its political significance in the international arena.

THE EU’S HARD POWER

By contrast, the EU has never been defined in political discourse as a hard power actor in international relations, since as we have said, it does not have its own army and does not apply military means of coercion, and in the light of Nye’s theory, it is military potential that underpins hard power. Nor is the EU based on a *casus foederis* as with a traditionally understood political-military alliance. Thus, in terms of its role and position in the system of cooperative security, it has been described by Roman Kuźniar as a “security community”, with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implemented since 1999.¹² The latter is an integral part of the CFSP, whose legal basis is laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon. The treaty provisions address not only its present state, but also a framework for its possible evolution. Under Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union, defence policy may be communitarised, but with the consent of all member states. Paragraph 6 of the same article states: “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view

⁸ B. Piskorska, *Wpływ procesów antydemokratycznych w państwach Partnerstwa Wschodniego na Europejską Politykę Sąsiedztwa*, Warsaw 2014, pp. 21–22.

⁹ D. Miłoszewska, op. cit., pp. 2–8.

¹⁰ J. S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means...*, p. 12.

¹¹ B. Piskorska, *Soft power jako efekt dyfuzji siły we współczesnym świecie międzynarodowym*, [in:] *NATO wobec wyzwań współczesnego świata*, R. Czulda et al. (eds.), Warsaw–Łódź 2013, pp. 363–378; D. Miłoszewska, op. cit., pp. 2–14.

¹² For more on the system of cooperative security see R. Kuźniar, *Bezpieczeństwo w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza, struktura, dynamika*, E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar (eds.), Warsaw 2006, p. 155.

to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.”¹³

European policy in the area of security has undergone a long process of evolution. In 1950 the Pleven Plan was put forward, providing for the creation of a European army composed of international units, subordinate to a minister of defence, who would be appointed at supranational level. This was the first initiative of a French government towards creating European military structures. The idea of a European army is thus by no means a novelty; however, the institutionalisation of defence policy was not a priority for an organisation representing “soft power” on the international stage. Moreover, member states took different positions with regard to military integration, particularly because it was NATO that remained the foundation for common defence, and the introduction of such structures at EU level might lead to duplication, as well as undermining trans-Atlantic solidarity in the sphere of mutual defence. This view of the matter was maintained by the United Kingdom in particular. As a result, institutionalisation in the area of defence began only in 1999, with the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), aimed at strengthening the EU’s capacity to engage in autonomous operational activity and to manage crisis situations.¹⁴ However, this was not an initiative oriented towards the creation of a real defence policy, but a reaction to the EU’s ineffectiveness during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and the associated need to work out foundations for civilian and military response beyond the territory of member states.¹⁵

Progress in the evolution of the CSDP came in 2003, with the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS), and the announcement of the formation of European Battlegroups (operational and tactical groups) consisting of approximately 1500 troops. The creation of such a structure might be seen as a distinct step forward in providing the EU with “hard” military capacity; however, the units have yet to be used, in view of the lack of political approval from member states, in addition to financial and logistical constraints.¹⁶

In analysing issues of military integration, it should be underlined that crisis response operations under the CFSP were conducted on an ad hoc basis, organised by a “framework nation”. No common body with the competences of an operations centre was set up.¹⁷ Thus, although the operations conducted by the EU were of a clearly intergovernmental character, a key element of hard power was lacking in the ESDP itself. Only in 2004 was the European Defence Agency established. Its competences

¹³ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Title V: General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, *Official Journal of the European Union* C 326/38, 26 October 2012.

¹⁴ N. Bobryk-Deryło, *Uwarunkowania Ewolucji Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej*, Warsaw 2012, pp. 41–87.

¹⁵ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁶ For more on the Battlegroups see A. Ciupiński, *Zdolności wojskowe Unii Europejskiej. Perspektywy grup bojowych*, *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, no. 8, Warsaw 2014.

¹⁷ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

included, primarily, acting to improve the competitiveness of the EU armaments industry, and setting up multinational security programmes.

The development of the CSDP was held up as a result of the financial crisis, which placed burdens on the EU budget and on the financial capabilities of the main net contributors. A result of this was the taking of decisions by individual member states to reduce expenditure for military purposes. Crisis management operations were also scaled back, since – in accordance with the Athena financing mechanism – the costs of deploying troops and experts are borne by the country sending them.¹⁸ Moreover, because of the financial crisis and its consequences, some member states began to pursue a policy of rationalisation of defence expenditure, one element of which was a reduction in troop numbers. For example, France in 2008 announced that it would reduce its number of service personnel by 74,000, and the United Kingdom in 2010 adopted a programme of modernisation of its armed forces whereby the number of troops would be reduced from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2017. Also in 2010, Germany initiated a programme by which the size of the *Bundeswehr* would be reduced to 185,000 personnel (from an initial number of 250,000), together with a reduction in the number of tanks. An end to the process of budget cuts in the German army was announced only in 2015, in an official speech by then defence minister Ursula von der Leyen, the reason being the crisis in Ukraine, which confirmed the reality of the threat from the Russian Federation. These circumstances did not favour the development of the CSDP, and made it necessary to work out, at EU level also, a new approach to the issue of the development of military capabilities. In a conclusions document dated 9 December 2010, the Council of the European Union proposed a pooling and sharing strategy as a solution to the problem of contracting defence budgets. The aim was to increase the military effectiveness of the available resources through their mutual utilisation, while enabling constraints on spending.¹⁹

TOWARDS SMART POWER

Although the EU cannot be analysed as a hard power actor, its international role should not be limited purely to the soft power category. An argument for this is that in its foreign policy the EU exacts specific behaviours from other international actors using what are classed as hard power instruments. Primary among these are economic sanctions, as well as military and civilian missions, carried out under the CSDP. Facing the challenges of the refugee crisis and growing terrorist threats, the EU is also strengthening control of its external borders by deploying new large-scale systems,

¹⁸ For the legal basis for the functioning of the mechanism see: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 of 27 March 2015 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena) and repealing Decision 2011/871/CFSP, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015D0528>

¹⁹ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–39.

such as the Entry/Exit system and ETIAS. These have the goals of improving security in the Schengen area, combating unregulated migration, and detecting offences involving foreigners overstaying in the Schengen area or the multiplication of identities. This shows the scale of the EU authorities' determination to tighten up regulations in order to strengthen security and avoid crisis situations. Moreover, the member states, in their proposals for further integration, are increasingly aiming for the development of joint military capabilities, including integration of the defence sector and the establishment of European armed forces.

The new dimension of the EU's political potential is associated with an increased blurring of the dichotomy of power in the context of the definition of its resources. New challenges, such as the conflict in the Middle East and the consequent refugee crisis, Brexit, Russian imperialism, and the resurgence of right-wing populist trends in European countries, give rise to a need to combine "soft" and "hard" means of exerting political influence and to use them effectively in particular crisis situations (the conflict in Ukraine, or the migrant crisis). The combination of these two types of influence in the international arena is realised in the concept of *smart power*, which can be taken to mean "intelligent" capabilities to conduct foreign policy in a prudent manner.²⁰ This entails the use of the resources of power in a way that maximises their usefulness.²¹ For this concept to be put into practice effectively, an international actor must possess the necessary resources. These include in particular: the attractiveness of its culture and languages throughout the world; diplomatic and mediation effectiveness; humanitarian and development aid; conflict avoidance capabilities; attractiveness of its political system and legal culture; the development of education; and economic and military potential.²² It is essential, however, to maintain suitable proportions between persuasive and coercive capabilities in specific situations.

The EU is seeking to strengthen its influence through realisation of the concept of smart power, because current international circumstances have placed the European integration project and the Community's security in danger. To achieve this, the EU must also develop "hard" capabilities of exerting political influence, above all its military potential, which might strengthen the block's position on the international stage, and remove Europe's dependence on American guarantees within the NATO alliance. The main difficulty in implementing the concept of smart power would appear to be the decision process: the main decision-making institution is the Council of the European Union, an intergovernmental body where the differing positions of member states clash.

The formation of united armed forces under the EU aegis may prevent the crisis of European Union integration from deepening, or it may further exacerbate divisions

²⁰ S. Niedźwiecki, Unia Europejska w świecie: soft power, hard power, czy może smart power?, *Przegląd Europejski*, no. 3 (45) 2017, pp. 88–91.

²¹ J. Sadłocha, Pomiędzy miękką a twardą siłą: smart power, *Teoria Polityki, Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne*, 13, Wrocław 2012, pp. 37–44.

²² S. Niedźwiecki, op. cit., pp. 88–91.

within the block. Moreover, balancing the soft and hard instruments may prove impossible, because of the strongly rooted idea of cooperation and dialogue on which the organisation's external activity has been based. The treaty provisions themselves do not require a balancing of these two dimensions, but ascribe key importance to the instruments of soft power. It is thus important to indicate to what degree the EU may come to be perceived, by member states and internationally, as a smart power actor, and what action it is taking to achieve such power.

NEW VISIONS OF MILITARY INTEGRATION

Analysing the evolution of European security and defence policy, we see that the joint army project is not a new initiative, although the actions taken so far, including the institutionalisation of the CSDP, have not led in reality to the creation of a European Union army. It cannot be definitively stated that the EU has ever been perceived by member states as exclusively a soft power actor, but there is still no unanimous political acceptance for the proposed communitarisation of defence policy and the establishment of joint armed forces.

There have been several motivating factors for the new security and defence initiatives in the EU, including the refugee crisis of 2015, the initiation by the United Kingdom (to date an opponent of the creation of a joint army) of the procedure to leave the EU, and the victory in the United States presidential election of Donald Trump, who has frequently questioned the grounds for an American presence in Europe and accused NATO allies of failing to meet their obligations in contributing to the defence sector.

In spite of the real needs to strengthen the EU's defence structures, since the introduction of the CSDP member states have set out their own positions with regard to the form it should take. They have also adopted different attitudes to military integration, as a result of which the operation of the common security policy has sometimes lacked coherence, leading to internal tensions and divisions. A new stage in the evolution of EU defence policy was marked by the speeches of Jean-Claude Juncker and the actions of some European Union governments which see the departure of the United Kingdom from EU structures as a new opportunity for military integration and the expansion of defence capabilities, even up to the formation of a European Union army.

The vision of military integration is being created by two leading member states who currently have the greatest responsibility for overcoming the integration crisis. Following the Brexit referendum, France and Germany had to determine the areas of cooperation in which progress might be made with integration, neutralising the adverse effects of the crisis of European unification. The exit of the chief opponent of EU-wide armed forces from the organisation's structures created real opportunities for the development of common initiatives for security and defence, enabling the EU to strengthen its image as a smart power. These initiatives concerned above all the implementation of a mechanism for permanent structured cooperation (PESCO:

Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence), the establishment of a European Defence Fund (to finance multilateral research and military projects), and the introduction of a defence review procedure (to enable member states to coordinate planning of the development of their military potential and capabilities).²³

Before analysing the joint initiatives of France and Germany in the matter of EU military integration, we shall consider their individual visions for the expansion of defence structures at EU level, as presented in official government documents. These are France's "Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017", a complementary document to the 2013 Security White Paper; and Germany's "2016 White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr*", which sets out strategic goals in the area of security over a period of 10 years.²⁴

The French Strategic Review is the first comprehensive document setting out the position of President Macron in matters of security, both at national level and in terms of the expansion of cooperation within Europe. According to the document, France's strategic objectives include military engagement in unstable territories for the resolution of security crises.²⁵ It sees Europe, the Middle East and Africa as regions of increased activity and responsibility. This is significant in view of the fact that Germany operates an opposite policy in these regions, refraining from taking part in military interventions or doing so only as a last resort.

An important issue raised in the Strategic Review is the reorientation of the existing model of cooperation in Europe, which was based – according to the provisions of the 2013 White Paper – on integration within the framework of the CSDP. France supports the intensification of European defence efforts, but according to the document, this goal need not be identified with the realisation of military integration in the EU, in spite of official support for the creation of a European Defence Union and integrated armed forces. France's position results from the absence of unanimity within the UE as to a vision for the future scope of the CSDP. The strengthening of European defence is thus to take place primarily within the framework of NATO, through bilateral and multilateral cooperation between European states, and through increased structural cooperation within the EU.²⁶ Such an approach may limit France's engagement in the development of "hard" capabilities for the EU, in favour of more certain and realistic initiatives of narrower cooperation, which do not require unanimity among all member states, and may beneficially support French armed engagement in the aforementioned regions and strengthen the potential that is essential for carrying out such military operations. According to Macron's plans, France is to become the "sec-

²³ J. Gotkowska, Francusko-niemiecki tandem w polityce bezpieczeństwa – interesy i rozbieżności, *Analizy OSW*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-10-04/francusko-niemiecki-tandem-w-polityce-bezpieczenstwa-interesy-i> (accessed 12 December 2018).

²⁴ Ministry of Armed Forces of France, *Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017*, pp. 16–82; Das Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Weissbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Berlin, July 2016, pp. 21–132.

²⁵ *Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017*, pp. 20–26.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 56–61.

ond army of the free world”, capable of conducting operations independently within a NATO framework, with a strength of 10,000 troops.²⁷

The “White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the *Bundeswehr*” also refers to matters related to EU military integration. Its declarations concern above all the creation of a European Security and Defence Union as a joint initiative of Germany and France, as well as the establishment of a European military headquarters and the building of a European field hospital. According to the White Paper, a more reliable form of cooperation between states seeing a need for profounder military integration is the permanent structured defence cooperation provided for in the Lisbon Treaty (TEU Article 42). It is pointed out that this does not conflict with NATO obligations: on the contrary, it reinforces that pillar of European security.²⁸ Reference is also made to the possibility of volunteers from other EU countries serving in the German army, and of Franco-German cooperation being expanded to include countries that traditionally work in conjunction with Germany in military matters, such as the Netherlands. The document provides for the modernisation of the German armed forces through the provision of advanced equipment, and thus expresses support for research projects being carried out within Europe-wide arms consortia (the Airbus Group, MEADS, the European Defence Agency).²⁹

Official statements by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron indicate that they agree on the need for further integration, including in the area of defence and with regard to the establishment of European formations with autonomy from NATO. This was the position presented by the German chancellor to the European Parliament during an open debate on the future of the Union, held in Strasbourg in November 2018. Merkel spoke of the need to begin joint work on the creation of a “true European army”. Her stance was backed by President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani, who said with regard to the Defence Union that work should begin on establishing EU military structures which would be complementary to NATO’s capabilities, although achievement of these aims would require time and concerted effort by all member states.³⁰

²⁷ Ł. Jurczyszyn, M. Terlikowski, Przyszłość polityki obronnej Francji, *Biuletyn PISM*, no. 20 (1593).

²⁸ *Weissbuch 2016*, pp. 70–83; K. Szubart, Biała Księga 2016 – niemiecka odpowiedź na obecne wyzwania w zakresie bezpieczeństwa, *Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego*, No. 266/2016, <https://www.iz.poznan.pl/plik.pobierz,1630,268e82ddee5f0cfae9a9a6f82772df5/266BialaKsiegaNiemcy.pdf?pplik.pobierz,1630,268e82ddee5f0cfae9a9a6f82772df5/266BialaKsiegaNiemcy.pdf> (accessed 13 December 2018).

²⁹ *Weissbuch 2016*, pp. 70–83, 87–132; B. Koszel, „Kultura wstrzemięźliwości” czy aktywne współdziałanie? Dylematy polityki bezpieczeństwa Niemiec w XXI wieku, *Bezpieczeństwo, Teoria i praktyka*, no. 1, 2017, pp. 33–34.

³⁰ Debate on the Future of Europe: opening statement by Angela Merkel, German Federal Chancellor; https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/debate-on-the-future-of-europe-opening-statement-by-angela-merkel-german-federal-chancellor-_I162933-V_rv (accessed 17 December 2018); Presspoint by A. Tajani, President European Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/other-events/video?event=20181113-1730-SPECIAL> (accessed 17 December 2018).

In turn, German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen spoke frequently of the need to establish a Defence Union, as a kind of “defence Schengen” including Europe-wide air defence. It should be noted, however, that the German government’s proposal for deeper military integration would first require an improvement in Germany’s own military potential, particularly the state of its armaments, which has often been criticised. Despite this, it is Germany that is the main driver of greater structural cooperation in the area of defence.

France under Macron points to a still greater need for reform of the EU and deepening of European integration, including military integration. In spite of the stated position that operational capabilities should be expanded within the NATO framework, the concept of joint armed forces is one of the key issues raised by the French president in relation to European policy. Macron expresses clear support for German proposals in this matter, and has said that the EU is not in a position to defend itself against the Russian threat without a true European Union army.³¹ In the French president’s concept of European policy, there are also proposals for developing military capabilities with autonomy from NATO, providing for joint response forces and a common EU military doctrine, as well as the provision of a joint defence budget at EU level.³² Such proposals for the further development of the EU were referred to by Macron in a speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017.

Germany and France, known in political circles as the “pro-European tandem”, are expanding practical cooperation in the area of European security, undertaking joint initiatives towards military integration. An example is the joint notification of 23 EU states, dated 13 November 2017, establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism (PESCO).³³ The purpose of this mechanism was to improve member states’ effectiveness in protecting security and strengthening defence capabilities, bringing progress in further integration. This strengthened cooperation involves 25 EU member states which have expressed support for developing defence potential and have the necessary capabilities to conduct joint EU military operations.³⁴ PESCO

³¹ *EXCLUSIF – “Fracture” de l’Europe: “Non, je n’exagère en rien”, affirme Emmanuel Macron*, <https://www.europe1.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron-sur-la-montee-des-nationalismes-en-europe-je-nexagere-en-rien-je-suis-lucide-3794444> (accessed 19 December 2018); *France’s Macron pushes for ‘true European army’*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46108633> (accessed 19 December 2018).

³² J. Gotkowska, *Francusko-niemiecki tandem w polityce bezpieczeństwa – interesy i rozbieżności*, *Analizy OSW*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-10-04/francusko-niemiecki-tandem-w-polityce-bezpieczenstwa-interesy-i> (accessed 12 December 2018).

³³ *Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf> (accessed 13 December 2018); Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States, *Official Journal of the European Union* L 331/57.

³⁴ The participating member states are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.

is intended to increase protection for EU citizens and to maximise the effectiveness of defence spending. A particular feature of this form of cooperation is the binding nature of the undertakings made, although participation is voluntary.

The decision of the Council of the European Union establishing PESCO was adopted on 11 December 2017, and all participating countries approved a declaration concerning the first joint projects, which included, among other things, the establishment of the European Medical Command (EMC) and a European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC), both coordinated by Germany, as well as groups for rapid response and mutual assistance in cybersecurity. On 6 March 2018 the Council confirmed the implementation of 17 projects and adopted recommendations for participating countries. At present, France is the coordinator of seven, and Germany of six, of the 34 projects being carried out under the PESCO framework.³⁵ The mechanism is closely linked to the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), which are mutually complementary and serve to strengthen the defence capabilities of participating states. The Review is conducted by the European Defence Agency through the systematic monitoring of national defence and budget plans for expenditure in the defence sector, and has the aim of identifying possibilities for new joint initiatives. In turn, the EDF serves as financial back-up for member states, supporting cooperation in the area of defence, from preliminary research up to the stage of actual development of capabilities.³⁶

Another joint initiative of these countries related to the development of the EU's "hard" capabilities was the project to establish a military training centre, also known as Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), based in Brussels. The Council took a decision on the establishment of a planning unit in June 2018, although already in March 2017, in its conclusions concerning progress in the implementation of the Global Strategy for security and defence, it had approved a concept document concerning the conduct of missions under the CSDP and operational planning capabilities.³⁷ The new structure would be created to command EU military missions, without an executive mandate. According to these plans, the MPCC would have competences in the mobilisation, formation, oversight and maintenance of EU forces, thus providing support for mission personnel in the field. The new structure is intended to reinforce EU crisis management procedures, and to operate under the command and oversight of the Political and Security Committee in Brussels (consisting of ambassadors of EU member states).³⁸ The EU's High Represent-

³⁵ PESCO official website, <https://pesco.europa.eu/> (accessed 13 December 2018).

³⁶ *Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO Deepening Defence Cooperation among EU Member States*, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_factsheet_pesco_permanent_structured_cooperation_en_0.pdf (accessed 18 December 2018).

³⁷ Council conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, 9178/17, 18 May 2017, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9178-2017-INIT/en/pdf>

³⁸ Council of the EU, *EU defence cooperation: Council establishes a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)*, Press Release 338/17, 8 June 2017.

ative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, said in response to the creation of the new structure that it is “not the European army – I know there is this label going around – but it’s a more effective way of handling our military work.”³⁹

In June 2018, France and Germany, together with seven other EU member states, signed a letter of intent establishing another form of cooperation, the European Intervention Initiative (EI2).⁴⁰ According to the proposal of the French and German governments, EI2 is to serve as a form of cooperation, but outside the structures of the EU. The aim is for an “intervention coalition” to take effective action in responding to crises close to the borders of the EU, without the involvement of NATO or American troops.⁴¹ EI2 is supposed to improve capabilities for the undertaking of joint initiatives of the participating countries in various military intervention scenarios, covering a whole spectrum of potential crises impacting Europe’s security. It is also to serve as a forum for the development of a common strategic culture, and to strengthen Europe’s credibility and strategic autonomy. Cooperation is planned to take place in four areas: strategic capabilities, deployment scenarios, doctrine and experience, and operational support.⁴²

In a joint declaration following a meeting in Meseberg on 18 June 2018, France and Germany agreed that the EI2 project should be closely linked to a mechanism for permanent structured cooperation, and that it was necessary to prepare an integrated military and civilian concept for crisis response at EU level. In the declaration, the countries proposed the continuation of joint efforts to develop the capacity for integrated action under the CFSP, including in particular cooperation on the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). The last point in the section on European security policy concerned to need “to progress towards a better integrated European defence, incorporating all civil and military aspects and means of crisis management and response of the EU.”⁴³

³⁹ Quoted after J. Kanter, *E.U. Moves to Create Military Training Headquarters*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/eu-military-headquarters.html> (accessed 15 December 2018); M. Lasoń, *Perspektywy utworzenia wspólnej armii europejskiej a kryzys funkcjonowania Unii Europejskiej w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku*, *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe*, no. 1/2017, pp. 71–72.

⁴⁰ *Letter of Intent between the Defence Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom concerning the development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)*.

⁴¹ Federal Ministry of Defence, *Letter of Intent concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2)*, www.bmvg.de (accessed 14 December 2018).

⁴² Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, *European intervention initiative*, <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/1-iei/1-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention> (accessed 15 December 2018).

⁴³ *Meseberg Declaration. Renewing Europe’s promises of security and prosperity*, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/events/article/europe-franco-german-declaration-19-06-18> (accessed 16 December 2018).

THE COMMISSION'S STANDPOINT AND MAIN AREAS OF CRITICISM

The choice of the European Commission as the institution representing the EU's position on the future shape of military integration and the development of "hard" capabilities was made with regard to that body's supranational character. The Commission has decision-making competences, being the only community institution empowered to present legislative proposals for new instruments of EU law. Moreover, it is the politically independent executive body of the EU, and commissioners are expected to act collegially to protect the interests of the whole Community.

The European Commission has presented a definitive position in the matter of common defence, expressing support for the establishment of the EU's own armed forces. This viewpoint is evidenced in Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's speeches and official statements, and in the Commission's 2017 report. Also significant is the European Security Strategy put forward by the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, Federica Mogherini, which indicates directions of development for European security policy.

A new impulse towards military integration resulted from the Brexit referendum, but even before that the European Commission had indicated the need for deeper cooperation on defence, in view of a number of challenges and threats to the EU's internal security. For example, in a 2015 article in the German newspaper *Welt am Sonntag*, Juncker appealed to member states for more decisive action in creating a joint army at EU level. He believed that such action could ensure the security of the EU in the face of new challenges, and enable it to react effectively to situations that threatened peace on its territory and in neighbouring countries.⁴⁴ He gave a similar message during a ceremony held by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin in 2016, when he stated that EU member states should re-address the issue of a European defensive alliance and the building of the structures of a European army.⁴⁵

Juncker's proposed initiative was presented following the publication of a report titled *More Union in European Defence*, prepared by a group of experts chaired by Javier Solana, the former EU Representative for Foreign Policy and Security. The document set out principal directions of development of defence capabilities and military integration, which were expected to result in the creation of a European Defence Union, being the foundation for both civilian and military security architecture, complementary to defence within the NATO framework. The provision of hard power resources to the EU would enable more effective intervention operations outside its borders. The expert group, in the published results of research, also recommended the establishment of a military headquarters in Brussels.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ R. Zięba, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴⁵ European Commission, *The 'Europe Speech' given by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3654

⁴⁶ Centre for European Policy Studies, *More Union in European Defence*, Task Force Report, Brussels 2015.

Although the Commission President's State of the Union addresses do not point unambiguously to a need to create communitarised armed structures, they indicate that stronger cooperation on joint defence is important for strengthening the EU's hard power resources. In the 2016 address, basic goals of security policy were defined, and a definitive vision of the Union as a smart power actor in the international arena was set out:

Still, even though Europe is proud to be a soft power of global importance, we must not be naïve. Soft power is not enough in our increasingly dangerous neighbourhood. [...] Europe needs to toughen up. Nowhere is this truer than in our defence policy. Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military might of others or let France alone defend its honour in Mali.⁴⁷

Juncker went on to say that action in the field of security would be efficient and effective only if military integration were deepened and the defence capabilities of member states were combined. In turn, in the 2017 address, when such initiatives as the European Defence Fund and permanent structured cooperation were already in place, the Commission President indicated the need for greater institutionalisation of these joint actions: "By 2025 we need a fully-fledged European Defence Union. We need it. And NATO wants it."⁴⁸

An important document which to some extent replaced the 2003 European Security Strategy is the *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, published in 2016. This document defines the most important challenges and threats, as well as the goals and directions of actions under the CFSP. According to the Global Strategy, for the EU to be in a position to react to external crises and to guarantee the security of its citizens, it is necessary to provide it with a whole spectrum of defence capabilities. It is emphasised that member states retain sovereignty in decision-making concerning defence, but for the Union to acquire and maintain "hard" capabilities, there is a need for deeper and determined cooperation in creating a strong European defence sector. The document also contains indications towards the implementation of strengthened structural cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential.⁴⁹

In the matter of relations between the EU and NATO, the most important goals concern a deepening of cooperation with respect for the principles of institutional competence, complementarity, and the decision-making autonomy of both structures. The EU is not to be perceived only as a soft power actor on the international stage, as is indicated by a section on the strengthening of the EU's image as a security com-

⁴⁷ J.-C. Juncker, European Commission, *State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe – a Europe that protects, empowers and defends*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_16_3043

⁴⁸ J.-C. Juncker, European Commission, *President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address 2017*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_17_3165

⁴⁹ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf, p. 11.

munity. The organisation should function independently in the area of security and defence, and this goal is to be served by efforts on the part of member states to ensure the interoperability and efficiency of defence cooperation.⁵⁰

The Commission's 2017 *White Paper on the Future of Europe* set out five possible scenarios for the development of European integration up to 2025. These also contained different proposals for the development of military integration and the formation of joint military structures. In the first part of the document it was stated that "NATO will continue to provide hard security for most EU countries, but Europe cannot be naïve and has to take care of its own security. Being a 'soft power' is no longer powerful enough when force can prevail over rules."⁵¹ The first of the scenarios assumed the continuation of a joint programme of actions towards integration. It was foreseen that by 2025 cooperation in the field of defence would be tightened in relation to scientific research, industry and joint orders. In turn, member states would pool certain military capabilities, and would also enhance financial solidarity for EU missions abroad.⁵² The second scenario, titled "Nothing but the single market", assumes the lack of a general determination for joint actions in security and defence in the future.⁵³ The third scenario assumes increased cooperation in these areas, but concentrated on a "coalition of the willing" whose military and financial capabilities and potential would be such as to enable such cooperation.⁵⁴ The fourth scenario focuses on the deepening of integration only in priority areas, which include defence and security.⁵⁵ The final scenario foresees the strengthening of cooperation in all policy areas.⁵⁶

Another document related to development of the EU's hard capabilities is the Commission's *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence* dated 7 June 2017, which sets out three possible development paths for defence policy and the establishment of armed forces. Military integration is described under a cautious scenario, oriented towards action at national level with limited EU involvement, and under a more decisive initiative to create a common defence policy with its own army. The first scenario, titled "Security and defence cooperation", provides for the coordination of military action at national level. The European Defence Fund would ensure the creation of new joint capabilities and resources, but member states would still be responsible for overseeing their development. The second scenario for the development of European defence includes a division of tasks within the CSDP. To increase defence solidarity, member states might pool selected financial and operational assets. The EU would have a greater influence in areas such as cybersecurity, the fight against terrorism, and border protection. The change of strategic context would come with

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 20.

⁵¹ European Commission, *White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*, COM(2017)2025, 1 March 2017, p. 9.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 16.

⁵³ Ibidem, p. 18.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 20.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 22.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 24.

a strengthening of EU–NATO cooperation and the joint coordination of action in relation to European security. The final concept for the development of the CSDP assumes the gradual shaping of a common EU defence policy, leading in the longer term to the establishment of a common defence system in accordance with TEU Article 42.⁵⁷

The proposals of France and Germany for closer cooperation in all areas are often the subject of criticism from other member states, which see in them a realisation of the concept of a “two-speed Europe”. This leads to a reinforcement of intra-EU divisions through the intensification of cooperation between certain countries that have the necessary potential. At the same time, other countries which lack the capabilities (usually economic) to sign up to joint initiatives and projects remain outside the structures of strengthened cooperation established by the “coalition of the willing”.⁵⁸

Member states have criticised the idea of creating a joint EU army on the grounds that it might limit national sovereignty and duplicate NATO structures. Such a view was expressed most often by the United Kingdom, whose Eurosceptic approach was at odds with the idea of European military integration. Hence the greatest opportunities for the evolution of defence policy have been created by Brexit, which will exclude from the decision-making process the chief opponent of a European army. However, the countries of the “new Union” (including Poland), which joined the block at later stages of its integration, and the “old Union”, represented first and foremost by France and Germany, may have conflicting interests with regard to the deepening of integration.

Strengthened cooperation in security and defence is a topic that has been raised in public debate, particularly since the implementation of such projects as PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative. The main areas of criticism of the establishment of a European army relate to the question of unequal expenditure on defence, the transfer of competences to EU institutions, and the possibility that the new structures will compete with those of NATO. Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki, speaking at a conference devoted to the European perspective on trans-Atlantic relations, held in Hamburg in November 2018, said that a necessary precondition for the creation of joint EU armed forces was an increase in defence expenditure, since countries such as France and Germany do not currently meet the NATO alliance commitment to spend 2% of GDP for that purpose.⁵⁹ Other reservations concern the possible limitation of national sovereignty in the area of security and defence through its communitarianisation in accordance with TEU Article 42.

⁵⁷ European Commission, *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence*, COM(2017)315, 7 June 2017; European Commission, *A Europe that defends: Commission opens debate on moving towards a security and defence union*, press release, Brussels, 7 June 2017.

⁵⁸ A term defined in the 2017 White Paper and used to denote a group of countries participating in initiatives of strengthened cooperation. See *White Paper*, op. cit., p. 20.

⁵⁹ *By zbudować wspólną armię, kraje UE musiałyby znacznie zwiększyć wydatki na obronność*, <https://forsal.pl/artykuly/1352691,morawiecki-by-zbudowac-wspolna-armie-kraje-ue-musialyby-znacznie-zwiekszyc-wydatki-na-obronnosc.html> (accessed 16 December 2018).

The deepening of integration in defined areas is linked to the transfer of competence to supranational level, which may be perceived as a limitation on national independence in the decision-making process. What is primarily at stake here is member states' perception of their position in EU structures. Current divisions within the EU have led to the distinguishing of two models of participation in integration: membership of the most strongly integrated core of the EU, and a model of varied intensity of integration, dependent on national interests defined outside the European context. The first model provides for action oriented towards the deepening of cooperation in all areas and participation in closer structural cooperation, as well as the strengthening of the community dimension in EU policies such as the CSDP. This model corresponds to the positions of France and Germany. The second case provides a possibility of remaining outside the areas of strengthened cooperation until such time as favourable conditions (political, social, economic) come about. Such a model assumes non-participation in the formation of a European army, unless compatibility with NATO's system could be guaranteed, as well as possibilities of allowing permanent opt-out clauses.⁶⁰ This model is supported by, for example, the United Kingdom and Poland. These countries' main argument against a joint army is the possibility that new structures would be created in competition with NATO, without interoperability between them. This might lead to a loss of trust on the part of countries belonging to NATO, which for those countries represents the principal security guarantee.

CONCLUSIONS

The EU is most often defined in political discourse as an actor in international relations of the "soft power" type. However, the challenges and problems that the organisation has faced since 2015 have led to the concept that EU should not be viewed through the lens of exclusively "soft" capabilities of exerting political influence. The EU is striving to achieve the status of a "smart power" actor by developing "hard power" resources which may provide it with appropriate tools to face up to new threats. A watershed moment in the evolution of EU security and defence policy was the establishment of Battlegroups in 2004; however, due to a lack of political will on the part of all member states, as well as financial and logistical constraints, these formations have never been used. In spite of its constant presence in public debate, until 2015 the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remained in a state of stagnation. New threats, related to terrorist attacks, the refugee crisis and the imperial policies of Russia, seemed to make it essential to take more decisive action.

Both the member states forming the most strongly integrated core of the EU, and the leaders of EU institutions, express support for initiatives to deepen military inte-

⁶⁰ J.M. Fiszer, Społeczno-polityczne i ekonomiczne skutki wprowadzenia euro w Polsce, *Mysł Ekonomiczna i Polityczna*, 2010, no. 4, pp. 113–114.

gration with respect to the communitarisation of defence policy, and in the longer term the formation of a European army with the political acceptance of all member states. Franco-German visions of the evolution of security and defence policy incorporate a deepening of military cooperation and the formation of armed units at EU level; however, there are also other determinants of such actions and proposals concerning the scope of institutionalisation.

France, whose main region of strategic engagement remains the Middle East and North Africa, is striving for deeper military integration in Europe, although not necessarily within the framework of the EU. Moreover, such cooperation may be limited to several countries with strong economic and military potential. This approach is reflected in the creation of the European Intervention Initiative and in the analysed objectives defined in official French government documents.

The position of the German government is determined above all by the security interests of EU citizens and the need for greater resilience against crisis situations. Thus, according to that country's vision, actions relating to the deepening of military cooperation ought to take place within the framework of the CSDP. This is evidenced in German diplomatic efforts to include as many member states as possible in cooperation under the PESCO framework. Germany also has a divergent position in relation to military interventions outside the EU's borders, being less willing than France to take part in such operations.

The position of the European Commission is well expressed in a quote from the White Paper of 2017: "Europe cannot be naïve and has to take care of its own security. Being a 'soft power' is no longer powerful enough when force can prevail over rules."⁶¹

The French and German proposals are often criticised for the lack of a clearly defined framework of interoperability between the European army and the military structures of NATO, and for the possible limitation of national sovereignty in the area of defence. In spite of the voices of criticism, the idea of the communitarisation of defence policy and the formation of joint EU armed forces would appear to be significant, above all in the context of overcoming the crisis of the integration project and rebuilding the EU's image on the international stage. The development of "hard" potential is thus a key measure of the EU's success in achieving smart power status.

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Keywords: smart power, Common Security and Defence Policy, Permanent Structured Cooperation, European Intervention Initiative, EU army

⁶¹ *White Paper*, op. cit., p. 9.

ABSTRACT

This article analyses proposals made by France and Germany in the years 2015–2018 with regard to increased military integration in Europe. The European Union, as an organisation based on dialogue and international cooperation, has to date been defined in the political space through the prism of “soft” capabilities to influence the international environment. New threats and security challenges have strengthened the conviction of national and EU authorities that there is a need to increase defence cooperation and to develop a new approach in defining the tools of EU foreign policy.

The aim of the article is to determine to what extent the French and German proposals contribute to turning the EU into a smart power actor, and in what direction the CSDP is developing. The analysis is based on the assumption that both France and Germany, known as the European “tandem”, as well as the European Commission, are taking measures which aim to break with the image of the Union as a soft power actor, through a gradual communitarisation of defence policy and the creation of a European Defence Union, equipped with autonomous armed forces. The consequence of these initiatives is to provide the EU with “hard” (military) capabilities to exert political influence, which are important in the implementation of the smart power concept.

The research is based chiefly on an analysis of official documents published by EU institutions and the French and German governments in the field of security and defence, as well as intergovernmental letters of intent laying foundations for new cooperation initiatives. Comparative analysis was applied to the approaches of the German and French governments to the deepening of military integration.

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The journal is indexed in ERIH PLUS and Index Copernicus International

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Peer-reviewed journal

Reviewing procedure and information for authors available at: www.iz.poznan.pl
The Publisher has implemented procedures to prevent ghostwriting and guest authorship
practices.

The hardcopy paper version is the primary (reference) version.

PUBLISHER: INSTYTUT ZACHODNI
61-854 POZNAŃ, UL. MOSTOWA 27

tel. (061) 852 76 91; fax (061) 852 49 05; e-mail: wydawnictwo@iz.poznan.pl;
www.iz.poznan.pl
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PRINTING: CERDRUK, www.cerdruk.pl

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PL ISSN 0033-2437

